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 DEMOCRACY AS AN ECOSYSTEM 
STEVEN BLOCKMANS 
Immersed in Greek history, and a bit later also in Greek tragedy 
and philosophy, I had to, sooner or later, come across that 
cursed word: politics. Cursed today, since for the ancient 
Greeks, politikon had many positive meanings: public, civic, 
daily, ordinary, sociable, even polite! The spelling of the word 
polite is not a coincidence. 
Donald Tusk 
Athens Democracy Forum, 9 October 2019  
 
1.1 Democracy means more than just holding 
elections 
Elections are the preferred way to freely transfer power from one 
term to the next and from one political party or coalition to another. 
They are an essential element of democracy. But if the process of 
power transfer is corrupted, democracy risks collapse. Reliance on 
voters, civil society organisations and neutral observers to fully 
exercise their freedoms as laid down in international human rights 
conventions is an integral part of holding democratic elections. 
Without free, fair and regular elections, liberal democracy is 
inconceivable. 
Elections are no guarantee that democracy will take root and 
hold, however. If the history of political participation in Europe over 
the past 800 years is anything to go by, successful attempts at gaining 
voice have been patchy, while leaders’ attempts to silence these 
voices and consolidate their own power have been almost constant 
(Blockmans, 2020). 
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Recent developments in certain EU member states have again 
shown us that democratically elected leaders will try and use 
majoritarian rule to curb freedoms, overstep the constitutional limits 
of their powers, protect the interests of their cronies and recycle 
themselves through seemingly free and fair elections. In their recent 
book How Democracies Die, two Harvard professors of politics write: 
“Since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have 
been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected governments 
themselves” (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). 
Figure 1.1 Key elements of a democratic ecosystem 
 
 
 
Source: EPRS, 10 Trends Shaping Democracy in a Volatile World, 31 October 2019, 
adapted from IDEA, the global state of democracy initiative. 
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“Democracy is not just an election, it is our daily life” (Tsai Ing-
wen 1956). It means being involved in between elections, throughout 
the whole political process – from agenda-setting to the definition of 
policies and deciding how they are funded, to making sure that 
money reaches the designated communities. Democracy requires 
fact-based deliberation, must protect and promote the rights of all 
interest groups, in particular minorities, and hold corrupt elements 
to account. 
Democracy is an entire ecosystem defined by the following key 
principles: representative government and impartial administration; 
respect for fundamental rights, including those of minorities, and the 
rule of law; a vibrant parliament with strong opposition; free media; 
and participatory engagement. Each of these elements form an 
integral and crucial part of a functioning democracy. There is thus no 
such thing as an ‘illiberal democracy’; it is a contradiction in terms. 
Unfortunately, democracy is in retreat in many parts of world. 
Reports by Freedom House and others show the decline of 
democratic freedoms for 13 straight years, and the emergence of an 
increasing number of elected authoritarians. In Europe too we are 
witnessing the rise of anti-democratic leaders, including some who 
have consolidated power beyond 
constitutional limits, undermining 
institutions that protect freedoms of 
expression and association and the rule 
of law. Intolerance for due process, 
deliberative rationality and political 
patience poses a crisis for representative 
democracy in Europe (Appadurai, 2017). 
We should therefore ask ourselves how 
we ‘do’ democracy and how we might strengthen it. But first we need 
to understand the underlying causes of democracy fatigue. 
1.2 Understanding what causes democracy fatigue 
Observers have identified at least three challenges to democracy 
across Europe, indeed the world. First, the extension of the internet 
and social media exposes growing inequalities within and between 
countries. Differences in human rights protection and the uneven 
benefits of globalisation are dividing societies into winners and losers 
Intolerance for due process, 
deliberative rationality and 
political patience poses a 
crisis for representative 
democracy in Europe. We 
should therefore ask ourselves 
how we ‘do’ democracy and 
how we might strengthen it. 
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on an unprecedented scale. Global markets are creating billionaires 
who can park their profits in tax havens. At the same time, the 
incomes of the middle and working classes 
have stagnated, their tax burden has 
increased and their livelihoods are more 
vulnerable to technological change 
(Rendueles, 2017). The democratisation of 
access to information is driving migrants to 
seek a freer and more prosperous life, even 
if they face an increasingly hostile welcome 
in several member states. 
Second, governments are looking increasingly powerless in the 
face of global economy imperatives and the international 
commitments they signed up to (Krastev, 2017). Taking the Greek 
crisis as a case in point, this loss of economic sovereignty and the 
ensuing inability of the Greek government led by the (initially 
extreme) left-wing Syriza to overturn the 
EU’s austerity policies, despite the party’s 
popular mandate to do so, created a sense 
of frustration. The management of the 
Eurozone debt crisis has fuelled conspiracy 
theories that democratic government has 
been captured by special interests and 
suspicions that the EU prioritised big banks over the Greek 
population, whose incomes fell by about a third (Varoufakis, 2017). 
Finally, there is a crisis of efficiency that erodes the legitimacy 
of democratic institutions even further. Every political system must 
strike a balance between two fundamental criteria: efficiency, i.e. the 
speed with which institutions can find 
effective solutions to problems, and 
legitimacy, as in the degree to which people 
support the solution (Manin, 1995). Most 
parliaments seem to take months over 
long-term strategic decisions, from investment in emerging 
technologies to choosing the right energy mix to combat climate 
change. Many member state governments appear powerless in the 
face of acute crises, as the spike in arrivals of refugees and migrants 
in 2015 revealed.  
Observers have identified  
at least three challenges to 
democracy across Europe, 
indeed the world. First, the 
extension of the internet  
and social media exposes 
growing inequalities within 
and between countries. 
Second, governments are 
looking increasingly 
powerless in the face  
of imperatives and the 
international commitments 
they signed up to. 
Finally, there is a crisis of 
efficiency that erodes the 
legitimacy of democratic 
institutions even further. 
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The combination of these and other factors has set the scene for 
the resurgence of populism: the promise by political upstarts of 
simplistic solutions to people’s grievances through radical policies 
that dismiss existing institutions and laws as either irrelevant or 
inconvenient (Müller, 2016). The rise of ‘cultural sovereignty’ lies at 
the heart of the most popular of protest movements, that of the 
nativist far right (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). Myths, lies, hate 
speech, and violence are the tools to deal with opponents, 
competitors, ‘misfits’ or foreigners. To paraphrase former European 
Council President Donald Tusk in his speech to the 2019 Democracy 
Forum in Athens: “It is politics understood as war”. Even if no shots 
are fired, some part of the populist playbook aims to destroy, 
invalidate or totally subordinate the others. “Emotions have replaced 
reason, while in political mathematics, dividing and subtracting have 
displaced multiplying and adding” (Tusk, 2019). 
With a focus on what 
divides the people rather than on 
what could and should unite 
them, populists give a bad name to 
the term Politeia, which Cicero 
translated into Latin as Res Publica, 
the public affair. In the year we 
commemorate the centennial of 
Max Weber’s death, this is 
perhaps the greatest challenge of 
today: how to overcome the forces of growing polarisation and 
restore politics to the art of deliberating and acting in the common 
good, guided by the ethics of conviction and responsibility.  
1.3 Drivers of positive change 
Despite the recurrence of populist victories at the ballot box and 
prevailing uncertainties around Brexit and the future of Europe, the 
proportion of citizens with a confident outlook towards the European 
Union has remained steady, with 59% support for membership 
(Parlemeter, October 2019). One in two Europeans in 20 member 
states also agreed that their voice counts in the EU. This figure had 
been rising since the 2016 Brexit referendum and spiked immediately 
after the European Parliament elections of May 2019. The share of 
those who believe that their voice counts in the EU is back to the level 
In the year we commemorate the 
centennial of Max Weber’s death, 
this is perhaps the greatest 
challenge of today: how to overcome 
the forces of growing polarisation 
and restore politics to the art of 
deliberating and acting in the 
common good, guided by the ethics 
of conviction and responsibility. 
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registered at the beginning of 2019 (49%, -7). The flipside is that a 
worrying 46% of Europeans still disagreed with this statement, while 
5% did not know. 
The 2019 post-electoral Eurobarometer survey highlighted the 
increase in satisfaction with a range of aspects of democracy in the 
EU, strengthening the impression of strong democratic values 
associated with citizen engagement in Europe. Europeans 
particularly appreciated free and fair elections (75%), freedom of 
speech (74%) and respect of fundamental rights (73%), with clear 
improvements registering for the fight against disinformation in the 
media (48%, +8) and against corruption (43%, +7).  
Fifty-two percent of Europeans were satisfied with the way 
democracy works in the Union and 56% shared this opinion 
concerning their own country (see Figure 1.2). This feeling had 
improved over the previous 12 months with regards to the EU 
democratic process, while changes were less significant on the 
functioning of democracy at the national level. 
Figure 1.2 Satisfaction with how democracy works 
 
Source: Parlemeter 2019 (92.2), QB13. 
 
The October 2019 Parlemeter nevertheless revealed a 
significant weakening of the perception that their voice counted 
among young people (48%, -12) and students (52%, -10) These drops 
in numbers might point towards signs of a more rapid 
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disengagement within the youth demographic, marked by an 
unprecedented level of mobilisation at the last European ballot.1 
Figure 1.3 Satisfaction with EU versus national democracy  
 
Source: Parlemeter 2019 (92.2), QB13a-QB13b. 
 
Beyond these top-line figures, a wide spectrum of national 
situations becomes apparent, particularly a pronounced divide in 
assessing the functioning of the domestic political system. Figure 1.3 
shows that in October 2019, the overall degree of satisfaction with 
European democracy in 14 member states was greater than that 
expressed for the national one. These differences were particularly 
striking for Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. 
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Spain showed the highest 
increases in support for EU democracy. These endorsements should 
be seen in context and take account of specific political developments 
such as the EU institutions’ position on compliance with the rule of 
law in Hungary and Poland and the uncertain political climate in 
Spain. 
                                                        
1 Eurobarometer Survey 91.5, Have the European elections entered a new dimension? 
September 2019. 
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Table 1.1 Satisfaction with level of political participation 
QB8.4 How satisfied or not are you with the following aspects of democracy in the 
European Union? Possibility for individual citizens to participate in political life (e.g. 
as candidates in elections, members of political parties) (%) (SENSITIVE QUESTION) 
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EU 28 14 49 22 7 2 6 63 29 
BE 12 58 22 6 1 1 70 28 
BG 9 36 30 14 1 10 45 44 
CZ 11 53 20 7 2 7 64 27 
DK 29 49 12 2 1 7 78 14 
DE 20 49 21 4 2 4 69 25 
EE 18 53 14 4 0 11 71 18 
IE 20 56 14 2 1 7 76 16 
EL 11 44 32 9 0 4 55 41 
ES 14 42 29 11 1 3 56 40 
FR 9 51 25 7 1 7 60 32 
HR 15 38 29 16 1 1 53 45 
IT 9 45 27 11 2 6 54 38 
CY 15 47 27 6 0 5 62 33 
LV 17 51 17 7 1 7 68 24 
LT 12 44 28 6 1 9 56 34 
LU 16 51 18 5 3 7 67 23 
HU 17 47 24 8 1 3 64 32 
MT 15 54 17 3 0 11 69 20 
NL 19 54 14 4 1 8 73 18 
AT 20 49 22 5 1 3 69 27 
PL 16 58 16 4 4 2 74 20 
PT 5 64 19 4 1 7 69 23 
RO 10 37 29 16 4 4 47 45 
SI 13 44 27 10 1 5 57 37 
SK 9 51 22 7 2 9 60 29 
FI 18 52 19 4 1 6 70 23 
SE 15 50 16 4 2 13 65 20 
UK 13 50 17 7 3 10 63 24 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2018. 
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Table 1.2 Satisfaction with respect for the rule of law 
QB8.5 How satisfied or not are you with the following aspects of democracy in the 
European Union? Rule of law (e.g. respect for independence of the judiciary, the 
integrity and impartiality of the electoral system) (%) (SENSITIVE QUESTION)  
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EU-28 12 45 27 9 2 5 57 36 
BE 12 60 20 6 1 1 72 26 
BG 6 26 34 24 1 9 32 58 
CZ 8 40 32 14 2 4 48 46 
DK 29 47 13 2 1 8 76 15 
DE 15 48 27 5 1 4 63 32 
EE 13 57 17 3 0 10 70 20 
IE 21 56 13 2 1 7 77 15 
EL 9 39 37 12 0 3 48 49 
ES 13 37 32 14 1 3 50 46 
FR 9 44 29 10 1 7 53 39 
HR 7 33 34 23 1 2 40 57 
IT 10 38 33 12 1 6 48 45 
CY 19 45 25 7 0 4 64 32 
LV 8 40 29 9 1 13 48 38 
LT 11 43 32 6 1 7 54 38 
LU 16 49 15 7 4 9 65 22 
HU 13 44 26 12 1 4 57 38 
MT 12 50 20 5 1 12 62 25 
NL 15 54 21 4 1 5 69 25 
AT 22 50 20 4 1 3 72 24 
PL 13 49 25 8 3 2 62 33 
PT 5 53 27 6 1 8 58 33 
RO 9 37 31 16 3 4 46 47 
SI 4 30 36 26 1 3 34 62 
SK 6 35 34 15 2 8 41 49 
FI 17 50 23 4 0 6 67 27 
SE 13 51 20 3 1 12 64 23 
UK 13 49 18 8 3 9 62 26 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2018. 
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These findings confirm those of previous Eurobarometer 
surveys that citizens’ expectations of the EU and European 
democracy are strong, in particular the possibility for individuals to 
participate in political life (see Figure 1.4) and for respect for the rule 
of law (see Figure 1.5). 
While barely three years ago less 
than half of young Europeans believed 
that living in a democracy was essential 
(Foa and Mounk, 2017), the above-
mentioned figures and other polls (see 
Chapter 3) show that most citizens 
aspire to more freedom, a greater say in 
politics, and higher levels of 
accountability in ‘their’ (multi-layered) European Union (see Chapter 
4). Arguably, liberal democracy remains an aspiration because it 
delivers.2 
This is an important finding. It 
means that rather than looking for 
alternatives to democracy (autocracy or 
technocracy), one should instead seek to 
reform Europe’s faltering political 
systems through concrete measures that 
enhance their functioning. 
1.4 Which liberal democracy model? 
James S. Fishkin, a professor at Stanford University and a leading 
political theorist, has compared four models of democracy: 
competitive democracy, elite deliberation, participatory democracy 
and deliberative democracy – in light of four democratic principles: 
political equality, participation, deliberation and ‘non-tyranny’ 
(Fishkin, 2018). Ideally, a democracy would embody all of these 
principles. 
‘Competitive democracy’, the model upon which all EU 
member states’ choice for representation relies, supposedly 
guarantees political equality through universal suffrage and non-
tyranny thanks to political parties and their candidates being able to 
                                                        
2 See http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi.  
Citizens aspire to more 
freedom, a greater say in 
politics, and higher levels of 
accountability in ‘their’ 
(multi-layered) European 
Union.  
Rather than looking for 
alternatives to democracy, 
one should instead seek to 
reform Europe’s faltering 
political systems through 
concrete measures that 
enhance their functioning. 
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compete for the popular vote in free and fair elections. It can, 
however, fall short of the ideals of participation (due to low and 
unequally distributed levels of voter turnout) and deliberation. As 
the case of Hungary under Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party shows, 
political inequality and streaks of tyranny are not excluded either. 
Where populism has translated into the power of government this 
erodes the fundaments on which democratic systems are built: the 
rule of law, free press, parliamentarian oversight, and more. Yet, 
‘meritocratic authoritarianism’, a model in which regimes with 
flawed democratic processes provide efficient and effective 
governance, may nevertheless garner domestic and international 
support (Fishkin, 2018). 
In a similar vein, ‘elite deliberation’ should guarantee a system 
with thoughtful weighing of arguments and resultant non-tyranny. 
But such a system would contravene political equality and 
undermine mass participation. 
The theory of ‘participatory democracy’, on the other hand, 
advocates for a greater participation by citizens in the political 
process. It would guarantee both political equality and mass 
participation, but might fail in terms of deliberation (the theory is 
built on the general assumption that citizens have the potential for 
political learning) and staving off tyranny (Schiller, 2007). The label 
is a very broad one though. In the early stages of development, 
leading theorists placed democratic participation within the frame of 
an overall transformation of society (Bachrach, 1970; Pateman, 1970). 
Later contributions to the debate elaborated on direct democracy as 
a form of extended participation, a mechanism for a popular 
decisive vote with a majoritarian character. They differentiated 
between the concepts of ‘associative democracy’, concentrating on 
the participative dynamics of social and political movements; 
‘cooperative democracy’ elaborated on bargaining models; and a 
conceptual group formed around applied models of participation 
such as problem-solving schemes and alternative conflict resolution 
(cf. Held, 1987). 
With a focus on communicative rationality, ‘deliberative 
democracy’ can be considered both as a sub-set of ‘participatory 
democracy’ and as a stand-alone category that attempts to reconcile 
deliberation by citizens with an equal consideration of diverse views. 
The focus is on dialogue, argumentation and reflection (Gutmann 
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and Thompson, 2004; Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). In the search for 
practical solutions, Fishkin has been a pioneer in backing up 
normative theories of deliberative democracy with ample empirical 
research3 on face-to-face deliberations of adults whose selection is 
based on the logic of random sampling, guaranteeing political 
equality by giving all citizens the same 
chance of selection by lot. Better known 
‘deliberating microcosms’ are citizens’ 
juries (12-26 participants), consensus 
conferences (10-50 participants), citizen 
assemblies (50-160 participants) and 
deliberative polling (100-500 participants) (Breckon et al., 2019). Even 
if this ‘folk theory of democracy’ has been criticised by some political 
scientists for being empirically naïve (cf. Achen and Bartels, 2016), 
most political theorists are now in favour of 
participatory/deliberative democracy (Chambers, 2019). 
Of the four above-mentioned models, deliberative democracy 
does, indeed, maximum justice and minimum violence to all four 
above-mentioned principles. Yet the design settings under which 
public deliberation can take place do not allow for mass participation. 
Neither do the group dynamics fully exclude tyranny by the 
rhetorically more advantaged (Grönlund et al., 2014). This branch of 
deliberative democracy may work well at the local level, as early 
experiences in the German-speaking eastern cantons of Belgium 
reveal (Van Reybroeck, 2018), but to zoom this model out to the 
macro level creates problems in political communication outside the 
controlled settings. Even when trying to maximise demographic and 
attitudinal representativeness, most ‘mini-publics’ fail to capture the 
full variety of public opinion and none of them are representative in 
the electoral sense (Goodin and Dryzek, 2006). In large countries and 
in supranational cases such as the European Union, random sampling 
remains segmented across geographical areas. 
The emphasis on discursive methods to strengthen existing 
forms of representative democracy is nevertheless an attractive and 
potentially powerful one in the European context (Dryzek, 1990). 
According to Jürgen Habermas, one should leave the 
                                                        
3 See https://cdd.stanford.edu. Deliberative polls have been conducted in well 
over 100 countries and twice across all member states of the EU. 
Most political theorists 
are now in favour of 
participatory/deliberative 
democracy. 
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institutionalisation of discourse wide open because democratic 
legitimacy is tied to what citizens would agree to under discursive 
conditions: “only those statutes can claim legitimacy that can meet 
with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that 
in turn has been legally constituted” (Habermas, 1996: 110). 
Habermas is not saying that we need to institute a discursive process 
of legislation in order to achieve true democratic legitimacy, but 
rather that the only way to make sense of liberal democratic claims to 
legitimacy is to understand them in discourse-theoretic terms. If we 
look at democracy this way, then our constitutions, rights and 
freedoms, our equal opportunities to participate and speak, the fair 
regulation of the public sphere, and the accountability of our 
representatives, and so on, are all to be understood as a legally 
constituted discursive process of legislation (Chambers, 2019). 
This way of looking at liberal democratic constitutional orders 
then highlights certain normative priorities and evaluative standards. 
The circulation of information becomes central to maintaining 
democratic legitimacy. Equal access to information and to the public 
debates that articulate policy priorities is also key. Creating channels 
of communication between citizens and the centres of decision-
making becomes an imperative mission in enhancing democracy in 
addressing real world problems, claims and needs (Contiades and 
Fotiadou, 2018; Chambers, 2019), especially in an era when new 
media and e-democracy techniques like petition platforms and 
crowdsourcing have become important participatory tools. 
1.5 How to strengthen representative democracy 
Since the ‘Great Recession’ (Geiselberger, 2017) has many different 
origins, it will inevitably require many different remedies. It requires 
action in at least three areas. First, inequality, 
both economic and political, must be tackled. 
Governments must respond by redistributing 
fairly the benefits of globalisation by 
restricting tax avoidance and evasion 
schemes, and most importantly, discouraging 
tax havens. Fortunately, democracy is one of 
the only systems in which the concerns of the majority can overturn 
the interests of the wealthy and prevent self-serving and self-
perpetuating political classes from forming and disconnecting from 
First, inequality, both 
economic and political, 
must be tackled. 
This demands more 
participation, not less.  
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their electorates. This demands more participation, not less. Making 
choices is the foundation of democracy. Those who do not choose 
themselves become the object of others’ choices. They lose the ability 
to shape their future, they lose power. You’re either at the table or on 
the menu, as the saying goes. The majority should therefore harness 
the mechanisms at their disposal. 
Second, representative democracies must be made more efficient. 
Much of the debate in our democracies turns on the politics of 
redistribution and public spending (output 
legitimacy), but not enough on efficiency 
(throughput legitimacy). We are trying to 
solve today’s problems with yesterday’s 
solutions. We must harness new technologies 
and management techniques to overhaul the administration of the 
state to make our democracies less bureaucratic and more responsive 
to citizens, especially those who cannot afford high-priced lawyers 
and lobbyists. 
Third and finally, democracy must be championed. Yet many of the 
tools in support of democracy have been abandoned or are 
underfunded. Democracy’s enemies are 
spending billions to undermine it, both in 
practice and through misinformation. 
Democracy is a work in progress. Athenian 
democracy shows that practice never meets 
the ideal: women could not vote, slavery was a given and the body 
politic could be captured by oligarchic interests. Victory over nazism, 
fascism and communism were all ideological struggles won on the 
battlefield of ideas as well. Democracies must reclaim the lost ground 
by defending and promoting liberal ideas, just as they did against 
democracy’s past ideological enemies. 
1.6 Our contribution to the debate 
In our ‘Towards a Citizens’ Union (2CU)’ project, we have focused on 
one dimension: the way we do 
democracy in Europe. We have zoomed 
in on the constitutional and institutional 
frameworks, practical procedures and 
mundane interfaces that citizens and 
Second, representative 
democracies must be 
made more efficient. 
Third, delivberative 
democracy must be 
championed. 
In our project, the 
underlying rationale has 
been that instruments can 
shape results. 
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politicians use to make democracy happen. The underlying rationale 
for this approach has been that instruments can shape results in 
generating greater efficiency, accountability and thus authority for 
the democratic model (see Chapter 2). 
Building on the notion of increasing social, economic and political 
interdependence in a multi-layered European Union, we devoted the 
first book to the question whether a sense of solidarity and European 
identity could be rescued from the bottom up by empowering citizens 
to ‘take back control’ of their Union. Our research revealed, among 
other things, that people’s interest in exploring ‘direct democracy’ 
has increased as a result of the EU’s polycrisis of recent years – 
although this trend is far from overwhelming and is even absent in 
some member states. Yet, to move 
beyond being “a heavily 
instrumentalised wrecking-ball”, the 
various (new) instruments of direct 
democracy need to meet certain 
participatory preconditions in order to 
contribute to the quality of democracy overall (Youngs, 2018). 
As citizens make what experts consider to be ‘wrong’ populist-
fuelled choices, sympathy has resurged for the classical concept of 
elite-mediated governance. In the second volume, we investigated 
how the relationship between democratic institutions of the member 
states and the EU has changed as a result of a decade of crisis. Rather 
than assess the state of collective government (Van Middelaar, 2019), 
we focused primarily on the role of parliaments. As in the first book, 
the national level lent itself best to a broad investigation of the health 
of representative democracy in 
Europe. Our research found that the 
practice of voting and decision-
shaping mechanisms differ 
considerably between member 
states, and that there is hardly any momentum towards greater 
convergence. Except in moments of crisis, EU issues and European 
elections are of a second order. The ‘Europeanisation’ of 
representative democracy is rather uneven across the continent. This 
is not an east-west or a north-south divide. It is a divide between 
those who feel politically represented and those who do not.  
The first book revealed that 
people’s interest in exploring 
‘direct democracy’ has 
increased as a result of the 
EU’s polycrisis of recent years. 
In the second volume, we found 
that the ‘Europeanisation’ of 
representative democracy is rather 
uneven across the continent. 
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Against the backdrop of shifting political ecosystems we uncovered 
the deliberative disconnections within and between them, described 
the limitations of the instruments we use to conduct direct and 
representative democracy in Europe, and the inherent limitations and 
even outright refusal to change procedures. 
In our attempt to contribute ideas to strengthen the ecosystem of 
democracy, the next step (the present volume 3) in the 2CU research 
is to use the empirical findings collected in the previous two volumes 
to draw up a prescriptive agenda aimed at improving political 
participation, efficiency and accountability in Europe. 
Following in the 
footsteps of Habermas and 
others, this book aims to find 
ways to strengthen voting-
centric competition by placing 
‘deliberative’ elements in the 
broader landscape of representative democracy in Europe. Rather 
than trying to plug an ideal-type instrument of ‘direct democracy’ or 
one favoured institutional form of deliberation into existing systems 
of democracy, we ask which institutions, instruments, procedures 
and mechanisms (innovative or not) could enhance representative 
democracy in Europe, at both 
the national and EU levels and 
between them. In our search for 
ways to generate participatory 
fusion, the focus will again be 
on polity. Our focus will be on 
assorted varieties of citizen 
engagement that complement, not threaten representative 
democracy. It is by gearing up, not dumbing down that we find the 
antidote to the threats of entitlement, complacency and populism. 
To unpack these issues, we have identified the mechanisms 
that would require a deeper prescriptive analysis.  
  
This book aims to find ways to 
strengthen voting-centric competition  
by placing ‘deliberative’ elements in 
the broader landscape of 
representative democracy in Europe. 
We ask which institutions, 
instruments, procedures and 
mechanisms (innovative or not) could 
enhance representative democracy in 
Europe, at both the national and EU 
levels and between them. 
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 EFFICIENCY, AUTHORITY 
AND REPRESENTATION 
DANIEL SMILOV 
This chapter looks at the conceptual differences between two approaches that 
might be called the ‘transmission paradigm’ and the ‘political education 
paradigm’, and applies them to recent political developments in Europe and 
Eastern EU member states in particular.  
From a policy perspective, it argues that the dominance of the 
‘transmission paradigm’ should be checked by attempting to restore the 
educational and filtering potential of political parties, mass media and other 
instruments of democratic education. Restoring the authority of these 
instruments is no easy task but it must be faced to counter the increasingly 
unfiltered transmission of the public’s wishes, which has already produced major 
political deadlocks and irrationalities – the painful process of Brexit being just 
one illustration of this. 
2.1 Introduction: Two paradigms for efficiency 
What is efficient political representation? There could be at least two 
competing conceptions of this issue. First, representation could be 
deemed efficient if a political party translated people’s preferences 
directly and swiftly into political decisions. From this point of view, 
an efficient vehicle of representation would reflect the popular will, 
avoid distorting it, and would feed it, as it is, into the decision-making 
mechanisms of state. Second, political representation could be 
considered efficient if it educated the public and helped it to reach 
better decisions, all things considered. The first conceptual approach 
could be called the ‘transmission paradigm’, and the second 
approach ‘the political education paradigm’.  
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Both these approaches have their roots in the history of ideas 
and the political processes of European democracies. Both are rooted 
in the Enlightenment. The transmission paradigm is an emanation of 
anti-paternalistic Enlightenment ideology. People should be treated 
as mature citizens who know their interests and values best. Equally 
grounded in Enlightenment ideology is the ‘education’ paradigm, 
however. It argues that the political process should be led by reason 
and provide incentives to bring the best out of rational individuals.  
Over the last decade, however, the transmission paradigm has 
come to prevail, with the rise of populist parties and politicians. 
Populist parties and politicians could be seen as a democratic 
“innovation” (Smilov, 2017) that provides an almost instant 
transmission of popular wishes and preferences to the public sphere 
and the institutions of state. Technological, informational and 
communicational advances underpin this innovation: with social 
networks, Big Data and AI it is now possible to aggregate information 
about public preferences cheaply. At 
the same time, social networks and 
telecommunication allow for direct 
targeting of voters. The mutual 
feedback between voters and 
politicians is much more intensive today. Deliberative polling, 
voting-aid devices are other advances in democratic representation 
that improve the transmission of public preferences. 
Yet increased efficiency in terms of speed and immediacy of 
transmission comes at a cost, namely the increasing inability of 
political parties and politicians to filter out specific preferences, 
which is potentially dangerous for the public good. Also, political 
parties are losing their capacity to 
educate the public and to take 
responsibility for unpopular but 
necessary decisions. Indeed, 
contemporary political parties are 
thin on ideology and usually lack 
their own expertise in policymaking; 
most of these activities are outsourced 
to PR-companies, independent think 
tanks, commercial IT companies, or even media programmes. By 
losing their educational potential, (some) political parties have 
The mutual feedback between 
voters and politicians is much 
more intensive today. 
Yet transmission comes at a 
cost, namely the increasing 
inability of political parties 
and politicians to filter out 
specific preferences to educate 
the public and to take 
responsibility for unpopular 
 but necessary decisions. 
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gradually become functionally identical to the media – both are 
vehicles for the transmission of popular wishes and preferences in the 
public sphere. It is not surprising that in many countries there are 
party-media hybrids: political parties that have sprung from popular 
TV shows. 
This chapter defines the conceptual difference between the two 
above-mentioned approaches to efficient representation in more 
detail, and applies them to recent political developments in Europe 
and Eastern EU member states in particular.  
It argues that the dominance of the transmission paradigm 
should be checked by attempting to restore the educational and 
filtering potential of political 
parties, the mass media and other 
instruments of democratic 
education. Restoring the authority 
of these instruments is no easy task 
but it must be faced to prevent the 
rapid and unfiltered transmission 
of the public’s wishes – a 
phenomenon that has already produced significant political 
deadlocks and irrationalities. 
2.2 Populism and the ascendancy of the 
transmission paradigm 
The ‘rise of populism’ has become a dominant interpretative theory 
in the understanding of contemporary politics. Populism is a basic (if 
not the basic) democratic ideology, according to which politicians 
should follow the will of the people, no matter what. From this point 
of view populism is the opposite to paternalism: it is a minimalistic 
democratic ideology that argues that people are mature enough to 
make up their own minds and take their own decisions. 
In terms of representation, populism is the embodiment of the 
transmission paradigm. Populist politicians offer to transmit the 
preferences of the electorate to the public sphere. They are not 
‘educating’ the electorate, they are merely humble servants of the 
people. This may be a manipulative strategy, but much of the appeal 
of populist politics is due to the appeal of such anti-paternalistic 
messages. 
The dominance of the 
transmission paradigm should be 
checked by attempting to restore 
the educational and filtering 
potential of political parties, the 
mass media and other instruments 
of democratic education. 
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There may be many explanations of the rise of such anti-
paternalism. One obvious candidate is disappointment with the 
grand narratives of more sophisticated ideologies such as social 
democracy or Christian democracy, for instance. The growing self-
confidence of post-war generations, which are gradually forgetting 
the lessons of the anti-liberal turn of the 1930s in Europe, is another 
explanatory factor.  
In general, two types of theories have been advanced to capture 
populist developments. The first group stresses economic hardship 
and discontent with rising inequality as the main drivers of populism. 
The second group points to cultural factors, notably the increased fear 
for the collective identity of large groups. Both theories rely on the 
widespread fears among majorities that they are losing status – either 
economic or cultural. 
Fear is an excuse for a more egoistic type of behaviour and for 
the (temporal) suspension of empathy and solidarity. Anti-
paternalism serves precisely such majorities (or near majorities) 
rather well in liberal democracies, which have grown to become self-
centred and egoistic.  
From this perspective, the populist majorities have internalised 
the homo economicus mindset and have started to view politics as a 
game of maximising their own interest without regard for the interest of 
others. The homo economicus mindset has always been a theoretical 
model designed to explain behaviour rather than to justify it. Rational 
egoism has its philosophical defenders as a moral stance, but most 
people are still ashamed of themselves if they openly act in an egoistic 
manner.  
Populism as anti-paternalism serves both as an antidote to and 
a therapy for such shame. At the psychological level populism 
‘normalises’ egoistic behaviour. At the moral level it argues that such 
behaviour is not inferior to others. 
The rise of the populist anti-paternalistic party could be 
interpreted as the response of the political class to the above-
mentioned egoistic attitudes and circumstances. The anti-
paternalistic party thrives on and nurtures such attitudes by having 
two general purposes. The first is therapeutic and psychological. It 
has to heal homo economicus from residual feelings of shame, guilt and 
indebtedness to others. For this purpose, it often presents these 
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others, not as fellow citizens, but as enemies or at least as people of 
inferior moral status. Commonly, populist politicians rail against 
‘political correctness’ and use language that denigrates and 
politically assassinates the opponent. 
The therapeutic function of the anti-paternalistic party is also 
served by its attack on educational authorities of any type. Most 
commonly it positions itself against established expert institutions 
and individuals: from the mainstream media to academia. Populists 
portray these institutions as self-interested and corrupt, with the aim 
of depriving them of authority. Thus, society is left without a neutral 
critical vantage point – everything becomes a clash of self-interested 
groups, and the majority can be relieved that its egoism is not a 
deplorable aberration – it is actually the norm.  
This attack on political education is in essence the populist 
rejection of the ‘education paradigm’ in terms of political 
representation. 
The second function of the anti-paternalistic party is 
ideological. It gives arguments to the majority that its behaviour is 
not only normal (in the sense of widespread) but is also morally 
justified. This ideological function of the anti-paternalistic party has 
been generally neglected in the literature: rather, it has been argued 
that its central message is the representation of the people as a 
homogeneous group against the corrupt elite. Things are more subtle 
than this, however. The main message is that the majority is right to 
pursue its self-interest as much as possible. In a situation where we 
have only clashing self-interests, what is right is the will of the 
majority. 
This ideological message goes against deeply entrenched 
political attitudes in Western (and not only) history. From as early as 
Aristotle it is known that genuine politics exists only in power 
relationships, which are mutually beneficial – both for the ruling and 
the ruled. In this sense politics is non-definable without the notion of 
a common, public interest; otherwise it descends into master-slave or 
familial relationships. 
The Aristotelian difficulty of the ideological task of the anti-
paternalistic party is dealt with in two ways. On the one hand, 
populists sometimes take on board libertarianism as an extreme form 
of justification for the pursuit of self-interest in politics. On the other 
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hand, populists discourage people from believing that public 
authorities could defend common societal interests in principle. In this 
sense the anti-paternalist party rides the waves of distrust in politics 
that characterise the West. Populists rarely try to convince the people 
that politics is something good and morally justified: on the contrary, 
their argument is that politics is a ‘dirty business’, in which the more 
unscrupulous and devious individual outsmarts the rest. The 
conscious undermining of the very notion of public authority by 
populists makes the ‘political education paradigm’ of representation 
hardly applicable in contemporary politics. 
2.3 The populist party and identity 
The most important instrument for achieving the ideological goals of 
anti-paternalistic populism has proved to be identity politics, 
however. Multiculturalism has turned ethnic and cultural difference 
into grounds for a moral claim to equality. Populist anti-paternalism 
is the identity politics of the majority. It argues that the majority has 
a right to be authentic – to express itself as it is. Not equality, but the 
right to authenticity is the major ideological tool of the anti-
paternalist party. In multiculturalism, difference is just a 
precondition and a mobilisational means for the achievement of the 
goal – equality. In populist anti-paternalism authenticity is the goal – 
the difference of the majority is what is to be cherished and preserved. 
Majorities are not only allowed to believe in the superiority of their 
culture, but are required to do so. Eastern Europe is again the 
champion in this regard: Russians, Bulgarians, Romanians and 
Greeks all have this superiority complex.1 While this may be the 
cultural legacy of Orthodox countries, majorities in other regions are 
also adopting this pride in their ethnic, cultural and racial identity as 
a justification for prioritising themselves over others. 
                                                        
1 See the Pew Research Study of 2018 (Albert Kim, 2018), according to which 
majorities or near majorities in many European countries believe that their 
culture is superior to others: Greece 89%; Russia 69%; Norway 58%; Poland 55%; 
Finland 49%; Portugal 47%; Italy 47%; UK 46%; Germany 45%; France 36%. See 
also Michael Lipka, (2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/ 
31/greek-attitudes-toward-religion-minorities-align-more-with-central-and-
eastern-europe-than-west/ 
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2.4 The populist party and the evolution of party 
systems 
Populist anti-paternalist parties are the latest phase of development 
in Western party systems and systems of political representation. 
While the post-war catch-all party was paternalistic and compromise-
oriented, the populist anti-paternalist party is a vehicle for self-
centred and self-interested groups. It has dropped most claims to an 
educational role. On the contrary, it claims that people are good as 
they are, and that their authenticity should be expressed in the public 
arena.  
The west-European phenomenon of the ‘cartel’ party of the 
1980s and 1990s was the first to openly abandon political education. 
The cartel party is parliament-based, thinly ideological, increasingly 
memberless and dependent on the state through public funding and 
other privileges. But the cartel party was animated by the search for 
compromise and solidaristic visions of politics. It was part of a team 
(albeit a cartel) and pretended to offer something to everyone in 
society: in this sense, the cartel party preserved the ‘catch-all’ element 
from its predecessors, while abandoning its educational and 
paternalistic role. 
The anti-paternalistic populists reject the social compromises 
and the appeal to society as a whole of the catch-all party. They thrive 
on social polarisation and promise to protect the interests of specific 
groups without altruism towards others.  
The anti-paternalistic populist party resembles the cartel party 
in another respect: it does not lessen public distrust in party politics 
but rather increases it. The goal of the anti-paternalistic party is not 
to prove that it has authority and deserves the trust of the public. As 
argued, it is predominantly negatively oriented and tries to convince 
the public that there are in principle no reliable authorities beyond 
the people themselves. 
This is the manipulative part of anti-paternalistic populism. It 
is in fact a utopian view, according to which people do not need 
authority to guide their decisions, but only vehicles to transmit their 
preferences and beliefs. For various conceptual and practical reasons 
this is untrue and impossible in any complex society. After all, the 
anti-paternalist populist party is an authority, that claims not to be 
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one. It derives power and the ability to guide people’s behaviour by 
claiming that they do not need to be guided. 
This type of manipulation is bound to be noticed by the 
electorate at some point. Anti-paternalist populists therefore come 
with an expiry date that rarely goes beyond a few electoral cycles. 
This may be one of the reasons for the increased voter volatility and 
instability of contemporary party systems.  
2.5 Populist politics and homogeneity 
As mentioned, theories of contemporary populism exaggerate the 
communal homogeneity that this political phenomenon presupposes 
(Jan-Werner Müller, 2018). In fact, populist majorities have been far 
from homogeneous – on the contrary, they often appear as temporary 
and unlikely coalitions of disparate sections of society. The populist 
party reflects this heterogeneity (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018: 17-25). 
Although it often speaks of the nation and reveres its history, this 
rarely translates into committed party membership or any type of 
intense and integrated political community. Nationalistic populist 
rallies in Poland and Hungary do appear as actions of a 
communitarian nature. The rallies of Donald Trump, Syriza and 
Podemos had a similar air. But in fact contemporary populism could 
not function and operate without deep communitarian mobilisation 
and without the creation of homogenous communities. Political 
interaction in the populist era is often close to anonymous internet 
and social networks, and the constructed communities are a 
collection of individuals sharing a common interest, almost 
accidentally. In this way the 
mobilisation of voters through 
psychological (rather than 
political and ideological) profiling 
has proved vital, as the incidents 
with Cambridge Analytica have 
demonstrated.2 
To sum up, the populist 
anti-paternalist party is a 
                                                        
2 See the Cambridge Analytica Files: a project by the Guardian newspaper 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files 
The populist anti-paternalist party 
is a paradoxical organisation: it is 
an authority that claims to have 
little authority, and it creates 
communities with very weak 
communal obligations, held together 
by the temporary coincidence of 
individual self-interests. 
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paradoxical organisation: it is an authority that claims to have little 
authority, and it creates communities with very weak communal 
obligations, held together by the temporary coincidence of individual 
self-interests. For this reason, the populist party is very close in nature 
to the mass media: it attracts diverse publics by trying to keep their 
interest and attention without a serious attempt to educate them.  
2.6 The accountability of populist parties   
An important question which the dominance of the transmission 
paradigm raises is the transformation of the notion of political 
accountability brought by the advent of populist politics. The 
question is that so far there have been few populist parties and actors 
in power, which prevents the drawing of definitive conclusions. On 
the basis of existing evidence, the following could be said. There have 
been cases in which populist players have been transformed into 
mainstream political parties under the burdens of government. They 
have gradually dropped their populist appeal and have started to 
impose ‘filters’ on public preferences and wishes. The transformation 
of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia into a centre-right formation is maybe the 
paradigmatic example of this category. In Bulgaria, the movement of 
the former Tzar Simeon II also gradually transformed itself into a 
mainstream liberal party. Arguably, the burdens of government also 
had similar effect on Syriza in Greece, which by the end of its term in 
office (2018) had dropped many of its more radical ideas about the 
Eurozone and identity politics vis-à-vis North Macedonia. Under this 
model, the transmission paradigm is used to bring a party to power, 
but after that the paradigm is moderated by requirements of 
economic rationality and expedience. 
President Trump’s term of office shows that the transmission 
paradigm may not be moderated, however, but continues to be used 
for the mobilisation of political majorities. Trump has insisted on the 
implementation of policies (such as the Mexican wall) that run 
contrary to economic rationality. As promised, he has initiated trade 
wars with virtually all of America’s trade partners. His foreign policy 
has also shaken existing alliances and created possibilities with new 
relations with countries such as Russia, North Korea, etc. It is difficult 
to assess how these policies are going to develop in the future, but it 
is safe to conclude that up to now there has been little in the way of 
‘moderating’ policies or deviation from the transmission paradigm. 
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This example, like the realisation of Brexit, suggests that it is much 
too simplistic to assume that the transmission paradigm is just a tool 
for the mobilisation of votes before elections, which is quickly 
forgotten once the populist actor has been elected to office. 
And there is also the central European experience. In countries 
such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, populist 
actors have dominated the political landscape for the last ten years. 
In some countries their attempt to entrench themselves has led to 
deformations of liberal democracy. Victor Orbán has effectively 
kicked out a university (and many NGOs) from Hungary. In Poland 
there is an ongoing battle for the 
political takeover of the judiciary. 
All this demonstrates that the 
transmission paradigm is not a 
tool of pre-election demagoguery 
that is swiftly forgotten after 
elections. On the contrary, once they are in office, the transmission 
paradigm could again serve as justification for their policies. They 
may argue that they are justified in removing the shackles of 
constitutional constraints at the will of the people. Of course, ‘reality’ 
checks, as in the case of Syriza, may demonstrate to the public the 
limits of the transmission paradigm. But for the time being this has 
been an exception rather than the rule. 
2.7 The twin dangers to liberal democracy 
Thus far, liberals have been mostly worried that the ‘rise of populism’ 
could lead to the subversion of liberal democracy into autocracy. The 
Hungarian example, mentioned above, has been the major scare, 
where the rule of the many has gradually eroded into oligarchy, with 
tyrannical elements. Aristotle’s classical analysis offers another path 
to an even more fundamental corruption of democracy, however. In 
his view, a government by a self-centred majority transforms 
democracy into the rule of the mob, a tyranny of the majority. Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill had similar worries: when 
self-centred and egoistic majorities take government control, 
democracy could easily be transformed into a political nightmare. 
Not all liberals share this concern, and this is the reason why 
‘the rise of populism’ has effectively split the liberal community into 
The transmission paradigm is not 
a tool of pre-election 
demagoguery that is swiftly 
forgotten after elections. 
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warring factions. Adam Smith’s view that the unbridled competition 
of self-interested actors is beneficial to society as a whole is often 
transplanted from economics to politics. Many liberals – not 
necessarily fully fledged libertarians – share such trust in the positive 
effect of competition among political players. Such liberals reject the 
Aristotelian wisdom that a well-governed politea needs public, well-
intentioned majoritarian decision-making.3 
Who is right: Aristotle or contemporary pluralists? This may 
seem an abstract question, but it has effectively split the liberal 
community in many countries. Some see the rise of populism as a 
gross corruption of politics, while others are willing to view it as a 
mere extension of what they have always preached: the primacy of 
the markets, competition and self-interested political behaviour.4 
There is reason to believe that the Aristotelian camp has the 
better argument, however. Thus far, liberal democracy has survived 
and thrived due to public-centred and public-minded majorities. 
Post-war Europe and post-New Deal America were societies 
characterised by considerable levels of solidarity, sensitivity to the 
needs of vulnerable groups and a desire for compromise. More 
importantly, these were societies based on unwritten conventions 
about self-restraint by politicians. This ethos has gradually been 
eroded and the ‘rise of populism’ denotes the advent of its 
replacement – self-centredness and political egoism.  
Those who believe that institutions can function and shape 
behaviour, even in the absence of a corresponding ethos among the 
main political players, should take the Hungarian case seriously into 
account. Indeed, institutions could serve a constraining function, but 
for a limited amount of time. In Hungary, this was until Viktor 
Orbán’s party Fidesz gained a two-thirds constitutional majority; 
                                                        
3 There has always been a tension between public choice accounts and the 
justification of democracy, starting from the puzzling consequences of Kenneth 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. More recently, concerns about the empirical 
validity of rationalistic accounts of politics have been powerfully raised by 
Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels (2016).  
4 Committed liberals have been willing to admit that the ‘rise of populism’ is a 
political response to real failures of liberal democracy (as the rising inequality) 
or its inadequate answer to novel developments, such as the so-called migration 
revolution. See Ivan Krastev (2017) and Jan Zielonka (2018).  
32  EFFICIENCY, AUTHORITY AND REPRESENTATION 
 
after that the constitution itself became an instrument for self-
entrenchment in power.  
The constitutive ambiguity about the extent to which populists 
are willing and able to change the institutional set-up of liberal 
democracy is only exacerbating the situation. Where is the breaking 
point of liberal democracy? When the government forces a university 
out of the country? Or when it imposes a 20% tax on NGOs engaged 
in activities it does not approve? Or when it interferes with the 
judicial system by retiring overnight most of the senior judges? 
It is a pity that in today’s Europe public opinion is divided on 
such matters and many think that such government actions are fair 
game. If anything, this shows that the public ethos in liberal 
democracies has changed dramatically. 
The politea is in danger of becoming a 
rule of the partisan mob.   
The rationale of representation 
has also been strongly affected by these 
developments. Actors who attempt to 
‘educate’ the public and rationalise their preferences and beliefs have 
faced strong competition from the anti-paternalistic camp of the 
populists: the ‘transmitters’ of the wishes of the public. The problem 
is that the transmitters do not differentiate between majorities that 
rule in the interest of all and majorities that rule exclusively in their 
own interest. For the transmitter, the majority is always right.   
2.8 Conclusions: are democracy and liberalism still 
possible?  
The predicament in which liberal democracy finds itself at present is 
the following: it has constructed ‘authentic’, self-centred and self-
interested majorities that reject most forms of political education. 
Simultaneously, institutions that educate the people in the spirit of 
solidarity and the public good have been systematically eroded. The 
advent of the populist anti-paternalist party is only one side of the 
phenomenon. Similar developments have taken place in the media 
and NGOs, and to a lesser extent in schools and the academia. To put 
it crudely, we have societies that have started to reject political 
education, and political education institutions. All of these have 
suffered a vast erosion of their authority. 
The public ethos in liberal 
democracies has changed 
dramatically. The politea is in 
danger of becoming a rule of 
the partisan mob. 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE EU  33 
 
The greatest danger to liberal democracy therefore may not be 
that it slides into autocracy or oligarchy, but that it gets a bad name 
as a corrupt and defective form of 
government. For long centuries people 
thought of democracy as the rule of the 
mob and the uneducated; therefore it 
was considered inferior to more 
enlightened options. Contemporary 
democracy risks portraying itself 
exactly along these lines. Here we could 
be reminded of Churchill’s important caveat that democracy is the 
worst form of government, except for all the others. However, this 
optimism underestimates technological advancements, which could 
vastly improve the attractiveness of autocracy. In the brave new 
world of Big Data, AI, biometric information, and physical and moral 
enhancements of the human being, powerful governments or 
corporations will be able to: 
 
 know better what the real preferences of individuals are. 
Machines could model human preferences better than humans 
themselves; 
 take decisions in the interest of society as a whole by avoiding 
the traps into which short-sighted egoistically-minded homo 
economicus habitually falls (Prisoners’ Dilemmas and other 
problems of collective action, for instance); 
 take decisions by which individuals themselves will be better 
off if they followed them, compared to situations where they 
take these decisions themselves. 
 
In such technological circumstances, which are not so far off in 
the future, democracy as the rule of self-centred and egoistic political 
majorities will appear infinitely inferior to technologically advanced 
autocracies. 
Philosophers dealing with the ethical issues of post-humans 
have already raised similar concerns while arguing in favour of 
human beings’ moral duty to accept moral enhancements, if they are 
technologically available (Persson and Savulescu, 2017). It is an 
intriguing question whether this moral duty would entail the 
The greatest danger to liberal 
democracy may not be that it 
slides into autocracy or 
oligarchy, but that it gets a 
bad name as a corrupt and 
defective form of government. 
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endorsement of technologically advanced enlightened autocracy 
over democracy functioning as the rule of egoistic majorities. 
These questions have no easy answers. Thus far, liberal 
democracy has been repaired in two ways: more procedural 
democracy (including instruments of direct democracy as 
referendums and initiatives) and/or more 
accountability – ‘counter-democracy’ in 
Rosanvallon’s sense (Rosanvallon, 2008): 
more supervisory bodies ensuring 
transparency and the following of 
uncontroversial standards. The first path 
leads to the transfer of more and more decisions directly to the 
people. It tries to decrease the costs of social coordination and 
association. The second path attempts to limit the possibilities for 
democratic majorities to make mistakes, by enf orcing common 
standards of transparency, economic efficiency, and informed 
decision-making, etc. For these purposes the second strategy creates 
expert bodies that are relatively insulated from democratic power, 
such as independent central banks, fiscal councils, judiciaries, media 
councils, etc. 
Both these strategies, however, work when there is a public-
minded majority interested in the protection of the common good. If 
there is no such majority, democratic 
instruments could be used to tyrannise the 
majority, while the idea of uncontroversial 
common standards dissipates. All 
benchmarks, checklists and the 
accompanying NGOs or independent 
bodies become involved in a partisan 
game between self-interested players. 
So, if the traditional paths of more 
democracy or counter-democracy are 
problematic, is there a way forward for liberal democracy? One 
option would be an attempt to sanitise the idea of political 
perfectionism and political education with the goal of constructing 
public-minded majorities. This may be more difficult that it sounds 
because it would require major reforms of the media, the political 
parties, the NGO sector and academia. These are the instruments that 
have to regain their authority in shaping the public imagination in a 
Thus far, liberal democracy 
has been repaired in two 
ways: more procedural 
democracy and/or more 
accountability. 
Both these strategies, 
however, work when there 
is a public-minded 
majority interested in the 
protection of the common 
good. If there is no such 
majority, democratic 
instruments could be used 
to tyrannise the majority. 
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more solidaristic and empathic direction. Education does not 
necessarily mean paternalism, dogmatism and a forceful imposition 
of views. But it may involve nudging (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). the 
public towards valuable options, or at 
least providing the public with a set of 
valuable options to choose from (Raz, 
1988). As far as anti-paternalistic 
populism is moving in precisely the 
opposite direction, it is a most serious 
danger to the future of democracy and 
liberalism.  
  
One option would be an 
attempt to sanitise the idea 
of political perfectionism 
and political education with 
the goal of constructing 
public-minded majorities. 
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 DEMOCRACY AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: 
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TO 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY  
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
JACEK KUCHARCZYK AND FILIP PAZDERSKI 
While representative democracy remains the preferable form of government for 
a vast majority of Europeans, the satisfaction with the way democracy is 
practised varies greatly across Europe’s regions (east and west, north and south) 
and among the citizens of different member states. Likewise, different aspects of 
democratic governance are differently evaluated by European publics, with the 
fight against corruption and low resilience to disinformation perceived as key 
weaknesses. The data from a number of studies of European and global public 
opinion also indicate that commitment to democracy varies across Europe and 
that, in some countries, significant majorities find non-democratic models as 
desirable alternatives. Public opinion remains rather critical and distrustful of 
political elites; hence many Europeans tend to support direct democracy 
mechanisms as a way to keep their elites more accountable. This chapter suggests 
that increasing Europeans’ commitment to democracy requires twin changes. 
First, European democratic elites should adopt a different language and develop 
political narratives that would counteract (and not imitate) the populists’ 
divisive narratives. Second, new policies addressing genuine citizens’ concerns 
need to be developed and implemented, while EU institutions should more 
consistently ensure that democratic standards are observed in all member states.   
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3.1 Introduction: Democracy in Europe 30 years 
after the fall of the wall 
Recent celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the fall of communism 
in central and eastern Europe and the 15th anniversary of the 2004 EU 
big bang enlargement have generated an intense debate about the 
state of democracy in Europe and the commitment of its citizenry to 
democracy as a European value and as a political practice across the 
member states. Thirty years after the triumph of democracy over 
dictatorship and the peaceful reunification of the continent, the mood 
of the celebrations was sober, if not gloomy. The old certainties about 
the inevitability of democratic progress have been replaced by 
warnings that democracy’s global future is being challenged by the 
growing influence of authoritarian 
states such as China and Russia and 
by the rise of authoritarian populist 
parties in new and established 
democracies. As authors analysing 
results of the World Values Survey 
aptly observe “In a world where 
most citizens fervently support 
democracy, where anti-system 
parties are marginal or non-existent, and where major political forces 
respect the rules of the political game, democratic breakdown is 
extremely unlikely”. But as the same authors add: “It is no longer 
certain, however, that this is the world we live in” (Foa and Mounk, 
2016: 16). 
There seems to be solid empirical evidence of democratic 
reversals in many parts of the world, including the European Union. 
The recent report of the reputable Swedish research organisation IDEA 
claims that three EU member states (Hungary, Poland and Romania) 
have experienced “severe democratic backsliding” in recent years 
(IDEA, 2019: 215). The same report also points out to “general malaise 
within mainstream political parties across most of Europe and 
particularly in Western European countries”, which creates fertile 
grounds for the rise of “non-traditional parties, such as populist, 
extremist and anti-establishment parties” (IDEA, 2019: 212). 
The old certainties about the 
inevitability of democratic 
progress have been replaced by 
warnings that democracy’s global 
future is being challenged by the 
growing influence of authoritarian 
states and by the rise of 
authoritarian populist parties. 
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At the same time, the evidence from a number of studies of 
public opinion attitudes across Europe indicates that most EU 
citizens are still committed to the value of 
democracy and yet are not fully satisfied 
with the current democratic practice in 
their country. A significant minority is 
willing to contemplate alternatives to 
democratic governance, while a large part 
of the public wants democracy to be 
renewed rather than abandoned. (Reynié, 2019: 46). This chapter 
looks at these attitudes in more detail, including differences and 
similarities across different parts of the EU (east-west, north-south) 
and across different member states. 
3.2 What do Europeans think about democracy and 
its alternatives? 
There are various ways to evaluate what people think about 
democracy, the most basic one being to ask their opinion about the 
best political system. This overall opinion on democracy can be 
further explored by applying other measurements, such as 
satisfaction with the state of democracy in their country and the 
evaluation of some specific aspects of democracy as it is practised 
here and now. Thus, we can evaluate how procedural requirements 
are fulfilled (related to electoral processes, the representativeness of 
the system or observance of political rights and civic freedoms), what 
is the level of inclusiveness and sense of having influence on the 
course of events in the country (including direct democracy 
mechanisms), as well as the system’s 
efficiency (to what extent it delivers 
solutions to the most important social 
challenges and helps in counteracting 
social inequalities).  
On the most general level, large majorities of people across 
Europe have a positive view of representative democracy. In this 2017 
study by Pew Research Centre as many as 80% of Europeans agree 
that such a political system is either good or very good.  
However, the same study concludes that this overall support 
for democracy differs between various age groups and is significantly 
Most EU citizens are still 
committed to the value of 
democracy and yet are not 
fully satisfied with the 
current democratic practice 
in their country. 
Large majorities of people 
across Europe have  
a positive view of 
representative democracy. 
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lower among younger citizens. Moreover, the strength of support for 
representative democracy differs from country to country, with 
Sweden being the only country in this survey where an absolute 
majority agreed that representative democracy is a very good system. 
The same survey also indicated relatively low satisfaction with the 
way democracy works in a particular country, which indicates a gap 
between the general appreciation of democracy as a political system 
and the way it is seen to function here and now.  
Figure 3.1 The evaluation of representative democracy as a political system 
in selected EU countries and beyond  
 
Note: Question: Would a democratic system where representatives elected by 
citizens decide what becomes law be a good or bad way of governing this country? 
Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes, Fetterolf, Pew Research Center, 2017: 20. 
 
The data show large cross-national differences in how people 
view the current state of democracy in their country. In Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Germany, UK and Poland, majorities are satisfied with 
the way democracy is working, while in Greece, Bulgaria, the UK, 
Italy and Spain, two-thirds or more are 
dissatisfied. One could add that the 
level of satisfaction with the operation 
of democracy in a given country is not 
always related to the way democracy is 
evaluated by external observers. The two illustrations are Poland, 
which has suffered a severe democratic reversal in recent years, and 
The data show large cross-
national differences in how 
people view the current state 
of democracy in their country. 
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even more so Russia, where a large part of the public seems to be 
satisfied with its democratic performance, in spite of the 
authoritarian turn this country has taken since 2011.  
Figure 3.2 Satisfaction with the way democracy works in particular countries  
 
Note: Question: How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working in our country? 
Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes, Fetterolf, Pew Research Center, 2017: 13.  
 
A more recent study by Pew indicates some interesting changes 
in respect to satisfaction with democracy in the EU. We can observe 
a growth of dissatisfaction in several western and northern EU 
member states with a relatively high level of satisfaction (e.g. in 
Sweden to 28%, Netherlands to 31%, and Germany to 36%). In the 
UK, the already relatively high dissatisfaction with the way 
democracy works has further increased (from 52% to 69%) as the 
citizens witnessed the British Parliament struggling to “get Brexit 
done”. At the same time, there has been some improvement in a 
number of southern European countries as the high levels of 
dissatisfaction with democracy have decreased in France (falling 
from 65% to 58%), Spain (from 74% to 68%) and Greece (from 79% to 
74%). Notably, the dissatisfaction with democracy has also fallen in 
the countries of central-eastern Europe, including Poland and 
Hungary. (Pew Research Center, 2019: 43).  
On the other hand, this generally low level of satisfaction with 
democracy can be also related to prevalent awareness that democracy 
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is under threat in one’s own country indicated by the Open Society 
Foundation study (Bui-Wrzosińska, 2019: 6). This study shows that 
concerns about the future of democracy are shared by the majorities 
of all seven surveyed publics (in Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and to a lesser extent in the Czech 
Republic). However, understanding the detailed reasons for this 
situation would require more in-depth studies within each of the 
countries. 
Figure 3.3 Levels of commitment to democracy in various European countries 
 
Source: Commitment to representative democracy index – Wike, Simmons, Stokes, 
Fetterolf, Pew Research Center, 2017: 5. 
 
The Pew Research 2017 report also provides some insight into 
this paradox of the considerable satisfaction among citizens with 
democracy in their country and its negative evaluation by external 
entities basing their judgements on 
various objective criteria. It reveals that 
the commitment to democracy differs 
across Europe and in many countries 
small but significant minorities are 
willing to consider non-democratic 
options. The countries experiencing 
democratic backsliding (Hungary and Poland) as well as Russia stand 
out on both counts: a relatively low overall commitment to 
Commitment to democracy 
differs across Europe and in 
many countries, small but 
significant minorities are 
willing to consider non-
democratic options. 
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democracy as well as significant support for authoritarian 
alternatives.  
The survey indicates that people living in more democratic, 
wealthier nations are more committed to representative democracy, 
but it also shows that some in high-
income countries would be willing 
to consider non-democratic 
alternatives.  
It is also important that the 
dissatisfaction with how 
democracies work and deliver is 
growing over time in Europe and in 
the US. The analysis of data from the World Values Survey also 
reveals that younger citizens are significantly more susceptible to 
‘democratic fatigue’.   
Figure 3.4 Change in the levels of negative evaluation of democracy  
 
 
Note: Answers to “Having a democratic political system” is a “bad” or “very bad” 
“way to run this country”. 
Source: World Values Surveys, Waves 3 to 6 (1995–2014). Data for Europe includes a 
constant country sample in both waves: Germany, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Romania, Poland, and the United Kingdom. Valid responses: United States, 1995: 
1,452; United States, 2011: 2,164; European countries, 1995–97: 6,052; European 
countries, 2010–12: 8,197. –Foa, Mounk, 2016:  9. 
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The conclusion that younger cohorts of citizens are less 
committed to representative democracy is further corroborated by an 
international survey conducted in 2019 in 
42 countries around the world (including 
27 EU member states). It indicates 
significant support for some alternatives to 
representative democracy, some of them 
with clear authoritarian implications (see Figure 3.5).  
Figure 3.5 Age gap in attitudes towards non-democratic ways of governing 
the country  
 
Note: Question: Indicate whether this way of governing a country is/would be very 
good, good, bad, or very bad; Total responses: “very good” and “good”. 
Source: Muxel, 2019, Fondation pour l’innovation politique/International 
Republican Institute: 45. 
 
Furthermore, studies focusing on central Europe show that the 
youngest citizens there tend to value higher living standards and 
access to goods more than democratic values in their country 
(Gyárfášova, Molnár, Krekó, Pazderski, Wessenauer, NDI 2018: 6; 
Pazderski, 2019: 25-26). 
The data thus reveal that Europeans remain broadly 
supportive of representative democracy but their commitment to 
democratic governance and satisfaction with the way democracy 
works varies across Europe and – in some countries – paves the way 
to non-democratic alternatives. The wavering commitment to 
democratic values seems to affect younger voters in particular. In 
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what follows we will look more closely at how EU citizens evaluate 
particular aspects of democratic practices in their respective countries 
and whether being a citizen in a democracy gives them a sense of 
control and influence on how the country is governed.   
Figure 3.6 Level of satisfaction with various aspects of democracy in Europe  
 
Note: Question: How satisfied or not are you with the following aspects of democracy 
in the European Union?; % - EU; n=24,808. Source: Eurobarometer, 2018: 73. 
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concrete aspects of democracy as it is practised in their countries. One 
set of findings that provides a more detailed evaluation of democratic 
practices comes from the Eurobarometer. 
Thus, people in Europe tend to be relatively critical regarding 
how democracy works in particular areas. Not only are various 
dimensions in which we can evaluate democracy being differently 
graded, but some dimensions are 
evaluated positively by only a minority 
of Europeans. This low evaluation 
especially concerns the fight against 
corruption and disinformation, as well as political parties’ connection 
(or rather disconnection) with ordinary people and their interests. 
One should also notice that large portions (not majorities) of 
public opinion of many EU countries are dissatisfied with the 
implementation of some important aspects of democracy, such as the 
rule of law, possibilities for civil society to play its role and media 
diversity. Moreover, there are also some significant differences in 
evaluating particular aspects of democracy between the citizens of 
different EU member states.  
An important example of different levels of satisfaction with 
aspects of democratic governance in the European Union is the issue 
of rule of law. The alleged backsliding in this area was the reason why 
the proceedings under Article 7 of the TEU were initiated against two 
member states (Poland in 2018 and Hungary in 2019) (cf. Chapter 14). 
Interestingly, the data below indicates that dissatisfaction with rule of 
law is relatively strong in some countries, particularly in southern and 
eastern member states, but neither the public in Poland nor in Hungary 
seems to be particularly dissatisfied or aware of the problems in this 
area. Just one-third of all respondents in Poland and 38% of 
Hungarians are dissatisfied with the rule of law in their countries, 
compared with 46% of Spaniards as well as 62% of Slovaks. There 
might be two possible (not mutually exclusive) explanations for this 
fact. Firstly, the Eurobarometer question concerns both the 
independent judiciary and integrity of the electoral system.  It can be 
presumed that elections are still perceived by both supporters and 
opponents of the ruling parties in Poland and Hungary as a relatively 
open process, with opposition parties able to score significant victories, 
as was the case in the municipal elections in Poland in 2018 as well as 
in Hungary in 2019. Secondly, the supporters of the ruling parties and 
People in Europe tend to be 
relatively critical regarding 
how democracy works. 
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many undecided voters tend not to believe the allegations of 
democratic deconsolidation and instead trust national institutions 
more than their fellow citizens voting for the parties in opposition 
(Penno Hartlová, Bútorová, Wessenauer, Pazderski, 2019: 25). In 
Poland, the supporters of the ruling party subscribe to a majoritarian 
definition of democracy and tend to believe the official version that the 
dismantling of the independent judiciary is an attempt to bring the 
judicial system closer to the needs and interests of ‘the people’ 
(Pazderski, 2019: 21-22). This is a part of a broader phenomenon of 
“asymmetric political polarisation”, where the supporters of the ruling 
party remain “ideologically cohesive, tightly knit, and politically 
mobilised”, while the opposition is “fragmented and mobilises 
primarily in reaction to the government’s policies and rhetoric” 
(Fomina, 2019: 126).  
Figure 3.7 Level of satisfaction with a rule of law in Europe  
 
Note: Question: How satisfied or not are you with the following aspects of 
democracy in the European Union? Rule of law, e.g. respect for independence of the 
judiciary, the integrity and impartiality of the electoral system; in %; n=24,808]. 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2018: 82. 
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As we shall see, the sense that 
democratic institutions are not 
representing people’s interests is fairly 
pervasive in Europe, and not limited to 
those countries experiencing democratic 
backsliding.  
 
3.3 Europeans’ sense of democratic empowerment 
One of the most important ways of evaluating democracy is related 
to whether the people feel empowered (or not), that is, whether they 
see themselves as having a voice and influence in political life. In this 
respect, once again, we can observe important differences between 
individual EU member states. The recent Eurobarometer data 
indicate relatively high levels of empowerment, with two-thirds of all 
Europeans declaring their satisfaction with their ability to take part 
in the political process.  
Figure 3.8 Level of satisfaction with a regular citizen’s possibility for 
political participation in Europe  
 
Note: Question: How satisfied or not are you with the following aspects of 
democracy in the European Union? Possibility for individual citizens to participate 
in political life, e.g. as candidates in elections, members of political parties; in %; 
n=24,808. 
Source: Eurobarometer, 2018: 77. 
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The sense that democratic 
institutions are not 
representing people’s 
interests is not limited to 
those countries experiencing 
democratic backsliding. 
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The authors of a recent study on attitudes to democracy on the 
30th anniversary of democratic transitions in Europe come to a similar 
conclusion: 
“Despite the misgivings many Europeans have about the way 
democracy is working, most still believe they can have an 
influence on the direction of their country. In every nation 
surveyed, roughly half or more agree that voting gives people 
like them some say about how the government runs things. And 
about seven-in-ten or more express this view in Spain, Sweden, 
Slovakia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as in 
the U.S.” (Pew Research Center, 2019: 10). 
Figure 3.9 Belief that politicians tend to hear the needs of the people  
 
Note: Percentage of people who disagree/agree that most elected officials care about 
what people like them think; “Don’t know” responses not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center, 2019:10. 
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However, the above-quoted study also indicates high levels of 
frustration with the democratic elites in Europe. Relatively few 
Europeans believe that elected officials care about what citizens feel. 
A powerful sense of disconnection between the people and the 
ruling elite can be seen in the results of another study conducted in 
42 countries (including 27 EU member states). Importantly, only a 
little more than one in three respondents believe that their country is 
run by ‘elected officials’, whereas ‘politicians’ are indicated by two-
thirds of respondents, followed by ‘rich people’ and ‘large 
companies’.1  
Figure 3.10 Entities perceived as holding the most power in the country  
 
Note: Results for 42 states. * Option proposed in parliamentary monarchies only. 
Source: Reynié, Fondation pour l’innovation politique/International Republican 
Institute, 2019: 26. 
On average, opinion in European Union democracies varies 
little when it comes to these results. On the other hand, country by 
country, there are major divergences within the democracies 
evaluated (Reynié, 2019: 26-27). Elected representatives, cited as 
holding power by an average of 35% of respondents, are most 
frequently selected by inhabitants of rather more established 
democracies – Luxembourgers (54%), Swedes (51%) and Estonians 
(50%; this last country being only ‘new’ EU member state in this 
                                                        
1 Respondents were given a possibility to answer with three options: “first”, then 
“second” and “third”. The total of the mentions, for a designated entity, is 
therefore the sum of all mentions in the positions: “first”, “second” or “third”. 
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group). Respondents in the countries known for large corruption 
scandals, connections between politicians and big business or 
seriously affected by the last economic recession select this option 
least frequently. This latter group includes Cypriots (16%), Italians 
and Greeks (20%). Moreover, elected representatives are even less 
likely to be selected by younger respondents. Politicians, cited on 
average by 66% of respondents, are instead most commonly chosen 
by citizens in relatively younger democracies. Likewise, a significant 
percentage of respondents selected rich people, including 71% of 
Bulgarians, 62% of Hungarians and 60% of Slovaks. 
Looking at public opinion in Europe, we can conclude that 
while people appear to be fairly satisfied by their opportunities to 
take part in the democratic process, they are less appreciative of the 
political outcome. Only a minority believes that they are really 
governed by their elected representatives.  
3.4 Attitudes towards direct forms of democracy 
Probably because of its perceived deficiencies, representative democracy 
seems to compete for popular support (in various parts of Europe and 
the world to different degrees) with its more direct version.  
Figure 3.11 Attitudes towards representative and direct democracy  
 
Note: Question: For each one, indicate whether this way of governing a country is/would 
be very good, good, bad, or very bad; Total responses: “very good” and “good”. 
Source: Reynié, Fondation pour l’innovation politique/International Republican 
Institute, 2019: 25. 
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As this global survey indicates, while citizens of EU countries 
are strongly committed to a system of parliamentary control over the 
government, a large majority also 
agrees that ‘citizens’ and not a 
‘government’ should decide what is 
best for the country. This can be 
interpreted as desire for more direct 
forms of democratic control than 
representative democracy. Indeed, 
such is the conclusion that can be 
drawn from the following data. 
Figure 3.12 Differences in evaluating direct democracy between various 
countries 
 
Note: Question: Would a democratic system where citizens, not elected officials, vote 
directly on major national issues to decide what becomes law be a good or bad way 
of governing this country? 
Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes, Fetterolf, Pew Research Center, 2017: 22. 
 
Interestingly, while a significant majority of Europeans appear 
positively inclined towards direct democracy, the average percentage 
of Europeans who think that it is ‘very good’ way of governing their 
county is equal to the percentage of those who think it is a bad idea. 
As one could expect, relatively low support for direct democracy 
While citizens of EU countries 
are strongly committed to 
parliamentary control, a 
 large majority also agrees  
that ‘citizens’ and not a 
‘government’ should decide 
what is best for the country. 
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comes from those countries with high satisfaction regarding the 
functioning of representative democracy.   
The same study indicates that 
direct democracy seems to be particularly 
popular among the supporters of 
populist or far-right parties. This can be 
explained by pointing out that the ideas of direct democracy and 
populism both appeal to the sense of disenchantment with political 
elites. 
Figure 3.13 Populist party supporters’ attitudes to direct democracy  
 
Note: Question: A democratic system where citizens, not elected officials, vote 
directly on major national issues to decide what becomes law would be a good way 
of governing this country. 
Source: Wike, Simmons, Stokes, Fetterolf, Pew Research Center, 2017: 23. 
Direct democracy seems to be 
particularly popular among 
the supporters of populist or 
far-right parties. 
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3.5 Conclusions and recommendations  
The evidence reviewed in this chapter reveals that 30 years after the 
fall of communist dictatorships in Europe, a vast majority of 
Europeans remain committed to democracy as a political system and 
support its ‘building blocks’ such as free and fair elections, free 
speech or an independent judiciary. There are persistent divisions 
between western and eastern as well as northern and southern parts 
of the EU in terms of the satisfaction with the way democracy 
functions in different member states, but, at the same time, citizens 
generally feel empowered by the democratic process, even if they 
resent some of its outcomes. While different publics may prioritise 
some aspects of representative democracy over others, e.g. free 
speech over the rights of opposition parties, in each case there are 
majorities endorsing such democratic values.2 In short, people want 
democratic values to be upheld rather than replaced by some 
alternative value system, for example what Mr Orbán calls “illiberal 
democracy”. 
At the same time, Europeans expect democracy to work for the 
benefit of ordinary people, not just the political or economic elites. 
Their biggest discontent concerns political elites, which are often 
perceived (rightly or wrongly) as disconnected with their citizenry, 
often selfish if not corrupt. This sense of alienated elites makes direct 
democracy appealing for many Europeans, although in the context of 
the overall support for representative democracy, the mechanisms of 
direct democracy should perhaps be 
seen as augmenting rather than 
replacing existing democratic 
institutions and practices. 
The negative assessment of the 
European political and opinion-making 
elites clearly contributes to the upsurge 
in support for populist parties and movements, which denounce the 
                                                        
2 As shown by the Voices of Values study, in most of six surveyed European 
societies (excluding Italy) there are significant majorities that are broad 
supporters of open society values (related to liberal democracy and cultural 
diversity). But part of this group are people with significant economic, political 
and cultural concerns (Eichorn, Mohr, 2018: 23). 
The negative assessment of 
the European political and 
opinion-making elites clearly 
contributes to the upsurge in 
support for populist parties 
and movements. 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE EU  55 
 
existing elites and promise to create a more direct relation between 
the rulers and the ruled, often in disregard of ‘formal’ democratic 
procedures. While we can observe a parallel between negative views 
on democratic elites among many Europeans and populist narratives, 
we should beware of taking these narratives at face value, as a 
plausible explanation of what is wrong with democracy in Europe.  
In response to the above-mentioned challenges, the following 
activities could be beneficial: 
 Political elites in Europe (including Brussels elites) should 
change their language and communicate better.  It is crucial for 
European political leaders to listen to and acknowledge citizens’ 
concerns. At the same time, it needs to be stressed that adopting 
softer versions of populist narratives, for example on migrants 
or sexual majorities, should not be seen as an effective way of 
closing the gap between the citizens and their elected 
representatives. On the contrary, it may make more extreme 
forms of exclusionary language used by populists more credible 
and attractive for broader publics.  
 Moreover, the same democratic political elites should re-invent 
the language they use to speak about democracy. Referring to 
legal norms and rule of law may be not engaging enough and 
too ‘cold’ to generate positive responses among wider publics 
within European societies. Instead, politicians, experts and 
opinion makers should start speaking 
about democracy and rule of law 
using the language of peoples’ 
interests and try to show that direct 
benefits come from fulfilling legal 
standards and securing rule of law mechanisms for individuals 
and communities. All these activities should be dedicated to 
building stronger emotional bonds between individual citizens 
and the democratic system and its standards. 
 However, changing the language of democratic politics would 
not be enough. We also need new policies. Therefore, in order to 
regain credibility, established political actors on national and 
European levels should propose some concrete, realistic 
solutions to the most important concerns of citizens. The latter 
include implementing social and economic rights and 
Democratic political elites 
should re-invent the 
language they use to  
speak about democracy. 
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responding to the dramatically accelerating climate crisis 
(Dennison, Leonard, Lury, 2019: 16-17). Various studies indicate 
that these issues are also crucial for the youngest generation, 
(Gyárfášova, Molnár, Krekó, Pazderski, Wessenauer, NDI 2018: 
...6, Pazderski, 2019: 17, 23 and 29). Thus, by addressing these 
concerns, elected officials would have a chance to rekindle 
interest and belief in democracy among the youth as well as 
channel their energies towards democratic forms of 
participation.  
 Decision-makers within the European institutions as well as 
member states should recognise significant differences in the 
way the citizens of EU member states evaluate the state of 
democracy in their respective countries as many studies that 
informed this paper reveal. This uneven democratic 
performance should be seen as a challenge for European 
institutions and decision-makers, as it often implies 
infringement of European values as defined in Article 2 of TEU 
and the European acquis communitaire. Enforcing democratic 
standards and rule of law across the EU should therefore take 
priority over concerns with a possible Eurosceptic backlash in 
some member states. The publics in Poland and Hungary have 
remained strongly pro-European despite the steps taken against 
their governments’ policies and their respective governments’ 
rejections of “Brussels interventions”. 
 Studies indicate that the failure to tackle corruption and the 
spread of disinformation are some of the most important sources 
of discontent with the state of democracy in Europe. The EU 
already has institutions in place that could support national 
governments effectively in tackling these issues.  
 These institutions include the East StratCom Task Force, which 
is currently part of the EEAS with the mandate to fight 
disinformation in the EU’s neighbourhood. This unit should be 
promptly provided with greater resources and increase its scope 
of activities to counter disinformation in EU member states. 
 Likewise, the newly established office of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, an independent Union body competent to 
fight crimes regarding the Union budget, could address cases of 
corruption throughout the EU. The office should especially focus 
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on cases where populist governments direct EU funds to their 
political cronies, who reciprocate by providing political support 
to these governments, e.g. by buying independent media and 
turning them into propaganda tools for the governments.  
 The proposed mechanism linking the distribution of EU funds to 
respect of the rule of law should be implemented within the new 
financial perspective. Its effective implementation would go a 
long way to prevent backsliding governments from buying 
political support with EU funds. 
 Last but not least, the European Commission and other actors 
should ensure that infringements of European values, such as 
democracy and rule of law, are addressed equally across the 
Union. Different speeds of actions under Article 7 of the TEU 
(largely due to the reluctance of the EPP faction to censure Mr 
Orbán) has been used by Poland’s PiS party to claim that their 
government is singled out unfairly. While the actions under 
Article 7 should be vigorously pursued during the current 
Commission’s term of office, they should be followed up by 
regular audits of the state of democracy within each member 
state.  
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 THE EMOTIONAL LANDSCAPE 
OF EUROPEAN VOTERS 
CATHARINA SØRENSEN AND 
WILLIAM ROHDE MADSEN 
Examining public opinion towards the EU as detected across the Union’s 
member states around the time of the 2019 European Parliament elections makes 
it possible to analyse the underlying sentiments of European voters as the EU 
enters the post-Brexit era. The election results, as well as concomitant opinion 
surveys, portray a divided citizenry. On the one hand, support for EU 
membership, and feelings of benefit from, and of being heard in, the EU, are at 
historically high levels – and voter turnout was at its highest level since 1994. 
On the other hand, support for populist, Eurosceptic parties is high and growing 
in several countries, and a majority of European citizens today doubt their 
children face better prospects than did their parents. A staggering 28% of 
Europeans believe it is realistic to expect a war between EU member states 
within the next 10 years. This duality shows that the oft-assumed inference that 
populist voters reject European integration is empirically weak, but, 
simultaneously, that there seems to be a consistent disconnect in many voters’ 
minds between national and European politics.  
4.1 Introduction: One election. Two conclusions. 
Have European elections entered a new dimension? This question 
was the title of the official post-electoral survey from the European 
Parliament, published in September 2019 (European Parliament, 
2019). The report does not provide a direct answer to its own 
question, but the subheadings and tone of its various chapters are 
affirmative. The results across member states from the May vote are 
interpreted as an indication that, among citizens, there is today ‘an 
enhanced sense of importance in these elections’, which are now 
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viewed as ‘a central part of democratic life’ (ibid). Findings of the 
highest turnout levels since 1994, and historically high levels of 
support on key indicators of EU attitudes, 
back the idea of a positive momentum in 
EU public opinion. 51% of the electorate 
voted in the 2019-elections, while 59% 
thought that their country’s membership 
of the EU was a ‘good thing’. Both figures 
represent an increase in popular support 
of eight percentage points since 2014.  
In this chapter we assess these optimistic findings from the 
European Parliament’s post-electoral study against the concomitant 
signals from recent surveys that European citizens today feel 
disillusioned by politics and even with democracy as such (De Vries 
and Hoffmann, 2016). According to Brussels media outlet Politico, 
populist, Eurosceptic parties1 won more than one-third of the vote in 
the EU elections in eight member states, including in four of the six 
biggest countries: France, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom 
(Pawelec and Piccinelli, 2019).  
How to make sense of these parallel findings of political 
optimism and pessimism among Europeans today? In the following, 
we first examine public opinion towards the EU as evidenced 
through recent surveys in order to establish commonalities and 
differences in voter sentiment across the member states. We then look 
at the actual European Parliament results. We question the common 
expectation that populist and/or dissatisfied voters also reject 
European integration, but, simultaneously, we suggest that for many 
voters, national and European politics remain two disconnected 
spheres.  
                                                        
1 The terms ‘Eurosceptic’ and ‘populist’ are used in a vast variety of ways, leading 
to uneven classifications. This chapter builds on the classification by the media 
Politico. For an academic definition and conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, see 
Sørensen, 2007. For the 2CU’s take on ‘populist’, see Blockmans and Russack, 
2018.  
The highest turnout levels 
since 1994, and historically 
high levels of support on 
key indicators of EU 
attitudes, back the idea of 
a positive momentum in 
EU public opinion. 
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4.2 The good news 
In the still lingering aftermath of the Eurozone financial crisis and a 
migration crisis that hit many EU countries hard, and just after a 
decision by the EU’s third-largest member 
state – the United Kingdom – to leave, the 
fact that public support for the Union is at 
an historic high represents a piece of 
remarkably good news for supporters of 
European integration.  
The European Parliament’s post-
electoral survey includes three main indicators of EU attitudes: 
membership support, feeling of benefit from membership and 
perception of one’s voice being heard in the EU.  
As to perceptions of membership, the 59% of the population 
across the EU-28 which thinks that their country’s membership of the 
EU is a ‘good thing’ is just three percentage points short of a high 
point of 62% in 2018. It is not since 1992, when the Union consisted of 
just 12 member states, that appreciation of membership has been at 
these high levels. 
Almost seven out of 10 citizens, 68%, think that their country 
has ‘benefitted from membership’, which is the joint highest level 
recorded since the Eurobarometer surveys started to include this 
question in 1983. And with 56% who agree that their ‘voice counts in 
the EU’, a question which was first asked in 2002, this is also the most 
positive result ever recorded.  
Turnout was a piece of equally good news for EU supporters, 
with the highest level of voter participation in European elections in 
20 years. The post-electoral survey found that the high media 
coverage and discussions on Brexit had had an encouraging impact 
on citizens’ decisions to vote, rather than to abstain, with just under 
a quarter of Europeans (22%) saying that Brexit had played a role, at 
least to some extent, in encouraging them to turn up at the polling 
booth. Nonetheless, the survey report also links the higher turnout to 
a combination of a growing sense of civic duty among Europeans and 
a stronger sense that voting matters and can make things change, 
which suggests that this is a development that could continue in 
future elections. 
The fact that public 
support for the Union is at 
an historic high represents 
a piece of remarkably good 
news for supporters of 
European integration. 
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For a European Union that has been marred by perpetual crises 
over the past decade, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of 
this double positive message of increasing voter turnout, on the one 
hand, and historically high EU approval rates on the other hand. It is 
exactly this kind of message that can give the EU’s new leadership in 
the European Commission the boost of optimism it needs to create 
momentum around its evolving strategy for the coming five years.  
4.3 The bad news 
That optimism boost is much needed, as there are plenty of alarm 
bells about the health of contemporary public opinion from other 
surveys. Around the time of the EU elections, a poll published by the 
European Council on Foreign Relations 
(ECFR) showed that in two of the EU’s 
biggest countries, the predominant feeling 
about life among citizens was a negative 
one: fear about life in France, and stress 
about life in Italy (Dennison, 2019). The 
survey also found that three-quarters of Europeans felt that either 
their national political system, the European political system, or both, 
were broken, and that a staggering 28% of Europeans believed it was 
realistic to expect a war between EU member states within the next 
10 years (ibid). Also in 2019, a survey by eupinions showed that 51% 
of the population in the EU are ‘worried about the state of society’ 
while 49% are not. This societal worry is not primarily about 
economics, as much fewer, 35%, claim that they feel ‘economically 
anxious’ (De Vries and Hoffmann, 2019). Moreover, trust in key 
national institutions has been worryingly low for a while. 
Eurobarometer data from June 2019, for instance, shows that just over 
one-third of Europeans (34%) have trust in their own national 
parliament. Since the onset of the economic and financial crisis in 
2008, across the Union, the feeling of distrust in the national 
parliament has often come out more than 30 percentage points higher 
than feelings of trust in this institution (Eurobarometer Interactive 
Search System, question: ‘Trust in the [national] parliament’). Trust 
in the European Union, at 44% across the EU-28 in June 2019, has 
improved somewhat after a low period in the early to mid-2010s, 
where it polled at just 31%, but the level of trust is still nowhere near 
its former high level of 58% in 2007 (ibid).  
Optimism is much needed, 
as there are plenty of 
alarm bells about the 
health of contemporary 
public opinion. 
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These findings of public disillusionment provide a 
disconcerting backdrop to recent reports about a gathering process of 
‘autocratisation’ across many parts of the globe, including Europe, 
where actual falls in democracy levels have been noted in some 
European countries during the last decade (Godfrey and Youngs, 
2019, Youngs, 2019). Indeed, if democratic backsliding is occurring at 
the will of, or indifference of, a growing number of people, there is 
reason for concern about the state of democracy.   
A Pew Research survey from 2017 showed that substantial 
percentages across the EU are today 
willing to consider non-democratic 
options as possible alternatives to 
representative democracy (Wike et al., 
2017). The survey asked respondents in 
ten EU countries to declare their 
openness to various forms of 
government. Even in Sweden, where there was the largest share of 
the population (62%) committed to democratic government, 40% of 
the respondents were listed as ‘less committed’, meaning that while 
they did support representative democracy, they declared at the same 
time their openness to a non-democratic form of government (rule by 
experts, a strong leader, or the military). In Hungary, the share of ‘less 
committed’ was 60%.  
4.4 The nuanced view 
With respect to both turnout at the European Parliament elections, 
and the state of public opinion, the complete story is one of large 
differences between individual member states.  
Among those countries, where voting is not compulsory (i.e. 
the EU-28 with the exception of Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece 
and Luxembourg), turnout ranged from 
73% in Malta and 66% in Denmark, to 23% 
in Slovakia and 29% in the Czech 
Republic. It is a sign of the persistent 
democratic challenge that in a quarter of 
the Union’s member states, only one-third, or less, of the electorate 
bothered to vote. Table 4.1 lists turnout levels across the EU. 
If democratic backsliding is 
occurring at the will of, or 
indifference of, a growing 
number of people, there is 
reason for concern about the 
state of democracy. 
In a quarter of the Union’s 
member states, only one 
third, or less, of the 
electorate bothered to vote. 
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Table 4.1 Turnout by country at the 2019 European elections 
 
Source: European Parliament. 
Among the bottom ten turnout performers, seven are central or 
east European countries. At first sight, this considerable 
overrepresentation of the ‘newer’ member states confirms the 
persistence of an east/west gap in the EU; however, if we look at the 
development in turnout since 2014, it is 
precisely in central and eastern Europe 
where there is the greatest positive change in 
voter participation rates. As Table 4.2 shows, 
across the EU-28, Poland saw the most pronounced increase (22 points) 
in turnout, followed by Romania (18 points). In fact, among the ten 
countries, where turnout rose the most, half are from central and 
eastern Europe. The takeaway, thus, is one of cautious optimism that the 
east/west divide in voter participation may be becoming less relevant. 
Table 4.2 Change in voter turnout rate at the European elections from 2014 to 2019 
 
Source: European Parliament. 
 
The east/west divide in 
voter participation may 
be becoming less relevant. 
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As to the various indicators of contemporary public opinion 
cited in this chapter, Table 4.3 below gives an overview of the five 
highest and lowest scoring member states. As neither the survey from 
the ECFR, Pew Research, nor eupinions, provide a breakdown of 
figures for all 28 member states of the EU (they focus on, respectively, 
14, 10 and 6 member states), we only include data from the EU-wide 
Eurobarometer.  
Table 4.3 EU support: Top- and bottom-scoring member states 
 Most positive Least positive 
Membership ‘a good 
thing’ 
LU – IE – DE – NL – DK CZ – IT – EL – HR – SK 
Membership 
‘beneficial’ 
LT – IE – EE – PL – 
DK/LU 
IT – BG – UK – EL – FR 
My voice counts  
in EU 
SE – DK – NL – DE – 
IE/PL 
LV – EL – EE – CY – CZ 
Trust EU LT – DK – EE – LU – FI EL – FR – CZ – IT – SK 
Trust national 
parliament 
SE – DK – FI – NL – LU HR – BG – LT – LV – CZ 
 
Interestingly, there is a tendency for the same countries to recur 
several times within the ‘most positive’ or ‘least positive’ columns, 
suggesting that it is possible to speak of a generally upbeat versus 
downbeat mood about the EU across the various member state 
populations. In the map below, we use the four EU-specific indicators 
to illustrate the geographical distribution of these sentiments, by 
giving the member states points according to how many times they 
appear at the extreme ends of the opinion spectrum.  
There is evidence of a particularly upbeat mood about the EU 
in the Union’s more affluent member states – especially in Denmark, 
Ireland and Luxembourg. That such strong EU support exists in the 
very two member states with the strongest record of having voted 
‘no’ to European integration in referendums, Denmark and Ireland, 
may provide some comfort to those who worry after the British Brexit 
referendum that ‘no votes’ leave a lasting sense of negativity 
surrounding European integration in the country. As there is also an 
upbeat EU sentiment in Finland, Germany, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, and to some extent in Estonia, it is 
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noteworthy that this group of countries largely corresponds to the 
member states mentioned in connection with recent ideas of a 
Hanseatic League II (for instance Arak, 2018). 
 
Figure 4.1 Upbeat or downbeat about the EU? 
 
 
 
In contrast, there are consistent, downbeat signals from several 
central and southern European countries, especially the Czech 
Republic, Greece and Italy. Interestingly, despite the long-standing 
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reputation of the British as the EU’s most Eurosceptic population, the 
United Kingdom is only among the five most critical member states 
with respect to one of the indicators, namely that about perceptions 
of benefit from the EU.  
With the exception of one country, Lithuania, the 
Eurobarometer indicator gauging sentiments about the national 
political climate – that of trust in the national parliament – does not 
add any country to these lists of top- and bottom-scoring member 
states in terms of EU support. In other words, the populations with 
the lowest degree of trust in their own parliament also figure among 
the populations with the lowest degree of EU support, and the 
populations with the highest degree of trust in their own parliament 
also figure among the populations with highest degree of EU 
support. The high degree of overlap suggests that EU support and 
general political outlook is strongly correlated. As mentioned, 
Lithuania is the exception, as its population has low trust in the 
national parliament, while at the same time figuring among the 
member states where there is the highest trust in the European Union 
and the highest sense of benefit from membership.  
4.5 Euroscepticism and the 2019 European 
Parliament results  
While it is largely recognised that populist, Eurosceptic parties did 
not make enough gains at the May 2019 elections to seize control of 
the European Parliament, they nonetheless improved their already 
strong standing in the previous parliament (Pawelec and Piccinelli, 
2019). And, as mentioned above, they came first in France, Italy, 
Poland and the United Kingdom – four of the EU’s six biggest 
member states. In terms of vote share, support for populist, 
Eurosceptic parties ranged from 62% in Hungary to 5% in Ireland 
(ibid.). Table 2.4 gives an overview of the performance of Eurosceptic 
parties. 
Comparing these election results with the findings on public EU 
attitudes listed above leads to an interesting observation: support for 
parties classified as Eurosceptic appears much higher than individual 
Eurosceptic attitudes. The Hungarians, for instance, voted to the 
greatest extent in the EU-28 for a Eurosceptic party, yet they are not 
among the five most Eurosceptic populations on any of the classic 
indicators of EU attitudes used in this chapter. The Poles voted 
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fourth-most for a Eurosceptic party, yet they actually feature among 
the Union’s most EU-supportive populations. 
Figure 4.2 Euroscepticism in the 2019 European elections 
 
Note: Data for Malta and Romania were unavailable. 
Source: Politico, European Parliament. 
 
To explore this observation further, we created a scatterplot 
(Figure 4.2) where member states are positioned according to their 
Eurosceptic vote share and their mean position on a question about 
desired speed of European integration (European Commission, 2019; 
Annex 1 lists the mean values). This latter indicator asks respondents 
whether European integration in their view should slow down or 
speed up, where 1 is ‘standing still’ and 7 is ‘running as fast as 
possible’.  
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Figure 4.3 Euroscepticism and the desired speed of European integration 
 
Note: National Eurosceptic vote share at the 2019 European elections plotted against 
citizens’ mean desired speed of EU integration (scale of 1-7). Data for Malta and 
Romania were unavailable. 
Source: Think Tank Europa, Politico, European Parliament. 
 
The results show that in Hungary and Italy, where the 
populations voted to the greatest extent for a Eurosceptic party, there 
is a mean desired integration speed of above 5. Looking at the 
position of the countries in Figure 4.2, it is clear that there is in fact no 
pattern between voting for Eurosceptic 
parties and wishing to bring the 
integration process to a halt. Put 
crudely, when citizens vote for these 
parties, it is more likely to be in spite of 
(or with indifference to) their 
Eurosceptic stance, rather than because of it. In this light, caution 
should be used when interpreting recent support for populist parties 
as a concomitant sign of strongly Eurosceptic public sentiment. The 
oft-assumed inference that populist voters reject European 
integration seems empirically weak. 
While this finding may appear comforting to supporters of 
European integration, it is at the same time a sign of concern for the 
ambition and prospect of establishing a Citizens’ Union (Blockmans 
and Russack, 2018), which assumes a bottom-up engagement in 
European affairs. Indeed, it points to a likely disconnect in many 
Caution should be used when 
interpreting recent support 
for populist parties as a 
concomitant sign of strongly 
Eurosceptic public sentiment. 
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voters’ minds between national and European politics, where the 
European dimension does not weigh heavily in the decision-making 
process ahead of an election to the European Parliament. 
Recommendation 
National parliaments should intensify efforts to bridge the disconnect 
in many voters’ minds between national and European politics. This 
chapter shows that there is no pattern between voting for Eurosceptic 
parties in the 2019 European Parliament elections and wishing to bring 
the EU integration process to a halt. Put crudely, when citizens vote for 
these parties, it is more likely to be in spite of (or with indifference to) 
their Eurosceptic stance, rather than because of it. This finding suggests 
a disconnect in the eyes of many citizens between national and 
European politics, which it is important to address in between 
elections, in order to maximise the relevance of the European elections. 
More focus on the European dimension in day-to-day discussions of 
national policies – for instance policies on climate change, migration or 
cyber security – is recommended. 
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 IMPROVING REPRESENTATIVENESS 
IN EUROPE: 
A STORY OF MISSED AND  
FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES 
DÍDAC GUTIÉRREZ-PERIS AND  
HÉCTOR SÁNCHEZ MARGALEF 
There have been attempts to improve representativeness in Europe since the very 
inception of the European project. This chapter explores the history and also 
analyses recent initiatives that have proven insufficient by themselves to 
improve representativeness, but that appear to have potential. Finally, it also 
provides policy recommendations that seek to make democracy function better in 
Europe by learning from missed opportunities and considering future 
opportunities. 
5.1 Introduction: Revisiting assumptions 
The 2005 rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
represented a wake-up call that fifteen years later is still very much 
relevant at the European level (Hix, 2008; Follesdal and Hix, 2006; 
Castiglione, 2007; Hennette, 2019). From a neo-functionalism 
perspective, the initial Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty was 
the beginning of the end of the permissive consensus (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2009) and the failure of the Constitution was the final nail in 
the coffin, signalling the advent of a new period where notions such 
as ‘democratic deficit’ and ‘crisis of legitimacy’ have become 
increasingly central (Schweiger, 2016; Longo and Murray, 2015). A 
new period, where the result of (perceived) lack of accountability – 
and consequently of representativeness has become central. From a 
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more political standpoint, the failed Constitution was also perceived 
as the tip of a much bigger iceberg regarding the way policymaking 
worked when dealing with European affairs.  
Such an understanding of the recent history of European 
integration is built on, at least, two major assumptions. The first 
portrays the failed referendums in France and Netherlands as 
something ‘unexpected’, often described as a shock and as a surprise 
for European policymakers (García-Valdecasas, 2005; Segurado, 
2015). Such an assumption presupposes that the European Union, 
prior to the 2000s, overlooked the issue of representativeness. It 
presupposes that the European Union did not really engage and did 
not attempt to pass the necessary reforms that could have improved 
the way representativeness worked at the European level, and in 
particular regarding the functioning of the European Parliament.  
The second major assumption is that the crisis of legitimacy 
and the waves of criticism regarding the lack of accountability at the 
European level could be sorted out with a top-down approach. In 
other words, the belief that by proposing some institutional changes 
and some bold policy options regarding the European elections, thus 
putting the focus on input legitimacy, greater explicit citizen support 
for the European Union could be achieved (Gheyle, 2019). 
This chapter aims to offer alternative views regarding both 
assumptions. We argue that the European Union has attempted since 
its inception to implement many ground-breaking innovations 
regarding representativeness in Europe but that these have been 
blocked by an inter-institutional fight over 
competency. An institutional battle that 
has only amplified since the Lisbon Treaty 
and the financial crisis between 2009 and 
2014. We also argue that a top-down 
approach regarding the challenge of post-
national representativeness can only 
partially succeed, while the most 
promising alternatives can flourish in a 
mature European public space where proposals find their way in 
areas such as educational policy, media Europeanisation and 
sociological bonds. Finally, we argue that the focus should be put on 
both input and output legitimacy because one alone is not enough to 
The most promising 
alternatives can flourish in 
a mature European public 
space where proposals find 
their way in areas such as 
educational policy, media 
Europeanisation and 
sociological bonds. 
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tackle both the lack of a European demos and the need for greater 
representativeness. 
The final section presents policy recommendations regarding 
representativeness in Europe: some options that have already been 
proposed over the years but remain blocked by the European Council 
or the European Parliament, as well as some original proposals.   
5.2 Old and new institutional reforms 
One possible approach when studying the current state of 
representativeness in Europe is to assess institutional improvements 
that could take place within each of the four main European 
institutions – the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council 
of the European Union and the European Council. It is worth nothing 
that this ‘case-by-case’ method would undoubtedly need to include 
the European Council, an institution that despite not being 
traditionally considered part of the ‘institutional triangle’ has, over 
the last twenty years, undergone the most radical transformation of 
all. From an informal gathering of heads of government in the 80s, 
the European Council has become a plenipotentiary structure 
formally acknowledged by the Lisbon Treaty where the political 
direction of the European Union is decided and sometimes directly 
implemented. The institutional rise of the European Council means 
in practice that intergovernmentalism has overtaken in times of crises 
some of the executive powers that are supposed to be devolved to the 
European Commission. This new institutional balance represents in 
itself a major challenge regarding representativeness. Indeed, it is 
commonly acknowledged that the most legitimate body to represent 
the European public interest is the European Parliament since it is the 
only European institution elected directly by European citizens.  
Regarding the other institutions, some sensitive reforms have 
already been proposed by academics and policymakers to improve 
accountability and representativeness at the EU level. To name only 
a few:  
 To increase supervision of the role played by delegated 
committees within the European Commission (i.e. a specific 
practice known as comitology) (Bergström, 2005);  
 To extend Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) as the normal 
procedure for all policy areas discussed within the two 
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intergovernmental bodies of the European Union (Cosandey, 
2007);  
 To end the monopoly of the legislative initiative currently 
enjoyed almost exclusively by the European Commission 
(JEF, 2016);  
 To revamp the European Commission in order to hierarchise 
political priorities emerging from the European elections by 
including some sort of ‘senior and junior’ Commissioners – 
an idea that was first mentioned in the Constitutional Treaty 
in 2005, then left out of the Lisbon Treaty, and finally is 
making its way back in after the experience of creating vice-
presidencies within the Colleges presided by Jean-Claude 
Juncker and Ursula von der Leyen.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the main challenge regarding this case-by-case 
approach is that many of those options are ambiguous regarding the 
principles they intend to improve. For example, many of those 
improvements are intended to encourage a more transparent and 
accountable praxis regarding decision-making, and by that effect, 
they are deemed to also have a positive impact regarding the 
perception of representativeness at the European level. Even if such 
a virtuous circle exists, we believe it is not exactly the same to debate 
how to improve representativeness at the European level and to 
debate how to improve transparency more generally within the 
European Union. Thus, the aim of the following section is to focus on 
those policy improvements that could be more easily associated with 
our understanding of how representative democracy usually works. 
For that purpose, we intend to focus on two ideas that echo the most 
recurrent traits of parliamentary democracy and that could 
potentially be implemented at the continental level.  
A common and harmonised electoral system 
Even if we acknowledge that the European Union is a unique political 
system that has its own specificities and cannot be automatically 
compared or defined simply as a parliamentary democracy (Corbett 
et al., 2018), the structure draws one part of its legitimacy by means 
of organising democratic elections that determine the composition of 
one of the two legislative branches of the Union since 1979. 
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Interestingly, this parliamentary inspiration was in line with the will 
of the founding fathers, which wanted to bring a solid democratic and 
political basis to the European project. This chapter of European 
history is sometimes forgotten because such intentions were quickly 
buried with the failures in the early 50s of the Communauté Européenne 
de Défense (CED) and the weakened powers given to the Assemblée 
Commune (1952-1957) and the Assemblée parlementaire européenne 
(1957-1962).  
Yet, an historical assessment of how representation in Europe 
has evolved allows us to dismiss the argument that European 
policymakers have disdained the issue of representativeness for forty 
years. On the contrary, the decade of 1950 was an extremely 
promising period regarding European parliamentary innovations. 
The Assemblée Commune (the first version of the European Parliament) 
had, indeed, sanction powers over the Hauté Autorité of the 
Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier (the predecessor of the 
European Commission). Those powers were lost and were changed 
into mere ‘consultative prerogatives’ with the advent of the EEC and 
the definitive consolidation of the ‘small-step doctrine’ cherished by 
functionalism as the only effective way to build European 
cooperation.  
An illustration of the importance 
given to representativeness in Europe in 
those early years can be found for example 
in the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957. In its 
Article 138 the Treaty proclaimed that the 
Assemblée Commune had to be elected 
through direct universal suffrage by means 
of a common electoral system applicable to all member states. It was, 
precisely, this legal basis that triggered the first proposals to create a 
system that would establish a direct link between European citizens 
and European representatives (see for example the Dehousse Rapport 
in 1961 and the following proposals in 1963 and 1969 as quoted in 
Corbett et al., 2018).  
Despite this legal basis being formulated in the founding 
Treaties, it was only in 1975 that the proposal of the Dutch MEP 
Schelto Patijn was accepted by the Council (European Parliament, 
1975). The proposal, only four pages long, set up a roadmap divided 
into two phases (ibid.). The first phase was to grant direct universal 
The Treaty of Rome 
proclaimed that the 
Assemblée Commune had 
to be elected through 
direct universal suffrage 
by means of a common 
electoral system. 
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suffrage for the elections of 1979. The second phase called for the 
establishment of a common electoral reform with a common set of 
rules to improve representativeness across all member states for the 
European elections.  
Such harmonisation, which was supposed to be applied 
immediately after 1979, was blocked once more by the Council for 
more than twenty-two years. As a consequence, the proposals sent by 
the European Parliament to the Council started to pile up again, such 
as in 1983 the Seitlinger rapport (European Parliament, 1983) or ten 
years later, the 1993 De Gucht rapport (European Community, 1993). 
It was only in 2002 that member states agreed to implement the 
proposals included in the rapport of Greek MEP Anastassapoulos 
(European Parliament, 1998). The common set of rules decided in 
2002 were limited in fact to only three criteria and those three 
principles are still the sole common basis underpinning the 
legitimacy of European representativeness to this day. Those 
principles are well known and they include: i) the use of a 
proportional electoral scheme for European elections; ii) the 
incompatibility between being an MEP and a national MP; iii) and 
finally, the right of Europeans to vote in the European elections 
irrespective of their country of residence.    
In sum, the idea of a common electoral system at the European 
level is in fact a long-standing demand of the European Parliament. 
An idea that despite having the initial support of member states and 
the European Commission was then rapidly blocked and watered 
down by the Council and the European Council over the years. We 
can speculate about the reasons, yet the most plausible hypothesis is 
that member states have been keen to maintain a monopoly, or at 
least the dominant position, as the main source of democratic 
legitimacy and representativeness in Europe.  
From Spitzenkandidaten to transnational lists 
A similar situation has occurred with more recent initiatives such as 
the Spitzenkandidaten (see Chapter 8) and transnational lists. The 
former, an ambitious formula approved by the European Parliament 
in 2012, was intended to increase the sentiment of representativeness 
by creating a more direct link between European citizens’ preferences 
during the elections and the choice about who should be heading the 
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executive branch of the European Union (European Parliament, 
2012). The formula implied that the European Parliament and the 
European Commission were in need of an enhanced level of 
representativeness and that this objective could be reached by 
increasing input legitimacy. Yet, the most recent experience of 2019 
seems to indicate clearly that the European Council is still not entirely 
comfortable with losing its symbolic upper hand. At least that is one 
of the potential readings of its decision to circumvent the 
Spitzenkdandidaten initiative altogether by choosing Ursula von der 
Leyen as European Commission President.  
Again, it might be argued that inter-institutional fighting 
prevented a development that, even though it followed a top-down 
approach, had been designed to improve the legitimacy, 
representativeness and accountability of the Union towards its 
citizens. In this case the reluctance is 
even more significant considering 
that the Spitzenkandidaten formula 
was not exactly a Copernican 
revolution. The mechanism included 
a legal ‘safeguard’ in favour of the 
status quo in that, while creating a 
link between the results in the 
elections and the political configuration of the Commission, the 
European Council retained the last word. In that sense, this 
innovation merely went some way to providing an enhanced input 
legitimacy connection between citizens and institutions (Sánchez 
Margalef, 2019).  
Transnational lists have also been a long-standing federalist 
dream, as they could be seen as confirming the existence of a 
European demos, thereby granting legitimacy to the Union and 
bridging the gap between voters and representatives. In this case it 
was the two main groups in the European Parliament who rejected a 
proposal that originated inside the chamber itself but was also 
championed by some member states, especially France. 
Transnational lists could have been a bold idea to improve the feeling 
of Europeanness and the idea of a certain European identity (Verger, 
2018). However, the system would directly undermine the 
accountability of a member of the European Parliament towards their 
constituency because it would not be clear where and to whom 
Inter-institutional fighting 
prevented a development that, 
even though it followed a top-
down approach, had been 
designed to improve the 
legitimacy, representativeness 
and accountability of the Union. 
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exactly the MEP would be accountable. Moreover, they would also 
challenge the current power structure set up in the European 
Parliament and controlled by the biggest groups, Christian 
Democrats and Social Democrats. As pointed out by Verger (ibid.), it 
is neither clear how those new MEPs were going to be financed, nor 
how they could claim an exclusive or better representativeness of a 
given ‘European demos’. The two-speed parliament that Verger 
warns about looks a very plausible future scenario. The European 
vision these MEPs would theoretically embrace lacks clarity and 
definition; and there are MEPs that already embrace such a vision 
without the need of transnational lists.  
There again, transnational lists were conceived as a top-down 
reform aimed at increasing the legitimacy of the European Parliament 
and thus, that of the EU. In any case, it is also not clear whether the 
implementation of the lists would translate into an increase in 
turnout. What we do know is that the Spitzenkandidaten process in 
2014 did not lead to a significant change in participation rates and the 
increase in the elections of 2019 cannot be attributed solely to the 
Spitzenkandidaten formula. One hypothesis at this stage is that input 
legitimacy has a limited impact in terms of electoral turnout at the 
European scale. It might even be argued that these two top-down 
reforms were stopped by the institution that is still perceived by 
many EU citizens as one of the main sources of legitimacy. 
5.3 Beyond the top-down approach  
In fact, the debate about representativeness in Europe rests on the 
assumption that European citizens want or need a better and more 
advanced system of representation at the European level. 
Nevertheless, some findings seem to point in the exactly opposite 
direction.  
First of all, the majority of European integration theories often 
overlook the role of socialisation over institutional structures. Neo-
functionalism, for example, is understood as 
a ratchet mechanism where the delegation of 
a political competency will call for another 
competency, and this sequence will 
supposedly consolidate over the years the 
political powers of the European Union. 
The majority of European 
integration theories often 
overlook the role of 
socialisation over 
institutional structures. 
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Curiously, even the current theories, which are more interested in 
sociological notions such as ‘legitimacy crisis’ or ‘democratic deficit’ 
are still proposing institutional responses, such as the ones observed 
and analysed in the first section of this chapter. In that sense, despite 
the fact that the main literature has detected that there is a challenge 
emanating directly from what citizens think or perceive about the 
European Union (Follesdal and Hix, op. cit), the response is still based 
in an institutional or political reform calling for more institutional 
transparency or for more ‘Europeanised’ elections.  
The more complex and sociological solutions are overlooked 
because they cannot be implemented in one day or decided at one 
summit. Among those reforms, we could mention an educational 
policy that included a common European curriculum, the 
Europeanisation of some of the processes that influence our identity 
construction such as the way we inform ourselves, or the impact of 
certain life experiences such as working or living in another member 
state. All of those policies are considered 
by the literature to have an equally 
beneficial impact regarding the 
consolidation of a European demos. 
More importantly, they are considered 
to be efficient tools to improve 
participation, involvement and the 
feeling of ownership among citizens of European matters – three 
notions that are of paramount importance to representativeness.  
In this perspective, the broad question about how to reconnect 
the European Union with its citizens should be asked in reverse: can 
the citizens reconnect with the European Union without a proper 
sociological European bond?  
Closeness, recurrence and technologically savviness  
Following this bottom-up approach, it is interesting to recall the 
findings of comprehensive quantitative fieldworks across Europe 
such as the report co-presented by Notre Europe and CIDOB in 2014 
(Notre Europe and CIDOB, 2014), which points out that citizens tend 
to agree when identifying the best ways to improve 
representativeness at the continental level.  
The broad question should 
be asked in reverse: can the 
citizens reconnect with the 
European Union without a 
proper sociological 
European bond? 
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First, citizens want European policymakers, and in particular 
their MEPs, to be more informed and closer to their needs, as well as 
more accessible. Surprisingly, the initiative that gathers most support 
among interviewees from eighteen countries in the report (ibid.) is 
“the possibility to see in person the politicians and the professionals 
that work in the EU”. The desire extends to civil servants, 
Commissioners and middle administrators. Interestingly, such an 
initiative is not entirely new in Europe since it has already been tested 
nationally, in particular in the United Kingdom, where MPs hold 
‘political surgeries’ with their local constituents. Surgeries in the 
United Kingdom are institutionalised to the point that MPs have 
specific locations for holding these particular one-to-one 
conversations. Research shows that those surgeries create a strong 
accountability as the MP is compelled to follow up many of the issues 
brought to them (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 2019).  
In fact, there is a clear similarity between the British idea of 
‘surgery’ and the Citizens’ Dialogues initiated by the former Vice-
President of the European Commission, Viviane Reding, in 2013 and 
2014. The Dialogues have been institutionalised and made 
permanent, and they are considered as the most efficient way to 
create a link between Commissioners (who otherwise would not 
confront national audiences very often) and citizens across the 
continent. When the Dialogues started, 
there were few expectations for the 
initiative – it was supposed to be 
another technical town-hall meeting to 
explain one of the policies implemented 
by the European Commission. 
Nevertheless, public interest was 
sparked by simply making policymakers visible (Morillas et al., 2018). 
The relative success of the Dialogues combined with the findings 
from comparative research across Europe suggest that 
representativeness could be improved by extending the practice of 
local surgeries to all MEPs.  
The second main finding regarding improved 
representativeness is the importance accorded to recurrence by 
citizens. The general perception among respondents from the same 
report (ibid.) is that the most efficient way to gain credibility as a 
public representative is to create channels of communication and 
Findings from comparative 
research across Europe suggest 
that representativeness could 
be improved by extending the 
practice of local surgeries to 
all MEPs. 
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accountability that extend beyond election day. This calls for a 
continuum, also, in terms of political communication. Usually 
communication strategies end the day after winning or losing an 
election. Instead, communication policies could extend over time and 
be tailored for representatives holding responsibilities.  
The third improvement quoted largely by citizens regarding 
representativeness is directly linked with the use of new technologies 
to keep better track of voting patterns and parliamentary activity. It 
is worth noting that on that issue the European Union, and in 
particular the European Parliament, has often been a pioneer 
regarding transparency and accountability, with higher standards 
than many of the national parliaments. Since 2010, the website of the 
European Parliament has offered information thanks to a partnership 
with VoteWatch, a specialised platform where every vote is recorded 
and published. Similarly, there has been a very substantial effort 
regarding how the information is not only made available to the user, 
but also hierarchised and curated in order to be more understandable. 
With that aim, the European Parliament has published Press Releases 
explaining the significance and the stakes of every major plenary vote 
since 2010, as well as video clips of the main interventions during the 
plenary debates.  
To sum up, improving representativeness is a challenge that 
can also be led by civil society and individuals. The generalisation of 
local surgeries, the consolidation of tools to consult with citizens on a 
recurrent basis, and the use of new technologies to follow 
parliamentary activity are some of the ideas explored in this chapter. 
There are many other initiatives that depend on the level of 
willingness of the citizen to play their part, such as for example using 
the network of agencies known as Europe Direct or obtaining 
information about European affairs through channels such as 
Euronews or specialised newspapers and magazines.  
In all cases, our argument is that the challenge of improving the 
perception of representativeness in Europe should be both a top-
down and bottom-up task. It seems 
that beyond those not-so-new 
institutional changes, what is also 
needed is time and long-term policy 
programmes to develop a common 
sense of ‘us’. Or in a Habermasian 
Beyond those not-so-new 
institutional changes, what is 
also needed is time and long-
term policy programmes to 
develop a common sense of ‘us’. 
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wording, both institutions and demos need to be consolidated at the 
same time in order to obtain a representative political union at the 
European level. There is a virtuous circle where institutional reforms 
such as transnational lists or a common electoral system have a 
limited but still positive impact in terms of representativeness, the 
same way that there is a virtuous circle and a better perception of 
representativeness when citizens are involved in making those in 
power accountable. In order to improve representativeness, the 
assessment of previous attempts needs to be combined and taken into 
account together with the following policy recommendations. 
5.4 Recommendations  
As we have seen, securing more legitimacy for the EU by increasing 
representativeness, participation and legitimacy is a conundrum that 
EU leaders and pro-EU democratisation movements and associations 
have not been able to solve in the last thirty years; although the 
problem can be traced to very nearly the inception of the European 
project. 
Yet, the long-diagnosed ‘disease’ of the lack of a European 
demos will at some point come to an end. Stefan Lehne (2019) points 
in that direction when he claims that the 
nationalisation of European politics and the 
Europeanisation of national politics are 
leading irremediably to the emergence of a 
European political space. In fact, every 
decision that has been taken in the last 60 
years has contributed to the creation and expansion of the European 
political space and the European demos. The growing talk of the 
politicisation of the EU bears witness to such phenomena (Morillas, 
2019). Therefore, not only politicians and institutions have 
contributed to it, but so have citizens; in other words, top-down and 
bottom-up solutions, innovations and developments have been 
reinforcing the European demos. 
If the goal of some political leaders of the EU, the institutions, 
and engaged European citizens is to create a European political space 
that grants the EU more legitimacy more rapidly, these policy 
recommendations could be followed: 
 
Top-down and bottom-up 
solutions, innovations 
and developments have 
been reinforcing the 
European demos. 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE EU  89 
 
 In the first place, reviving the Spitzenkdandidaten system and 
implementing a reformed transnational lists system (that still 
needs to be debated further to garner greater support from all 
relevant actors) could reinforce representative democracy for 
the Commission and the Parliament. Linking the results of the 
elections with the composition of the Commission could also 
help, but this is something to keep in mind for the future as 
the conditions are not yet fulfilled. The Commission should 
aim to make EU democratic credentials a top priority for the 
next decade (Youngs et al., 2019); and to re-evaluate some 
mechanisms of its decision-making process. Finally, adopting 
a more comprehensive electoral system applicable to all 
member states for the elections to the European Parliament; a 
demand that has been on the table since 1957.  
 Secondly, inter-institutional fights over legitimacy cannot be 
solved solely by stressing representative democracy, 
especially if the College of Commissioners will not see its 
composition reflecting the results of the elections to the 
European Parliament. Thus, representative democracy needs 
to be complemented by elements of direct, participatory and 
deliberative democracy; even if it means opening up 
traditional representative institutions like the European 
Parliament. As an example, it would be a start to randomly 
select EU citizens to participate in national citizens’ 
assemblies in the agenda-setting phase. This would also make 
participants comfortable by using their own language, for 
example. For the decision-making phase, this could be done 
at the European level with the different participants of the 
national assemblies, making sure all the voices from member 
states are heard (Gerwin, 2019). 
 Finally, building on the last point and acknowledging the 
difficulties the different bodies of the European Union have 
to become more democratic on account of representativeness; 
it is time for the EU to recognise itself as a hybrid democracy 
whose sources of legitimacy do not come only from 
representative democracy but from introducing elements of 
direct and deliberative democracy to the decision-making 
processes.  
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Those are policy recommendations that could tackle input 
legitimacy. Regarding output legitimacy, it is well known that public 
attitudes are influenced and are often shaped by how the European 
Union and its member states handle socio-economic challenges 
(Debomy, 2016; Nancy, 2016). In that sense, the EU is facing not only 
a challenge about issues of representativeness and accountability but 
also a challenge regarding its social effectiveness as one of the main 
policy powerhouses in Europe.  
Even if top-down initiatives have a limited impact not 
everything can rest in the hands of citizens. We have argued 
throughout the chapter that this kind of institutional reforms are 
often subjected to the will of all member states, which may make 
implementation difficult. One can nevertheless imagine a ‘coalition 
of the willing’ in a vast array of areas, from creating a harmonised 
electoral system to allow the European Union to have a shared 
competency over educational and civic policies (i.e. school 
curriculum, European Solidarity Corps…). Indeed, a precondition for 
improving representativeness in Europe is improving inter-European 
solidarity (Habermas, 2013). It might be useful to keep in mind that 
institutional bonding is only a potential way to achieve a higher sense 
of ‘us’, which still appears as the main challenge after 60 years of 
representativeness in Europe. 
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 TRANSPARENCY IN EU  
DECISION-MAKING:  
UNDER GROWING PRESSURE,  
MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER 
TUOMAS ISO-MARKKU 
Transparency is widely seen as a crucial component of democratic governance, 
ideally allowing for greater accountability and building public trust. Within the 
EU, transparency started gaining wider attention in the 1990s and quickly 
established itself as an important objective in EU decision-making. However, 
there continue to be different views on transparency among EU institutions and 
member states, which has led to varying degrees of openness across the EU. 
Moreover, it has made it difficult to reform or rethink existing transparency 
rules and practices of the EU institutions. Such a process would be urgent, as 
several trends currently challenge the EU’s already limited transparency 
regime. Some of these challenges are specific to the EU, whereas others apply to 
other actors as well. The former comprise the increased role of the EU’s 
persistently secluded intergovernmental bodies, the emergence of new actors and 
agencies and the prevalent use of closed trilogues in legislative decision-making, 
whereas the latter consist of the general blurring of the boundaries between 
internal and external policies as well as the prospect of increasing geo-economic 
competition. These challenges call for a rethinking, and reappraisal, of the role of 
transparency in today’s complex political environment, both within the EU and 
vis-à-vis other actors. However, transparency is not a panacea for generating 
political legitimacy in the eyes of the EU citizens or a quick fix for the lack 
thereof. Instead, it is better to understand it as part of the basis on which these 
can be built. 
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6.1 Introduction: Shades of transparency 
There is no universal definition for transparency in academia or 
politics. However, generally speaking, transparency refers to the 
openness of a (public) body with regard to how it acts (for a general 
definition, see Johnston, 2014). While different understandings of 
transparency may emphasise different aspects of the concept and put 
forward differing practical demands, transparency is broadly seen as 
a crucial component of democratic governance and of a functioning 
relationship between citizens and public authority. Ideally, it both 
allows for greater accountability of decision-makers and builds 
public trust (Abazi and Tauschinsky, 2015). 
Within the EU, transparency issues started gaining growing 
attention in the 1990s, with a strong focus on the citizens’ access to 
the documents of the EU institutions. By the early 2000s, increasing 
the transparency of EU decision-making had become a widely 
accepted objective, promoted as a means for the EU institutions to 
connect with EU citizens. That said, no generally agreed definition of 
transparency exists in the EU either (for discussions on the use and 
understanding of the concept of transparency in the EU context, see 
e.g. Curtin and Meijer, 2006; Hillebrandt et al., 2014; Naurin, 2017). 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that ‘the 
Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their 
work as openly as possible’ (Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union), and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes the right of 
access to documents (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union). However, in practice different EU 
actors advocate, and allow for, varying 
degree of access and openness. This reflects, 
at least in part, the differing views of the EU 
member states on transparency. Due to the 
different (and sometimes conflicting) 
preferences regarding transparency in the 
EU, efforts to develop and reform the 
Union’s central rules on transparency have repeatedly petered out. 
This is all the more unfortunate, as several trends – both within the 
EU itself and in global politics more broadly – are currently putting 
the existing rules and practices under increasing pressure. There is 
Due to the different (and 
sometimes conflicting) 
preferences, efforts to 
develop and reform the 
Union’s central rules on 
transparency have 
repeatedly petered out. 
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thus a growing need to discuss how the EU’s approach to 
transparency could be adjusted to live up to current (and future) 
challenges. 
The dynamics and needs guiding the EU’s approach to 
transparency lie at the heart of this chapter, which will proceed as 
follows: first, it will provide a succinct overview of how the 
transparency discourse has evolved in the EU and what the Union’s 
current transparency rules and practices look like. After that, it will 
turn to the different developments both in the EU and in global 
politics more broadly, which increasingly challenge existing rules 
and practices. It discusses five trends that strain the EU’s already 
limited transparency regime. Finally, it explores how the EU could 
(and should) address these challenges, concluding with a short 
summary of the main findings and a separate section presenting 
some practical policy recommendations and suggestions. 
6.2 Transparency in the EU 
Tracking the evolution of the transparency discourse and practices in 
the EU, Curtin and Meijer (2006) distinguish between two different 
periods. During the first period, which began in the early 1990s, 
transparency was seen primarily from a legal point of view. The focus 
was on the rights of EU citizens to access different types of documents 
held by the Council of the European Union, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament. 
The start of the transparency discourse coincided with the 
negotiations on, and adoption of, the Maastricht Treaty, which 
included a separate declaration on the right of access to information. 
The declaration stated that ‘transparency of the decision-making 
process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the 
public’s confidence in the administration’, recommending the 
Council of the European Union to submit a report on how public 
access to information could be improved. On this basis, the Council 
and the European Commission adopted a Code of Conduct on Access 
to Documents, promising to provide the ‘widest possible access to 
documents’ (Augustyn and Monda, 2011: 17). With the adoption of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, both the general principle of transparency 
and the citizens’ right of access to documents were anchored in the 
EU Treaties. An important role in this first phase was also played by 
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the EU Courts, which built up a body of case law on access to 
information, putting pressure on EU institutions to work more 
openly and disclose documents (Curtin and Meijer, 2006). 
The pinnacle of this first period was the adoption of Regulation 
1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, 
Commission and Council documents (Ibid.: 113). The regulation 
defines the “principles, conditions and limits” that govern the right 
of access to EU documents, which is guaranteed to “[a]ny citizen of 
the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State”. While the regulation established 
the right of access to documents as an important principle in the work 
of all EU institutions, it also codified the exceptions to this general 
principle, based on which the EU institutions can refuse access to 
documents. These concern cases in which the publication of a 
document would:  
1) Undermine the protection of public interest regarding public 
security; defence and military matters; international relations; 
the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community 
or an individual member state; or the protection of personal 
data; 
2) Undermine the protection of commercial interests of a natural 
or legal person; court proceeding and legal advice; or the 
purpose of inspections, investigations and audits; 
3) Undermine the institution’s decision-making process. 
The second period in the evolution of transparency in the EU 
started in the early 2000s, more or less at the time Regulation 
1049/2001 was adopted (Curtin and Meijer, 2006), and was closely 
related to the process that led to the adoption of the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe. In this second period, the 
debate about transparency gained a more explicit political 
dimension. Transparency was no longer seen merely as a goal in 
itself, but increasingly also as part of a broader effort to strengthen 
the EU’s legitimacy and narrow the alleged gap between the EU and 
its citizens (Ibid.). European courts continued to be central actors in 
this second period as well, as Regulation 1049/2001 generated new 
legal cases that served to clarify the practical implications, and limits, 
of its provisions (Hillebrandt et al., 2014: 14-15). However, other 
important actors appeared on the stage as well. Above all the 
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European Commission, with its white paper on European 
governance, took a prominent role in the transparency discourse. In 
the white paper, the Commission identified “better involvement and 
more openness” as one of its four broad proposals on how to reform 
EU decision-making in a way that would bring the EU closer to its 
citizens (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). The 
European Council, in its 2001 Laeken Declaration, continued in this 
vein, paying considerable attention to the role of transparency in EU 
decision-making (European Council, 2001). 
The debates and milestones of the 1990s and 2000s continue to 
form a point of reference in the EU’s approach to transparency and 
have guided the steps taken since then. Notably, openness, 
transparency and the right to access documents were also touched 
upon in some of the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Most 
importantly, Article 15(3) TFEU extended the right of access to all EU 
institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies (Curtin and Leino-Sandberg, 
2016). However, in practice, the 
evolution of the EU’s transparency 
rules and practices has not followed a 
linear course towards increasing 
openness (see Ibid.). Thus, a process to reform Regulation 1049/2001, 
initially launched in 2008, ended up in legislative limbo, as did a more 
limited proposal from 2011 to adapt the regulation to the new legal 
basis provided for under Article 15(3) TFEU. The Commission of 
President Ursula von der Leyen has now decided to withdraw both 
proposals altogether, arguing that agreement is not foreseeable and 
that both proposals have anyway become largely outdated (European 
Commission, 2020). 
At the same time, the preferences and track record of the 
different EU institutions with regard to transparency have continued 
to vary substantially. Particularly the institutions that represent the 
EU’s member states, i.e. the European Council, consisting of the 
member states’ heads of state and government, and the Council of the 
European Union, formed by sectoral ministers of the member states 
and – in the case of its sub-bodies – national civil servants, remain 
reluctant to commit themselves to a higher degree of transparency.  
While the incorporation of the European Council as an official 
EU institution by the Lisbon Treaty made it formally subject to the 
In practice, the evolution of 
the EU’s transparency rules 
and practices has not 
followed a linear course 
towards increasing openness. 
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EU’s transparency rules, in practice it has remained a very secluded 
body, its practices driven more by the exceptions than the obligations 
deriving from the right of public access to documents (Hillebrandt 
and Novak, 2016: 531-532). In the case of the Council of the European 
Union, the development of the general transparency framework in 
the EU, the efforts of a small group of pro-transparency member 
states – consisting mainly of the three Nordic EU members and the 
Netherlands –, and new possibilities of information technology led to 
a gradual increase in the level of openness of the Council between 
1992 and 2006, including the establishment of a digital register 
providing access to a growing number of Council documents 
(Hillebrandt et al., 2014). However, this process stalled in the late 
2000s (Ibid., 2014). 
Overall, the Council’s practical commitment to transparency is 
characterised by strong variance across different legislative processes 
(Cross, 2014; Omtzigt and Leijten, 2017). Tellingly, a strategic inquiry 
into the transparency of the Council’s legislative process, launched 
by the European Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly, concluded that 
“legislative documents of the Council are not, to any significant 
extent, being made directly and proactively accessible to the public 
while the process is ongoing” (European Ombudsman, 2017). 
According to O’Reilly, the Council’s restrictive transparency practice 
constitutes maladministration (Ibid.). The Council’s hesitancy or 
outright reluctance reflects the continuing differences in the 
preferences of the EU member states with regard to transparency.  
The European Parliament, for its part, is the primary 
representative of EU citizens and the Union’s major oversight 
institution. As such, it is subject to more stringent transparency 
requirements than the Council or the European Council. Moreover, 
due to its oversight role, it has a vested interest in advancing at least 
some forms of transparency, especially vis-à-vis the other EU 
institutions (see Hillebrandt et al., 2014). However, it neither has 
uniform preferences nor is it equally active in all dimensions of 
transparency (see e.g. Abazi and Adriaensen, 2017, on the preferences 
of the European Parliament and other EU institutions with regard to 
the transparency of international negotiations).  
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Finally, while the European Commission broadly 
acknowledges the importance of transparency, its engagement 
depends both on the preferences within the College of 
Commissioners and the broader political context in which the 
Commission operates. It is worth noting that the Commission of 
President Ursula von der Leyen has raised some expectations in this 
regard, as it includes a designated vice-presidency for values and 
transparency, held by Věra Jourová. However, her mission letter does 
not spell out any concrete new actions to be undertaken to increase 
the transparency of the Commission or the EU more broadly 
(Hofmann and Leino-Sandberg, 2019), simply calling on her to “bring 
more transparency to the legislative process” and “lead the 
negotiations on behalf of the Commission for a Transparency Register 
for the Parliament, Council and Commission” (European 
Commission, 2019). 
Overall, the different views on 
transparency among the key EU 
institutions as well as among the EU 
member states have led to varying 
degrees of openness across the EU. 
Moreover, they have made it very 
difficult to amend, reform or rethink the Union’s transparency rules 
and practices. However, such a rethinking is becoming more and 
more urgent due to developments both within the EU and in global 
politics more broadly, which will be discussed in the next section. 
6.3 Transparency under pressure – growing 
challenges 
As described above, experience has shown that EU’s current 
transparency rules and practices have their limits. At the same time, 
rethinking and reforming these rules and practices is becoming even 
more urgent, as the conditions under which the EU and its 
institutions operate continue to change. This is due to developments 
both within the EU itself and within global politics more broadly. 
This section identifies five major developments and trends that strain 
the EU’s already limited transparency regime. The list presented here 
is not exhaustive, but rather intends to serve as a starting point for 
discussing the kind of pressures the EU’s transparency rules and 
Different views on transparency 
have led to varying degrees of 
openness. Moreover, they have 
made it very difficult to amend, 
reform or rethink the Union’s 
transparency rules and practices. 
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practices are facing, and will be facing, in the near future. The first 
three trends are related to recent and ongoing changes in the 
institutional roles and relations in the EU and thus EU-specific, 
whereas the last two are broader and concern other actors – including 
EU member states – as well. 
First, strong evidence suggests that the contribution of the EU’s 
intergovernmental bodies, and above all the European Council, to 
initiating and guiding EU policymaking has grown. As formulated 
by Fabbrini and Puetter (2016: 482), “intergovernmental forums and 
notably the European Council take lead roles at all stages of the policy 
process, including agenda-setting, decision-making and, finally, the 
adoption and implementation of EU policies at all relevant levels of 
governance”. This is evident particularly in newer areas of EU 
policymaking, “such as economic governance, foreign and security 
policy, crucial sub-fields of justice and home affairs and social and 
employment matters”, many of which fall largely or entirely outside 
the scope of the traditional community method of EU decision-
making (Ibid.). Concurrently, the European Council and other 
intergovernmental bodies have also had a highly prominent role 
during the different crises that the EU has faced over the course of the 
last decade, and especially in the context of the Eurozone crisis, which 
saw the European Council, the Euro Summit and the Eurogroup all 
play a significant part. 
From the point of view of transparency, the increased 
concentration of decision-making activities in the EU’s 
intergovernmental bodies and, above all the European Council, is a 
significant challenge. As described in the previous section, the 
European Council remains the most insulated of the EU’s major 
institutions. The Euro Summit and the Eurogroup also work broadly 
outside the framework of the EU’s transparency regime. The Council 
of Ministers, on its part, operates under more extensive transparency 
provisions than the other intergovernmental bodies. However, this 
mainly concerns legislative decision-making and even here, the 
Council has developed institutional practices that highlight its need 
for a ‘space to think’ and thereby seek to justify a more limited degree 
of transparency (Hillebrandt and Novak, 2016). Moreover, the 
importance of non-legislative decision-making has increased in 
recent years. In the context of non-legislative decision-making, the 
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Council can allow itself an even more selective approach to the 
openness of its deliberations and documents (Ibid.). 
Second, while the intergovernmental actors have gained in 
importance, so have some supranational actors. This does not only, 
or even primarily, apply to the most significant supranational 
institutions, most notably the Commission, but above all to the 
different ‘de novo’ bodies that have often been created at the initiative 
of the intergovernmental actors (Bickerton et al., 2015; Schmidt, 2016). 
These include the European Central Bank, the European External 
Action Service as well as different regulatory bodies and executive 
agencies (Bickerton et al., 2015). Their increasing role often further 
complicates the EU’s already complex policymaking system, thus 
making it less transparent by definition. Moreover, due to the failure 
to amend Regulation 1049/2001, the EU agencies continue to operate 
outside the Union’s transparency regime, meaning that their 
commitment to the right of access to information varies. 
Third, the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure, with 
the European Parliament acting as a co-legislator alongside the 
Council, has arguably opened and democratised EU decision-
making. However, a very high percentage of legislative processes is 
now settled in informal trilogues between the EU’s three main 
institutions, the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Commission. The trilogues take place behind closed door and are 
only insufficiently reported on even to the committees of the 
European Parliament (Brandsma, 2019). Thus, the ordinary 
legislative process, which is in theory subject to the most stringent 
transparency provisions, is shielded both from broader 
parliamentary oversight and, above all, from the public eye (see also 
European Ombudsman, 2015). In its ruling on the case De Capitani v. 
European Parliament of March 2018, the General Court pushed for 
more transparency in trilogues, but whether the ruling is enough to 
trigger substantial changes in institutional practices remains to be 
seen (see Martines, 2018). 
Fourth, and moving on to broader trends that go beyond the 
specific context of the EU, there is a general agreement that many key 
policy issues increasingly transcend the traditional dichotomy based 
on a division between internal and external policies. While this is a 
topic that has been discussed for some time already, many recent 
developments have shed light on the practical implications of this 
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trend. The challenge that this trend poses for the EU’s existing 
transparency regime is that the realm of international affairs has 
traditionally been dominated by the secretive nature of diplomatic 
culture. Accordingly, the protection of the public interest regarding 
international affairs is one of the exemptions that the EU institutions 
can raise to refuse public access to their documents. However, the 
issue becomes much more complicated and controversial with the 
intermeshing of internal and external issues, which breaks down the 
neat conceptual separation between them (see e.g. Leino, 2017). 
In the EU, such dynamics are particularly relevant, for 
example, in the case of international trade negotiations, which 
increasingly tend to be mixed agreements with considerable potential 
implications for the EU’s and the member states’ own legislation, 
standards and practices and therefore for EU citizens. Against this 
background, following the traditional diplomatic culture, which 
often still dominates trade negotiations, hardly seems reasonable or 
justifiable. Thus, striking the right balance between the need for 
confidentiality and the necessities of oversight emerges as a key task 
in international negotiations (Abazi and Adriaensen, 2017). Conflicts 
revolving openness were particularly visible during the negotiations 
on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Different 
civil society organisations were highly vocal in their criticism of the 
negotiations, prompting the European Commission to undertake 
several transparency initiatives with varying degrees of success 
(Gheyle and De Ville, 2017). 
Another area where the interplay between internal and 
external actors and issues and the resulting need for bringing the 
EU’s transparency rules up to date concerns security matters. Here, 
actors and agencies traditionally associated with justice and home 
affairs, or internal security, are also increasingly active outside EU 
borders (see e.g. Bendiek and Bossong, 2019). A case in point is the 
newly revamped and significantly expanded European Coast and 
Border Guard (Frontex), which is to have greater power and 
resources to act both within and outside the EU (see e. g. Tammikko, 
2019). In view of transparency, it is of great importance to ensure that 
by encroaching into the area of foreign policy and external relations, 
these actors and the related policymaking processes do not move into 
the traditionally more closed sphere of international affairs and 
diplomacy. An additional, and equally important, transparency 
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challenge in this particular area is related to the openness of the new 
(or revamped) agencies and bodies discussed above. 
Finally, there is a growing perception that we are entering a 
new era of geopolitical and/or geo-economic rivalry among the 
world’s pre-eminent powers – including the EU. This discourse could 
challenge any new transparency initiatives and even trigger demands 
for increasing secrecy, as openness could be argued to provide a 
strategic advantage for the EU’s potential competitors and, even 
worse, expose the EU to different forms of hybrid influencing (see 
Wigell, 2019). Such arguments could have a considerable impact on 
the already limited transparency rules and practices of the EU 
institutions. 
In addition to these five trends, it is important to note that 
technological development will have wide-ranging implications for 
transparency, presenting both challenges and opportunities. The 
challenges are related, inter alia, to the increasing use of complex 
algorithms at different stages of the EU’s policymaking cycle 
(Hofmann and Leino-Sandberg, 2019). At the same time, technology 
also allows for new ways of communicating with citizens and new 
possibilities for enhancing the transparency of EU decision-making. 
6.4 A new approach to transparency 
The previous section has presented some of the key trends, which 
make rethinking the EU’s approach to transparency important and 
urgent. Such rethinking should not only be considered as a 
compulsory technical exercise, a ‘necessary evil’, or concentrate 
merely on small adjustments to the existing transparency rules and 
practices – even though these are an important part of the process as 
well. Instead, the process should start with a broader attempt to 
rethink – and reappraise – the role of transparency in the complex 
political environment of today, both within and outside the EU. 
For example, instead of considering transparency as a potential 
vulnerability of or even an outright security risk for the EU and its 
member states in the heightening geo-economic competition, 
transparency could be understood as an essential part of a broader 
democratic deterrence strategy against hybrid interference (Wigell, 
2019). After all, it is much more difficult to conduct covert operations 
in a political environment characterised by a high degree of 
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transparency than it is in a secluded setting (Ibid.). Similarly, 
transparency could play an increasingly important part in conscious 
– and, ideally, proactive – communication efforts on the part of the 
EU institutions to counter different post-factual narratives and 
arguments. This dimension of transparency was already highlighted 
in the communication strategy of the Finnish presidency of the 
Council of the European Union in the latter half of 2019, in line with 
Finland’s broader efforts to increase the openness of the EU (Kojo and 
Leppävirta, 2020, forthcoming). 
As far as the EU-specific trends discussed in this chapter are 
concerned, it is clearly important to think more thoroughly about the 
link between efficiency of decision-making and transparency. At the 
moment, safeguarding the efficiency of decision-making is one of the 
key arguments raised against more extensive transparency rules and 
practices, especially with regard to the Council and the European 
Council. However, research has so far not unequivocally shown that 
increased transparency would reduce efficiency or that secrecy 
would actually guarantee a higher degree of efficiency (Novak and 
Hillebrandt, 2020). 
However, the aim here is not to pre-empt a debate on the 
significance of transparency for the EU or point out specific needs in 
terms of the EU’s transparency regime. Instead, this chapter is 
primarily a call to acknowledge the pressures currently facing 
transparency in the EU and use them as a starting point to think about 
the meaning of transparency in the EU context. This approach could 
help to break the deadlock on transparency reform in the Union. 
The above-mentioned examples 
notwithstanding, it is important to point 
out that transparency is no panacea for 
generating political legitimacy in the eyes 
of the EU citizens or a quick fix for the lack 
thereof (see also Curtin and Meijer, 2006). 
Instead, it is better to understand it as part 
of the basis on which this can be built. 
Ideally, transparency enhances both the citizens’ possibilities to 
control public authority and the citizens’ trust in public authority 
(Abazi and Tauschinsky, 2015). However, achieving these two goals 
may require catering for different actors and widely differing 
practical needs. In practice, only a small part of the public participates 
Transparency is no 
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eyes of the EU citizens. It 
is better to understand it 
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which this can be built. 
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in controlling public authority, which is primarily done by means of 
parliamentary oversight, civil society engagement as well as 
journalism and research. The citizens involved in these activities have 
a strong interest in gaining as much information as possible about 
individual decision-making processes. On the other hand, the grand 
majority of the public is not interested nor has the required (expert) 
knowledge to study a vast amount of detailed information about 
decision-making processes. From their point of view, it is more 
important that the authorities convey the sense that they are acting in 
citizens’ best interests. Both of these dimensions need to be 
considered when moving into more detailed discussions about the 
nature of transparency and the ways to increase it in the EU. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Transparency is now a well-established objective in EU decision-
making, codified in Regulation 1049/2001 and the EU Treaties. At the 
same time, the commitment of different EU institutions and other EU 
bodies or the member states to transparency is by no means equal. 
This has resulted in clear deficiencies in the EU’s transparency 
practices. Moreover, attempts to rethink or reform the EU’s 
transparency rules and practices have met with reluctance or outright 
resistance. Rethinking the EU’s approach to transparency is 
necessary, as several ongoing developments in the EU and more 
broadly challenge the Union’s existing transparency rules and 
practices. This chapter has identified, and discussed, five such 
developments: 1) the increased role of the EU’s persistently secluded 
intergovernmental bodies; 2) the emergence of new supranational 
actors and agencies, which complicate the EU’s already byzantine 
policymaking system and whose commitment to transparency varies; 
3) the prevalent use of closed informal trilogues in the EU’s ordinary 
legislative procedures, 4) the general blurring of the boundaries 
between internal and external policies, with the risk of new policy 
areas falling under the traditionally very secretive culture of 
international affairs; and 5) the growing perception of a geopolitical 
or geo-economic rivalry, which could trigger new demands for 
secrecy. In view of both the importance attached to transparency in 
the EU and the urgency of the challenges facing the existing 
transparency rules and practices in the EU, it is indispensable to 
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rethink and reappraise the role of transparency in today’s complex 
political environment both within and outside the EU. 
6.6 Recommendations 
 Transparency is no panacea for generating political legitimacy in 
the eyes of the EU citizens or a quick fix for the lack thereof. 
However, in line with the ethos of the early 2000s, EU 
institutions, bodies and agencies as well as the member states 
should acknowledge transparency as a fundamental right and a 
crucial component of democracy in the EU and of a functioning 
relationship between the EU and its citizens. 
 Transparency is already a generally established objective in EU 
decision-making. However, the inconsistent implementation of 
the Union’s transparency rules across the different EU 
institutions, bodies and agencies shows that its significance is not 
shared or understood by all. Thus, it would be high time to 
discuss the meaning of transparency for EU governance. This 
would be in line with the European Council’s strategic agenda 
2019-2024, which highlights the respect of the EU institutions for 
“the principles of democracy, rule of law, transparency and 
equality between citizens and between Member States” 
(European Council, 2019).  
 The European Parliament, as the primary representative of the 
EU citizens and the Union’s major oversight institution, should 
act as a frontrunner in promoting transparency. Similarly, the 
European Commission, not least through the newly created vice-
presidency for values and transparency, should play a more 
proactive role. However, it is crucial that the efforts of the 
supranational institutions be supported and complemented by 
the EU member states, whose role as constituent parts of the 
European Council and the Council is key.  
 Transparency should be a fundamental aspect of the upcoming 
Conference on the Future of Europe, both informing the set-up 
of the Conference and featuring as a major item on its agenda. 
Any discussion on transparency in this context should take the 
different kinds of pressures facing transparency in the EU and 
more broadly – some of which were discussed in this chapter – 
as a starting point. 
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 In the terms of specific measures to be taken in view of the 
present challenges, the recommendations of the European 
Ombudsman following her strategic inquiries into trilogues 
(European Ombudsman, 2015) and Council decision-making 
(European Ombudsman, 2017) as well as the ruling of the 
General Court on the transparency of trilogues from 2018 
already put forward several practical proposals, the 
implementation of which would form an important first step in 
increasing the openness of the EU’s legislative process. 
 Another crucial issue relates to EU agencies and other ‘de novo’ 
bodies. As their significance continues to grow, there is an 
increasing need to shed light on their exact roles in EU 
policymaking as well as to assess and review their transparency 
rules and practices. This effort should involve a wide variety of 
actors, including the agencies themselves, the EU Courts, the 
European Parliament, the European Commission and, the 
European Ombudsman as well as civil society, journalists and 
researchers. 
 At the same time, the discussion on transparency should not only 
focus on the gaps in the EU’s current transparency regime. 
Instead, it should pay attention to what the transparency rules 
and practices need to look like in the future and especially what 
kind of added value transparency may have for EU governance 
in the changing political environment within and outside the EU.  
 Recognising the role of transparency as part of a democratic 
deterrence strategy against hybrid influencing and as a tool 
against post-factual narratives provides one example. In this 
sense, the efforts and experiences of the Finnish presidency of 
the Council of the European Union in the latter part of 2019 could 
give some guidance to other member states and EU institutions 
alike. 
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 ALIGNMENT OF NATIONAL 
PARTIES AND EUROPEAN PARTY 
FEDERATIONS 
JAN KOVÁŘ, ZDENĚK SYCHRA  
AND PETR KRATOCHVÍL 
European party federations (Europarties) are only slightly aligned with national 
political parties and their low visibility at the national political level undermines 
their ability to perform their role in EU politics and to contribute to generating 
European awareness and a European party landscape. This chapter discusses the 
concept of Europarties, including their relationship with the political groups in 
the European Parliament. It then presents a number of specific policy proposals 
to improve the alignment of Europarties to national political parties and improve 
their visibility at the national level.   
7.1 Introduction: Europarties, a conceptual analysis 
In order to understand what role Europarties fulfil and what is the 
main purpose of their existence, we first have to shed more light on 
their connection with national policymaking. Similarly, the link 
between democratic legitimisation at the national level and that at the 
level of the Europarties needs to be explored. Only then can we start 
thinking about the reforms the system of Europarties should 
undergo.  
There are three basic approaches to understanding the role the 
Europarties play in the EU-wide political system, with each of these 
three approaches also having a distinctly different impact on the 
relationship between the national and EU levels of policymaking.  
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The first of these is the understanding of Europarties as simple 
expressions of national political preferences at the European level. 
Europarties are in this context simple aggregates of the national 
positions of EU member states and their respective political parties. 
Consequently, the activities of Europarties, even in a formally strictly 
supranational setting (such as that of the European Parliament), 
remain strictly intergovernmental.  
The second approach conceptualises Europarties as actors that 
are active on a specific level of EU multi-level governance. The 
Europarties are thus part of the same broad political system as 
national political parties, with which they frequently interact, but the 
Europarties remain largely independent. At times, Europarties may 
even become the senior partners for their national counterparts, 
taking the initiative in those areas where the European Parliament 
has a substantial say (such as in the debates about the European 
financial framework).  
Finally, the Europarties can also be seen as an integral part of 
the emerging EU-wide political sphere. In this sense, they do not 
simply represent an additional level of decision-making next to the 
national level. Instead, European policymaking is poised to become 
the key political locus, relegating national politics to a secondary 
place. This argument is then linked to the broader discussions about 
the European public sphere and the possibility of establishing one 
European demos (i.e. politically conceived “people”).  
Interestingly, while an intense scholarly debate is going on 
about these three ideal types, it is the third interpretation that the EU 
legal texts prioritise. For instance, the Treaty of Maastricht argues that 
Europarties “contribute to forming a European awareness and to 
expressing the political will of the citizens”. Hence, Europarties have, 
from the very start, been seen not just as a simple means of collecting 
and expressing national political preferences, but they have been 
endowed with a heavily normative 
dimension: their contribution to the 
creation of the EU-wide political sphere.  
But it is exactly this point that has 
been recently turned into an issue of 
contention. The emerging Eurosceptic 
parties argue that the aim of transcending 
Europarties have, from the  
very start, been seen as a 
contribution to the creation of 
the EU-wide political sphere. 
But it is exactly this point 
that has been recently turned 
into an issue of contention. 
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the narrow national political sphere also implies the aim of 
destroying national democracy. Therefore, Europarties have recently 
become more visible in a negative sense, as the focus of the 
Eurosceptic critique of supranational policymaking. Paradoxically, 
while Europarties are seen as weak, they are simultaneously 
perceived as dangerous, and this perception thus replicates the 
general Eurosceptic attitude towards the EU as a whole.   
Hence, the once technical discussions about Europarties are 
now part of the intense and at times heated political debates about 
the possibility of democratic governance on the supranational level 
as well as the contentious relationship between EU decision-making 
and the national obligation to comply with these decisions, even if 
they are passed by qualified majority (an ordinary legislative 
procedure).  
The choice of one of the three answers is not merely theoretical 
as it pre-determines whether we should discuss Europarties as 
dependent on national policymaking and thus largely connected to 
the evolution of the national party systems, or whether, while 
acknowledging the genealogy of European integration, Europarties 
are autonomous political actors that interact with the national arenas, 
but increasingly formulate their own positions and policies. 
Irrespective of the starting theoretical position, it cannot be 
disputed that Europarties have gradually become stronger. In the last 
twenty years, developments have taken place rendering Europarties 
less dependent on national politics and national political templates. 
Among these developments, some are rather obvious and 
straightforward, but by no means unimportant. For instance, the 
increasing politicisation of the European Commission translates into 
an increased importance of the 
ideological cleavages in the Parliament, 
and thus also of the Europarties. Even 
though it is not a novelty that Europarties 
(as well as European Parliament groups) 
are organised on the principle of 
ideological affinity, the politicisation makes the differences among 
Members of European Parliament from the same country much more 
The increasing politicisation 
of the European Commission 
translates into an increased 
importance of the ideological 
cleavages in the Parliament. 
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pertinent. The introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten1 has had a similar 
effect as it also underlines both the supranational support for the 
candidates and the different views within individual countries (see 
Chapter 8).  
Equally importantly, a similar development towards 
strengthening Europarties has taken place as far as their financial 
autonomy is concerned. Indeed, the financial weakness of 
Europarties had been long identified as one of the major hurdles to 
their increased visibility within EU politics (Wolfs, 2017). Hence, a 
Regulation was adopted in 2003 whose aim was to deal with exactly 
this conundrum. It has been amended several times since with the 
most recent version adopted in 2018.2  
The result of all these factors is the fact that the established 
Europarties exhibit a surprisingly high level of ideological cohesion, 
which is then also reflected in the high degree of voting cohesion of 
most European Parliament political groups (Tilindyte, 2019). This 
ideological cohesiveness is again a consequence of the intentional 
stress on the formation of European Parliament groups based on 
political affinity (i.e. primarily, but not exclusively, on their 
membership of a particular Europarty). At the same time, research 
also shows that this cohesion is heavily dependent on the 
composition of the Europarty (Klüver and Rodon, 2013). If, for 
instance, a high number of the party members come from a particular 
national political party, then there is a high probability that the 
Europarty´s policies will be a result of a policy upload from that 
national party. In this sense, Europarties continue to exhibit a strong 
dependence on the national political parties of which they are 
composed (Hix, 2002). 
                                                        
1 It needs to be noted that the system has not been permanently established and 
is not part of the formal treaty or legislative framework for European elections. 
2 Official Journal of the European Union (2018), Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 
2018/673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 May 2018 amending 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European 
political parties and European political foundations. 
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7.2 European Party federations and their 
relationship with the political groups 
The catalyst for the formation of Europarties was the decision to hold 
direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. As a result, the 
first Europarties were established in the mid-1970s, followed by 
others in the mid-1980s and the most recent wave between 2004 and 
2015, which included in particular Eurosceptic formations. 
Europarties are usually composed of national member parties; 
European Parliament groups or individual MEPs; secretariats, 
associations and political foundations; and some form of individual 
membership. Currently, there are 16 registered Europarties as of 
2018.  
Europarties are thus not identical with the political groups and 
they are legally separate entities, although they closely cooperate 
with each other. They can be understood as umbrella organisations 
and coordinating structures that bring together the party 
organisations within the national and 
European institutions. Initially, the main 
role of Europarties was to coordinate 
European election campaigns and adopt 
common manifestos for these elections. 
Groups in the European Parliament, on 
the other hand, were first established in 1953, when MEPs decided to 
sit according to political ideology rather than nationality. 
Nonetheless, they have only commanded significant importance and 
financial resources since the first direct European elections. In day-to-
day EU politics, the groups operate independently of the Europarties. 
Having said this, there are still relations between Europarties and 
groups. In fact, the only real linkage of Europarties to EU institutions 
in the early years of their development was through the political 
groups.  
In the early years, there was a symmetrical relationship 
between them. Each Europarty was linked to its group. Today this 
symmetry is no longer the case: only about half of the current 
Europarties have their own political group. The distinction between 
Europarties and groups became more explicit after the EU party 
regulation of 2003, which required a separation of the two types of 
organisations and the establishment of Europarties as separate legal 
Initially, the main role  
of Europarties was to 
coordinate European 
election campaigns and 
adopt common manifestos. 
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entities. Until that time, Europarties were in fact subordinate to their 
group, reliant on it for staff, accommodation (groups allowed 
Europarties to use their European Parliament premises) and 
resources. This dependence only changed after the adoption of the 
2003 party regulation that paved the way for Europarties to be 
funded from an European Parliament budget.  
As a result, the Europarty leaders’ meetings are usually 
required to approve decisions on which parties and individuals will 
sit in their political groups. The leaders of each Europarty’s group 
participate in the so-called Party Leaders’ Meetings if the given 
Europarty organises one. Delegates from the groups participate in the 
Executive Committees and Congresses of individual Europarties, in 
which they usually have full voting rights. Policy resolutions of the 
Congresses as well as other recommendations of Europarties provide 
a non-enforceable agenda for their MEPs. In the adoption of medium- 
and long-term EU policy goals, policy is developed through an 
interaction between the national parties and the groups through 
Europarty coordination. Some Europarties, for instance the Party of 
European Socialists (PES), organise bi-annual meetings between the 
party and its group to coordinate issues and strategies.  
7.3 Steps to align national and Europarties  
Visibility of Europarties at the national level 
For many years, it has been clear that the low visibility of Europarties 
and their overshadowing by national political parties are closely 
linked to the absence of a European party system. Not only the 
member states, but also political parties try to maintain their 
autonomy in as many areas as possible. 
This ‘sovereignty’ of national parties, 
which are directly involved in several 
processes at the institutional level of the 
EU (especially the European Council and 
the Council of the EU, and the ex ante 
Early Warning System should also be 
The low visibility of 
Europarties and their 
overshadowing by national 
political parties are closely 
linked to the absence of a 
European party system. 
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mentioned),3 has always been prioritised over the strengthening of 
the Europarties. These are instead used rather as simple umbrella 
organisations at the EU level. Moreover, the low attention to 
European topics in national policymaking further reinforces the 
invisibility of the Europarties for the general public. As a result, the 
public often confuses and conflates the 
Europarties with the political groups and 
is often even unaware of their existence. 
There is a correlation between the 
emphasis the national political elites place 
on the European agenda and the media 
focus on the EU, and, subsequently, public 
attention. The media coverage of European issues is therefore an 
essential ‘transmission’ factor for the promotion of Europarties. Only 
the gradual formation of a European public sphere can lead to a 
genuine Europeanisation of political parties in terms of fulfilling all 
the functions that their counterparts perform at national level. 
The visibility of the Europarties, however, deserves a deeper 
exploration as there are several issues that could improve the way the 
Europarties are treated by the media and the public. For instance, one 
clearly identifiable problem is whether political parties that are not 
members of one of the Europarties should be allowed to participate 
in European elections. The system of European electoral lead 
candidates (Spitzenkandidaten) is then another interesting, albeit not 
fully functional element (see Chapter 8) that can enhance this 
connection. In terms of the visibility of the interconnection of national 
and Europarties, this concept makes sense, but only in the period 
around the European elections. One wonders why the positions of 
electoral leaders should not be merged with those of the Europarties’ 
chairpersons, thus creating a permanent link between the leaders and 
the political parties. 
                                                        
3 This is a procedure that involves the national parliaments in controlling the 
principle of subsidiarity in the EU (also known as the orange or yellow card). 
Only the gradual 
formation of a European 
public sphere can lead to a 
genuine Europeanisation 
of political parties. 
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There are many other elements that should be a part of a wider 
debate on how to link the national and European levels more 
effectively and thus gradually create a real European party system. 
The visibility of Europarties is, for example, undermined by the 
unwillingness of many national member 
parties as well as candidates for 
European elections to make use of the 
Europarty logo and slogan on their 
(campaign) materials and ballots. 
Mandatory requirements for the use of 
the Europarty logo on campaign 
materials should be considered anew 
(this has been under discussion previously). Unless national parties 
begin to mention their Europarty links, not much can be expected to 
change regarding the low visibility and recognition of Europarties 
among the public. On the other hand, discussion of mandatory 
requirements to use the Europarty logo and slogans in campaign 
literature can backfire so far as national parties have been mostly 
reluctant.   
It is thus unlikely they will approve such a measure either via 
Europarty regulations or national electoral legislation. Even if the 
national parties, by and large, prefer to keep Europarties at a distance 
with limited roles, a system of incentives to use Europarty logos, 
symbols and/or common manifestos could be established via EU 
party regulations. They can allow national parties, for instance, to use 
funds from the EU budget for European election campaigns if they 
agreed to cooperate with Europarties in terms of using their 
campaign literature and symbols and emphasising their 
transnational links in general.  
An interesting point in the discussion is the surprisingly low 
activity of the Europarties in using the European Citizens’ Initiative, 
for example when collecting signatures or when financially 
supporting an initiative’s organisers 
(Bressanelli, 2014). Using this mechanism 
more could promote greater use of this 
instrument in the EU, while at the same 
time raising the profile of Europarties 
among the wider public. In order to 
improve their accessibility, Europarties 
Unless national parties begin 
to mention their Europarty 
links, not much can be 
expected to change regarding 
the low visibility and 
recognition of Europarties 
among the public. 
Another option is giving 
Europarties the right to 
participate in national 
referendums on EU issues, 
and to run campaigns for 
such referendums. 
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should also consider running their websites in multiple languages (so 
far, they are mostly run in English, French and/or German). Another 
option that can be considered is giving Europarties the right to 
participate in national referendums on EU issues, and to run 
campaigns for such referendums. This would likely require changes 
in the (national) legislative framework(s) and even if EU-related 
referendums are not held that often, it would increase the visibility of 
Europarties for electorates.    
A unified electoral system for European elections  
The direct elections to the European Parliament are still conducted in 
separate national electoral systems. This is one of the fundamental 
obstacles to the full establishment of European political parties at EU 
level, which would in turn strengthen the link of the European public 
to the EU political system. This obstacle persists even though the 
electoral system, based on “direct universal suffrage in accordance 
with a uniform procedure in all Member 
States”, has for many years been envisaged 
in primary law (currently in Article 223 (1) 
of the Treaty on Functioning of the EU). 
None of the European Parliament’s 
previous proposals leading in this direction 
have ever been accepted. However, 
without the existence of a unified electoral system, which can be 
further developed, for example, through the single European 
candidate (see below), the Europarties will forever remain secondary 
political actors of European integration. What is at stake is not only 
the fundamental question of equality of votes and size of 
constituencies (the number of voters per each MEP), but also the 
question of a uniform minimum age, a minimum election threshold, 
the reimbursement of electoral costs and other related aspects, all of 
which are fundamental. The supra-nationalisation of the electoral 
model, the variants of which were presented and discussed several 
times in the past during the Intergovernmental Conference, is thus a 
prerequisite not only for enhancing the role of the Europarties, but 
also for the adherence to the principle of an equal vote. To put it 
bluntly, this elementary democratic principle is grossly violated by 
the existing imbalance and diverging national regulations. 
Without the existence of a 
unified electoral system, 
the Europarties will 
forever remain secondary 
political actors of 
European integration. 
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Common manifestos and EU-wide ballots  
National political parties have a de facto monopoly in the selection of 
the candidates for European elections and in conducting election 
campaigns. This proves to be incompatible with the effort to bridge 
the gap between the European and national levels in the European 
elections (second-order elections). The practice of national political 
parties making these decisions is so deeply embedded that despite 
the efforts of the Europarties to become more involved in election 
activities (including through the Spitzenkandidaten system), no 
change is in sight. 
Common manifestos, on the other hand, are already a standard 
element of European elections. The question, however, is the extent 
to which they are really used by national parties during the 
campaign. Clearly, the level to which the 
electoral campaigns of the Europarties truly 
reach the national political arenas is limited. 
The effectiveness of common manifestos is 
further reduced by national parties’ own 
electoral programmes. On the other hand, 
Euromanifestos make sense in indirectly 
forcing national actors to transpose the main common positions to the 
national level. Since the 2009 elections, some national parties have in 
fact copied the European political party manifestos and have used the 
Europarties´ support in many areas, including the financial one 
(Kosowska-Gąstoł, 2017). The trend of linking electoral programmes 
as closely as possible should therefore continue. 
A broad debate on the single transnational list is another 
example of how to strengthen the link between the Europarties and 
the electoral process more fundamentally. The focus on much more 
visible political groups in the European Parliament should be 
replaced in this debate by a focus on Europarties. Additionally, the 
election of MEPs from national ballot lists has led to the absence of 
Europarties in terms of interest representation, thereby de facto losing 
their direct connection with the European public and undermining 
their legitimacy (Van Hecke, 2010). While the direct replacement of 
national candidates with a single pan-European list would be an 
effective solution, in this pure form it is perceived as too radical, 
politically risky, and therefore counterproductive. But gradual and 
Euromanifestos make 
sense in indirectly 
forcing national actors 
to transpose the main 
common positions to 
 the national level. 
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partial steps in the same direction could lead to a more effective 
interconnection of the two groups of political party actors, while not 
weakening the political legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of the public.  
Therefore, a more sensible, though technically complicated 
solution is a combination of a transnational ballot list (for 
Europarties) and a national ballot list (for national political parties), 
meaning that each voter would have two votes for two different 
constituencies. Indeed, such a proposal was already put forward 
unsuccessfully by the European Parliament in the past – as early as in 
1997. To offer a politically acceptable proposal, it was supplemented 
by the obligation to have at least one candidate per member state on 
the European ballot list, but even in this form, it was rejected. One of 
the reasons behind this idea was the potential elevation of the role of 
Europarties. The composition of the ballot lists, the conduct of the 
campaign and coordination of efforts regarding the pan-European 
constituency, and the adoption of a common manifesto for candidates 
would all be in the hands of Europarties, and they would thus 
become important electoral players, in contrast to their current 
limited electoral role. 
Allowing citizens to vote through pan-European lists, next to 
their national ballot, for Europarties and common EU-wide 
candidates would likely Europeanise 
the elections through the centralised 
campaign strategy, conduct of 
campaigns, candidate selection and 
manifestos, and would give national 
media incentives to cover Europarties 
more intensively. This would, in turn, 
lead to a greater focus on EU themes, and provide room for direct 
competition with other Europarties. While national parties would 
continue to run their own campaigns for national seats, they would 
be pressured to emphasise their transnational affiliations more. 
Even in a case where there is no common campaign of 
Europarties for transnational seats while national parties run 
decentralised campaign for these seats, this would elevate the role of 
Europarties by providing them a more important role in terms of 
putting forward a list of common themes, slogans, and tools that 
could be used by national parties. Even if Europarties remained 
primarily service providers for national parties, and campaigns for 
Allowing citizens to vote 
through pan-European lists, 
next to their national ballot 
would give national media 
incentives to cover 
Europarties more intensively. 
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transnational seats had a national bearing, this would still elevate the 
current electoral role of Europarties. As one of the possible ways for 
Europarties to establish their legitimacy is through their electoral role 
in European elections, Europeanising these contests and elevating 
Europarties’ role would improve their visibility and connection to 
citizens. In other words, it is not necessary for the Europarties to 
become completely independent from the national member parties. 
If a more important electoral role for Europarties is to be established, 
it can still involve to some extent the engagement of national parties.  
Individual membership 
The development of Europarties should be stimulated by broadening 
direct individual membership and individuals’ direct or indirect 
participation in the internal activities and decision-making processes 
of Europarties beyond the existing 
scope. While all major Europarties have 
introduced some form of individual 
membership scheme there are still 
important limitations as to who can 
become a member and, in particular, to the roles played by individual 
members.4 If Europarties want to get closer to being ‘true’ parties, 
they will need to have ‘true’ (individual) members. 
There is a clear added value in a strengthened individual 
Europarty membership. As has already partially happened in the 
lead up to the previous elections, individual members can help 
organise transnational campaigns on cross-border issues and other 
types of campaign exchanges for European elections, since even the 
current individual members have well-established transnational 
linkages. They can also add value to campaign exchanges between 
sister parties and help the parties to support each other in a national 
election campaign. Given their usually above-average knowledge of 
EU affairs and familiarity with their party’s EU policy positions, 
                                                        
4 There are currently three types of Europarty membership. The first is a direct 
individual membership scheme which allows anyone to join a Europarty even if 
they are not a member of an affiliated national member party. The second type 
derives from being a member of an affiliated national member party while the 
third is a loose type of membership connected to social media platforms. As of 
2018, the majority of Europarties currently allow natural persons to join. 
If Europarties want to get 
closer to being ‘true’ parties, 
they will need to have ‘true’ 
(individual) members. 
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individual members can also engage in EU debates with rank and file 
national party members and voters – and not only during election 
campaigns. 
While individual membership schemes have already been 
introduced by several Europarties, the restrictions on the roles of 
individual members mean that their roles are too small to make a 
difference. To attract more individual members in the light of 
declining party membership across Europe, Europarties would need 
to give them more participatory rights in terms of policymaking and 
decision-making powers. Individual members should be given more 
rights to participate in the writing of 
the Euromanifestos. Individual party 
members’ participation in policy-
formulations should also be 
strengthened. To give them agenda-
setting powers, they should be 
allowed, for instance on a group basis, 
to submit resolutions to the Europarty leadership and decision-
making organs, which would have to take these into consideration.5  
They should also be able to make amendments to policy 
documents drafted by the Europarty leadership, and to attend 
working group meetings alongside members of national parties. 
Europarties should also invite individual members (or delegates from 
their ranks) to attend Congress meetings which make/approve the 
most important decisions. Europarties should allow individual 
members to vote in the Europarties’ policymaking bodies, including 
the Congress, so that they are given rights to influence policymaking 
as well as leadership elections. Europarties should also organise and 
financially support the holding of regular forums of individual 
members to provide them with an opportunity to meet and exchange 
ideas and positions. Europarties should also consider the opportunity 
to let the individual members participate in the selection of the 
Europarty leadership. Most radically, if transnational lists for 
European Parliament elections are ever established, Europarties 
should consider the opportunity for individual members to stand for 
these elections. 
                                                        
5 The European Green Party as well as the PES already allow for this.  
To attract more individual 
members in the light of 
declining party membership 
across Europe, Europarties 
would need to give them more 
participatory rights. 
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To increase the attractiveness of individual membership, 
national political parties would also need to do their part. They 
would need to promote Europarty individual membership and at the 
same time they could aspire to integrate their Europarty’s individual 
members into their parties in order to build on their expertise and 
improve their visibility. Strengthening individual membership 
should not mean that national parties no longer play an important 
role within Europarties although resistance to giving more rights to 
individual members can be expected from some national parties. In 
sum, the existing schemes of individual party membership are 
insufficient to make it attractive. While some Europarties already 
give their members some of the above-mentioned rights and 
opportunities, individual membership schemes should be making 
use of the full spectrum of these rights and opportunities. In 
particular, the most recently established Europarties do not allow 
individuals to join and/or severely limit their participatory rights. 
Europarty regulations do not set limits on the rights of individual 
members, and the strengthening of the existing schemes is thus up to 
Europarties and their affiliated national parties. 
Supplementary measures 
When analysing existing Europarties’ deficits, it is also necessary to 
investigate the discussion about genuine and functioning integration 
in terms of the transnationalisation of party cooperation, instead of 
the de facto associations of national political parties or mere umbrella 
organisations of today. In fact, such a shift would correspond to the 
emerging ideological cleavages at the EU level: Quite a few issues 
have been strongly Europeanised in the recent past and ceased to be 
purely national themes (migration, internal security, foreign policy, 
climate protection, economic union). Hence, the transnationalisation 
of European parties would not be empty social engineering, but a 
reflection of the emerging transnational preferences of the European 
public. This change should also involve a stronger presence in the 
public discourse, which would in turn help to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the Union. 
It also turns out that a greater activity of Europarties regarding 
their members can increase their relevance as a distinctive type of 
actor. The EPP’s steps towards Hungary’s Fidesz in relation to 
democratic backsliding in Hungary, and the efforts of Europarties to 
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prevent the formation of coalition governments of their members 
with nationalist or extremist parties (such as those in Austria, 
Slovakia or Italy) are good examples. In this regard, there is 
paradoxically a need to strengthen political conflict within the Union, 
which would in turn promote the perception of the transnational 
political parties as more than just secondary actors. At present, 
conflict in the EU is most visible at institutional level (between the 
Parliament and the Commission, or the Parliament and the Council), 
but not at the party level, i.e. as a clearly expressed ideological 
disagreement. A greater responsiveness of the Europarties and their 
closer connection to voters would also go hand in hand with the 
growing powers of the European Parliament. At the same time, the 
escalation of political conflict within the EU could ‘force’ national 
political parties to pay much more attention to European integration 
and European parties than before. 
7.4 Conclusion: How to create a fully transnational 
EU party landscape? 
Overall, the activities of Europarties are closely linked to the EU 
political system and its weaknesses. The EU as a hybrid form clearly 
limits the extent to which the Europarties can play a decisive role in 
EU politics. The parties are logically concentrated in the European 
Parliament, while the influence of national political parties through 
governments is evident in other institutions (the Council of the EU, 
the European Council, and partly the Commission). Without a more 
systematic change at the level of the EU political system (such as a 
gradual federalisation), many proposals for a stronger 
interconnection of the transnational and national party levels are 
rather bold ideas. While the EU is 
addressing many problems of a 
transnational nature, correcting these 
deficits by rapidly enforcing federal 
elements would certainly lead to a 
Eurosceptic backlash. 
Nonetheless, the EU’s multi-level system requires that the 
Europarties should have strong structures at all levels and that, while 
remaining distinct, they should be well connected to national political 
parties, and not just depend on them one-sidedly. Although national 
Europarties should, while 
remaining distinct, be well 
connected to national 
political parties, and not just 
depend on them one-sidedly. 
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politics leads to aggregation of important political interests, these 
cannot be communicated effectively without strong Europarties at 
the EU level. No matter how much national political parties are 
involved in EU policymaking, they fulfil different roles in the EU’s 
multi-level political system, both in terms of policies and in terms of 
institutions. In other words, the interactions between national politics 
and Europarties should not be seen as a zero-sum game. Instead, due 
to several factors, such as the two-way Europeanisation (the bottom-
up and top-down effect of Europeanisation), the currently 
asymmetrical relationship between the national and the transnational 
level needs to be redressed.  
Summary 
 The only slight alignment of Europarties with national political 
parties, the little knowledge of them and their low visibility at 
the national political level as well as the equally low public 
awareness of them mean that a real European party system is 
still non-existent, and Europarties find it difficult to play a role 
in expressing national political preferences at the EU level, 
articulating the political will of EU citizens, or contributing to the 
forming of a European awareness. 
 There is a correlation between the emphasis placed by national 
political elites on the European agenda and the media focus on 
the EU, and, subsequently, public attention. The media coverage 
of European issues is therefore an essential ‘transmission’ factor 
for the promotion of Europarties. 
 In order to improve their accessibility, Europarties should 
consider operating their websites in multiple languages. Another 
option that could be considered is giving Europarties the right to 
participate in EU-related national referendums and run 
campaigns for them. 
 The supra-nationalisation of the electoral model, the variants of 
which were presented and discussed several times in the past, is 
a prerequisite not only for enhancing the role of the Europarties, 
but also in terms of adherence to the principle of an equal vote. 
 Allowing citizens to vote for transnational lists, next to their 
national ballot in elections to the European Parliament, and for 
Europarties and common EU-wide candidates would likely 
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Europeanise these elections through centralised campaign 
strategies, conduct of campaigns, candidate selection and 
manifestos and would give national media incentives to cover 
Europarties more intensively. 
 The development of Europarties should be stimulated by 
broadening direct individual membership and individuals’ 
direct or indirect participation in the internal activities and 
decision-making processes of Europarties beyond the existing 
scope. 
 There is a need to strengthen political conflict within the Union, 
which will promote the perception of the transnational political 
parties as more than just secondary actors. At present, conflict in 
the EU is most visible at institutional level (between individual 
EU institutions), but not at the party level. 
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 HOW TO APPOINT A 
COMMISSION PRESIDENT 
SOPHIA RUSSACK 
The rise and fall of the lead candidate procedure has shown the need for fresh 
ideas. The EU’s reputation among citizens was damaged when the European 
Parliament ‘grabbed’ power from the European Council, selected one candidate 
and demanded their appointment in 2014. And also when the European Council 
simply appointed a non-lead candidate as a continuation of its usual practice in 
2019. What must be prevented for 2024 is another jostling for position between 
the institutions. A revised Commission president appointment procedure is 
therefore needed that reflects the dual legitimacy on which the EU is built and 
that ends institutional turf-battles between the European Council and the 
Parliament by setting out clear rules and creating certainty. This chapter 
proposes five crucial elements: a transnational list; earlier campaign kick-off; 
sufficient involvement of both responsible institutions; joint selection of 
candidates; a two-step procedure that might include a hearing for the president-
designate. 
8.1 Introduction: A tricky balance 
The EU’s unique institutional setup reflects a complex balancing act 
of different interests: those of sovereign member states, the political 
will of the citizens, and the general 
interest of the Union. The EU does 
not apply a strict separation of 
powers; as the core executive 
body, the European Commission 
also has legislative functions (initiating new legal acts) and shares 
executive competences with the Council (and national authorities). 
Neither is the EU is a genuine parliamentary system, due to the 
The EU’s unique institutional 
setup reflects a complex balancing 
act of different interests.  
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missing link between the legislature and executive. At national level, 
the power balance in parliament determines the composition of the 
government. At EU level, what is at stake at elections is who will sit 
in the European Parliament (EP), not who will govern. Up until 2014 
(and the launch of the so-called Spitzenkandidaten – or lead candidate 
– procedure) there was no connection between the outcome of the EP 
elections and the composition of the executive, the European 
Commission. 
The lead candidate procedure was copied from national 
parliamentary systems (in particular the German model), whereby 
citizens do not directly elect the head of state but do elect the 
members of parliament – who in turn elect the head of the executive. 
To give electoral certainty, the respective parties announce the 
candidates to head their respective lists, with the expectation that this 
person would be chosen as head of government in the event of 
electoral victory. The EU’s lead candidate procedure was similarly an 
attempt to close the gap between the legislative and executive branch 
and thereby between the EU institutions and its citizens. It failed, 
however, to deliver on that promise and instead caused institutional 
turf battles. 
Following the lead candidate debut in 2014 and its demise in 
2019, there is now much confusion about how to proceed in 2024.  
This chapter will consider the appointment procedure of the 
president of the European Commission. First, it will sketch out the 
institutional history and run-up to the so-called lead candidate 
procedure. Second, the chapter will make a suggestion for a future 
procedure to appoint the Commission president. 
8.2 The story behind the failed lead candidate 
system 
Who appoints the head of the EU’s quasi executive? Traditionally, it 
was the Heads of State and Government in their capacity as members 
of the European Council (EUCO) to simply appoint this person, 
following consultations behind closed doors. From the very early 
days of European integration, this was the procedure; the Treaty of 
Rome did not set out any involvement of the Parliament but did 
stipulate that “the members of the Commission shall be appointed by 
the Governments of Member States acting in common agreement” 
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(Article 158) and “The President […] shall be appointed […] with the 
same procedure.”(Article 161). Throughout the integration process, 
there were alternations to this system: the Treaty of Maastricht (1990) 
for the first time involved the EP by prescribing that the member state 
governments nominate by common accord, and after consulting the 
European Parliament, the person they intended to appoint as 
Commission president (Article 1992(2)). The Treaty of Amsterdam 
(1999) then expanded on this wording by determining that the EP did 
not only need to be consulted, but that the whole College and its 
president needed to be approved and receive the assent of the EP 
(Article 40). The Treaty of Nice only the voting rule of the Council 
was modified. As of then the president-designate was appointed by 
qualified majority rather than by unanimity (Article 22).1  
This Lisbon Treaty revision changed the wording that the 
EUCO has to “take into account the elections to the European Parliament 
and […] shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for 
President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the 
European Parliament by a majority of its component members.” 
(Article 17(7) TEU). The Lisbon Treaty therefore made two important 
changes: i) for the first time, there was a link between the result of the 
EP elections and the head of the EU’s executive; and ii) instead of 
consulting or approving, the EP was now to elect the president of the 
Commission. Despite the fact that the Lisbon changes were more 
significant than previous ones, they can be seen as the continuation 
of a trend to involve the EP in the appointment procedure and 
thereby as a bolstering of its democratic control function over the 
main executive body of the EU.  
2014 
The role that the Lisbon Treaty set out for the EP was not in fact a 
proactive one. In the run-up to the elections 2014 (the first to be held 
under the Lisbon Treaty) it was the EP itself that exploited the new 
phrasing of the treaties and upgraded its role through the instigation 
of the lead candidate procedure. This meant that most party groups 
appointed lead candidates on the understanding that the candidate of 
the party group with the most seats in the elections would become 
                                                        
1 Italics added by author. 
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president of the European Commission. Hence, citizens’ votes 
translated (indirectly) into the selection of the next Commission 
president of the Commission. Executive 
power was at stake for the first time in 
EP elections. 
The EP was able to win an 
interinstitutional battle with the 
European Council by demonstrating internal cohesion and unity 
right after the elections and by exposing divisions within the 
European Council. It acted with astonishing speed to support Jean-
Claude Juncker and to present him as the common EP candidate. 
Institutional power seemed to trump party interest; there was still the 
grand coalition between the EPP and S&D, and competitors Jean-
Claude Juncker and Martin Schulz agreed that whoever ranked 
second would become the EP president. On this basis Juncker had 
solid support in the chamber. For its part, the EUCO underestimated 
the lead candidate device and was unprepared for its clout.  
By aiming to make executive power the prize in EP elections, 
the lead candidate procedure sought to raise awareness of those 
elections and European issues in general. The idea was that the 
different candidates would launch a pan-European election 
campaign to introduce themselves to citizens in all member states and 
present the position of their EU-level political groups (Schulze, 2016: 
24). The personalisation of candidates can generally (that is, at 
national level) enhance elections by informing and mobilising voters. 
This was also expected to happen with the EP election: the 
nomination of lead candidate would personalise the election 
campaign and in turn boost voter turnout 
(Schulze, 2016: 24). It had been suggested 
that open and rival candidacies for the 
position of Commission president would 
liven up the electoral competition and 
allow a greater connection between 
voters’ references and the EU institutions 
(Follesdal and Hix, 2006: 553). In short, 
the aim was to raise the stakes of the European elections and 
personalise European politics, thereby increasing voter turnout and 
ultimately strengthening democratic (input) legitimacy. 
Citizens’ votes translated 
(indirectly) into the selection 
of the next Commission 
president of the Commission. 
The aim was to raise the 
stakes of the European 
elections and personalise 
European politics, thereby 
increasing voter turnout and 
ultimately strengthening 
democratic (input) legitimacy. 
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However, this system had no tangible effect. Voter turnout hit 
an all-time low in 2014 and research has shown that voters were 
largely unaware of a) the lead candidate system as such (i.e. that their 
vote indirectly translated into the choice of Commission president) 
and b) the individual candidates, particularly outside their own home 
countries The awareness of indirect support for one candidate was 
highest in Luxembourg, France and Germany (74.8%, 63.3% and 60% 
respectively). Awareness was significantly lower in northern and 
eastern countries (35.2% on average), with the lowest level of 
knowledge in the UK, at 13.9%. Unsurprisingly, this study shows that 
knowledge of specific candidates was highest in the home countries 
of the (key) candidates: about 55% of voters in Luxembourg and 25% 
in Germany and Belgium could name one or more candidates. 
However, in the other member states the average was 8.2%. In the 
UK, only 1.1%2 of voters were able to recognise a candidate (Hobolt, 
2014).3  
As it turned out, the debates around key policy issues (such as 
migration) were not shaped by the lead candidates, but rather by anti-
establishment and Eurosceptic parties (Hobolt, 2014: 1536–1537). 
“Neither pre-election campaigning nor post-election decision-
making delivered greater party-political competition or a genuine 
choice between rival political programmes” (Christiansen, 2016: 
1007). Instead, the 2014 elections perpetuated the long-term trend of 
close cooperation between pro-integrationist parties at the centre of 
the political spectrum.  
Candidates were more prone to campaign in countries where 
they were already known and where it was hoped their appearance 
would have a positive effect on the electorate (Schmitt et al., 2015). 
The bigger member states, i.e. Germany and France, were favoured 
as campaign venues because the larger the population, the more seats 
in the EP up for grabs. Germany by far, and France were therefore the 
                                                        
2 These low numbers for the UK can partly be explained by the opposition of all 
three main British parties to the lead candidate system and their refusal to let the 
candidates campaign (Christiansen, 2016). 
3 Based on an AECR-commissioned post-election survey in 15 member states, 
where voters and non-voters were asked directly after the elections about the 
degree of awareness of the political parties and candidates at the European level 
(see Hobolt, 2014, 1536). 
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most attractive countries to campaign 
in (Christiansen, 2016). Furthermore, 
studies on visibility and media 
coverage for the candidates have 
shown that the media did not promote 
the system: the EP elections were in 
general not very present and the lead candidate appeared more as a 
“side issue” (Schulze, 2016).  
So, the lead candidate system had no positive effect on turnout, 
or on the second-order nature of the EP elections. It therefore failed 
to improve the representativeness and the accountability of the EP. 
The only effect it did have was institutional in nature, as the EP 
successfully enhanced its own influence in selecting the Commission 
president, thereby slightly altering the EU’s interinstitutional 
dynamic (Hobolt, 2014).  
2019  
Proponents of the lead candidate procedure had hoped to see it firmly 
established in 2019. In the election campaign, most political groups 
selected a candidate to campaign across Europe but the system lost 
further momentum. It was significantly weakened institutionally 
compared to 2014, especially because one of the most important 
political groups, ALDE, which was afraid of losing Emmanuel 
Macron as a potential political group partner, did not participate. At 
the same time, President Macron – one of Europe’s most important 
leaders, did not support it. Clearly, and somewhat ironically, both are 
closely linked.  
The increased turnout of almost 8% at the European elections 
could have strengthened the Parliament’s hand. But despite the 
higher turnout, the EP found itself in a weaker position. As this 
institution is more pluralistic (as a general trend there is more support 
for fringe parties and less for established ones) it was unable to build 
a majority in favour of one or the other candidate. The EPP (narrowly) 
obtained the most votes, but the other parties did not agree to back 
its lead candidate (Manfred Weber). The major political groups in the 
EP were simply unwilling to rally behind one common candidate. As 
a result, there was a very different institutional power play in 2019 
compared to 2014 Without internal institutional unity, it was much 
Studies on visibility and media 
coverage for the candidates 
have shown that the media did 
not promote the system. 
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easier for the EUCO to keep a firm grip on its prerogative to appoint. 
In other words: greater pluralism and the end of the duopoly hitherto 
enjoyed by the EPP and S&D 
parliamentary groups has a price for 
the EP in terms of institutional 
power. 
Ursula von der Leyen, then 
President-elect of the European 
Commission, did not run through the lead candidate procedure but 
was instead nominated by the European Council and eventually 
elected by the EP, by only a paper-thin margin. Many in the newly 
composed EP felt they had been robbed by the European Council 
riding roughshod over the lead candidate procedure. By excluding 
the EP, this ‘backroom’ appointment did not give any say on this 
personnel decision to the citizens. Furthermore, it ridiculed those 
who had engaged in the lead candidate campaigns by simply 
irgnoring them. 
The EU as a parliamentary system? 
The failure of the lead candidate system is partly due to systemic 
reasons. The procedure implicitly promotes the ‘parliamentarisation’ 
of the EU and a federal model of 
European democracy, in which the EP 
receives a democratic mandate from 
the electorate to select the executive 
and then ultimately hold the executive accountable (Hobolt, 2015, 
1537). However, the EU is not a genuine parliamentary system. 
Certainly, the policy and legislative procedures provide a link 
between the EP and the Commission. However, the democratic 
control that the EP execises over the Commission (including the 
appointment and removal procedure) plays a crucial role. 
Parliamentary democracy has been defined as: 
 
1. “A democratic form of government in which the party (or a 
coalition of parties) with the greatest representation in the 
parliament (legislature) forms the government, its leader 
becoming prime minister or chancellor.  
Many in the newly composed 
EP felt they had been robbed by 
the European Council riding 
roughshod over the lead 
candidate procedure. 
However, the EU is not a 
genuine parliamentary system. 
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2. Executive functions are exercised by members of the 
parliament appointed by the prime minister to the cabinet.  
3. The parties in the minority serve in opposition to the majority 
and have the duty to challenge it regularly.  
4. Prime ministers may be removed from power whenever they 
lose the confidence of a majority of the ruling party or of the 
parliament.”4 
 
When applied to the institutional setup of the EU, it is obvious 
that the Commission president is not the leader of the strongest 
political party in the EP elections; that Commissioners are not 
members of the EP5; and that there is no classical government-
opposition divide within the EP. Only the last criterion is met, as the 
European Parliament has the power to issue a no-confidence vote 
against the Commission and thereby force it to step down collectively 
(Article 17 TEU and Article 234 TFEU). 
Despite the EP having other control mechanisms before6 and 
during7 the mandate at its disposal, the institutional setup of the EU 
as a hybrid polity goes in the direction of but misses the crucial 
criteria for a parliamentary democracy. Further structural limitations 
arise from the fact that key areas of decision-making remain in the 
hands of national governments as “constituent actors” (Fabbrini, 
2015, 573). 
Therefore, the Commission is in no way the ‘parliamentary 
government’ that advocates of the lead candidate process had wished 
for.  
That leads to institutional flaws in the application of the lead 
candidate procedure. For instance, the procedure only extends to the 
Commission president, not to the whole executive – the appointment 
of the other members of the college follows a different logic. Even if 
                                                        
4 From https://www.britannica.com/topic/parliamentary-system 
5 Some Commissioners run for election and are elected, the EU Treaties however 
don’t allow members of the college to hold any other offices (Art. 245 TFEU), 
6 Approval of the College of Commissioners as a whole (Article 17(7) TEU). 
7 Posing of parliamentary questions (oral, written and ‘question time’) (Article 
230 TFEU). 
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the president attributes their portfolios and can refuse individual 
candidates, they are ultimately 
selected by their respective national 
governments. This arrangement does 
justice to the existence and importance 
of the Council and EUCO as the fora 
of the voice of the member states. This 
third forum will always require a 
unique setting. Therefore, one should not measure the EU’s 
democratic quality against national standards. 
8.3 New concept 
The 2014 rise and 2019 fall of the lead candidate procedure damaged 
the reputation of the institutions and that of EU-level democracy as 
such. Certainty and stability around an appointment is needed now. 
2024 seems to be far on the horizon, but it is necessary to start 
working on this now to use the momentum created around the debate 
on the Conference on the Future of Europe, where a debate on this is 
envisaged. The following improvements could be made within the 
possibilities of the EU’s unique institutional framework. 
I. Transnational list 
The transnational list is the intuitive counterpart to the lead candidate 
procedure. Such a list would contain candidates to be elected in a 
single constituency formed of the whole territory of the European 
Union. This would facilitate voting for candidates across member 
states and give citizens two votes: one for their national or regional 
constituency, and the other for the entire EU. Each party group’s lead 
candidate would be put on the 
transnational list and citizens from all 
member states could vote for all 
candidates, not just for their respective 
compatriots. A revised lead candidate 
procedure could in theory stand on its 
own, but it would strengthen the 
legitimacy of the procedure if all EU citizens could vote for each of 
the candidates running, not only those of the same nationality. 
This arrangement does  
justice to the existence and 
importance of the Council and 
EUCO as the fora of the voice 
of the member states. 
It would strengthen the 
legitimacy of the procedure if 
all EU citizens could vote for 
each of the candidates running, 
not only those of the same 
nationality. 
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Opponents argue that the proposal is ahead of the political and 
social reality, as there is no European demos and therefore no true 
unified European will that can be expressed in European elections. 
The construction of a true European political space is indeed a long 
way off and it will be a challenge to familiarise voters with the new 
system (the second vote) and the individual candidates. For this 
reason, it will face similar problems to those of the lead candidate 
procedure. Nonetheless, a transnational list could contribute to 
overcoming the ‘second-order national election’ problem. In their 
campaign, MEPs from this list cannot focus their campaigns only on 
one single small area (as ‘regular MEPs do with their constituencies’). 
As the whole EU territory is their constituency they will be motivated 
to campaign and travel across the EU. In this way they can increase 
their transnational visibility and trigger cross-national debate around 
EU-related policy choices. It would be the transnational MEPs 
(especially the lead candidates among them), that have the chance to 
develop into something like European public figures. This would 
require considerable effort to implement and might not be a great 
success in the first round, but it is an inevitable next step for EU 
democracy. Hence, a transnational list would not be a sufficient, but 
a necessary condition for the cross-border visibility of Commission 
president candidates. 
French President Emanuel Macron and German Chancellor 
Merkel committed to “put in place transnational lists for European 
elections as of 2024” 8 and Commission President von der Leyen sees 
the list as “as a complementary tool of European democracy”. The 
Commission (despite having no competences in this field) is 
facilitating the debate around it in the context of the Conference on 
the Future of Europe.9 It remains to be seen how the EP itself will 
decide in the future, after having voted down the introduction of a 
transnational list in 2018.10 The institutional design of such a list still 
needs to be debated and defined. The 25 seats that became vacant and 
                                                        
8 In the Meseberg Declaration of 2018: https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/ 
archiv-de/meta/startseite/meseberg-declaration-1140806 
9 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-conference-future 
-of-europe-january-2020_en.pdf 
10 The EPP, ECR, EFDD and GUE voted against.  
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have not been reallocated since the UK’s departure would be a good 
place to start.  
II. Kick off the campaigns earlier 
One of the arguments used to justify the poor performance of the first 
Spitzenkandidaten round in 2014 was that the (then) new procedure 
had teething troubles; as it was implemented hastily and 
spontaneously, there was little time to prepare and campaign. Hence, 
one of the obvious reform ideas was that Europarties should select 
their lead candidates earlier to allow time for intensive campaigning 
across the EU and to give voters the chance to familiarise themselves 
with the a) process as such and b) the candidates running for the 
office of president. This is not what happened, however. Only the 
EPP (2014: March; 2019: November) and the Greens (2014: January; 
2019: November) nominated and therefore presented their 
candidates earlier. Even later than before were the Left in December 
2014 and February 2019, and the Social Democrats (2014: November; 
2019: December, with a formal campaign kick-off only in March). 
ALDE only declared in February 2019 that it wouldn’t participate in 
the Spitzen race, instead inventing its own ‘Team Europe’ game and 
bringing even more confusion to the whole situation. Lead 
candidates, but also other potential MEPs from the transnational list, 
need time to make themselves known across the EU and to create 
space for genuine debate and deliberation on policies. Europarties 
must acknowledge that and nominate their respective candidates at 
least six months before elections.  
III. Involve both institutions: EP and EUCO 
A fully-fledged lead candidate system under which the EP would 
nominate the candidate in any event is not only difficult to implement 
(as it is not guaranteed that majorities can be found, as we have seen 
in the past) but also not desirable. 
What is needed is a system that 
reflects both the will of citizens and 
governments, because the EU is a 
Union of citizens and states. The EU 
treaties gave the prerogative to both institutions – this must be 
respected and reflected in a new procedure.  
The EU is a Union of citizens and 
states – this must be respected 
and reflected in a new procedure. 
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The EP’s involvement is crucial to translate the majority vote 
and citizens’ policy preferences into the appointment of the 
president. But equally important is a formal role of the EUCO in this: 
the Council and EUCO as member states’ fora not only bring more 
complexity but also a second strand of legitimacy. The EU is 
legitimised in two ways: through the usual parliamentary channel, 
and through the member states’ governments and their national 
parliaments.  
Furthermore, the EUCO’s involvement is important to ensure 
that national and party interests are respected and that the political 
equilibrium among EU government is reflected, as are the balances 
between big and small member states, geography and gender. 
By getting national leaders and governments on board, EU 
actors also increase the chances that they will make a positive case for 
the elections at home vis-a-vis their parties and parliaments, which in 
turn might have a positive effect on awareness and visibility towards 
citizens.   
Hence, the Commission president appointment procedure 
must reflect the need for consensus between the European Council 
and the European Parliament as the two main institutions involved, 
rather than one institution attempting to impose its candidate on the 
other. 
IV. Joint selection of candidates 
The proper functioning of a revised lead candidate procedure 
depends in the first instance on the European Parliament. The process 
of providing ‘political programmes with a face’ should not be 
abandoned. In an attempt to involve 
the EU citizens in this decision as 
much as possible and to create space 
for genuine debate and deliberation 
on policies, the European political groups should continue to identify 
their leaders. This has to happen in close collaboration with the 
respective Head of States and Governments from the same party. The 
MEPs and the members of the EUCO belong to two different EU 
institutions, but they are members of the same party groups. This 
should not necessarily be organised as primaries (as organised by the 
EPP group), but rather a small grouped format to allow for those 
The process of providing 
‘political programmes with a 
face’ should not be abandoned. 
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leaders’ voices to be heard, not drowned out by massive delegations. 
Europarties would have a crucial role in this as they are in the best 
position to bring together their members: MEPs and leaders from 
different national parties, united under the same party family roof.11 
If this proves unacceptable for the European Council, an 
alternative scenario would be to allow the EUCO to draft a list of 
potential candidates. The Europarties could then each nominate one 
of them as their candidate. This idea is not new: in the run-up to the 
Nice Treaty, the EP suggested that the European President should be 
selected by the European Parliament from a pool of candidates 
approved by the Council (Yataganas, 2001, 259). 
V. Two-step procedure 
If one of the candidates can rally a solid (absolute) EP majority behind 
this candidate, the European Council would have to nominate this 
person. If Parliament is not able to find such a majority, the European 
Council should be allowed to propose its own candidate – also 
someone who did not participate in the lead candidate procedure.  
The downside of this second option of the two-step proposal is 
that it cannot establish a direct link between citizens’ preferences and 
the president-designate’s agenda. Citizens would not be able to 
debate the policies put forward by the candidate (as it is also a 
traditional backroom deal). However, their representatives in the 
European Parliament would be able to because this Commission 
president-designate should be required to undergo a parliamentary 
hearing, similar to those the 
Commissioners-designate have to 
face. So far, the president (like von der 
Leyen in July 2019) has met the 
different political groups informally. 
A cross-party hearing could be organised either as one plenary 
session or be split into different committee sessions.  
That way, the competitive element of the lead candidate 
procedure remains, while the EU leaders are involved twice: first at 
the very beginning of the process when nominating the candidates, 
                                                        
11 For more details on Europarties and how to strengthen their role, see Kovář, 
Sychra and Kratochvíl in this volume.  
A cross-party hearing could be 
organised either as one plenary 
session or be split into different 
committee sessions. 
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here in their capacity as party members, and second at the end of the 
process if the EP is not able to build a majority, this time in their 
capacity as members of the EUCO. 
Timeframe 
After the election in May, the Parliament would have the month of 
June to find a majority. The nomination by the European Council 
would follow in early July and the candidate should have until early 
September to prepare the hearing before the EP. The hearings of the 
Commissioners-designate could then follow later that month. It 
should then be possible to still hold the inauguration of the new 
Commission in November. 
The Commission president-designate coming from outside the 
lead candidate process would be allowed time over the summer to 
properly prepare her/himself for the EP hearing and confirmation 
and to put together a detailed agenda for the upcoming legislative 
term.  
Treaty revision? 
The lead candidate procedure is based on Article 17(7) TEU.12 To 
legally manifest a new procedure to appoint the Commission 
president an interinstitutional agreement between the European 
Council and the European Parliament can be adopted. No 
amendment of the EU Treaties would be necessary. 
The introduction of transnational lists would not require treaty 
change either, just the adaptation of EU electoral law.13  Article 223 
TFEU of this act stipulates that this process is initiated by an EP 
proposal, which is then adopted in the Council by unanimity and 
                                                        
12“Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having 
held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of 
the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by 
a majority of its component members.” 
13 Act of 20 September 1976 concerning the election of the representatives of the 
Assembly by direct universal suffrage, last amended by Council Decision (EU, 
Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018. 
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approved by member states in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. 
Article 14(2) TEU sets out the criteria for the composition of the 
European Parliament. It remains broad, only determining the 
minimum and maximum threshold per member state, the maximum 
number of MEPs, and that representation is to be degressively 
proportional. A Council Decision lays down the details of the 
composition (which member state has how many seats).14 Hence, this 
Decision might have to be adapted if the allocation of seats would be 
affected.  
Added value 
An agreement along the lines proposed here would guarantee both 
institutions a fair share in the decision-making process and eliminate 
the waste of energy on institutional 
muscle-flexing. That way, EU 
institutions as well as political 
parties/Europarties would not be 
distracted from what is actually at 
stake: identifying the best suitable 
candidate for the office.  
However, institutional reform is never end in itself. To rethink 
the Commission president appointment procedure goes beyond 
institutional peace and smooth workflow. This is about bolstering 
democracy and representativeness. This new procedure would make 
the process more democratic by involving both EU citizens and their 
governments in the decision, thereby exploiting both strands of EU 
legitimacy. A revised procedure and the introduction of a 
transnational list are certainly no silver bullets for European 
democracy, but they have the potential to narrow the gap between 
the EU legislative and executive branch as well as EU institutions and 
EU citizens  
                                                        
14 Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 amending the Act 
concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 
20 September 1976. 
An agreement along the lines 
proposed here would guarantee 
both institutions a fair share in 
the decision-making process and 
eliminate the waste of energy on 
institutional muscle-flexing. 
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8.4 Recommendations 
 The current system(s) has failed. New rules must do justice 
to the EU’s unique institutional framework and reflect the 
dual legitimacy on which the EU is built: coming from the 
member states’ governments (represented by the EUCO) and 
the European citizens (represented by the members of the 
EP). 
 The ground rules need to be agreed by the two institutions 
with the treaty mandate to jointly find a president of the 
Commission: the European Council and the European 
Parliament. These rules must be set down and be legally 
binding to avoid institutional (and party) turf battles. This 
should be done via an interinstitutional agreement. 
 A new procedure would include five crucial elements: 1. the 
candidates run for election in the EP elections via a 
transnational list, and can therefore be elected by voters 
across the EU; 2. the campaigns are kicked off by the 
Europarties much earlier to give voters time to familiarise 
themselves with the process and the candidates; 3. both the 
EP and the EUCO are involved equally; 4. EU leaders have 
a say in selecting the respective lead candidates; and 5. a 
two-step procedure would allow the EP to try to build a 
majority and giving the EUCO the right to appoint in case of 
failure, which is then preceded by a formal EP hearing of the 
Commission president-designate. 
 The term Spitzenkandidaten should be dropped. It only 
speaks to those who understand German and recalls the 
previous failed attempts. 
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 HOW CAN EUROPEAN 
AFFAIRS COMMITTEES BE 
STRENGTHENED? 
IVETA KAZOKA AND SINTIJA TARASOVA 
This chapter examines the general trends and best practices in national 
parliaments of the European Union for engaging in EU affairs. It analyses the 
position of European Affairs Committees, ex ante and ex post parliamentary 
scrutiny of governments, direct communication with EU institutions, and how 
a broader public is involved in EU issues. The position and weight of an EAC 
and indeed of the parliament differ from one member state to another, but 
nevertheless there are a certain number of common approaches that would help 
a national parliament to increase its power relative to other national and EU 
institutions involved in EU policymaking. 
9.1 Introduction: Roles of national parliaments  
This chapter is dedicated to identifying general trends and best 
practices relating to the role in EU affairs of national parliaments 
(NPs) and, more particularly, parliamentary European Affairs’ 
Committees (EACs). Its three sub-sections are linked to the roles NPs 
play in respect to EU affairs: providing scrutiny of their own 
governments, engaging directly with EU institutions, and with the 
broader public regarding EU matters.  
According to a survey conducted by the Conference of 
Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the 
European Union (COSAC) in 2016, all of the NPs surveyed have an 
ambition to be active players at the EU level (COSAC, 2016a: 9). Being 
active does not mean that an NP needs to be engaged in every single 
matter related to Brussels. On the contrary, in order to be influential, 
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the NP needs to “select the matters that are worth parliament’s time” 
(De Wilde, 2018, cited by Winzen, 2013: 
153).  
So, what are the most important 
matters that are worth NPs time? 
According to their self-evaluation: for 
national parliaments it is more 
important to provide scrutiny of their 
own governments than to be a frequent and independent actor on the 
EU scene (see Figure 9.1). 
Figure 9.1 Importance of scrutiny activities 
 
Source: Survey responses of 38 EU NPs/Chambers. Annex to the 25th Bi-annual Report 
of COSAC (http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/). 
 
At the current stage of the EU’s institutional development, NPs 
still tend to perceive their own governments as being the lead players 
in negotiating in Brussels, and it is relatively rare that an NP would 
see for itself a role independent of their government. As evidenced 
by Figure 9.1, NPs currently prefer to try to shape their government’s 
position rather than actively engage with EU institutions. 
Nevertheless, in recent years, NPs have started to explore more direct 
means of engagement in EU decision-making, as well as ways of 
engaging a broader public (especially experts).  
17
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27
34
0% 10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
Active Brussels' player (interacting directly 
with the EU institutions)
Government support (supporting the position 
of the government in EU decision making)
Policy shaper (actively influencing the 
government's EU position)
Government oversight (holding the 
government accountable regarding EU affairs)
What percentage of EU National Parliaments/Chambers gave this response? 
Question: How important are the following EU parliamentary 
scrutiny activities for your Parliament/Chamber?
Important Moderately important Not important No answer
For national parliaments it is 
more important to provide 
scrutiny of their own 
governments than to be a 
frequent and independent 
actor on the EU scene. 
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This article is based on a presumption that an active NP would 
want to play all three key roles well, namely, (1) to provide scrutiny 
of their own government related to EU affairs, (2) to engage in EU 
decision-making directly and (3) to educate and engage a broader 
public in EU matters. The prioritisation of these different roles might 
differ from one NP to another, but it is important for an NP to have 
sufficient capacity in each function.  
There have been several attempts to rank the institutional 
strength of NPs in EU affairs (Auel, 2016: 268). These attempts do not 
provide a clear-cut answer to the 
question on whether the 
institutional strength of NPs is 
dependent on concentrating EU 
expertise in a specific European 
Affairs Committee or dispersing it 
throughout the parliament. The 
general tendency seems to be in favour of mainstreaming EU 
expertise across the parliament and not keeping it within the bounds 
of European Affairs Committees (see Figure 9.2). 
Figure 9.2 Sole responsibility of European Affairs Committee 
 
Source: Survey responses of 38 EU NPs/Chambers. Annex to the 27th Bi-annual Report 
of COSAC (http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/). 
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Question: Is the European Affairs Committee the only Committee 
responsible for the scrutiny of EU proposals?
Yes No No answer
The general tendency seems to 
be in favour of mainstreaming 
EU expertise across the 
parliament and not keeping it 
within the bounds of European 
Affairs Committees. 
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Even though EACs have been formed in every NP of EU 
member states, there is a different extent to the involvement of those 
members of parliament who are not sitting on an EAC. For the 
majority of NPs, not only the European Affairs Committee, but also 
sectoral committees are involved in scrutiny of the EU proposals 
(COSAC, 2017a: 9). In some parliaments, EU-related debates 
frequently take place not only in EACs, but also in plenary settings.  
On the one hand, the benefits of concentrating EU expertise in 
an EAC is clear: it provides for swifter and more streamlined 
decision-making. On the other hand, with the increased range of 
policy areas related to the EU, it makes sense to involve sectoral 
committees in EU-related scrutiny and to spread EU-related expertise 
across the NP. Some of the strongest NPs have at least some ways of 
engaging sectoral committees in EU affairs – for example, in Germany 
and Ireland each EU proposal is addressed by sectoral committees 
(Munro et al., 2016: 19). In Sweden, the EAC retains the lead role as it 
has been entrusted with mandating rights, but scrutiny of the 
proposals is decentralised to sectoral committees (Auel, 2018: 36). 
9.2 Scrutinising one’s own parliament:  
ex ante, ex post or both?  
According to the NPs, governmental oversight is the most important 
function for an NP in relation to the EU affairs (see Figure 9.1). Each 
government produces its national positions before the Council and 
European Council meetings, and – over 
the years – NPs have become important 
players in providing scrutiny for these 
positions.  
Overall, NPs prioritise prior control 
over accountability: more NPs debate and 
provide scrutiny over their government’s 
plans before the Council meeting (ex ante control) than demand 
accountability after the meeting (ex post control) (Auel, 2018: 21). 
The strongest form of ex ante control is a mandate – a 
government is required to obtain a parliamentary mandate before 
taking a position in the Council (COSAC, 2017a: 12). A less strong form 
of parliamentary oversight would be discretionary mandates – namely, 
NPs can decide to issue mandates, but are not required to do so by law 
Each government produces  
its national positions before 
the Council and European 
Council meetings and NPs 
have become important 
players in providing scrutiny. 
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(Auel, 2018: 17). The strongest expression of parliamentary oversight 
has been observed in Denmark, which was the first country to establish 
parliamentary mandates on EU issues and where, due to the frequent 
occurrence of minority governments, the government cannot be certain 
of obtaining a parliamentary mandate, so it needs to work harder to 
convince the different parties represented in parliament (Kluger 
Dionigi, 2019: 129-131).  
Usually, it is ministers who are obliged to appear before the 
relevant parliamentary committee on the EU issues under scrutiny;1 
in some cases the government position is presented by the prime 
minister.  
It is relatively rare that an NP provides scrutiny for all EU-level 
proposals. The general tendency for most NPs is to select the most 
important EU proposals for examination (COSAC, 2017a: 11). Among 
notable exceptions, the German Bundestag and Swedish Riksdag 
scrutinise the government’s position on all EU proposals throughout 
the EU legislative process. 
Even though it might seem strange to provide prior control 
without later making certain that the government has, in fact, 
followed parliamentary prescriptions, 
there are many parliaments that do not 
demand their governments report back 
from Council and European Council 
meetings (Auel, 2018: 17).  
Among the strongest NPs, two in 
particular can be recognised as having quality ex post control: Finland 
and the Netherlands. In Finland, ex ante parliamentary scrutiny and 
a mandate for government is obligatory, but the mandate is 
intentionally elaborated in a manner that clearly relates to the 
preferred outcome, but leaves the government sufficient room for 
manoeuvre to negotiate as they see fit. Nevertheless, if the outcome 
is not achieved, the government needs to justify itself (Munro et al., 
2016: 17). Moreover, the government also needs to inform the 
                                                        
1 According to NP/Chambers’ responses to a survey conducted by COSAC, in 21 
NP/Chambers a minister is obliged to appear before the relevant committee on 
issues related to scrutiny of the government position on EU proposals. See Annex 
to the 27th Bi-annual Report of COSAC (http://www.cosac.eu/ 
documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/). 
There are many parliaments 
that do not demand their 
governments report back 
from Council and European 
Council meetings. 
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Parliament of Finland in cases where EU proposals change or where 
the government needs to amend its position (Ibid.: 23). 
In the Netherlands, ministers are also required to send a 
written report to parliament of each Council meeting, and – in the 
case of the European Council – there might be a follow-up debate in 
the plenary (Ibid.: 22).   
The importance of parliamentary oversight exercised by NPs 
relating to EU affairs is affirmed by the presence of prime ministers 
during the scrutiny. In seven EU member states, the presence of 
prime minister is expected for ex ante and ex post parliamentary 
scrutiny (Auel, 2018: 21). 
9.3 Becoming active players on the EU stage: 
priority areas for engagement 
Compared to the oversight of their own government, being a direct 
Brussels’ policy shaper is a second-order priority for most NPs (see 
Figure 9.1).  
There are three main ways in which an NP can gain in 
importance at the EU level: 1) by communicating directly with the 
European Commission; 2) by communicating directly with the 
European Parliament; 3) by forming networks with NPs in other EU 
member states.  
It is relatively rare for an NP to choose a different method of 
engagement. For example, in 2016, 33 out of 38 parliamentary 
chambers admitted during a survey that they had not participated in 
a consultation on the transparency of trilogues organised by the 
European Ombudsman (COSAC, 2016a: 4). 
Direct communication with the European Commission 
Despite the initial promise of strengthening NPs through the 
introduction of the Early Warning System (EWS) or the so-called 
yellow and red cards, many NPs chose not to issue warnings to the 
European Commission regarding risks to the principle of 
subsidiarity. Participation rates among member states vary 
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significantly, and only the Swedish and French parliaments can be 
considered active users of this opportunity.2  
Among the reasons for the scepticism and low uptake of the 
procedure are the following: 1) members of national parliaments are 
not the greatest experts on 
subsidiarity (Rozenberg, 2017: 28), 
which is perceived as a narrow and 
specific subject matter; 2) there is little 
faith in the effectiveness of 
subsidiarity checks – the European 
Commission is accused of responding 
slowly and inattentively 
(Mastenbroek, 2014: 19). In fact, in a 
survey of NPs conducted in 2019, less than one-third of all 
parliaments considered that participation in Political Dialogue with 
the European Commission had affected outcomes at EU level (see 
Figure 9.3) During Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission, there was an 
unprecedented decline in EU legislative activity as part of the 
Commission’s Better Regulation policy,3 which made the subsidiarity 
check partly redundant (Rozenberg, 2017: 7)  
There have even been accusations levelled against the EWS 
stating that the procedure redirects NPs’ attention away from more 
important duties – such as controlling their governments and 
communicating with citizens (De Wilde, 2018: 3). Some parliaments 
from across EU, such as Germany’s Bundestag (Brandes, 2019: 167-
168) or Slovakia’s Národná rada (Világi, 2019: 304) prefer to control 
their own governments rather than to check subsidiarity. There might 
even be a case where the “strength of parliamentary control over the 
government and thus its negotiation position in the Council seems 
inversely related to the use of EU-level procedures” (Blockmans, 
2019: 368). 
                                                        
2 For detailed analysis of the successes and failures of the Early Warning System, 
please see Chapter 10.  
3 See “Two decades of Better Regulation in the EU Commission – Towards 
evidence-based policymaking?”, Clingendael Policy brief, December 2018, p. 15 
(https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/PB_Better_ 
regulation.pdf). 
There is little faith in the 
effectiveness of subsidiarity 
checks – less than one third of 
all parliaments considered 
that participation in political 
dialogue with the European 
Commission had affected 
outcomes at EU level. 
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Figure 9.3 Ability to affect outcomes at EU level 
 
Source: Survey responses of 38 EU NPs/Chambers. Annex to the 32th Bi-annual 
Report of COSAC (https://secure.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/conference/get 
conference.do?id=8a8629a86bc08c43016bd61f04da09fb/). 
 
 
In a similar manner to Political Dialogue – an institutional 
mechanism between an NP and the European Commission to 
exchange information and opinions on policy issues, legislative and 
non-legislative initiatives – NPs may hold contradictory opinions 
during EWS and their opinions are just one item of information 
among many. There are even fears that an overly active NP might see 
its credibility with the European Commission damaged 
(Mastenbroek, 2014: 19, 27-28). In spite of this, for several NPs, both 
the EWS and Political Dialogue are important mechanisms both to 
generate their own position on a subject matter, and to communicate 
it to the European Commission and other NPs.  
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Question: Does your Parliament/Chamber consider that its reasoned opinions or its 
participation in political dialogue with the European Commission has affected 
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Figure 9.4 Parliament visits by European Commission representatives 
 
 
Source: Annex to the 26th Bi-annual Report of COSAC 
(http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/). 
 
Some parliaments prefer other methods for direct engagement 
with the European Commission. For example, the parliaments of the 
Netherlands and Germany try to invite European Commissioners at 
a very early stage during the elaboration of a new EU policy (Munro 
et al., 2016: 26). The number of visits of European Commissioners and 
Commission officials to NPs visibly increased during Jean-Claude 
Juncker’s Commission. There was also some increase in visits of NPs 
to the European Commission (see Figure 9.4). 
Overall, the European Commission tends to appreciate a timely 
involvement in EU decision-making (Mastenbroek, 2014: 19), and the 
EWS is intended for a relatively late stage in the legislative process, 
when the legislative proposal has already been developed. That is 
why it is worrying to see a recent trend in NPs paying less attention 
to the Commission’s green and white papers (Ibid.: 19-20) where – 
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prior to elaborating a legislative proposal – it proposes issues for 
discussion or policy options. Sweden is among the few exceptions: its 
committees still scrutinise Commission green and white papers 
(Munro et al., 2016: 24).   
Direct communication with the European Parliament 
It is relatively rare that an NP prioritises establishing good contacts with 
the European Parliament. Germany’s Bundestag is an exception: it tries 
to meet with European Parliament rapporteurs on important topics, and 
to send its sectoral committees to Brussels (Munro et al., 2016: 26). 
The European Parliament cannot be expected to be interested in 
communications to the European Commission produced by NPs. The 
primary reason for this lack of interest is information overload, though 
there is also some institutional rivalry (Mastenbroek, 2014: 20 & 28).  
Nevertheless, it is likely that MEPs from the member state 
concerned would be more interested in regular communication 
between their NP and EU institutions. Currently, there is a lack of 
involvement of MEPs in their respective NPs: less than half of all NPs 
organise regular meetings with their MEPs (COSAC, 2016a: 1). 
Nevertheless, MEPs from some countries are simultaneously 
members of European Affairs Committees, can be rapporteurs for the 
NP on the most significant EU matters, and even have the right to 
participate in the NP’s debates.  
Cooperation with other NPs. 
For most parliaments, an active exchange 
with parliaments in other EU member 
states is an important part of their job (see 
Figure 9.1). There are several main ways an 
active NP can actively network with other 
NPs in order to raise support for some EU 
policy or to block it: 
 Networking during parliamentary conferences, such as COSAC 
(The Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union 
Affairs) or some policy-specific forums, for example, on defence. 
It is such networking that can play a key role in amassing 
support for yellow or red cards during EWS (Auel, 2018: 29). 
For most parliaments,  
an active exchange with 
parliaments in other EU 
member states is an 
important part of their job. 
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 Networking with other NPs via parliamentary liaisons from each 
NP in Brussels – they are useful to gather and exchange 
information. In fact, a survey of NPs indicates that this is the 
most frequently used method for an NP to gather and exchange 
information on EU-related matters with other parliaments/ 
Chambers.4 
 To share information with other NPs using The 
Interparliamentary EU information exchange (IPEX). It should 
be taken into account, though, that NPs would prioritise just 
certain types of information to share with others, such as their 
input to the Political Dialogue or subsidiarity checks. Rarely, if 
ever, will they be prepared to share more sensitive information 
relating to trilogue negotiations (COSAC, 2016a: 18).  
9.4 What else is important for a well-functioning 
European Affairs Committee? 
In order to be able to control their own governments regarding EU 
affairs and to engage more directly in EU decision-making, members 
of parliaments need assistance as well 
as expertise. It is usually the 
administrative staff of the NP that 
helps to draft NP’s communications 
with the European Commission that 
selects and summarises the relevant 
EU documentation. Germany’s 
Bundestag not only provides the 
largest administrative staff related to the EU policy, but also organises 
training classes for MPs both on the EU and thematic subjects, as well as 
on using EU-related databases (Munro et al., 2016: 28). 
An NP and/or an EAC might also consider additional powers 
and considerations to help them achieve more in the scrutiny of their 
governments, involvement with the EU and communication with the 
public. 
                                                        
4 34 out of 38 NPs/Chambers admitted that they use this method very often. See 
Annex to the 25th Bi-annual Report of COSAC (http://www.cosac.eu/ 
documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/). 
In order to be able to control 
their own governments 
regarding EU affairs and to 
engage more directly in EU 
decision-making, members of 
parliaments need assistance 
as well as expertise. 
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Additional powers/considerations related to the scrutiny of 
government  
In order to ascertain that a government is following the basic outlines 
of the national position during the Council and European Council, an 
NP needs access to more information than is available to a broader 
public. Actual negotiations in the Council, especially during the 
working groups and COREPER, are not well documented, so the NP 
is reliant on its own government to either share this information with 
parliament. There are two countries that provide very extensive 
information to their NPs: Germany (Auel, 2018: 32) and Italy. Italy’s 
permanent representation in Brussels is required to provide its 
parliament with comprehensive information, including information 
relating to negotiations during trilogues and minutes of Council 
working groups and COREPER (Ibid.).   
Figure 9.5 Monitoring role of parliaments 
 
Source: Survey responses of 38 EU NPs/Chambers. Annex to the 27th Bi-annual Report 
of COSAC (http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/). 
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One area of EU-related scrutiny that is frequently overlooked by 
both the EACs and NPs in general: scrutiny of their governments related 
to the implementation or non-implementation of EU legislation. Even 
though it is possible to raise this issue in almost all the parliamentary 
chambers across the EU (COSAC, 2017a: 15), it is relatively rare that an 
NP asks its government to explain whether it has managed to implement 
an EU law. Nevertheless, granting a greater role to parliaments in 
monitoring the implementation of EU law is controversial even among 
parliaments themselves (see Figure 9.5). 
In order to increase the 
importance that both the government 
and the broader public gives to EU 
affairs, it might be useful to have an 
obligation or an option to organise 
plenary debates on EU policy. For example, Portuguese prime 
minister has participated since 2012 in such debates before European 
Councils (Auel, 2018: 20). Also France’s Assemblée Nationale 
convenes for a public debate before each meeting of the European 
Council. Regular plenary debates on the EU are relatively rare in NPs, 
but the majority of NPs do find an appropriate way to discuss issues 
of high EU importance, such as, for example, Brexit (COSAC, 2017a: 
18). From 2010 to 2018, there were more than thirty debates in the 
Austrian Parliament on EU policies (Schaller, 2019: 70-72). 
Even though the workload of NPs is already substantive with 
their involvement in scrutiny over governmental positions and with 
direct communication on EU legislation, NPs nevertheless need to 
allocate some time to participate in EU-level policy coordination 
activities, among which the European Semester is currently the most 
important. In 2016, only around a half of all NPs scrutinised both the 
Stability or Convergence Programmes and National Reform 
Programmes (Rozenberg, 2017: 43-46). It is not yet common to give 
NPs voting powers on these documents and/or to amend them – only 
some NPs have such powers (Ibid.: 43-46). 
Additional powers/considerations related to NPs becoming 
active players on the EU stage 
NPs that are not tasked to provide mandates for their government on 
every single EU-related issue need the ability to prioritise different 
Granting a greater role to 
parliaments in monitoring the 
implementation of EU law is 
controversial even among 
parliaments themselves. 
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EU dossiers. The prioritisation may be based on different 
considerations. For example, for many parliamentary chambers the 
key document is the European Commission’s work programme 
(Auel, 2018: 35). Croatia obliges its government to come up with a list 
of items of draft legislation expected to be discussed at the EU level, 
and picks its priorities from the list. Ireland prioritises those 
documents that need attention at an early stage (Munro et al., 2016: 19).  
To provide for early engagement, the Netherlands looks at the 
European Commission’s work programme and sends it to sectoral 
committees that might express interest in more scrutiny. In 2014, 
around half of all European Commission’s initiatives were deemed 
worthy of further scrutiny (Ibid.: 24). A similarly decentralised early 
engagement system is in place in Sweden. 
The Parliament of Finland prefers to be engaged at a very early 
stage, so it tends to respond to green and white papers issued by the 
European Commission (Ibid.: 24). Germany’s Bundestag has 20 staff 
members in its liaison office in Brussels who check for new legislative 
developments of interest to the Parliament (Ibid.: 27).   
Sometimes NPs – in EACs or in sectoral committees – appoint 
their own rapporteurs on some EU subject area of specific interest. 
This person would collect more information on the issue and draft an 
NP’s position. Rapporteurs in NPs on EU issues are becoming 
increasingly common.5 
It is quite uncommon for NPs to evaluate existing EU-level 
legislation: only the French Sénat regularly produces its own 
evaluation reports about EU legislation (COSAC, 2017a: 14). NPs tend 
to be more active scrutinising their own government’s position on the 
evaluation reports produced by the European Commission (COSAC, 
2017a). 
                                                        
5 In a survey conducted in 2016, 16 out of 38 NPs/Chambers admitted already 
having rapporteurs on EU issues, with Portugal intending to introduce 
rapporteurs in the near future. See Annex to the 25th Bi-annual Report of COSAC 
(http://www.cosac.eu/documents/bi-annual-reports-of-cosac/). 
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Powers/considerations related to informing and engaging 
the public on the EU issues 
Fewer than half of all NP chambers have developed a communication 
strategy on EU policy (COSAC, 2016b: 26). The most frequently used 
channels for informing the public about the EU are parliamentary or 
committee websites, specific meetings, social media, newsletters and 
even dedicated TV channels. In general, NPs tend to inform the 
public about the agenda and discussions during EAC and plenary 
meetings, as well as about proposed EU legislation. Some NPs adapts 
their communication to their audience, for example, school students. 
It is relatively uncommon for NPs to develop specific citizen 
engagement procedures for EU affairs. Nevertheless, around half of 
all parliamentary chambers admit that they share their information 
with NGOs, and some even actively seek contact with NGOs to 
scrutinise governmental positions and EU documentation (COSAC, 
2017b: 20-21). Finland has even developed an EU expert database, 
naming people who can provide useful guidance for different 
thematic areas related to EU policymaking (Munro et al., 2016: 29).  
9.5 Recommendations 
The position and weight of an NP and an EAC differ from one 
member state to the other, so the following recommendations have 
been generated on the assumption that an NP or an EAC would seek 
good ideas, based on best practices in other EU member states, to 
increase their strength relative to other national and EU institutions 
involved in EU policymaking.  
In addition, it would make sense for an NP or EAC to 
commission regular assessments of the effectiveness of its 
engagement relating to EU issues. According to a 2019 survey,6 
almost half of all NPs have not had such assessments since 2010. 
 It would be preferable to involve in EU affairs not just the 
members of parliament on EACs, but also those on sectoral 
committees and the plenary sessions. That would help to 
                                                        
6 Survey responses of 38 EU NPs/Chambers. Annex to the 32nd COSAC Bi-
annual Report (https://secure.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/conference/getconference.do 
?id=8a8629a86bc08c43016bd61f04da09fb/). 
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strengthen the weight of NPs’ positions, spread EU-related 
interest and expertise across each NP and help to contribute 
more extensively to EU policymaking. 
 If an NP wants to improve its ex ante scrutiny powers over 
national positions, it should consider: (1) making it obligatory for 
the government to obtain a mandate from the NP; (2) requiring 
ministers and the prime minister to appear in parliament before 
Council and European Council meetings; 
 If an NP wants to improve its ex post scrutiny powers over 
national positions, it should consider: (1) making it obligatory for 
the government to report back to the parliament after each 
Council or European Council meeting; (2) making it obligatory 
for the government to report all information relating to the 
changes in the original proposal of the European Commission or 
changes in the position of the government. 
 The best and most effective way for the NP to communicate with 
European Commission: direct meetings with Commissioners 
and top officials, as well as responses to green and white papers 
at an early stage of the legislative process. The Early Warning 
System and Political Dialogue may also be used, but an NP 
should be careful with not overvaluing the importance of these 
communication channels and they also should be mindful that 
subsidiarity checks arrive quite late in the legislative process.  
 The best and most effective way for the NP to communicate with 
the European Parliament: finding ways to communicate 
regularly with MEPs from their own countries; meeting with 
European Parliament rapporteurs on dossiers of interest; 
participating in small-scale events organised by the European 
Parliament on specific topics of interest.  
 The best and most effective way for the NP to communicate with 
other national parliaments: taking part in common networking 
events, especially COSACs, and using the NP’s Brussels liaison 
as its eyes and ears regarding legislative developments of 
interest. 
 The NP and/or EAC needs sufficient administrative assistance 
to summarise and draft its EU-related communication, as well as 
to provide advice to MPs on EU policy. 
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 Additional powers/considerations relating to the scrutiny of the 
government: 
a. In order to ascertain that government is following the basic 
outlines of the national position in the Council and 
European Council, an NP needs access to more information 
than is available to a broader public, particularly regarding 
negotiations during trilogues and Council working groups, 
as well as COREPER.  
b. NPs and/or EACs might benefit from receiving regular 
updates from their governments on the implementation of 
EU law. 
c. The importance of EU-related policy would increase if there 
were additional debates on EU affairs in plenary sittings of 
NPs. 
d. NPs need to allocate some time for participation in EU-level 
policy coordination activities, among which the European 
Semester is currently the most important. 
 Additional powers/considerations relating to NPs becoming 
active players on the EU stage: 
a. The NPs and/or EACs need to find a way to prioritise those 
EU policy dossiers that require extra attention. 
b. The NPs and/or EACs need to strive for involvement in EU 
policymaking at the earliest of all possible stages – when the 
European Commission’s proposal has not yet been 
developed, but exists as an idea expressed during a 
conference, a green/white paper or has just appeared in the 
work programme. 
c. It would make sense for an NP and/or EAC to appoint their 
own rapporteurs on EU-related policy issues of high 
importance to their country. 
d. NPs should consider producing their own evaluation 
reports regarding legislation currently in force across the EU 
or, at least, provide feedback to their government when it 
states its position to the European Commission regarding 
those evaluation reports.  
 Powers/considerations relating to informing and engaging the 
public on the EU issues: 
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a. EACs should consider having their own sections on the 
NP’s website, where at least the following information can 
be easily found: agenda and discussions during EAC and 
plenary meetings, as well as about proposed EU legislation. 
b. EACs and sectoral committees (during their discussions on 
EU policy) should strive to involve NGOs and experts who 
would be able to provide guidance on EU policy and 
national interests.  
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 REVISING THE EARLY WARNING 
SYSTEM TO REINFORCE THE 
‘THIRD CHAMBER’ OF EU  
MULTI-LEVEL LAW-MAKING 
FILIPPA CHATZISTAVROU AND  
KONSTANTINOS PAPANIKOLAOU 
This chapter explores a potentially effective improvement of the role of national 
parliaments as the ‘third chamber’ in the EU’s multi-level governance system. 
The latter is characterised by a de facto transfer of competences within a new 
generation of EU policies, which requires a rethink of how to improve the lines 
of delegation and accountability. 
The generalisation of the Early Warning System (EWS) – through the 
establishment of new ‘blue’ and ‘green’ card procedures – would make it possible 
to extend multi-level parliamentary scrutiny in a more flexible way while 
rendering this control mechanism legally binding for the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament, not only on subsidiarity issues but 
throughout the whole policy cycle. In this way, conferral-focused scrutiny 
within a new mechanism could first assuage national anxieties that generate 
Euroscepticism; and second, it could transform the reactive and negative EWS 
involvement into an active and constructive one. 
10.1 Introduction: A confusing creep of competence? 
EU institutions exercise their functions under the fundamental 
principle of voluntary conferral of powers by member states. The 
loose and incomplete horizontal separation of powers has been based 
on this principle ensuring the proper functioning of the EU’s 
traditional institutional triangle. The Lisbon Treaty changes set out in 
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Art. 12 TEU, Art. 5(3) TEU, the Protocol (No. 1) on the role of national 
parliaments (NPs) in the European Union and the Protocol (No. 2) on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
placed emphasis on reshaping and strengthening the European 
supportive role of national assemblies. 
NPs’ first duty is to control national governments, thus 
ensuring (indirect) democratic legitimacy for one of the two 
representative bodies of European bicameralism. The subsidiarity 
control mechanism, the Early Warning System (EWS) established in 
2009, confuses this principal-agent relationship between NPs and 
governments, by also making NPs ‘agents’ at the EU level (Raunio, 
2007). Since then, NPs have been described, quite rightly, as a civil 
society actor of the third sector (Cooper, 2013); it has even been 
argued that the introduction of the EWS suggested a ‘tricameral’ 
system of representative democracy in the EU by empowering NPs’ 
collective and formal intervention (Cooper, 2013). 
Assessing the ten years of experience with the EWS, this paper 
challenges the status quo of political and institutional power within 
the EU and outlines a means of 
effective improvement in NPs’ role as 
the ‘third chamber’ in a multi-level 
governance system fit for the 21st 
century. By putting the accent on the 
problem of competence creep, it 
underlines the need to establish a real 
balance between preserving domestic 
socio-economic and politico-legal idiosyncrasies, and developing 
European public policies for convergence and inclusion. 
10.2 What policy capacity for national parliaments 
within the EU? 
Subsidiarity is a regulation and legitimation principle on the vertical 
distribution of competences according to which the EU must not 
intervene in any area of shared competence unless such an action is 
deemed necessary and presents a clear added value. The EWS, in the 
sense of monitoring the compliance of EU legislation, only comes into 
play when competence in a certain policy field is shared with the 
member states. In principle, national competences (such as national 
Need to establish a real 
balance between preserving 
domestic socio-economic and 
politico-legal idiosyncrasies, 
and developing European 
public policies for convergence 
and inclusion. 
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security, the maintenance of law and order), or exclusive EU 
competences (such as competition law, common commercial policy 
and monetary policy) or non-legislative documents such as 
communications or green papers are excluded. 
However, successive crises created a great deal of pressure for 
action at the EU level leading to the widening of policy initiatives 
beyond old-fashioned classifications and subsequently the erosion of 
individual national competences. For example, the question of 
oversight powers of NPs over the ECB,1 the Banking Union and the 
OMT programme, as well as the controversial question of ‘technical 
assistance’ provided on the basis of structural reform support 
programmes2 are issues that go well beyond scrutinising the 
Commission’s subsidiarity compliance. The phenomenon of ‘de-
parliamentarisation’ of European integration refers to the transfer of 
policymaking (mainly regulatory) 
powers to the European level; it is 
illustrated in two ways. First, the 
increased use of co-decision and 
qualified majority voting in the 
Council and the bargaining in the 
Council and the European Council 
make it difficult for national 
parliaments. They find themselves in a situation of informational 
asymmetry making it effective scrutiny of their governments’ 
activities difficult and are thus losing direct influence and becoming 
unable to force governments to make detailed ex ante commitments 
before taking decisions at the European level (Raunio, 2009). New 
powers for the European Parliament cannot fully compensate for the 
NPs’ loss of authority; the only way to address the democratic deficit 
is to better (re-)involve NPs directly at the EU level (Cooper, 2013). 
                                                        
1 This does not refer to the latter’s monetary policy but merely its supervisory tasks. 
2 The opinion of the Committee of Regions of 2018 on the structural reform 
support programme for the period 2017 to 2020 concluded that the proposal 
complied "with the principle of subsidiarity if technical assistance is provided in 
areas of shared competence between the Union and the Member States" adding 
that "as the proposal is based on a voluntary mechanism, the question of 
proportionality does not arise". In fact, in principle these programmes are not 
voluntary and technical assistance also covers areas of national competence. 
Successive crises created a great 
deal of pressure for action at the 
EU level leading to the widening 
of policy initiatives beyond old-
fashioned classifications and 
subsequently the erosion of 
individual national competences. 
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Second, policy developments in the early 21st century clearly 
show that there is a de facto transfer of new competences to the 
intergovernmental institutions and de novo bodies of the EU. This 
transfer ‘breaks’ the bicameral logic of the system, since the European 
Parliament cannot carry out its (direct) scrutiny role of the newly 
Europeanised core state policy areas (i.e. budgetary and economic 
policy, migration, asylum and borders policy, defence policy, etc.). 
Added to this, the long-term empowering of executives as the main 
policy shapers, which further undermines – depending on the 
national political systems – the scrutiny role of NPs within the 
domestic arena of public policy. 
Co-decision and forced Europeanisation of ‘new’ EU policies 
are taking place while only a handful of MPs involved with European 
Affairs Committees keep track of the Brussels agenda, the remainder 
appear to live on another planet called ‘domestic’, unaffected by the 
constant stream of new EU legislation (Borońska-Hryniewiecka, 
2015). 
These developments show that the traditional categorisations 
of competences do not correspond to the political and legal post-crisis 
realities. The need for impact assessments of each proposal before 
publication will increase. With the new generation of EU policies, we 
need to think how to redesign the lines of delegation and 
accountability. 
The EWS as it currently 
operates does not assess the 
transfer of powers to the EU, but 
whether those that have already 
been transferred are correctly 
classified according to the distinction between exclusive, shared and 
supporting EU competences. However, recurrent serious 
transgressions of the competence boundaries might raise questions as 
to whether the EU should continue to exercise powers in a given field 
(Jančić, 2015). So, the crucial question today is how to achieve a 
successful distribution of competences in a system of multi-level 
governance and multi-layer as well as multi-tier architecture by 
taking decisions at the most appropriate level. 
With the new generation of EU 
policies, we need to think how to 
redesign the lines of delegation 
and accountability. 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE EU  173 
 
10.3 The Early Warning System: an assessment 
According to the EWS (post-Brexit), each of the 15 unicameral 
parliaments is allotted two votes, while each of the 12 bicameral 
chambers counts as a single vote. With 27 EU member states and 39 
national parliamentary chambers, there are 54 votes in all; in the 
yellow card procedure one-third (one-quarter in the AFSJ) are needed 
to raise objections, while a simple majority is needed in the orange 
card procedure. Regional parliaments with legislative powers can also be 
consulted. The orange card procedure, that has never been used, gives 
the right to force the Commission or other EU legislative initiators 
(European Parliament, Council, a (group of) member state(s), etc.) to 
take NPs’ opinion directly into account and deal with their concerns. 
The acquis of this ‘game of cards’ is that NPs protested in their 
reasoned opinions on matters well beyond the issue of subsidiarity, 
for instance on the political choices made in Commission documents 
or policy areas in a draft legislative act, i.e. the legislative substance 
and the added value of the proposal, its legal basis, or on the 
compliance with the principle of proportionality and policy efficiency 
(Jančić, 2015). These submissions that are not raising concerns related 
to compliance with subsidiarity are referred to as ‘contributions’. 
No doubt, the fact that the yellow card procedure has been 
triggered three times (see Table 10.1) proves that NPs are quite 
willing to influence and participate in policy shaping in the pre-
legislative phase of EU decision-making, rather than merely being 
policy commentators expressing their views on EU law-making. 
In the policy debate one of the main questions is what triggers 
NPs to be proactive at the European level. The binding nature of the 
national parliamentary scrutiny procedure as far as it concerns 
governments’ negotiating mandates in the Council differs 
significantly from one member state to another; this also applies 
regarding the heterogeneity of national parliamentary traditions and 
perceptions of parliamentary roles in EU governance.3  
                                                        
3 Two forms of representation may be distinguished from one another: in ‘dyadic 
representation’, the individual MP represents his or her constituency; in 
‘collective representation’, the entire parliamentary chamber represents the 
electorate as a whole, and individual parliamentarians may represent interests or 
persons outside their own constituency. 
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Table 10.1 The three yellow cards 
May 
2016 
14 parliamentary 
chambers from 11 
member states totalling 
22 votes → Proposal for a 
Directive concerning the 
posting of workers in the 
framework of the 
provision of services.4 
Romanian Chamber of Deputies (1), 
Romanian Senate (1), Czech 
Chamber of Deputies (1), Czech 
Senate (1), Polish Sejm (1), Polish 
Senate (1), Seimas of Republic of 
Lithuania (2), Danish Parliament (2), 
Croatian Parliament (2), Latvian 
Saeima (2), Bulgarian National 
Assembly (2), Hungarian National 
Assembly (2), Estonian Parliament 
(2) and the National Council of the 
Slovak Republic (2). 
October 
2013 
13 parliamentary 
chambers from 11 
member states totalling 
19 votes → Proposal for 
European Public 
Prosecutor's Office 
(EPPO).5    
Cypriot Parliament (2),  Czech 
Senate (1), House of Commons (1), 
House of Lords (1),  Swedish  
Parliament (2), Slovenian National 
Assembly (2), Romanian Chamber of 
Deputies (1), Maltese Parliament (2), 
Irish Parliament (2), Hungarian 
National Assembly (2), French 
Senate (1), Dutch Parliament (1), 
Dutch Senate (1). 
May 
2012 
12 parliamentary 
chambers from 12 
member states totalling 
19 votes → “Monti II” 
Proposal Regulation in 
order to ensure the free 
movement of goods in the 
EU, while acknowledging 
Dutch House of Representatives (1), 
Portuguese Assembly (2), Latvian 
Parliament (2), French Senate (1), 
Belgian House of Representatives (1), 
Luxembourgian Chamber of 
Deputies (2), House of Commons (1), 
Swedish Parliament (2), Polish 
Parliament (1), Maltese Parliament 
(2), Finish Parliament (2), Danish 
                                                        
4 The opinion of the Committee of Regions on the Revision of the Posting of 
Workers Directive did not raise any issue and agreed with the Commission 
proposal. 
5 The task of prosecuting crimes affecting the EU budget had been within the 
exclusive competences of the member states. However, the Commission 
considered that they are not adequately equipped and motivated to counteract 
such offences (Brady, 2013). 
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the right and freedom to 
take strike action.6 
Parliament (2). 
Τhe Danish Folketing played the role 
of ‘initiator’, acting rapidly to adopt 
the first reasoned opinion. 
 
Scholars often conclude that there is no blanket weakening of 
legislatures due to the intergovernmental nature of crisis management, 
but rather the exacerbation of existing strengths and weaknesses. 
Nevertheless, they admit that NPs encounter many common 
obstacles related to the lack of resources (Paskalev, 2009), the central 
role of the European Affairs Committee vis-à-vis sectoral committees 
(Winzen, 2012), but also the short time period of eight weeks and the 
difficult while indispensable coordination between parliaments in order 
to meet the threshold of a yellow card (Cooper, 2012). Furthermore, 
the lack of compatibility and coordination in the field of European 
affairs between the houses in many member states naturally weakens 
national parliaments’ ability to exert influence on the EU. 
Scholars have explained that MPs are more likely to vote for a 
reasoned opinion under certain conditions, i.e. when there are high 
levels of contestation between parties 
over EU integration, presence of a 
minority government, strong public 
Euroscepticism, institutionally strong 
(upper) chambers, economic growth 
or an adverse macro-economic 
context, or new, urgent or salient 
legislation debated in the Council 
and voted in the European Parliament before the scrutiny period 
(Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015; Williams, 2016). Yet, disappointing 
experiences may also be a reason for the partly reluctant use. Strong 
parliaments are not invariably the most active. Beyond formal power 
and institutional capacity, motivational factors are significant in 
                                                        
6 Subsequent to several decisions by the CJEU, concerns were raised that in the 
internal market, economic freedoms might prevail over fundamental freedoms, 
such as the right to strike. Hence, the Commission decided to draft a proposal 
addressing these concerns and clarifying the relationship between these 
freedoms (European Commission, 2013, 7). 
The lack of compatibility and 
coordination in the field of 
European affairs between the 
houses in many member states 
naturally weakens national 
parliaments’ ability to exert 
influence on the EU. 
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explaining parliamentary involvement in the EWS (Auel, Rozenberg 
and Tacea, 2015).   
The EWS does not seem to live up to the expectation of 
establishing of a constructive and meaningful exchange of arguments 
between NPs and the Commission. A large number of parliaments 
have repeatedly criticised the fairly late, vague and generally 
inconsequential replies by the European Commission to both 
reasoned and Political Dialogue opinions7 (Conference of 
Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the 
European Union [COSAC], 2012, 2014, 2015). Whether and to what 
extent this also explains fluctuations in the number of submitted 
opinions is difficult to gauge, given that the number of new legislative 
initiatives by the Commission has also decreased (see Figure 10.1). 
Figure 10.1 Total of submissions by NPs under Protocol N° 2, 2010-2018 
 
Source: Annual Reports 2010-2018, Relations between European Parliament & EU 
National Parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon, European Parliament. 
 
                                                        
7 National parliaments can also submit opinions, contributions or statements in 
the framework of the Informal political dialogue, which is an individual 
procedure, non-binding in its entirety, and wholly dependent on the 
Commission both for its existence and for its impact. 
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Each parliament has different procedures for adopting a 
reasoned opinion, with its own combination of competent bodies – 
European Affairs Committee, sectoral committee and/or plenary 
session – involved in the process. Some NPs take a more active part 
in the EWS procedure than others, having made very frequent use of 
the instrument, but overall participation varies (Williams, 2016) (see 
Figure 10. 2). 
Figure 10.2 Submissions by NPs under Protocol N° 2, 20188 
 
Source: Annual Report 2018, Relations between European Parliament & EU National 
Parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon, European Parliament. 
 
In a long-term perspective, the absolute frontrunner in the EWS 
is the Swedish Riksdag, followed by the Polish and Austrian 
parliaments (see Figure 10.3). Other parliaments, however, have been 
more reluctant in their use of the instrument. While the Dutch 
Tweede Kamer seeks to be an active player in the EU, there is 
consensus between the Swedish, Finnish and German chambers that 
the EWS should remain a complementary tool since parliaments 
should not be granted a more independent role at the EU level. The 
Portuguese parliament is, along with the Italian parliament, by far the 
                                                        
8 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Latvia, Greece, Hungary, 
Estonia, Finland and Lithuania made no submissions in 2018.  
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most prolific parliament in submitting contributions. The former has 
a similar performance in informal political dialogue, since it has sent 
literally hundreds of letters to the Commission, but it is relatively 
reticent in using the EWS (See Figure 10.3). 
Figure 10.3 Total of submissions by NPs under Protocol N° 2, country by 
country, 2010-20189 
 
Source: Annual Reports 2010-2018, Relations between European Parliament & EU 
National Parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon, European Parliament. 
 
A parliament is not a homogeneous bloc, but a lieu of political 
antagonism where big or small majorities have the last say on 
formulating parliamentary positions. In fact, some studies show that 
the common majority-opposition divide represents a problem for the 
EWS (Cooper, 2012; Raunio, 2009). Further, the EWS has also been 
accused of having the potential to put powers into the hands of a 
‘minority’, while it is far from being a system allowing minority rule. 
                                                        
9 The Parliaments of Malta, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Finland and Slovakia have made less than 10 submissions per country 
for the whole period 2010-2018.  
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE EU  179 
 
National parliaments are the weakest link in the EU policy 
game for two reasons. First, the EWS is in effect a very demanding 
system requiring supermajority approval (Cooper, 2013). Second, 
other players, much more internally cohesive, dominate the policy 
agenda. For these two reasons, the ‘veto players’ (Tsebelis, 2004), i.e. 
the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, provide 
‘high policy stability’, thus preventing a shift from the legislative 
status quo, since the number of individual and collective national 
parliamentary actors that have to agree to a proposed change is very 
high. In this sense, it is rightly observed that there is a lack of a unified 
parliamentary approach to EU affairs and strained relations with the 
European Parliament, preventing NPs from becoming ‘multi-arena 
players’ (Auel and Neuhold, 2017). 
Individual national legislators are institutional and partisan 
players, which together are a collective actor but with no pre-defined 
preferences. They act as individual players exercising traditional 
scrutiny within the domestic arena and participating within the EU 
arena where possible (e.g., Political Dialogue, CJEU action, treaty 
revisions); they also act as collective 
parliamentary players together with 
other NPs submitting opinions (EWS, 
formal IPC) or as being formal 
members of future Conventions.10 
National parliaments operate more 
and more at both levels, oscillating between the two poles of internal 
antagonism and external cooperation. Unless we consider that the 
yellow card is at most advisory and the orange card is not a veto, the 
experience of the three yellow cards could constitute a good counter-
argument, bringing us to consider ways to reconfigure the EWS. 
                                                        
10 In the framework of the formalisation of the Convention method as part of the 
ordinary Treaty revision procedure (Art. 48 TEU). 
National parliaments operate 
more and more at both levels, 
oscillating between the two 
poles of internal antagonism 
and external cooperation. 
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10.4 New policy options 
As noted above, national parliaments view subsidiarity as a broad 
political principle rather than as a narrow legal or technical principle. 
The generalisation of the use of the EWS would allow politics to 
infuse EU policymaking. Under an ‘enlarged’ EWS, a parliament 
could become a mere tool of its government, who will instruct it to 
pass reasoned opinions against draft legislative proposals that the 
government opposes (Cooper, 2015).11 The generalisation of the EWS 
would mean that this mechanism is not only the first phase of what 
happens later in the Council. It would make it possible to extend 
multi-level parliamentary scrutiny in a more flexible way while 
rendering this control mechanism 
legally binding for the 
Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament, not only on 
subsidiarity issues but throughout 
the whole policy cycle.12 In that 
perspective, it would be judicious 
to refocus NP’s European scrutiny 
on the question of the existence of 
EU competence and the principle of (a dynamic) conferral, also 
amenable to the repatriation of powers from the EU, and thereby 
endow parliaments with a more positive role as regards the substance 
of EU legislation (Jančić, 2015).NPs’ role has already been extended 
to two further types of Treaty change, the simplified Treaty revision 
procedure as well as two ‘passerelles’ (Art. 48 para. 7 TEU and 81 
TFEU). While the former also requires ratification within each 
member state, NPs have been given a direct and individual veto right 
                                                        
11 Art. 8 of the Protocol 2 stipulates that member states may bring actions for 
annulment before the Court against a legislative act on grounds of infringement 
of the principle of subsidiarity on behalf of their national parliament or a chamber 
thereof, in accordance with their legal system. The Committee of the Regions may 
also bring such actions against legislative acts if the TFEU provides that it must 
be consulted. 
12 In the conceptual phase when policies and legislation are being designed, as 
well as in the implementation and evaluation phases after the measures have 
entered into force. 
The generalisation of the EWS 
would make it possible to extend 
multi-level parliamentary scrutiny 
while rendering this control 
mechanism legally binding for the 
Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament, throughout 
the whole policy cycle. 
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regarding the two ‘passerelles’ that can be exercised within six 
months of the notification of the change. It could be interesting to 
duplicate the right to veto (by adopting some elements from the red 
card proposal)13 on policy grounds in the application of a new multi-
level law-making mechanism while initiating reasonable voting rules 
for the essentially ‘positive’ cast of the EWS. In this framework, the 
logic of the system should be 
changed. The yellow card should 
not anymore be ‘advisory’, leaving 
it up to the Commission to decide 
whether to maintain, amend or 
withdraw the proposal, while, in 
the case of the orange card, if the Commission maintains the proposal, 
then the final decision is in the hands of the European Parliament and 
the Council. The merging of the yellow and orange card could make 
a single ‘blue card’ procedure possible, where NPs work in tandem 
with the European Parliament by reviewing legislative proposals 
(mixed parliamentary scrutiny, following the example of Europol) 
where the Commission and the Council would be obliged to take into 
account (see Table 10.2).14 Another step could be to re-frame the green 
card allowing ‘positive voting’ to make it a proposal to be issued 
together with the European Parliament (Borońska-Hryniewiecka, 
2015).  
Table 10.2 Towards a multi-level law-making mechanism 
Current 
system 
Deadlines for 
submission 
and rules for 
triggering 
Proposed 
system 
New deadlines for submission and 
rules for triggering 
Yellow 
card 
Eight weeks / 
one-third of 
total votes 
Blue card 
(a multi-
criteria 
15 weeks / 
35% of total 
votes of NPs 
The Commission (or 
other institution- 
legislative initiator) 
                                                        
13 Initially, the red card veto was a democratic reform contained within the 2016 EU-
UK renegotiated settlement according to which if in the first 12 weeks 55% of national 
parliaments raise objections to a new EU legislative proposal (on the grounds of non-
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity), then it must be either amended or 
discarded, and will be ‘comprehensively discussed’ in the Council. 
14 The review of the proposal means withdraw or substantially amend the proposal. 
The merging of the yellow and 
orange card could make a single 
‘blue card’ procedure possible, 
where NPs work in tandem with 
the European Parliament. 
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Orange 
card 
Over half of 
total votes 
scrutiny 
procedure) 
 
and one-third 
of EP total 
votes (with 
MEPs from at 
least 3 political 
groups) 
 
along with the Council 
must review the 
proposal in any policy 
area & votes of 55% of 
member states in the 
European Council. 
A national parliament 
or/and one-third of EP 
with MEPs from at least 
3 political groups may 
bring a complaint before 
the European 
Ombudsman and a case 
before the ECJ in case of 
non-compliance with 
the procedure. 
  Green 
card 
 
36 weeks / 
40 % of total 
votes of NPs 
and one-third 
of EP total 
votes (with 
MEPs from at 
least 3 political 
groups) 
NPs and EP right to 
initiate legislation in all 
policy areas except in 
areas of exclusive 
competence. 
The Commission along 
with the Council must 
examine the proposal 
& votes of 55% of 
member states in the 
European Council. 
A national parliament 
or/and one-third of EP 
with MEPs from at 
least 3 political groups 
may bring a complaint 
before the European 
Ombudsman and a 
case before the ECJ in 
case of non-compliance 
with the procedure. 
 
This could be facilitated through a gentleman’s agreement  
with the purpose of initiating, repealing legislation or proposing 
amendments to existing legislation or non-legislative initiatives, thus 
transforming the reactive and negative EWS involvement into an 
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active and constructive one (see Table 10.2).The assessment of a 
multi-level law-making mechanism should be undertaken not by the 
Commission, but by the European Ombudsman – whose role needs 
to be strongly reinforced. The Mediator would be competent to 
submit an informed assessment of the overall functioning of the 
system and the degree of compliance. 
It will no doubt not be easy for member states acting together 
in the Council, in cooperation with the European Commission, to 
agree this package of improvements. There is a real challenge to 
overcome governments’ fears that they will no longer hold a 
hierarchical gatekeeper position, in addition to the reluctance of the 
Commission and European Parliament, which already stipulated that 
any reform in that direction raises concerns about treaty 
incompatibility while cultivating legislative and parliamentary 
competition by confronting one level with the other. 
For that reason, there is a need for preliminary work with NPs 
to equip them domestically with specific institutional competences. 
to Reinforcing the presence of NPs in Brussels is also important, since 
NPs’ Representatives (NPRs) are quite weak in comparison to those 
employed by national governments, who have representatives 
meeting on a continuous and permanent basis in the Council and the 
COREPER (Cooper, 2015). 
In order to strengthen the follow-up of legislative activity 
within the new mechanism and also include regional parliaments and 
assemblies, new initiatives should be promoted, i.e. the regularisation 
of monthly meetings of NPRs in cooperation with the European 
Parliament, the establishment of a rotation system with a NPs’ leader 
for six months, along the lines of the presidency trio logic, and the 
development of sector-oriented joint parliamentary sessions under 
the auspices of a COSAC reinforced with real decision-making power 
(cf. Chapter 11). 
Up to now, competences conferred on the Union are moulded 
by ECJ case law and by the 
Commission’s extensive legislative 
reach. NPs could be the new actor to 
do so, endeavouring to strengthen, 
not to compete with the European 
Parliament’s legislative function. 
Conferral-focused scrutiny within a 
Conferral-focused scrutiny 
within a new mechanism could 
assuage national anxieties that 
generate Euroscepticism, and 
restore a sense of control over 
transfer of competence to the EU. 
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new mechanism could assuage national anxieties that generate 
Euroscepticism, and restore a sense of control over transfer of 
competence to the EU. Effective national parliamentary oversight of 
the quality of EU legislative output and the distribution of 
competences (Jančić, 2015) is an excellent way to alleviate the 
(national and European) democratic deficit and boost EU legitimacy. 
It should also be an integral part of national parliamentarians’ role in 
EU affairs. 
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 COSAC’S (UNTAPPED) 
POTENTIAL 
PAULA LAMOSO GONZÁLEZ 
Although the European Parliament has gained new powers through the various 
Treaties signed over the years, the EU’s democratic deficit has been a constant 
when talking about its decision-making processes. The solution is not easy as 
there is a split between those who think the situation should be solved by 
reinforcing the European Parliament and those who believe that national 
parliaments should play a more significant role. The Lisbon Treaty aimed to 
improve the problem by reinforcing the role of both the European Parliament and 
its national counterparts, while stressing the benefits of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation. The main aim of this chapter is to analyse the concept of inter-
parliamentary cooperation. Specifically, it examines the potential of the 
Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of the parliaments 
of the European Union (COSAC) as a highly useful tool for members of national 
parliaments and the European Parliament to cooperate in improving the 
legitimacy of EU affairs by directly scrutinising its day-to-day work and also by 
influencing EU policymaking. Finally, it focuses on some recommendations for 
strengthening COSAC in the future. 
11.1 Introduction: National parliaments and EU 
legitimacy  
The democratic deficit of the European Union has been, since the 
Treaty of Maastricht, very prominent in debates regarding its process 
of decision-making. Although the European Parliament has been 
successful in gaining new powers through the various Treaties, the 
debate about the democratic deficit continues. One of the key 
objectives of the Convention on the Future of Europe was, precisely, 
to amend this situation. There are many different ideas about how the 
188  COSAC’S (UNTAPPED) POTENTIAL 
 
democratic deficit can be improved. Over the years, member states 
have basically been divided into two main groups: those who think 
that the legitimation of the EU’s decision-making process requires a 
stronger the role for the European Parliament and those who consider 
that legitimacy should be achieved by strengthening the role of 
national parliaments (NPs) (Shackleton, 2017). 
Throughout the debates of the Convention on the Future of 
Europe,1 the participants considered formally recognising the 
participation of NPs in EU policymaking. Finally, the Treaty of 
Lisbon recognised the capacity of NPs to contribute to the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy by highlighting that NPs actively contribute to 
the proper functioning of the Union (Article 12 TEU; see also TFEU 
Protocol 1). The first permanent president of the European Council 
said that “Maybe not formally speaking, but at least politically 
speaking, all national parliaments have become, in a way, European 
institutions” (Van Rompuy, 2012). At the same time, the Treaty of 
Lisbon provided the European Parliament with co-decision power 
and it now has the same law-making powers as the Council.2 
In addition, the Lisbon Treaty identifies the advantages of 
cooperation between parliaments (TFEU Protocol 1, Title II) in order 
to facilitate the task of the European Parliament and the NPs in 
ensuring the EU’s democratic legitimacy. In short, it highlights that 
inter-parliamentary cooperation is important because it can help both 
NPs and the European Parliament better carry out their duties and, 
as a result, address the EU’s democratic deficit (Pokki, 2016). The EU 
has different instruments for inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
Nevertheless, this chapter pays particular attention to the Conference 
of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of 
the European Union (COSAC), as it is the only institutional inter-
parliamentary framework recognised by the Treaties. COSAC has 
proved to be a useful framework to bring the members of NPs and 
                                                        
1 It consisted of a broad debate composed mainly of member state representatives 
and EU institutions about the Future of the European Union leading to a 
Constitution for Europe (which failed in its process of ratification) and after that 
to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
2 This occurs when the Ordinary Legislative Procedure is applied, which is in the 
majority of cases, as it is considered the main legislative procedure in the EU’s 
decision-making process. 
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the European Parliament together in order to cooperate with each 
other and it also has an enormous potential as a tool for 
parliamentary scrutiny (Ruiz de Garibay, 2011). However, it lacks 
effectiveness when it comes to influencing the EU’s decision-making 
process. The main purpose of this chapter is precisely to suggest a 
few recommendations for its improvement. 
11.2 Inter-parliamentary cooperation: what does it 
mean? 
Inter-parliamentary cooperation refers to the dialogue (the exchange 
of information and best practices) between NPs and between them 
and the European Parliament without binding effects for the 
parliaments themselves or for national and EU institutions (Fasone, 
2012). According to Peters (2009), “Inter-parliamentary cooperation 
can be considered as one of the 
most visible parliamentary 
reactions towards the transfer of 
decision-making powers to 
international and supranational 
organisations in which democratic 
representation is somewhat 
lacking”. Within the EU, inter-parliamentary cooperation serves as an 
important instrument for NPs to coordinate themselves and to 
influence the EU’s decision-making process. The cooperation 
between NPs and the European Parliament can be seen as essential in 
bringing the EU closer to its citizens (Croatian Parliament). This 
cooperation is also of great importance in sharing best practices to 
scrutinise EU affairs, even though it has not been thought to give rise 
to scrutiny itself (Ruiz de Garibay, 2011). 
The Treaty of Lisbon marks the turning point as it focuses on 
inter-parliamentary cooperation in the European process of decision-
making. Its Art. 12 is the first formal recognition of NPs’ active 
contribution to the proper functioning of the EU (Auel and Neuhold, 
2018). In addition, in its Protocol no. 1 on the role of NPs in the EU, a 
title is specifically devoted to inter-parliamentary cooperation, 
stressing that “the European Parliament and national Parliaments 
shall together determine the organisation and promotion of effective 
and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Union” 
Within the EU, inter-
parliamentary cooperation serves 
as an important instrument for 
NPs to coordinate themselves  
and to influence the EU’s 
decision-making process. 
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(Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 
Title II, Art.9). COSAC is the first and only recognised inter-
parliamentary conference in the Treaties. However, inter-
parliamentary conferences and permanent formal forums of inter-
parliamentary cooperation have 
flourished since the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty. A least two new 
conferences and one joint 
parliamentary group have been 
created since 2012: the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CFSP Conference) in 2012; the Conference on Economic 
Stability, Coordination and Governance (SECG Conference) in 2013; 
and the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group for Europol (JPSG), 
established in 2016 but which adopted its rules of procedure in March 
2018 (Fromage, 2018). 
According to the guidelines of inter-parliamentary cooperation 
in the EU, its major objectives are: the exchange of information and 
best practices between the European Parliament and NPs in all policy 
fields included in the Treaties with the aim of reinforcing 
parliamentary control, influence and scrutiny of EU matters; and to 
supervise the principles of subsidiarity (which emphasises that 
decisions should be taken as close as possible to the citizens) and 
proportionality (which stresses that the EU’s actions should be 
limited to what is necessary regarding the objectives of the Treaties). 
In this respect, the NPs are called upon to exchange information on 
EU draft legislation in order to check whether it complies with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Asambleia da 
República Portuguesa). Inter-parliamentary cooperation is also an 
important tool for boosting cooperation with parliaments in third 
countries (Ruiz de Garibay, 2011). 
11.3 Inter-parliamentary cooperation to improve 
scrutiny  
The reinforcement of inter-parliamentary cooperation can improve 
scrutiny of EU affairs and, therefore, reduce the democratic deficit. 
The main instruments that NPs and the European Parliament use to 
accomplish scrutiny of EU affairs through inter-parliamentary 
COSAC is the first and only 
recognised inter-parliamentary 
conference in the Treaties. 
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cooperation are: COSAC, the network of administrative liaisons in 
Brussels, and IPEX (Auel and Neuhold, 2018). Thus, as just 
highlighted, one of the major purposes of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation is monitoring the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality3 to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the EU 
policies (Hefftler-Gattermann, 2015).  
Assuming that ensuring parliamentary scrutiny helps reduce 
the perception of a democratic deficit, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a 
more rigorous subsidiarity review process, identifying a new role for 
NPs as ‘watch dogs’ of the subsidiarity principle (Raunio, 2007; 
Kiiver, 2011; Barrett, 2008; Neuhold, 2011). One purpose of the Lisbon 
Treaty is to guarantee that decisions are taken as closely as possible 
to the citizens. To do so, the Treaty of Lisbon formally enshrined the 
Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), which is a procedure that enables 
NPs to carry out subsidiarity checks on draft EU legislative acts and, 
possibly, to object to them. The instrument assigns NPs the duty of 
ensuring that the Commission’s legislative proposals are in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. In cases where NPs 
detect a breach of the principle, they can issue a yellow card if 
numbering up to a third, or an orange card if up to 50%, in order to 
vet and temporarily block the proposal (Pintz, 2015). Analysts 
consider that it is absolutely necessary to achieve a major 
breakthrough in cooperation between parliaments for their new task 
to function (Raunio, 2010; Matarazzo, 2011). Thus, inter-
parliamentary cooperation is understood as an essential requirement 
for the EWM to work. This allows the exchange of opinions between 
the NPs of the various member states. 
Furthermore, the initiative of launching a ‘green card’ has been 
one of the most interesting (and controversial) proposals regarding 
inter-parliamentary cooperation in recent years. It allows the 
participation of NPs in EU policymaking by means of proposing 
legislative initiatives to the Commission. In brief, its main aim is to 
enrich the Political Dialogue between parliaments and the 
                                                        
3 According to Article 5 TEU, the principle of subsidiarity means that in areas of 
non-exclusive competence of the EU the action will only be pursued at the EU 
level if it cannot be undertaken at sub-national or at national level. On the other 
hand, the principle of proportionality means that the action taken by the EU 
should not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives set by the Treaty. 
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Commission at the same time as allowing the supervision by NPs of 
the Commission’s compliance with the principles of subsidiarity, 
proportionality, conferral and political accountability (Jančić, 2012). 
In addition to the existing forms of parliamentary scrutiny and 
involvement, the initiative offers NPs an opportunity to play a 
proactive role in the EU agenda-setting process and encourages their 
contribution to the Union’s proper functioning. 
However, there is no common view about the pertinence of 
introducing such an instrument. NPs were concerned about its legal 
status and they also had doubts about its viability as this procedure 
might be superfluous or incompatible with the Treaty and/or with 
the national constitutions. In addition, some NPs are contrary to this 
idea, ex: Finland, Italy or Romania, while some others remain 
sceptical, ex: Belgium, Estonia or Poland. This controversy responds 
to the different views about the role that NPs understand they should 
play in the EU decision-making process. While some NPs, like those 
in the UK or Denmark think they should play an active role in the EU 
legislative system, others such as that in Germany consider they 
should restrict themselves to controlling their national governments 
(Borońska- Hryniewiecka, 2017). 
Finally, the Political Dialogue has been considered by both the 
Commission and the EU Parliament as an enormous success (Margot 
Wallström, EC, 2008 and Diane Fromage for EP, 2017). It has been 
used much more frequently than the EWM as it is far more open. 
Within the Political Dialogue framework, the NPs can present their 
contributions to the Commission at any time, not being restricted by 
the eight-week limit. Furthermore, their contributions can deal with 
any issue, whereas the reasoned opinions addressed within the 
framework of the EWM are strictly limited to violations of the 
subsidiarity principle (Fromage, 2017). 
11.4 COSAC, more than an information exchange 
forum? 
COSAC was established in November 1989 in Paris at the Conference 
of Speakers of the Parliaments of the EU’s member states. It is the 
only institutional framework of inter-parliamentary cooperation 
directly recognised by the Treaties. Through COSAC, the NPs and the 
European Parliament hold bi-annual meetings that take place in the 
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member state occupying the rotating Council presidency: once in the 
format of the meeting of the chairs of the committees for Union 
affairs, where each EU member state is represented by one or two 
members, generally at the chair or vice-chair level; and once in the 
plenary meeting, where the committees of all member states are 
represented by a maximum of six members (Croatian Parliament). 
COSAC’s main aim is to strengthen the role of the committees 
for EU affairs of the NPs through regular meetings between their 
members and those of the EP. It also has a great potential to be a very 
useful tool for parliamentary scrutiny. Since 2003, COSAC has had 
the capacity to adopt contributions voted under majority rule. This 
allows it to express views and develop opinions which enable it to 
perform a better role of democratic scrutiny (Ruiz de Garibay, 2011). 
Moreover, COSAC is the only inter-parliamentary forum that has a 
permanent secretariat, with a permanent member and members 
delegated by the presidency parliaments for 18 months. It is hosted 
by the European Parliament and, among other things, contributes to 
the appropriate circulation of information between the conference 
and the NPs via their representatives in Brussels (Fromage, 2018). 
The Treaty of Lisbon has clarified the role of COSAC, stressing 
that it has a supporting role between NPs (Auel and Neuhold, 2018) 
and underlining that its contributions will neither bind EU 
institutions nor prejudge or compel NPs to take positions (Rules of 
Procedure of the Conference of Community and European Affairs 
Committees of Parliaments of the European Union). As Hofmann 
highlights, COSAC is a valuable forum for the exchange of 
information, ideas and experiences that has the potential to help NPs 
to increase their influence on EU policymaking. COSAC’s best added 
value is to enhance the personal contact between parliamentarians, 
thus contributing to a rising awareness of EU affairs (Pernice, 2001). 
At the same time, the participation of members of national 
parliaments in inter-parliamentary forums such as COSAC could also 
contribute to the creation of a European public opinion by replacing 
the lenses through which members of NPs see EU policies, from the 
purely national to the truly European. In addition, COSAC can also 
be a very useful tool for better conducting Political Dialogue. 
The main distinction between COSAC and the other inter-
parliamentary conferences is that the former is the only one to have 
been formally recognised and also the only one to have a permanent 
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secretariat. However, it could be said that it has not evolved 
significantly over the years, particularly taking into account that 
inter-parliamentary cooperation has become increasingly important 
over time, while a significant number of inter-parliamentary forums 
have recently been created (Capuano, 2016). COSAC faces significant 
challenges in terms of being more relevant and effective. It lacks 
effective tools to intervene in the EU’s policymaking process as its 
contributions are binding for neither EU institutions nor NPs 
(Cancela, 2007). In addition, its work is becoming more technical and 
bureaucratic, mostly dealing with procedural matters rather than 
political issues. Members of NPs and the European Parliament spend 
most of their time at the plenary meetings debating its structure and 
rules of procedure rather than on EU policies. Another point that 
further weakens its effectiveness is that NPs have different 
perceptions about the purpose of inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
Some consider inter-parliamentary cooperation only suitable for 
debates on general issues, or ‘discussion forums’, whereas others 
consider it a useful way to scrutinise EU affairs, a ‘supervisory body’ 
(Esposito, 2014) in (Fromage, 2018). 
11.5 COSAC: recommendations for improvement 
Even though the Treaty of Lisbon greatly upgraded their level of 
participation, there is still significant room for manoeuvre in terms of 
ensuring the effective participation of NPs and their contribution to 
EU policy, particularly regarding the achievement of the full potential 
of an inter-parliamentary 
cooperation forum such as 
COSAC. Despite being in a 
superior institutional position 
relative to the other inter-
parliamentary conferences that 
have recently appeared, it is mainly perceived as a forum for the 
exchange of information and best practices instead of as a useful way 
to improve EU legitimacy by influencing its decision-making 
processes. Therefore, the following ten points are some 
recommendations for reforming COSAC in the future in order to 
make it more effective in contributing to the EU’s day-to-day 
policymaking discussions. 
There is still significant room  
for manoeuvre in terms of  
ensuring the effective participation 
of NPs and their contribution  
to EU policy. 
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 It would be convenient to change the timing of COSAC 
sessions in order to let them coincide with important EU 
Council meetings. This would improve its impact by 
contributing suggestions to the meeting’s agendas, favouring 
their active participation in day-to-day discussions (Closa, 
2018). 
 It would be more useful to contribute COSAC reports upon 
request from the presidency, rather than offering them on a 
six-monthly basis. Its reports, contrary to what is now the 
case, should require a response from the EU institutions 
involved (Europapress.es/Navarra, interview MP Moscoso, 
2016). 
 It would be practical to organise COSAC meetings around 
well-focused and specific topics for debate. This simple 
change would help members of the NPs obtain a better idea 
about the main points under debate, the lessons learned 
during the meetings and, last but not least, the most 
important positions and trends regarding a particular dossier 
or policy field (Dias Pinheiro, 2018). 
 The conferences would be more valuable with a greater focus 
on the topics for discussion and if the sessions were split into 
smaller groups of parliamentarians in order to facilitate closer 
and more informal discussions (Parliament.uk). This is the 
trend in the new inter-parliamentary conferences, which tend 
to be far more specific. Therefore, the more specific the 
meeting, the more useful they can be to members of NPs and 
the European Parliament. 
 Increasing the frequency of the appearance of representatives 
of EU institutions at COSAC meetings would reinforce 
Political Dialogue. For example, it would be very helpful for 
the President of the Commission to present their political 
strategy or similar documents annually to the NPs 
(Europapress.es/Navarra, interview MP Moscoso, 2016). The 
President of the European Council could do the same 
(Parliament.uk). 
 Raising the level of cooperation between NPs through 
COSAC would enhance the dialogue between EU institutions 
and the NPs. This would help improve the coordination 
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among them and, as a consequence, ease the introduction of 
common standards to control ex ante and ex post EU decision-
making. 
 COSAC is in the best position to coordinate the work of the 
different inter-parliamentary forums. It could regularly invite 
the representatives of other inter-parliamentary conferences 
in order to avoid duplications, reinforce mutual trust and 
facilitate the exchange of information (Dias Pinheiro, 2016). 
 COSAC’s role as a forum for coordinating the priorities of the 
NPs – in order to act more effectively towards achieving a 
common scrutiny – should also be reinforced. Despite 
widespread criticism for being excessively oriented towards 
blocking rather than fostering more positive approaches, this 
could help to promote the simultaneous checking of global 
EU issues (Dias Pinheiro, 2018). 
 COSAC might also benefit from updating its working 
methods. For instance, introducing videoconferences and 
live-streaming would help increase the frequency of meetings 
and foster closer cooperation (Fromage, 2018). If travelling is 
not always required, it could increase the participation of NP 
members and might also ensure that the same person attends 
all meetings. The use of new technologies might also help to 
arrange ad hoc working groups without increasing the 
budget, in order to hold preparatory discussions or 
contributions (Parliament.uk). Another possible change 
would be to appoint a longer-term chair for COSAC to ensure 
coherence and continuity. 
 COSAC should share its secretariat support with the other 
inter-parliamentary conferences, such as the CFSP/CSDP 
and SECG (Fryda, 2016). This would help to improve their 
impact on the decision-making process as they would be able 
to adopt deeper analyses of different policy questions 
(Cooper, 2019). 
  
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE EU  197 
 
References 
Auel, K. and Ch. Neuhold (2018), “‘Europeanisation’ of National 
Parliaments in European Union Member States: Experiences and 
Best Practices”, Study for the European Parliament’s Greens/EFA 
Group, 11-12 (https://cutt.ly/NekBd4F). 
Borońska- Hryniewiecka, K. (2017), “From the Early Warning System to a 
‘Green Card’ for National Parliaments Hindering or Accelerating 
EU Policy- making?”, in Davor Jančić (ed.), National Parliaments after 
the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis. Resilience or Resignation?, Oxford 
Studies in European Law, 247 – 261. 
Cancela, C. (2007), “Los parlamentos nacionales y el déficit democrático de 
la Unión Europea”, Revista de Derecho Universidad de Piura, Vol. 8, 
203-226. 
Capuano, D. (2016), “The role of COSAC in the Europeanisation of 
national parliaments and in the Evolution of Interparliamentary 
Cooperation”, in N. Lupo and C. Fasone (eds), Interparliamentary 
Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution, Bloomsbury.   
Closa, C. (2018) “El futuro de la Unión Europea”, Informe Elcano 23, 113. 
Croatian Parliament, Interparliamentary cooperation in the European Union 
(https://cutt.ly/AekBsYW). 
Cooper, I. (2019), “The Inter-Parliamentary Conferences of the European 
Union: discussion forums or oversight bodies?”, in K. Raube, M. 
Müftüer-Baç and J. Wouters (eds), Parliamentary Cooperation and 
Diplomacy in EU External Relations. An Essential Companion, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 139-157. 
Dias Pinheiro, B. (2018), “The Contribution of COSAC to Joint 
Parliamentary Scrutiny in the EU: A Practitioner’s View”, Centro 
Studi sul Federalismo. Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 10, No. 3, 121 -
123. 
Dias Pinheiro, B. (2016), “The role of COSAC in the changing environment 
of national parliaments in the EU: an identity crisis?”, in L. Nicola 
and F. Cristina (eds), Interparliamentary cooperation in the composite 
European constitution, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 303-310. 
Europapress.es/navarra (2016), “Moscoso defiende los “logros” de la 
Presidencia española de la UE con la adopción de medidas contra la 
crisis”, 1 de junio (https://cutt.ly/dekNh86). 
Fasone, C. (2012), “Interparliamentary Cooperation and Democratic 
Representation in the European Union”, in S. Kröger et al. (eds), The 
Challenge of Democratic Representation in the European Union, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Mcmillan, 41-58. 
198  COSAC’S (UNTAPPED) POTENTIAL 
 
Fromage, D. (2018), “A comparison of existing forums for 
interparliamentary cooperation in the EU and some lessons for the 
future”, Centro Studi sul Federalismo, Perspectives on Federalism, 
Vol. 10, No.3, 1-27. 
Fromage, D. (2017), “Subsidiarity as a means to enhance cooperation 
between EU Institutions and National Parliaments”, European 
Parliament, Constitutional Affairs, Briefing. 
Fryda, C. (2016), “The role of the COSAC Secretariat within the Evolving 
Landscape of Interparliamentary Cooperation: Challenges for the 
Future”, in N. Lupo and C. Fasone (eds), Interparliamentary 
Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution, 311- 317, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing.  
Hefftler, C. and K. Gattermann (2015), “Interparliamentary cooperation in 
the European Union: Patterns, problems and potential”, in Hettler 
Claudia et al. (eds), The Palgrave Handbook on national parliaments and 
the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 94-115.  
Jančić, D. (2012), “The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy 
Boost?”, Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 78-91. 
Parliament.uk “Chapter 5: Inter-parliamentary co-operation”, in The Role 
of the National Parliaments in the European Union, European Union 
Committee - Ninth Report (https://cutt.ly/CekNbnb). 
Pernice, I. (2001), “The Role of National Parliaments in the European 
Union”, WHI-Paper 5/01. 
Pintz, A. (2015), “Parliamentary Collective Action under the Early 
Warning Mechanism, The Cases of Monti II and EPPO”, Politique 
européenne, 2015/3, No. 49, 84-114. 
Pokki, S. (2016), “Interparliamentary cooperation in the European Union – 
differences across policy areas”, Jean Monnet Network PACO, 
Working Paper No. 2. 
Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, Title 
II, Art.9. 
Ruiz de Garibay, D. (2011), “Relations between national parliaments and 
the European Parliament: opportunities and challenges”, ARI, No. 
153, Real Instituto Elcano. 
Wallström, M. (2008), “Working in Partnership – relations between the 
European Commission and the Spanish Parliament”, Meeting with 
the Joint Committee of the Spanish Parliament, Madrid, 1 December 
- Speech/08/666 (https://cutt.ly/lrohNM8). 
 
 199 
 
 
 EU DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF A 
CHANGING MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
AND DISINFORMATION 
STEFAN SCHALLER, PAUL SCHMIDT 
AND SUSAN MILFORD-FABER 
The 2019 European elections took place against the background of an 
increasingly changing media environment. The relevance of ‘traditional’ media 
is diminishing, while social media gains in importance. A new media culture 
facilitates access to information for everyone. The plethora of news and the 
development of sophisticated technologies makes it more and more difficult to 
distinguish between news and fake news. Social media do not only complement 
classic sources of information, but might completely replace them – adding to 
‘bubble’ mentalities and the polarisation of views. In addition, targeted online 
disinformation has the potential to weaken the democratic system and influence 
democratic elections. This chapter examines the role of social media during the 
EU election campaign, depicts EU measures to fight disinformation, and reflects 
on what needs to be done to reinforce factuality and strengthen resilience of the 
EU public space. 
12.1 Introduction: A growing challenge 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall 
be respected.” – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, 2010. 
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Today these principles are increasingly tested as the corner 
stones of liberal democracy itself are questioned by political actors 
worldwide – including EU member states.  
The 2019 World Press Freedom Index registers the second 
biggest deterioration (1.7%) in its regional score measuring the level 
of constraints and violations in the EU and the Balkans. “The decline 
in press freedom has gone hand in hand with an erosion of the 
region’s institutions by increasingly authoritarian governments”, the 
report notes. The murders of journalists in Malta, Bulgaria and 
Slovakia, intimidation of media reporting, for instance “during the 
yellow vest protests in France”, serve as examples alongside the 
stigmatisation of journalists in Hungary or Poland. 
Already in March 2015, the European Council identified 
“ongoing Russian disinformation campaigns” and called for an 
action plan on strategic communication, which in the end led to the 
establishment of the East StratCom Task Force in the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). In January 2018, the European 
Commission set up a high-level group of experts (HLEG) to advise 
on policy initiatives to counter fake news and disinformation spread 
online (European Commission, 2018). 
In the run-up to the 2019 European elections, Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker felt compelled to propose new rules “to 
better protect our democratic processes from manipulation by third 
countries and private interests” as “recent cases have shown the risks for 
citizens to be targeted by mass online disinformation campaigns with 
the aim to discredit and delegitimise elections” (European Commission, 
2018). At the same time, 72% of EU citizens say that they “often come 
across news or information that they believe misrepresent reality or are 
even false”. Three out of four consider this is a problem in their country, 
and eight out of ten for democracy in 
general (European Commission 2019: 
Eurobarometer 91). 
It seems paradoxical that access 
to news and information has never 
been so easy. While at the same time, it 
is becoming increasingly difficult to 
distinguish between facts and deliberately distorted reality 
(‘alternative facts’) – especially in the online world. In recent years, 
Access to news and 
information has never been so 
easy. While it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to 
distinguish between facts and 
deliberately distorted reality. 
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the EU, its open societies and values have become major targets for 
attempts to destabilise their fundamentals and to sow mistrust 
regarding the substance of its achievements.  
‘Traditional’ media1 are called upon to take up the challenge of 
rapidly growing digital media.2 This is especially true for the press: 
in Germany, for example, daily newspapers’ total circulation has 
decreased from 27.3 million sold copies in 1991 to 14.1 million in 
2018.3 Loss of revenue from advertising, which is moving to online 
platforms, curtails their ability to finance quality journalism. The 
AdEx Benchmark study 2018 shows that the European digital 
advertising market (28 markets covered) “grew 13.9 percent in 2018 
to € 55.1 bn, driven by strong growth in video, mobile and social 
spending” – the fastest growth since 2011. 
To react to the challenges ahead, the European Federation of 
Journalists (EFJ) in March 2019  called on all candidates for the 
European elections to commit to its manifesto “for the revival of a free 
and pluralistic media in Europe” and recommended the promotion 
of self-regulatory measures or bodies such as ethical codes and press 
councils to reinforce high standards in journalism also in “online and 
social media” as well as “a clear policy and legal framework […] to 
ensure the transparency and accountability of dominant platforms.”4 
The EU has already taken the first steps towards fighting 
disinformation. However, more needs to be done – also by EU 
member states – to raise overall awareness, increase media literacy 
and pressure major online platforms for more scrutiny and 
transparency.  
12.2 A changing media landscape 
In recent years, the European media landscape has been subject to 
profound changes that are still underway. 
                                                        
1 See: www.igi-global.com/dictionary/traditional-media/47688 
2 See: www.igi-global.com/dictionary/digital-media/7668 
3 See: https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/72084/umfrage/verkauf 
te-auflage-von-tageszeitungen-in-deutschland/ 
4 See: https://europeanjournalists.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/mani 
festoEN-3.pdf  
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A look at media use in the EU in 2018 reveals that television 
remains the unchallenged frontrunner with 92% of EU citizens 
turning on their TV set at least once a week. In second place, however, 
follows the internet (78%) – a rise of 15 percentage points since 2010 
– relegating radio use to the third place with 73% (79% in 2010). The 
number of those active on social media platforms even grew by 26 
percentage points and is now at 59%. More people connect to social 
media platforms than consult printed media, which are only read by 
56% once a week – a decrease of 17 percentage points since 2010.  
Regarding news on European matters, television (72%) is still 
the main source of information for EU citizens, while just over a third 
name the written press, radio or websites. Online social networks 
currently only account for 16% – though their importance is likely to 
increase given the media habits of younger generations. 37% of those 
aged 15 to 24 use social media platforms to receive news on the EU, 
while only 4% among those 55 years and older do so. 44% in the latter 
group receive information on EU matters via the written press, as it 
is the case for only 18% of the young. 
In search for information on the EU, its policies and 
institutions, 48% of respondents name television, while 42% refer to 
the internet (including social media). Since 2005 the number of those 
who use TV as source of information has nevertheless decreased by 
22 percentage points, while the internet has increased by 20 
percentage points (European Commission, 2018: Eurobarometer 
90.3). 
12.3 Trust in media 
Although social media is becoming more important, the trust placed 
in it is (still) very low. While 59% of Europeans have trust in the radio, 
50% in television and 47% in the printed media, only 32% trust the 
internet and 19% social media networks. 
While print media in particular has been able 
to regain some confidence since 2016, trust in 
the internet and social media platforms is 
tending to decrease further. 32 out 33 
countries surveyed have no or low trust in 
social media, Bulgaria being the only 
Although social media 
is becoming more 
important, the trust 
placed in it is (still) 
very low. 
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exception, showing at least medium trust levels (European 
Broadcasting Union, 2019). 
The ambivalence towards social media is even more visible 
when people access them as political information/communication 
tools. A majority of social media users agree that “online social media 
networks can get people interested in political affairs” (76%), that 
these are “a modern way to keep abreast of political affairs” (72%) 
and that such networks “are a good way to have your say on political 
issues” (69%). At the same time, 64% say that “information on 
political affairs from online social media cannot be trusted” (28% “can 
be trusted”) (European Commission, 2018: Eurobarometer 90.3).  
12.4 Public service media 
Television still serves as the major source for information for EU 
citizens. It is therefore all the more important that people can rely on 
the news provided. Thus, the role of European public service media 
(PSM) is paramount. Citizens’ trust in PSM is fairly high: in 16 out of 
26 European markets, PSM is the most trusted news brand, while in 
an additional five markets, they are among the top five most trusted 
news brands, according to the 2018 Reuters Digital Report (European 
Broadcasting Union, 2019).  
Nevertheless, PSM have been exposed to increasing pressure 
by politics often questioning traditional public funding and accusing 
them of biased reporting. Financial resources vary remarkably 
between EU member states – from €27 million in Latvia to €9.8 billion 
in Germany. 77.7% of PSM revenue is based on public funding 
(licence fees, national budget), while the remainder is from 
advertising, a comparative analysis of 17 European countries finds 
(Saurwein, Eberwein, Karmasin, 2019). The 
study also concludes that broadcasters 
funded directly via national budgets are 
perceived as more politically independent 
by citizens than their counterparts funded 
via broadcasting fees.  
Eurobarometer data also show a 
correlation between the level of 
trustworthiness of information provided by national media and 
satisfaction with national democracy. Low political pressure on PSM 
Data also show a 
correlation between the 
level of trustworthiness 
of information provided 
by national media and 
satisfaction with 
national democracy. 
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correlates with a higher level of press freedom in a country (European 
Broadcasting Union, 2019). 
12.5 Pan-European media 
A European public space, fundamental to strengthening European 
cohesion, is only beginning to emerge. The role of pan-European 
media remains limited. The market share of the German-French 
cultural broadcaster ARTE in 2018 was just 1.1% in Germany and 
2.4% in France. The EU-funded channel Euronews has the largest 
audience outside of Europe, while in Europe it only reaches an 
estimated 5 million viewers daily (Hillje, 2019). The availability of 
robust data on Euronews TV audiences “is however limited mainly 
due to the high cost of obtaining them”.5 The fact that European lead 
candidates gathered to discuss their political priorities in one 
Eurovision presidential debate is a drop in the ocean. There are 
therefore calls to create a European public space via an online 
platform, namely a “social network” for Europe that is funded by 
public service broadcasting and also includes European 
entertainment and cultural programmes (Hillje, 2019). Others argue, 
though, that such a project would only make sense if EU political 
structures were further developed and gave citizens a reason to 
become informed on such a common platform (Guérot, 2019).6 
12.6 The 2019 European elections and social media 
Social media is both a blessing and a curse. Undoubtedly, it has 
become an indispensable communication tool for political actors, 
who invest in professionally-managed social media accounts to pass 
tailor-made messages directly to potential voters, bypassing critical 
reporting by ‘traditional’ media and sharing external content. This is 
especially the case for those who feel neglected by public news 
coverage.  
The 2019 EU elections provide a telling insight into the growing 
importance of social media – despite the low trust placed in it.  
                                                        
5 See: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/RCR_EURONEWS/ 
RCR_EURONEWS_EN.pdf, p. 5. 
6 See: www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/digitale-oeffentlichkeit-eine-medien 
plattform-fuer-europa.1264.de.html?dram:article_id=442491  
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12.7 The EU’s action to fight disinformation 
Fearing the potential of social media being used to spread 
disinformation and influence the EU election process, the EU set up 
an election package (September 2018) (European Commission, 2018) 
as well as an action plan against disinformation (December 2018) 
(European Commission, 2018). The Commission established a Code 
of Practice that was signed in October 2018 by Facebook, Google, 
Twitter as well as software companies and bodies representing the 
advertising industry (Microsoft joined in May 2019) who “voluntarily 
committed to improve the transparency, accountability and 
trustworthiness of their services”. 
12.8 Political advertising on social media 
In the three months prior to the European elections, from March 1 until 
May 26 2019, the total amount spent on political advertisements on 
Facebook in the 28 EU member states 
was approximately €23.5 million. 
Advertisers in Germany spent the most 
(€3.5 million), followed by those in the 
UK (€3.3 million), Spain (€2.7 million), 
Belgium (€2.4 million) and Italy (€1.8 
million) (Babiroglio, 2019). 
The European Commission 
spent €105,000 in this period on promoted Facebook posts while the 
European Parliament was a comparatively ‘big spender’ investing 
€3.3 million. European political parties only accounted for €449,000 – 
“a figure close to that spent over the same time by individual national 
parties, such as Podemos in Spain and Vlaams Belang in Belgium, […] 
a clear sign that genuine pan-European parties still don’t exist for 
voters, even if a common political space is emerging” (Ferrari, Gjergji 
2019). 
From March 1 to May 12, national parties that constitute two 
explicitly Eurosceptic political groups in the Parliament – the ENF 
(Europe of Nations and Freedom) and the EFD (Europe of Freedom 
and Direct Democracy) – showed the fastest growth of followers on 
Facebook, a development mainly due to the performance of ENF 
members Vlaams Belang, Lega Nord and the Brexit Party (EFD) 
(Socialbakers, 2019). 
In the three months prior to 
the European elections, the 
total amount spent on 
political advertisements  
on Facebook in the 28 EU 
member states was 
approximately €23.5 million. 
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On the other hand, the parties of the European Social 
Democrats (PES), the Greens (Greens-EFA) and Liberals (ALDE) 
were in the lead in growth of followers on Twitter. 
Regarding political advertising on Facebook, political parties 
that are members of the European People’s Party (EPP) “promoted 
more posts than any other group” (11.95% of their overall posts) 
while the ENF group ranked last with only 1.77% of their posts 
promoted. 
In most cases, political advertising and promotion of 
candidates is not limited to the official social media accounts of 
political parties alone; also regional sub-party groups, like-minded 
organisations and others place sponsored ads, which makes it 
difficult to obtain a concrete picture of the extent and total 
expenditures of political advertising. 
12.9 Evaluation of disinformation activities 
In-depth social media mapping regarding sponsored content 
nevertheless remains tricky. The same holds true for an evaluation of 
the extent of tentative online disinformation activities.  
Thus, the EU report on the implementation of the action plan 
against disinformation concludes that “at this point in time, available 
evidence has not allowed to identify a distinct cross-border 
disinformation campaign from external sources specifically targeting 
the European elections”. However, disinformation campaigns 
deployed by state and non-state actors still pose a hybrid threat to the 
EU, as “the evidence collected revealed a continued and sustained 
disinformation activity by Russian sources aiming to suppress 
turnout and influence over voter preferences” (European 
Commission HR/VP, 2019). 
Between January and June 2019, 
the East StratCom Task Force detected 
and exposed 1,000 cases of 
disinformation – compared to 434 in the 
same period in 2018.7 
                                                        
7 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/factsheet 
_disinfo_elex_140619_final.pdf  
Between January and June 
2019, the East StratCom Task 
Force detected and exposed 
1,000 cases of disinformation 
– compared to 434 in the  
same period in 2018. 
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According to the report, “in the days preceding the elections, 
online platforms identified and took down additional accounts 
spreading disinformation and hate speech following alerts from 
independent investigators and journalists. More than 600 groups and 
Facebook pages operating across France, Germany, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, Poland and Spain were reported to have spread 
disinformation and hate speech or have used false profiles to 
artificially boost the content of parties or sites they reported. These 
pages generated 763 million user views”. Additionally, “large-scale 
attempts to manipulate voting behaviour across at least nine Member 
States” were identified. 
Online platforms enhanced their scrutiny of ad placements, 
stepped up their efforts to improve transparency for political ads and 
took actions to support the integrity of their services focusing on 
manipulative behaviour. Regarding the abusive use of bots and fake 
accounts, the report concludes that more has to be done, especially 
regarding the effectiveness of the transparency measures taken or the 
transparency of websites hosting ads. Platforms should enforce 
cooperation with fact checker networks, empower users to better 
detect disinformation and should give meaningful access to data to 
the research community.  
“The field of social media analysis needs to become more 
professional and transparent to avoid becoming a feature of 
disinformation itself and to weed out superficial, headline-hunting 
reports”, finds Michael Meyer-Resende (Democracy Reporting 
International).8 He detects a “wide spectrum of opinions” among 
experts dealing with the topic ranging from rather minor impacts 
(Oxford Internet Institute, 2019) up to disinformation content that 
was viewed “hundreds of million times across the EU” (Avaaz, 2019).  
Regarding the EU’s efforts to tackle disinformation, the 
Romanian EU presidency concludes that a more holistic approach is 
needed, as member states were affected to different extents by 
disinformation attacks, methods to fight disinformation varied and 
depended “on the human resources deployed and the technology 
used” (Presidency of the Council of the EU, 2019). 
                                                        
8 See: https://euobserver.com/opinion/145062 
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12.10 Conclusion 
Dealing with a fundamentally changing information and media 
environment in an era of increased importance of the internet and 
social media is one of the key challenges for the EU and its member 
states as the spread of intentional and targeted disinformation and 
fake news endanger liberal democracies and European values. In 
recent years, the EU has taken several steps to counter these trends, 
but more has to be done. Social media platforms in particular are in 
many ways still unchartered territory. 
Public awareness that disinformation represents a serious 
threat to democracy and cohesion in the EU remains 
underdeveloped. The fight against disinformation and fake news is a 
task for the whole of society, with especially national education 
systems needing to adapt to the new realities.  
In a changing media landscape where “everybody” can create 
and spread news globally, the role and status of serious journalism is 
particularly challenged. Media literacy becomes even more 
important. This may especially be the case for the young, who are 
more prone than older generations to look for information online. In 
2019, the European Commission initiated a European Media Literacy 
Week to promote media literacy skills and projects across the EU. 
Such efforts should be increased and supplemented by the media. 
National school systems should be encouraged to integrate media 
literacy into their curricula in order to teach students how to deal 
with the plethora of online information and news and how social 
media operates. 
The new conditions require an adaption of the fundamental 
conditions of ethical journalism to the new challenges of online and 
social media. It seems vital for ‘traditional’ media to innovate and 
reach out to new target groups, focus on quality journalism, establish 
emotional bonds with their audience and ‘simply’ point out why they 
are indispensable for citizens. Maybe this could have also a positive 
impact in mobilising more financial support and consequently the 
expansion of their own resources. It would be worth investing in 
quality by creating original content and promoting investigative 
journalism. Young journalists should be given more opportunities to 
bridge the gap in reaching out to youth. ‘Traditional’ and quality 
media in general should be more alert to new online trends and 
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proactive when exploiting the potential of social media. PSM, as they 
enjoy relatively high trust, should try to use this comparative 
advantage, invest in new media formats and grasp the opportunity 
to strengthen exchanges with their audience. PSM should depict what 
would be at stake if they could no longer fulfil their public service 
remit due to financial cuts or political attacks.  
The perceived distance between EU policy and individuals’ 
own lives is one of the main challenges in communicating European 
issues.  What happens at the local and regional levels is felt to be more 
important. For this reason, regional media has a vital role to play in 
communicating how the EU 
influences the lives of citizens. 
In recent years, political parties 
at the national level have invested 
heavily in social media activities. 
European political parties still lag 
behind. To foster a European public space, it would be worth 
promoting their engagement and visibility further via social media. 
However, social media is only one way to address citizens and 
potential voters. It might even gain more in importance, but cannot 
substitute for direct contact in the ‘real word’ and the credibility of 
political representatives. 
Freedom of the media needs to be valued and defended. 
Attacks on critical media, observed in recent years in some EU 
member states, must be firmly opposed. The EU needs to take a 
clearer stance and also make more efforts to oblige online platforms 
to combat disinformation. This is a prerequisite in the permanent 
fight for the principles of liberal democracy, European values, 
freedom of the press and in the reestablishment of trust in democratic 
institutions. An integrated approach by EU institutions and member 
states is required – leading to increased overall public awareness, 
strengthened European cohesion and, in the end, to the creation of a 
European public space.  
  
Political parties at the 
national level have invested 
heavily in social media 
activities. European political 
parties still lag behind. 
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12.11 Recommendations  
The European Commission should oblige social media platforms to 
step up their transparency regulations and intensify their efforts to 
counter fake news content and – if these prove not to be sufficient – 
also propose measures of a regulatory nature. More transparent 
political advertising on all relevant online and social media platforms 
would be welcome. Access to data, especially on sponsored content, 
should be facilitated for the public, journalists and the scientific 
community to allow in-depth analysis, comparison and long-term 
research.  
The European Commission’s financial and technical support of 
fact-checking networks is an important element in helping factuality 
regain ground, especially in the era of new media. Nevertheless, these 
efforts could be intensified: increased investment is needed as well as 
better promotion of fact-checkers’ activities and findings that up to 
now rarely reach a broad public. The funding for the East StratCom 
Taskforce should be stepped up. 
The inclusion of “communication” as part of the European 
Commission’s I.D.E.A. in-house think tank in the framework of the 
third cluster “Digital, Technology, and Innovation” would be a 
meaningful investment. The research should focus on the 
communication behaviour of younger generations and provide 
concrete policy recommendations, communication strategies, 
development and offer special training methods. It is essential to keep 
up-to-date with the ever faster changing online world and better 
understand the ways and needs of young people looking for 
information and their tools of communication. 
It might be overly optimistic to expect a “Fridays for Future”-
effect for freedom of the media, but why not reach out to the young 
by investing in digital games that broach European issues, as they are 
not just an entertainment product of our time, but have become a 
mass medium in themselves. Younger generations nowadays are also 
socialised via digital games. It would be worth bringing game 
developers together to draft ideas on how to depict information 
challenges in an attractive and exciting way and support the 
development of new tools via EU funding (Pfister, 2019).  
To help a European public space emerge, PSM should pool 
forces and work on the establishment of a common (online) European 
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media platform comprising content appealing to a broad European 
public. Such an effort would be very much worth funding and 
support by EU institutions (Hillje, 2019). 
The European Commission should propose the proclamation 
of a European Year9 of media literacy. A strong emphasis on this topic 
would help considerably in strengthening the resilience of EU 
democracy, further constructing a European public sphere, 
promoting mutual understanding between EU member states and 
fostering European civil society. Finally, it would constitute a firm 
statement regarding the importance of media freedom in the EU. 
  
                                                        
9 European Years were established in 1983 to address specific subjects to 
encourage debate and dialogue within and between countries and are intended 
to “send a strong commitment and political signal from the EU institutions and 
member governments that the subject will be taken into consideration in future 
policy-making”. See: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/european 
-years_en 
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 DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING:  
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
ANETA VILÁGI AND PAVOL BABOŠ 
The survival of any political system is dependent on its legitimacy. In a 
democratic society, trust is key to the regime’s legitimacy and political 
corruption breaks the link between citizens and the system and undermines 
political trust. This chapter details four areas of social and political life are 
vulnerable to political corruption: i) financing of political parties; ii) lobbying; 
iii) public procurement; and iv) European funds. 
13.1 Introduction: Political corruption and 
representative democracy 
There are several conditions necessary for representative democracy 
to function, whether on the level of the nation state or that of the 
European Union. One of these is that the state and political elites that 
act on behalf of the state are seen as legitimate by citizens. Political 
legitimacy is crucial to political stability. Only when citizens see the 
state as legitimate are they willing to accept its decisions and take part 
in the political process, such as voting in elections.  
Academic literature points out that long-term problems with 
political legitimacy may not only destabilise political systems (Booth 
and Seligson, 2009), but also predict violent forms of discontent such 
as revolution or civil war (Dalton, 2004). However, the effects of a 
legitimacy crisis may vary in less developed states, newly 
democratised countries and developed, capitalist democracies. A 
possible explanation is that developed democracies can accumulate 
legitimacy and create a so-called reservoir of support (Easton 1965, 
1975; Lipset, 1961).  
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A well-established indicator of political legitimacy is the degree 
of trust among citizens. Eurobarometer surveys show that trust in the 
European Union underwent a substantial decrease during the global 
economic crisis.1 This is possibly because citizens blamed the EU for 
not being able to protect its members from the economic 
consequences of the crisis. Despite a moderate increase in trust 
towards the EU in recent years, the overall figures are still below the 
pre-crisis level.  
The picture becomes even murkier when looking at national 
political parties. Although there is no sharp decline at any specific 
point in time, the overall level of trust is very low. Eurobarometer 
shows that the EU citizens’ trust in national political parties has been 
consistently below 20% since 2001 (except in Spring 2006 when it was 
over 22%). Low trust in national political parties may be behind the 
declining support for mainstream political parties and the emergence 
of various types of extreme, anti-establishment and anti-system 
political parties in a majority of member states. 
Academic literature indicates a connection between corruption 
(both experience and perception) and loss of trust (Anderson and 
Tverdova, 2003; Seligson, 2002; Chang and Chu, 2006; and others). 
The main argument is that people are supportive of the political 
system so long as they perceive they have an opportunity to influence 
decision-making processes, i.e. the decisions of elected officials. 
However, corruption breaks the link 
between citizens’ power to influence the 
political elites and collective decision-
making on the one hand, and voting on the 
other hand. In a democracy, the control of 
the people over decision-making, as well 
as political equality among the people is crucial. Corruption violates 
the political equality assumption by excluding large masses of 
people, while providing a privileged access to a small group of people 
to the decision-making process. Corruption “shrinks the domain of 
democracy [and] undermines democratic capacities of association 
within civil society by generalising suspicion and eroding trust and 
reciprocity” (Warren, 2004: 329). 
                                                        
1 The level of trust in the EU was at 58% in April 2007 and dropped to 34% in 
November 2011. 
Corruption violates the 
political equality 
assumption by providing a 
privileged access to a 
small group of people. 
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Figure 13.1 Perceptions of corruption among citizens of the European 
Union, by sectors 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 470. 
 
Official statistics from Eurostat confirm this trend. Political 
corruption is, by far, the most perceived form of corruption in the EU. 
According to the 2017 Eurobarometer, more than half of EU-28 
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regional or local level) as the areas of public life where the giving and 
taking of bribes is widespread – and only these two spheres scored 
more than 50%. Officials awarding 
public tenders were perceived as the 
third most corrupted actors, with 43% 
(see Figure 13.1 for details). There are 
only two countries where this form of 
political corruption is not in the top three: Bulgaria and the 
Netherlands. 
The remainder of this chapter looks at specific areas of political 
life that are the most vulnerable to corruption. These are party 
financing, lobbying, public procurements and abuse of European 
funds, particularly in central European countries. We will briefly 
explain why the selected area of public life is problematic, and 
propose measures that could contribute to greater transparency 
and/or accountability.  
13.2 Political parties financing 
Political parties need financial resources to operate, just like any other 
organisation, whether during an election campaign, or daily 
operation throughout the electoral cycle. Although there seems to be 
no consensus in the academic literature on the most appropriate 
sources of political party financing, there seems to be one regarding 
the increasing demands of political parties (Nassmacher, 2009; 
Smirnova, 2018).  
The problem with party financing is twofold. First, unequal 
access to financial resources may affect the fairness of political 
competition. Second, the lack of transparency may create space for 
corrupt behaviour. If a party accepts donations from domestic or 
international actors that are not openly admitted to public, there is a 
very limited opportunity for civil society (including media) to 
monitor their effects on the decision-making of the political party and 
its motivations for specific decisions, particularly when in office. 
Therefore, three broad measures are proposed. 
Political corruption is, by 
far, the most perceived form 
of corruption in the EU. 
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Continuous online publication of financial transactions in 
accessible form 
This measure is aimed at increasing the transparency of party 
financing. Reporting all relevant income and expenses would allow 
voters and civil society to know exactly how the party is financed and 
how it spends its financial resources. This 
is important for effective monitoring of 
political parties so as to check that all the 
legal limits to spending are respected.  
In order for this measure to be 
effective, the reporting should be timely 
and in a readable format so journalists, 
researchers and citizens in general can understand the flow of 
financial resources that a political party accepts and uses.  Untimely 
and difficult to access information should be considered as an 
avoidance of transparent reporting. 
Allow a truly independent body to audit the financing 
According to OECD (2016) only about half of the countries under 
study allow external, independent authorities to oversee financing of 
political parties. In many countries, oversight is in the hands of 
parliamentary commissions, which raises the question of 
independent control. A few countries may serve as an example of 
how to set up an independent authority; however, several key 
attributes are recommended by Casal Bertoa and Teruel (2019). 
Members of the oversight body should be appointed independently 
from political parties, and it should benefit from an independent 
budget with sufficient resources. The oversight body staff should be 
specialised and proficient in the relevant fields, and not be selected in 
a more or less random way (for instance for being members of a 
parliamentary committee). 
Regulate third party financing 
Once oversight of the internal political party financing is sufficiently 
independent and transparent, the state should also regulate third 
party financial involvement in political campaigns. In many 
European countries, this is a common way of circumventing 
Reporting should be timely 
and in a readable format so 
journalists, researchers and 
citizens in general can 
understand the flow of 
financial resources. 
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otherwise strict campaign rules. Whether they are a non-
governmental organisation affiliated with the party, a private 
company or a physical person acting as a donor, the rules for their 
involvement should contribute to transparent financing. The aim is 
to eliminate any suspicion that would further feed distrust towards 
political parties based on the possibilities for corruption that a lack of 
transparency can generate. 
Sanctions 
According to EuroPAM (2017) and IDEA (2014) the most common 
sanction for violating party financing rules is financial, with the EU-
wide average being around €20,000. Most member states also allow 
the suspension of public funding for a political party under certain 
circumstances (one month in Belgium, or up to 12 months in France, 
Germany or Greece). We argue that these sanctions are rather low to 
work as an effective deterrent. On the one hand, financial sanctions 
should be higher so as to represent a real risk. On the other hand, 
forfeiture of the party’s property or even criminal prosecution of the 
persons responsible could be an appropriate response, as is common 
in tax fraud cases.  
13.3 Lobbying 
One way of looking at the functioning of a political system is to 
consider it as an equilibrium between inputs and outputs (demands 
and policies). Lobbying is one of the approaches for transforming the 
preferences of the private sector into specific political demands.  
EU lobbying per se is usually a legal endeavour undertaken by 
professional lobbyists with the objective of influencing policy 
formulation and the decision-making processes of the European 
institutions and it is even regulated at some levels as, for example, the 
European parliament or European Commission. Various lobbying 
actions are not harmful to democracy or the public interest and 
advocate for, for instance, ecological issues. On the other hand, 
corporations, in particular, have a disproportionately larger amount 
of resources to ensure political influence. They are able to enjoy more 
frequent meetings with politicians, commission more research 
supporting their interests or run complex lobby campaigns across 
several member states.  
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The EU´s reputation has been harmed by portraying the EU 
institutions as working for the interests of elites, including financial 
and corporate elites rather than the 
public interest. Populists and 
Eurosceptic forces seek to exploit this, 
while overlooking the fact that member 
states play an important role in all key 
decision-making processes in the EU. 
Unlike the European parliament or 
Commission, the Council of the European Union is not hampered by 
any restrictions regarding relations with interest representatives. To 
obtain a permanent access pass to the European Parliament buildings 
or to lobby the European Commissioners, a lobbyist has to be a 
member of the EU transparency register. The pass permits them to 
move freely around the buildings and contact any politician or other 
staff member. On the other hand, the register is publicly available and 
provides data not only on registered organisations/individuals, but 
also on lobbying expenses. In this way, the influence is under public 
scrutiny. In November 2018, there were 11,912 organisations on the 
register, of which 7,246 people are accredited to the Parliament.2 At 
the Commission level, over 24,000 meetings of EC officials with 
lobbyists were taken over the last 5 years.3 As there is no register for 
the Council, we can only assume that being regularly the co-legislator 
with the Parliament under the EU Treaties, it attracts a similar 
attention from lobbyists as other two EU institutions.  
Not only the Council but also many member states fail to 
regulate lobbying: whether at national (e.g. ministerial) or EU level 
(COREPER), they provide no data on lobbying of their permanent 
representations. If operating in a regulatory-free environment, 
corporate influence could well extend into member states positions 
on EU decision-making and endanger both democracy as well as 
generate wider public concern, since other actors (watchdogs) would 
not have the opportunity to uncover the impact of private interests. 
  
                                                        
2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/faq/25/accredited-lobbyists 
3 https://www.integritywatch.eu/ 
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Table 13.1 Rules of the game for interest representatives 
Country Regulation on 
lobbying 
Register of 
lobbyists 
Code of conduct for 
lobbyists 
Austria Legislation Mandatory Legislation  
Croatia Not regulated Voluntary Self-regulation by lobbyists’ 
organisations (LO) 
Czech 
Republic 
Not regulated Not regulated Self-regulation by LO 
Finland Not regulated Not regulated Self-regulation by LO 
France Legislation  Mandatory Legislation 
Germany Soft regulation Voluntary Not regulated 
Ireland Legislation Mandatory Legislation  
Italy Not regulated Voluntary Self-regulation by LO 
Latvia Not regulated Not regulated Self-regulation by LO 
Lithuania Legislation Mandatory Legislation  
Netherlands  Soft regulation Mandatory Not regulated 
Poland Legislation Mandatory Self-regulation by LO 
Romania Not regulated Voluntary Self-regulation by LO 
Slovenia Legislation Mandatory Legislation  
Spain Not regulated Not regulated Self-regulation by LO 
Great Britain Legislation Mandatory Not regulated 
Source: Grosek and Claros, 2016.  
 
There are differences in the way EU member states approach 
lobbying. Different levels of regulation and registration as well as 
guidance for interest representatives vary across the EU as Table 13.1 
indicates. Only 25% of EU member states regulates the representation 
of interests through specific legislation on lobbying activities and 
another 7% (2 countries) uses soft regulation that requires lobbyist 
registration in the parliamentary rules of procedures. Member states 
such as Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Luxemburg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden do not 
have any direct provisions for lobbying. Some of them may have 
internal ethics codes at various ministries; others refer to different 
provisions as principles of neutrality and impartiality of public 
officers, but not lobbying regulations in particular.  
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE EU  223 
 
Transparency and accountability on the ‘Brussels route’ 
Based on the Green Paper of 3 May 2006 on the “European 
Transparency Initiative”, the European Parliament and the European 
Commission agreed on the establishment of a transparency register 
of interest representatives and a Code of Conduct. The registration is 
not mandatory; however, it is a precondition 
to accreditation and physical access to the 
buildings of the above-mentioned 
institutions. The information required for 
registration helps to increase transparency of 
the EU lobbying system by enabling public inspection of the lobbyists 
and the lobbying process itself. The transparency register should be 
improved and expanded to include the Council of the European 
Union. The ability of the public to hold EU officials accountable 
would then cover all EU institutions key to the decision-making 
process and the ‘Brussels route’ (Greenwood, 2011) and actions taken 
by lobbyists at European level in Brussels would be even more 
transparency-friendly.  
Transparency and accountability on the ‘national route’ 
There is also a problem with the way in which member states 
participate in EU affairs with regard to interest representation. While 
there was a serious attempt to increase the transparency of Council of 
Ministers’ meetings (sometimes livestreamed), the role of member 
state officials in the Council´s topic-based working parties is still 
covered by a veil of secrecy. The staff of permanent representations 
participate in Council working parties or other meetings where 
detailed work on new policies and laws is carried out. Lobbyists are 
able to approach them with the aim of blocking new legislation or 
delaying or substantially weakening proposed new rules. Therefore, 
some amount of transparency and public availability of information 
on lobbyists approaching permanent representation staff would be 
needed. According to Corporate Europe Observatory (2019), only 4 out 
of 19 permanent representations (Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Romania) offer some transparency regarding their meetings with 
lobbyists.  
Complementary efforts should be made at member state level 
with the adoption of national rules to reduce the risk of corporate 
The transparency 
register should be 
improved and expanded 
to include the Council. 
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influence capturing EU decision-making. Comprehensive 
frameworks for the legal regulation of lobbying activities in the 
context of public decision-making should be adopted. Such legal 
frameworks should be in accordance with the principle that 
recognises the legitimacy of lobbying but also reduce the risk of these 
activities taking place ‘behind closed doors’.  
13.4 Public procurement 
Public procurement is the process by which national, regional and local 
public authorities purchase products, services and public works. Private 
undertakings are also subject to public procurement rules whenever 
they carry out procurements that are predominantly publically funded 
or when such requirements are included in the grant agreement. 
(European Court of Auditors, 2015).  
Within the EU, public procurement is regulated by the EU 
public procurement directives, establishing common rules and 
procedures with which public authorities contracting works or 
services must conform in high-value procurements. The EU has 
established such rules to ensure the efficient use of public funds 
within the single market. They are essential for maintaining fair 
competition and awarding contracts to the best bidders. The rules are 
intended to allow companies from across the single market the 
opportunity to compete for public contracts. These EU-wide rules 
apply regardless of whether the funds are purely national or whether 
EU funds are involved. Public procurement regulation is directly 
relevant to the fundamental principles of the internal market and at 
the same time, it is a policy instrument in the hands of member states. 
(Bovis, 2012)  
Significant problems arise when, due to the breaches of the 
rules, competition is impeded or contracts are awarded to those who 
were not the best bidders. According to the OECD (2005), “public 
procurement is the government activity most vulnerable to waste, 
fraud and corruption due to its complexity, the size of the financial 
flows it generates and the close interaction between the public and 
the private sectors”. Such undertakings go against well-embedded 
principles such as accountability for public expenditure, avoidance of 
corruption and/or political manipulation. Thus, they have a 
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significant impact on public trust towards national governments, but 
also, in the end, towards the EU.  
Improve first-level checks 
If public procurement is conducted within EU-funded projects, the 
EU should encourage greater responsibility 
at the national level. The errors occurring at 
the beneficiary level should be detected and 
corrected by member state authorities 
before they submit claims for payment to 
the Commission. The audits targeted at 
public procurement processes (e.g. OLAF, 
2017) noted that member states’ first-level checks are still inadequate. 
The Commission should impose financial corrections wherever it 
finds that member states’ checks are insufficiently effective and, 
where necessary, pursue infringement procedures for breaches of 
public procurement directives. 
Fight against corruption 
Corruption in the procurement process can take many forms, 
including the allocation of government contracts to friends at the 
expense of a competitive process. Public officials or politicians might 
use their insider knowledge of procurement plans, or their influence 
over procurement decision-making to their private benefit. Another 
significant source of corruption is the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon, 
which consists of movements of personnel from jobs at various levels 
of an administration to jobs in the private sector, often to companies 
involved in public procurement. Civil servants or politicians can take 
advantage of their insider information or shape policy contracts while 
they are in office in order to benefit from it later when they work for 
a private contractor. There are a number of practical steps that 
authorities can take to reduce their exposure to such corruption, such 
as, for example, supporting the transparency of public procurement 
processes, moving to e-procurement systems or introducing codes of 
conduct that would prohibit, at least for certain time period, the 
possibility to move from a procurement administrator post to a 
position at a beneficiary.  
If public procurement is 
conducted within EU-
funded projects, the EU 
should encourage 
greater responsibility at 
the national level. 
226  DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
 
Reporting 
A new package of legislation on public procurement was put in place 
in 2014, which had to be implemented by member states by April 
2016. This also introduced new reporting requirements for the 
Commission and member states. Some member states had not yet 
fulfilled these conditions. For example, Austria along with the UK, 
Lichtenstein and Iceland did not submit a national report on public 
procurement in 2018. Publicly available reports contribute to 
strengthening the transparency and accountability of state 
administrations and therefore may lead to the punishment of rogue 
operators and greater trust in the political system.  
E-procurement 
EU institutions and member states should take greater advantage of 
the opportunities provided by e-procurement and data-mining tools. 
They should enhance transparency by publishing data and 
procurement details in order to encourage public scrutiny and 
involve civil society. E-procurement systems have been 
demonstrated as having a significant effect on reducing corruption 
risks in procurement (Ionescu, 2013; Neupane et al. 2014). 
13.5 European Funds  
There are many funding programmes that support EU policies.4 
However, when referring to EU funds, we usually mean EU 
structural and investment funds (ERDF, ESF and CF). Especially in 
central and eastern Europe, EU funds were used as a clear case of how 
the country could benefit from EU membership. For example, one of 
the main topics of the information campaign led by the Government 
of the Slovak Republic on its accession to the EU (1999-2004) was the 
use of pre-accession assistance from EU funds (Phare, ISPA, Sapard) 
                                                        
4 For more details see, for example: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/ 
funding-opportunities/funding-programmes/overview-funding-programmes_en  
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and the possibility of co-financing projects following accession.5 
However, over the years, EU funds, once perceived as one of the most 
valuable benefits of EU membership, 
have nourished Eurosceptic 
tendencies in many, mostly eastern 
European countries. They became to 
be perceived6 as the epitome of 
corruption and abuse of public 
resources. And the perception of this 
dysfunction is attached not only to management of the funds at the 
national level, but also to the EU itself.  
Push for more accountability at national level 
The EU funds’ reputation as tools supporting corrupted behaviour 
and misconduct of public finances is closely connected with the 
performance of the national elites and administration. Various affairs 
of companies connected with politicians and political parties (as 
donors) being most successful in public procurement in projects 
funded by the EU funds are well known in countries benefiting from 
EU funds. Recently, even direct profiting from the EU-funded 
projects by acting politicians came to the attention of the media and 
public (e.g. Čapí hnízdo farm of Czech prime minister Andrej Babiš). 
A push for better control of conflicts of interest is needed. 
Improve the EU control mechanism  
Even if the actors and motivations of corrupt behaviour arise within 
the national arena, the EU can still be blamed for failing to control its 
own resources. First, the EU should request that national states report 
a detailed list of the EU-funded projects, including the beneficiaries 
and subsequently publish the list. Second, the vague regulatory 
framework within which OLAF is supposed to operate, and with its 
                                                        
5 For more details, see the Report on the Implementation of the Conception of the 
Communication Strategy of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the 
Preparation of Population for Membership of the SR in the EU. 
6 Such perception has some merits. According to the European Court of Auditors, 
errors relating to public procurement were detected in around 40% of all projects 
co-financed from the EU budget through the ERDF, CF and ES during 2009-2013 
period (European Court of Auditors, 2015, 19).  
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competencies limited to carrying out administrative investigations, 
has left this main EU body for combatting fraud and corruption 
rather toothless while investigating 
member states (Bratu, 2017; Xanthaki, 
2010). A new European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) with 
competencies to carry out judicial 
investigations, prosecute and bring to 
judgment would improve EU control. An important task would be to 
include abuse of EU funds on the EPPO´s agenda. Nevertheless, 
several member states decided not to participate in the EPPO 
initiative. 
Revise the EU enforcement mechanism 
Another problem connected with the EU funds is the misconduct of 
projects. Some mistakes performed during project assessments as 
well as during the implementation phase could cause the country 
concerned to refund money to Brussels. Consequently, the national 
government has to refinance such projects from its own budget. From 
the perspective of EU citizens in such a country, the damage is 
twofold as it is not only the loss of the EU money but also their 
taxpayer money. However, the government and administration 
responsible for such malfunctioning of EU funds only suffer to a 
limited extent. A more rigorous approach towards national 
governments responsible for EU funds implementation should be 
considered. The EU should execute net corrections if expenditure 
which has been declared as legal and regular by member state 
authorities is subsequently found to be flawed.  
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that the processes and problems mentioned in this 
chapter are not the sole generators of political legitimacy, they do 
significantly contribute to it. In democracy, the control of the people 
over decision-making, as well as political equality among the people 
is crucial. However, the current institutional framework favours 
private, economically strong interests at the expense of the general 
public, be it participation in decision-making (where economic 
interests are better positioned for lobbying), public investments (EU 
A new European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office with 
competencies to carry out 
judicial investigations 
would improve EU control. 
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funds), or political representation (where the financing of political 
parties presents an advantage for strong business interests). These all 
contribute to the citizens’ perception that the political system is not 
there for them, and thus leads to the erosion of political legitimacy. 
The corrosionof the legitimacy of the political system is equally valid 
at both national and European levels. The suggested measures should 
contribute to preventing this deterioration.   
Recommendations 
European Union: 
 Improve lobbying register to show more details, and include 
all decision-making bodies 
 Enforce greater responsibility in public procurement in EU-
funded projects 
 Provide OLAF as well as EPPO with ample human and 
financial resources to investigate and prosecute abuse of EU 
funding 
 Ensure data on EU-funded projects (structural, agricultural, 
social, cohesion funds) are published in readable format to 
allow public scrutiny 
Member states: 
 Enforce timely reporting of political campaign financing in 
readable format to allow public scrutiny 
 Allow external, independent authorities to oversee financing of 
political parties 
 Depoliticise police and judicial processes in order to foster 
independence  
 Foster protection of media reporting about political corruption  
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 THE RULE OF LAW:  
BASTION OF DEMOCRACY,  
OR BARRIER TO IT?  
AGATA GOSTYŃSKA-JAKUBOWSKA 
AND IAN BOND1 
Respect for the rule of law is one of the founding values of the European Union, 
but the EU has been unsuccessful in addressing democratic backsliding in its 
own member states. This is despite the fact that lack of respect for the rule of law 
threatens the mutual trust that underpins some of the EU's most important 
policy areas, such as the single market and justice and home affairs. The new EU 
institutional cycle is an opportunity to intensify efforts to ensure that all 
member states comply with the rule of law, and to narrow the divisions that have 
emerged between member states as a result of disagreements over the rule of law. 
Progress in restoring the rule of law, however, will require greater collaboration 
between the European Commission and the Council of the EU. Among other 
steps to be taken, the EU institutions should carry out an objective annual 
review of the state of democracy in all member states; and they should invest in 
activities to raise public awareness of the negative implications of violations of 
the rule of law for their everyday life, as well as for the European project. The 
institutions should try to establish a stronger legal link between respect for 
fundamental values and sound EU financial management. The Commission 
should be quicker to refer problematic national laws to the ECJ if they seem to 
threaten the rule of law. 
                                                        
1 Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to Khrystyna Parandii, 2019-2020 
Clara Marina O’Donnell Fellow at the Centre for European Reform, for her 
research assistance. A version of this paper appeared in January 2020 as a CER 
stand-alone policy brief, ‘Democracy and the rule of law: failing partnership?’. 
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14.1 Introduction: What is the rule of law and why 
does it matter? 
In 427 BC, the Greek city of Mytilene surrendered to Athens after an 
unsuccessful revolt. In democratic Athens, the citizens were angry, 
and voted to send a ship to the commanders in Mytilene, ordering 
them to kill the male population and enslave the women and children 
(Thucydides, 5th century BC). A day later, they repented, and sent a 
second ship, with orders to spare everyone except the ring-leaders of 
the revolt. Fortunately, the second ship overtook the first. 
In most modern democratic states, the rule of law, overseen by 
independent courts, has replaced the second vote and the second 
ship. According to the Council of Europe’s Commission for 
Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission), the rule of law 
has six elements: 
 legality, including a transparent, accountable and democratic 
process for enacting law;  
 legal certainty (people know what the law is and how the 
courts interpret it, and neither will change unpredictably);  
 prohibition of arbitrariness (the exercise of power cannot be 
unlimited); 
 access to justice before independent and impartial courts, 
including judicial review of administrative acts;  
 respect for human rights;  
 non-discrimination and equality before the law.  
The rule of law ensures that governments administer laws 
accurately and impartially, but it also prevents the majority, or their 
elected representatives, from imposing laws that violate natural 
justice (in other words, that are inherently biased or procedurally 
unfair to one party in a case), including those that affect minority 
groups disproportionately.  
Unless the executive and the legislature respect the 
independence of the courts and comply with their rulings, democracy 
is at risk: the government can muzzle critical voices in the media with 
repressive libel laws; civil society organisations and whistle-blowers 
cannot hold governments or parliaments to account when they 
uncover corruption; voters cannot get redress if elections are rigged; 
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and minorities cannot assert their rights in the face of discriminatory 
laws or government actions. 
Respect for the rule of law is also one of the founding values of 
the European Union, set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU, 2012), and one of the essential requirements for 
countries seeking to join the EU. It ensures the consistent application 
and execution of EU law across the member states, and contributes to 
the mutual trust that underpins European cooperation.  
But in recent years, the rule of law in the EU has been 
challenged. Some governments have argued that the ‘will of the 
people’ is supreme, regardless of domestic or international legal 
constraints, and the views of those who voted for the government 
have been interpreted as the will of the 
people, even if they are not an absolute 
majority of the population. In some cases, 
when the courts attempt to defend either 
principles such as the rights of members of 
minorities, or external obligations such as 
EU law, they and those who defend them 
are accused of obstructing the will of the people. In other cases, public 
security is used to justify infringing the rights of citizens. Media and 
civil society organisations which investigate possible violations of the 
rule of law are under financial and/or political pressure in a number 
of member states.  The masterminds behind the high-profile murders 
of investigative journalists in Malta in 2017 and Slovakia in 2018 have 
yet to be brought to justice. 
Governments criticised by the EU institutions or by other 
member states for failing to respect the rule of law often complain 
that the critics are interfering in their internal affairs. But key Union 
policies (the single market, the area of freedom, security and justice, 
and the single currency) rely on all member states implementing and 
enforcing EU rules to similar standards in similar circumstances. An 
EU member state that does not respect the rule of law, even if it does 
not overtly breach EU legislation, undermines that mutual trust and 
cooperation. It thereby threatens the rights of its own and other EU 
citizens on its territory. Then the common legal space on which the 
EU is founded starts to fragment.  
Some governments have 
argued that the ‘will of 
the people’ is supreme, 
regardless of domestic 
or international legal 
constraints. 
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Commission President Ursula von der Leyen says that she 
wants to be a bridge builder. She might therefore be more sensitive 
than her predecessor, Jean-Claude Juncker, to claims that the EU’s 
mechanisms for addressing alleged breaches of the rule of law 
stigmatise central European countries. She has asked Commission 
Vice-President for Values and Transparency, Věra Jourová, a Czech 
who understands the complexities of central Europe, to supervise the 
work on rule of law of the Commissioner for Justice, Didier Reynders. 
The Czech Commissioner’s predecessor was Dutchman Frans 
Timmermans – now the Executive Vice-President with responsibility 
for the green deal – who was vilified by the Polish and Hungarian 
governments and media sympathetic to them for interfering in areas 
outside the Commission’s competence.   
Jourová promised MEPs that she would be “a resolute defender 
of the European Union’s fundamental values, including the rule of 
law”, and that she would take “prompt and proportionate action 
when the rule of law is in danger” (European Parliament 2019a). 
Reynders told MEPs: “My first core task is to lead the Commission 
work to uphold the rule of law and to preserve it in each and every 
Member State” (European Parliament 2019b). The task facing the two 
Commissioners is daunting. 
Rows over the rule of law have 
deepened rifts between western and central 
European member states. They have 
contributed to a perception in western Europe 
that violations of the rule of law are a ‘central 
European problem’. But as this chapter will show, other member 
states also have their own issues with the rule of law. 
14.2 The state of the rule of law in the EU 
The World Justice Project’s annual Rule of law Index highlights a 
number of trends that should be of concern to EU citizens and 
institutions. It evaluates the situation in 126 countries and territories, 
including 20 EU member states, examining how the general public 
perceive the rule of law (World Justice Project, 2015-2019). 
The index shows that the rule of law in four of the 20 member 
states covered (Bulgaria, France, Hungary and Poland) is worse 
overall in 2019 than in 2015 (see charts 1-4). Some countries have 
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suffered big drops in performance in relation to specific indicators: 
Bulgaria has slipped from 56th place (out of 102) for constraints on 
government powers to 91st place (out of 126); Hungary from 66th place 
to 103rd. France went from 30th place in 2015 to 56th place in 2019 in 
relation to order and security, presumably as a result of a number of 
terrorist attacks; its ranking for constraints on government power, 
protection of fundamental rights and the effectiveness of its criminal 
justice system also slipped, though by fewer than five places in each 
case.  
More broadly, the data shows that government powers in 10 
EU member states (including Austria, France, the Netherlands and 
Poland) were less constrained (by the judiciary, legislature, audit 
agencies or civil society) in 2019 than 2015; protection of fundamental 
rights worsened in 15 countries; and the administration of criminal 
justice (including speed, impartiality, effectiveness in reducing 
criminal behaviour, and due process including protection of the 
rights of the accused) deteriorated in 10 member states.  
In many cases, the decline was slight and the situation might 
improve without any need for EU involvement: Austria’s score for 
‘constraints on government power’ was 0.85 in 2015 and 0.84 in 2019 
– not a statistically significant change. But in some cases the decline 
was more worrying. In relation to equal treatment and non-
discrimination Bulgaria’s score fell from 0.67 in 2015 to 0.58 in 2019; 
France’s from 0.69 to 0.63; Greece’s from 0.62 to 0.54; Hungary’s from 
0.61 to 0.44 (putting it on a par with China and Iran); and Slovenia’s 
from 0.79 to 0.68. Countries including 
Croatia and Portugal saw noticeable 
deterioration in the performance of their 
criminal justice systems – from 0.58 to 0.51 
and from 0.67 to 0.60 respectively. 
Other surveys show a similar picture: 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) assessed that the rule of 
law deteriorated in 16 EU member states between 2009 and 2018 
(World Bank, 1996-2018).  
Adding to the evidence that declining respect for the rule of 
law is not only a central European problem, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index judged that 15 member 
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states in western Europe were less democratic in 2018 than they were 
in 2008 (of those, only Finland and France managed to get back to the 
2008 level in 2019, while Belgium, Italy and Malta deteriorated 
further). Italy, for example, suffers both from institutional problems, 
such as a shortage of judges leading to long delays in trials, and 
political issues. In its report on the situation in 2018, the EIU 
highlighted growing support in Italy for ‘strongmen’ who bypass 
political institutions, and noted that then interior minister Matteo 
Salvini, from the right-wing populist Lega party, had supported the 
eviction of members of the Roma community from a camp in Rome, 
even after the European Court of Human Rights had ordered that the 
action be halted. In France, the authorities have responded to terrorist 
attacks in recent years with laws permitting extensive surveillance, 
not only of suspects but of all communications in specified areas, with 
little judicial oversight. The EIU categorised six EU member states in 
western Europe (Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy and 
Portugal) as ‘flawed’ rather than ‘full’ democracies in 2018; France 
and Portugal ‘graduated’ to full democracy status in 2019, but Malta 
was downgraded to ‘flawed’ (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019; 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2020). Across the EU as a whole, the EIU 
currently identifies 16 member states as flawed democracies.2 
In the 2019 ‘World Press Freedom Index’ produced by the 
international NGO Reporters Without Borders, media freedom was 
judged ‘good’ in only 9 EU member states, ‘fairly good’ in 12, 
‘problematic’ in six (in increasing order of concern: Romania, Poland, 
Croatia, Greece, Malta and Hungary) and ‘bad’ in Bulgaria. Croatian 
law does little, for instance, to prevent political interference in the 
appointment and dismissal of editors-in-chief, while Maltese political 
parties own and control media enterprises (Nenadic, 2018; Bilić and 
others, 2018).  
                                                        
2 The 16 are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, , 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, , Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. 
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In recent years, the European Commission has focused on 
judicial independence issues in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and 
Poland, but has paid less attention to rule of law problems elsewhere. 
In the case of Bulgaria, the Commission set up the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism (CVM) – a 
transitional measure introduced when 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 
2007 – to monitor progress on issues such 
as the effectiveness of the judiciary, and 
tackling corruption and organised crime. 
But the most recent (and presumably 
final) CVM report says: “The 
Commission considers that the progress made by Bulgaria under the 
CVM is sufficient to meet Bulgaria’s commitments made at the time 
of its accession to the EU” (European Commission, 2019). If the 
Council of the EU and the European Parliament agree, the rule of law 
in Bulgaria will no longer be under the Commission’s microscope. 
But the Commission’s conclusions are in sharp contrast with the 
evidence from other sources: on the WGI’s scale, which ranges from 
-2.5 (very bad) to 2.5 (very good), Bulgaria’s latest rule of law score, 
for 2018, was -0.03 – the only negative score in the EU, and barely 
changed from the -0.05 it scored in 2007. By comparison, Finland was 
the EU’s best performer in 2018, with a score of 2.05.  
In summary, commentators in western Europe are wrong to 
equate the recent increase in rule of law problems in the EU only with 
rising authoritarianism in Hungary and Poland. The governments of 
those two countries have certainly undermined traditional 
democratic checks and balances, but independent assessments show 
that they are not the only offenders in the EU, and that the rule of law 
faces challenges throughout Europe. 
14.3 The EU’s current instruments 
In theory, the EU has a wide range of tools to monitor respect for the 
rule of law in its member states and respond to any backsliding.  
Monitoring 
The Commission monitors public administration in all member states 
as part of the European Semester, which provides a framework for 
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coordination of national economic policies; meanwhile, the 
Commission’s EU Justice Scoreboard compares member states’ 
judicial systems, aiming to encourage a business- and investment-
friendly environment. In addition, Bulgaria and Romania have both 
been subject to CVMs since their EU accession, to encourage their 
efforts to fight corruption and improve their judicial systems. The EU 
can also draw on reviews conducted by other organisations such as 
the Council of Europe or the United Nations. Efficient monitoring 
should in principle enable the Commission to nip any rule of law 
problems in the bud, before they reach the level of a “serious and 
persistent breach” of EU values, and put European cooperation at risk 
(TEU Article 7, 2012). 
Early intervention and problem solving 
When the EU concludes that a member state is undermining the rule 
of law, it has a number of tools to respond. The Commission can 
investigate threats to the rule of law and recommend policy changes, 
using the so-called rule of law framework (European Commission, 
2014). If dialogue with a recalcitrant member state does not resolve 
the issue, the Commission can recommend that the Council 
determine that “there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the EU 
values referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU)” and activate Article 7 TEU, potentially leading to a member 
state’s voting rights being suspended.  
The Commission can also open an infringement procedure 
against a member state when it believes that illiberal reforms violate 
EU law. But populist governments have often undermined EU values 
without breaking EU law as such. The Polish government, for 
example, has attempted to use this flexibility to limit the 
independence of the country’s Supreme Court (among other things), 
without violating any specific EU directive or regulation in the 
process (Gostyńska-Jakubowska, 2018a). The Polish government has 
claimed that it is up to member states rather than the EU to decide 
how their judiciary should be organised.  
The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has 
countered, however, by declaring itself competent to assess the 
judicial independence of national courts that apply and interpret EU 
law (‘EU courts’) (ECJ, 2018). And in the case against the Polish 
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government, the court first suspended the controversial reforms 
while it decided on the matter, before eventually ruling in 2019 that 
the reform of the Supreme Court violated EU law, in particular the 
principles of judicial independence and the irremovability of judges 
(ECJ, 2019). Thanks to such expansive judgements from the ECJ, the 
Commission might become more confident that the court will be its 
ally in tackling breaches of EU values and fundamental principles, 
even if no specific EU legislation has been breached. 
Despite this advance, however, the EU’s toolbox for assessing 
respect for the rule of law and addressing any backsliding has many 
flaws. The EU’s monitoring mechanisms do not give a full picture of 
the state of democracy across the 
Union. The justice scoreboard relies, for 
example, on data submitted voluntarily 
by member states. In 2014, the UK 
refused to submit any data, seeing it as 
an example of Commission overreach 
(Euobserver, 2014). The EU’s own surveys are also often too narrow 
in scope. The rule of law is in danger not only when a government 
directly undermines judicial independence, but also when it makes it 
impossible for media and civil society organisations to scrutinise its 
actions – issues that EU surveys have so far neglected (Brogi and 
others, 2018). The EU co-funds the Media Pluralism Monitor, a tool 
designed by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom 
(CMPF) to assess the risks to media pluralism in a given country, but 
has yet to make much use of it. Von der 
Leyen has asked Jourová to use the 
Monitor to identify threats to media 
plurality in the EU. 
The EU’s inconsistent response 
to alleged rule of law violations in 
Hungary and Poland has also opened it up to accusations of bias. 
Although the Hungarian government started undermining the 
country’s democratic checks and balances to a significant extent in 
2010, the Commission refused for several years to invoke Article 7. 
Instead, it launched infringement procedures against specific 
Hungarian government actions, relying on the ECJ to keep Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán in check. It took until September 2018 before 
the European Parliament (rather than the Commission) finally 
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launched the Article 7 procedure against Hungary. By contrast, when 
the Polish government started following Hungary’s playbook just 
months after it took power in 2015, the Commission was quick to take 
action under the rule of law framework. When negotiations between 
the Polish government and the Commission eventually broke down 
two years later, the latter recommended in December 2017 that the 
Council trigger Article 7. The Commission’s different approaches to 
similar violations in the two countries has made it easier for PiS, 
Poland’s governing party, to claim that it is being singled out.  
One significant difference between the Polish and Hungarian 
governing parties (which may explain the difference in how they 
have been treated) is that PiS does not belong to any of the 
mainstream European political families. At the time of writing 
Orbán’s Fidesz party still belonged to the European People’s Party 
(EPP), made up primarily of Christian Democrat parties including 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s CDU. PiS, by contrast, is a 
member of the European Conservatives and Reformists with a 
number of other parties, most of them with limited political influence. 
Although the EPP has formally suspended Fidesz’s membership, it 
has shied away from expelling Hungarian MEPs from its ranks or 
excluding them from high-profile positions in the European 
Parliament. Tamás Deutsch and Kinga Gál have been elected vice-
chairs of the Parliament’s budgetary control committee and security 
and defence sub-committee respectively. 
 Questions of alleged bias aside, Article 7 TEU has also proved 
an ineffective way to exert pressure. It is a multi-stage process that 
relies ultimately on member states’ willingness to vote unanimously 
(minus the state in question) to determine the existence of a serious 
and persistent breach of EU values, resulting in punishment for one 
of their own – something EU member states have been reluctant to 
do. They have struggled even to muster the votes of four-fifths of the 
member states needed to determine that there is a serious risk of EU 
values being violated in Poland – the first step towards punishing an 
uncooperative member state.  
Another problem with the EU’s response to democratic 
backsliding is that so far it has focused on deploying punitive 
measures – either via the Article 7 mechanism, infringement 
procedures or financial pressure. In May 2018, the Commission put 
forward a proposal to enable it reduce or suspend EU funding if a 
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member state did not respect the rule of law. But there are concerns 
among independent experts (backed by the Council Legal Service) 
that the draft regulation fails to make a solid connection between the 
objective of protecting the EU’s financial interests and deficiencies in 
the rule of law in a member state (Bachmaier, 2019). There is no 
evidence so far that the Polish government’s judicial reforms have led 
to mismanagement of EU funds. Despite the politicisation of its 
judiciary, Poland is in 41st place in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), far above Bulgaria (74th), 
Romania and Hungary (joint 70th), Croatia (63rd) and Greece (60th) 
(Transparency International, 2020). 
Even if legal objections to rule of law conditionality can be 
overcome, the Commission will need to ensure that only those 
responsible for violations of the rule of law are deprived of funding, 
and not worthy recipients in deprived regions of the EU. The 
Commission’s proposal stipulates that if EU funds are suspended to 
a country, the government of that member state would still have a 
legal obligation to fulfil their contractual obligations to the 
beneficiaries of financial assistance. The member states should ensure 
that this provision is maintained in the final text of the regulation.  
The lack of a clear link between the independence of the 
judiciary and sound management of EU funding has allowed central 
European states to claim that in its efforts to discipline member states 
that stand up to it the Commission is bending EU law and/or 
applying double standards. The counter-argument is that if the 
national courts are under government influence, they may not reach 
independent judgements on the conduct of any government officials 
suspected of embezzling EU funds. That would obstruct the work of 
the EU’s anti-fraud office, which relies on national authorities to 
prosecute cases where it uncovers criminal behaviour.  
While the Commission has various sticks to punish those that 
flout the rule of law, it has yet to develop any carrots to help 
encourage public support, and to increase 
understanding of why it cannot turn a blind 
eye to rule of law violations. Sadly, the EU 
has not given enough support to civil society 
organisations (CSOs) that try to increase 
public awareness of the implications for 
citizens’ rights and for the European project 
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of breaching the rule of law. According to Israel Butler of the Civil 
Liberties Union for Europe, an organisation which promotes civil 
liberties throughout the EU, current EU programmes do not focus on 
capacity building or public education, and are not available to local 
or national organisations that promote EU values (Butler, 2018). But 
the Commission has long argued that education policy is in the hands 
of member states, and the EU has only a supporting role in efforts to 
increase awareness of the EU and its values. 
The good news is that the Commission is aware that it has not 
yet found an effective response to democratic backsliding, and it is 
willing to listen to the views of outside experts on how to improve. 
In April 2019, the Commission encouraged various stakeholders to 
come up with ideas for preventing and responding to breaches of the 
rule of law, and for promoting EU values. CSOs responded with 
proposals to make the public more resilient to governments’ illiberal 
actions and to restore society’s appreciation of the importance of the 
rule of law. The Commission promised in July that it would consider 
organising an annual rule of law dialogue between civil society and 
EU policymakers (European Commission, 2019b).  
The Commission has also pledged to “make full use of funding 
possibilities for civil society and academia supporting the 
strengthening of a rule of law culture, in particular among the general 
public”. In May 2018, the Commission put forward a proposal to 
establish a Rights and Values Programme, an initiative to promote 
equality, rights and democracy, and to combat violence, with a 
budget of around €642 million over the next seven years. The 
European Parliament, however, amended the proposal to make it 
easier for local and national civil society organisations working on the 
rule of law to apply for funding. It also increased the overall funding 
to over €1.6 billion in 2018 prices and allocated over €750 million to a 
strand dedicated to promoting respect for EU values. The problem is 
that the European Parliament does not have the final word on the size 
of this programme. The proposal still needs to be approved by 
member states, which are generally reluctant to spend more money 
on promoting democracy than is absolutely necessary. The 
compromise proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework, 
put forward by the then Finnish presidency, suggests that the higher 
figure preferred by the Parliament offer will not feature in the final deal.  
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At his confirmation hearing in the European Parliament, 
Reynders promised that the Commission would examine the rule of 
law situation in all member states and draft an annual report. He also 
pledged that the Commission would widen the scope of its analysis 
and take issues of media pluralism into account. In its analysis, the 
Commission wants to draw on the expertise of the other international 
organisations, the Fundamental Rights Agency and the EU’s own 
monitoring mechanisms. It also wants member states to set up 
national contact points to facilitate the exchange of information about 
the rule of law. But despite calls from various civil society 
organisations for the Commission to delegate the assessment of the 
situation in member states to experts or a new agency, the 
Commission wants to control the content of its own annual rule of 
law report. The risk is that the Commission’s analysis is seen as being 
politically motivated in some member states. Proponents of keeping 
the review in the Commission’s hands will say, however, that since 
the assessment could form the basis for legal action, the Commission, 
as the guardian of the treaties, should conduct it; that way it would 
certainly be admissible evidence at the ECJ. The Commission could 
also offset such criticism with a public information campaign 
explaining the factual basis for its assessment. 
The Commission itself also hopes that such a report will create a 
basis for greater cooperation with the Council and the European 
Parliament on democratic backsliding. The Council has discussed rule 
of law-related themes such as disinformation or trust in public 
institutions (the so-called Council rule of law dialogue) since 2014, but 
it has shied away from debating democratic backsliding at the member 
state level, or putting forward any country-specific recommendations. 
As a result, the exercise has been an “unhelpful” waste of the Council’s 
time (Pech and Kochenov, 2019). Finland, which held the Council’s 
rotating presidency in the second half of 2019, was keen to reform the 
rule of law dialogue in the Council, so that the Council could use the 
Commission’s proposed report in its discussions on the rule of law 
(Council of the European Union, 2019). Poland and Hungary oppose 
the Finnish ideas, making them hard to implement. But Germany 
(which will hold the rotating presidency in the second half of 2020, 
when the next rule of law dialogue should take place) may, like 
Finland, be willing to push for a more coordinated approach to 
declining respect for the rule of law.   
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14.4 Conclusion and recommendations 
 The European Commission needs to address east/west 
tensions which, in the longer term, could undermine the EU’s 
integrity. The Commission should not turn a blind eye to 
negative developments in central Europe; rather it should treat 
all member states equally strictly. 
 Von der Leyen has made a small step in the right direction by 
promising an assessment of the rule of law in all member states. 
It is, however, not entirely clear how the Commission intends 
to collect data for such an annual report. If it wants a balanced 
picture, it cannot rely exclusively on data provided by member 
states’ governments. It should make better use of the 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in collecting information 
about the rule of law. There is nothing to stop the EU 
institutions asking the agency to collect data about the rule of 
law in individual member states. The FRA draws on the 
expertise of local contact points that could help it gather useful 
insights, for instance about judicial independence, and thereby 
contribute to the Commission’s annual rule of law report. The 
Commission should also seek information from international 
organisations such as the Council of Europe and from civil 
society organisations.  
 If the Commission’s report shows serious democratic 
deficiencies in a member state, the Commission should offer 
the government concerned the opportunity to comment on the 
findings. If the explanation provided is not satisfactory and the 
prospects for addressing the problems identified in the report 
are not promising, the Commission should not hesitate to ask 
the ECJ to weigh in. As in the Polish case, the Commission 
should ask the ECJ to order the suspension of controversial 
reforms until it issues a final verdict.   
 The Commission should prepare its report in time for the 
Council to use it in its own deliberations on the rule of law. The 
Commission should convince Poland and Hungary (opponents 
of this idea) that a report that looked objectively at the situation 
in all member states could spark a more honest debate in the 
Council about the state of democracy in the EU and improve 
the atmosphere among the member states. Some member states 
have expressed reservations about such a report, because the 
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Commission has given little indication of the sources it would 
draw on. The sooner the new Commission puts forward a 
detailed proposal answering these doubts the better.  
 EU political ‘families’ like the centre-right EPP and the centre 
left S&D have a responsibility to assist in upholding the rule of 
law throughout the EU, rather than protecting national parties 
that are undermining it at home. It would be in the interest of 
the EU and all the member states if serious violations of the rule 
of law led to political isolation. 
 The EU institutions should make greater use of civil society 
organisations, both as a source of information and as a means 
of increasing popular understanding of the rule of law; they can 
offer the EU useful recommendations on how to make the 
public more resilient to populists and their authoritarian 
actions. At the same time, in order to avoid being accused of 
political bias by hostile governments, the Commission should 
engage in a dialogue with civil society organisations with 
different opinions, including those sceptical about the 
Commission’s role as a guardian of the rule of law.  
 The member states should accept the European Parliament’s 
proposal to increase EU funding for rule of law promotion. This 
will be a hard sell for parliaments and publics who do not want 
to contribute more to the EU’s budget than they currently do. 
But they should understand that when a member state gets 
away with violating the rule of law, the cost to others may be 
more than the extra funding for rule of law promotion. In the 
end, any attempt to undermine judicial independence, infringe 
the rights of criminal suspects or restrict media freedom 
constitutes an existential threat to the integrity of the single 
market, a project which has contributed to member states’ 
prosperity, and to the common legal space, based on mutual 
trust, which contributes to the security of the EU’s citizens. 
 In the MFF negotiations, EU member states should establish a 
stronger link between respect for fundamental values and 
sound EU finances, regardless of pressure to compromise in 
order to reach a deal on the budget for the next seven years. 
Making the instrument legally watertight would help to see off 
accusations that the EU is prepared to bend its own laws to 
punish defiant member states.  
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Critics often accuse the EU of being an elite project, imposed on 
unwilling populations. But those populations benefit from the EU’s 
great achievements – the single market, and the borderless area of 
freedom, security and justice – which can only work if the rule of law 
prevails throughout the EU. Democratically elected governments in 
individual member states have to be prevented from taking decisions 
that suit them and boost their ratings, but undermine the rule of law 
throughout the EU. There is a difficult balance to be struck between the 
absolute ‘will of the people’ and the paternalistic ‘we know best’ rule 
by judges and other unelected institutions. But the alternative to a 
system in which the will of the people is constrained by the rule of law 
is to go back to hoping that the second ship will always arrive in time. 
A modern democracy needs a more reliable way to stop itself – or its 
leaders – from making terrible mistakes.  
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 NATIONAL REFERENDUMS: 
BETWEEN LEGITIMATE  
POPULAR DECISION-MAKING  
AND POPULIST TAKEOVER 
ATANAS SLAVOV 
Different forms, procedures and practices of using national referendums exist in 
EU member states, varying from fuller (Italy, France, Romania, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia), to more restrictive regimes (Germany, 
Netherlands). This chapter formulates important distinctions between 
facultative and mandatory referendums, popular votes on specific issues and 
legislative referendums, top-down governmentally controlled plebiscites and 
bottom-up popular initiatives, consultative and binding referendums as well as 
highlighting common European standards and good practices (Venice 
Commission). It finds that existing shortcomings could be addressed by enabling 
procedures for citizen-initiated referendums, introducing e-forms for signature 
collection, ensuring sufficient public space and time for deliberation and 
abolishing quorums or maintaining them at the legal minimum.  
15.1 Introduction: Political context of national 
referendums in EU member states  
The use of national referendums in European countries has increased 
over the last three decades, as a number of studies suggest (Renwick, 
2017; The Constitution Unit Report, 2018). Central and eastern 
European countries have used national referendums more often than 
older EU members (with the exception of Italy and Ireland).    
The issues decided in national referendums vary significantly 
– from constitutional and legislative questions, international 
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agreements and EU issues to more general political or specific policy 
issues (social and labour policy, privatisation, refugees, etc.).  
Constitutional referendums have attracted specific attention by 
scholars, due to their role in enhancing or potential to weaken 
existing systems of governing. Four different types of constitutional 
referendum could be outlined: on founding of new states; creation 
and amendment of new constitutions; recognition of sub-state 
autonomy; and European Union issues (Tierney, 2012). The increased 
use of referendums and popular expectations for more direct 
inclusion in the decision-making process reveals a tendency towards 
a more citizen-centred political and policy process, which is 
complementary and sometimes challenging to representative models 
of democracy. Tierney also observes that “the UK is a good example 
of how the referendum has evolved from a highly exotic 
constitutional option to one that is increasingly normalised within 
constitutional practice” (Tierney, 2013).  
Taking into account the process of creating “an ever closer 
union” that increasingly poses challenges to the traditional notions of 
statehood and national sovereignty – many states have decided the 
question of their EU accession by means of a referendum in order to 
provide political and popular legitimacy for the integration process 
(Schiller, 2009). With only three exceptions (Cyprus, Bulgaria and 
Romania), all newer member states 
organised referendums on EU accession 
along with amending their constitutions 
in order to provide for supranational 
forms of integration. Thus, national 
referendums on EU issues could be 
interpreted in at least two positive ways: first, they provide much 
needed direct involvement of the citizens in the EU integration 
process, thereby contributing to narrowing the ‘legitimacy gap’ in the 
EU; second, through referendums, member states exercise their 
sovereign decision-making, in both a politically and symbolically 
significant way. In that respect, as a general impression, national 
referendums on EU issues tend to mobilise wider public support for 
the cause of integration, and to engage citizens in a debate over the 
future and the strategic goals of the EU.  
With only three exceptions 
(Cyprus, Bulgaria and 
Romania), all newer member 
states organised referendums 
on EU accession. 
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In the last decade, national referendums have often become an 
arena for populist forces trying to use direct democracy to advance 
their political agenda by eroding institutions of constitutional 
democracy. It is true that the current wave of Eurosceptic populism 
questions the process of EU 
integration and consolidation. 
However, this rather opportunistic 
approach to direct democracy should 
not be used as a counter-argument 
against the use of national 
referendums to decide key issues. To 
the contrary, as Blockmans and 
Russack suggest, “instruments of direct democracy are no silver 
bullets but may be valuable supplements to representative 
democracy” (Blockmans and Russack, 2018). Moreover, in his 
empirically informed observation, Richard Youngs has got it right:  
It is worth remembering that populist forces have not arisen 
due to any excess of direct democracy, but in a context 
where it remains relatively rare. For all the fears of direct 
democracy giving nativist-populists more sway, indirect 
democracy has itself done a rather good job in nurturing 
these forces. (Youngs, 2018)      
15.2 National referendums: forms and practices 
For the purpose of this overview, national referendum will be 
understood in its wider sense as including a direct popular vote on a 
substantive political issue in different forms (popular 
referendum/government-initiated referendum, 
constitutional/legislative referendum, mandatory/optional 
referendum, binding/consultative referendum) (Altman, 2014; IDEA 
Handbook, 2008). Further, distinctions could be drawn between 
citizens’ initiative, referendum and plebiscite, based on differentiation 
between the authorship of the policy/legislative proposal, 
authority/political subject taking the initiative and the deciding 
authority/electorate (Kaufmann et al, 2010).  
National referendum as a direct democratic instrument is usually 
practised in the EU countries in several different forms: 
In the last decade, national 
referendums have often become 
an arena for populist forces 
trying to use direct democracy 
to advance their political 
agenda by eroding institutions 
of constitutional democracy. 
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 Mandatory referendum – this type of referendum is automatically 
triggered by law (the constitution) when certain conditions are 
in place and the voters have to decide either on approval or 
rejection of the proposal (e.g. when amendments to the 
constitution are proposed and voted by the parliament, they 
should be ratified by a popular vote; when a full constitutional 
revision is in place or fundamental constitutional provisions are 
amended; when a sovereign state agrees to transfer competences 
to a supranational authority or an international organisation; 
when the country decides to join the EU or to agrees to new EU 
treaties) (IDEA Handbook, 2008). Among EU member states, 
mandatory referendums are practised in Ireland (for 
constitutional amendments, international organisations and the 
EU), Denmark (for EU issues) (Sørensen, 2018), Lithuania 
(changing fundamental constitutional provisions and joining 
international organisations in the case of a transfer of powers), 
Latvia (changing fundamental constitutional provisions and 
accession to the EU) (Bukovskis and Vizgunova, 2018), Estonia 
(changing fundamental constitutional provisions) (Venice 
Commission, 2005). After the fall of the communist regime in 
Central and Eastern Europe in some countries (Estonia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania), constitutional referendums were 
held for approval of the new democratic constitutions (Schiller, 
2009). 
  Government-initiated referendum – is a type of optional referendum 
initiated top-down and often having a plebiscitary character. The 
electorate does not have a say on the questions, issues or 
provisions placed on the ballot but only has the final word of 
approval or rejection. In presidential or semi-presidential systems, 
this type of referendum can be initiated by the president who 
could submit laws to the people in a referendum with the advice 
and consent of the cabinet but with no subsequent approval by the 
parliament (France), or initiating a referendum after consulting 
the parliament (Romania, Poland). In parliamentary republics, the 
final decision for holding a referendum is usually made by the 
parliament (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Estonia).     
 Popular referendum – is a type of referendum initiated by the 
citizens themselves that triggers a popular vote on a decision 
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(usually legislative act) adopted by the parliament. It either 
provides popular legitimacy to the decision already made by the 
legislative authority or creates an opportunity for repealing the 
act (veto /abrogative referendum). This type of citizens’ controlled 
referendum exists in some constitutional models (Denmark, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania). For example, in Italy at least 500,000 
signatures are required to organise a national referendum to 
repeal a law adopted by parliament.1 In the Netherlands, 10,000 
signatures are needed to initiate the process and then a further 
300,000 signatures must be collected for the referendum to go 
ahead.2 
 Citizens’ (popular) initiative – is a type of referendum initiated 
bottom-up by a group of citizens formulating the proposal and 
gathering popular support behind it (in the form of collecting a 
legally defined number of signatures). After submitting the 
initiative proposal to the parliament, the latter has to take the 
formal decision to call a popular vote on the proposal. In some 
models, the parliament has the authority to adopt the initiative’s 
proposal without calling a popular vote (Switzerland), to make 
a counter-proposal, or is obliged to schedule the vote if all legal 
requirements are completed (Bulgaria). Citizens’ initiatives are 
used to propose and decide both constitutional (Italy, Latvia) 
and legislative (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, Croatia) issues, as 
well as more general questions on policy. Being initiated and 
controlled by the electorate itself, citizens’ initiatives are 
considered a form of direct empowerment of the electorate. 
Comparatively, full citizens’ initiatives leading to a popular vote 
are a relatively rare instrument of direct democracy in EU 
countries (Schiller, 2009).3 
 
 
                                                        
1 The Constitution of the Italian Republic 1947 (rev. 2012), articles 75 and 138. 
2 Consultative Referendum Act (Netherlands) 2014. 
3 On different forms of direct democracy, see the e-tool developed by IRI Europe: 
https://www.direct-democracy-navigator.org/countries/lithuania/national.   
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Assessing existing practices in the EU, it is worth comparing 
them to the most developed direct democracy model of Switzerland. 
In the Swiss model, forms of national popular votes can be classified 
using either the source of the proposal or the right of initiative: 
The source of the proposition describes who controls the issues 
which are subject to a popular vote, or in other words who sets the 
political agenda. In the Swiss case, this can be either the 
government or the parliament or the citizens. The other dimension 
relates to who can call for a vote. This can be either through a 
constitutional requirement or it can be through collecting 
signatures (Lutz, 2012). 
Thus, on the federal level, three forms of direct democracy exist 
leading to nationwide popular votes: obligatory referendum, citizens’ 
initiative and referendum. The obligatory referendum is organised 
when the federal parliament passes a constitutional amendment and 
the final decision on its adoption is made by a national referendum 
vote. The most prominent forms of Swiss direct democracy, however, 
are those triggered by popular initiative. The citizens’ initiative is 
aimed at constitutional change (proposes a specific constitutional 
amendment) and requires at least 100,000 signatures to be collected 
in a period of 18 months. The referendum is aimed at the final approval 
or rejection of legislative act, adopted by the federal parliament, 
requiring at least 50,000 signatures collected in a period of 100 days.4 
It is usually said that the former allows the citizens to step on the 
accelerator pedal, whereas the latter provides people with the 
possibility to step on the brakes of the democratic decision-making 
process (Kaufmann et. al., 2010). In other words, the popular 
referendum is clearly a ‘decision-controlling’ mechanism, while the 
popular initiative is a ‘decision-promoting’ mechanism (Podolnjak, 
2015).  
                                                        
4 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 1999 (rev. 2002), articles 138, 
139 and 141. 
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15.3 Organising national referendums: procedural 
and substantive challenges  
Quorums 
According to the Code of Good Practice on Referendums, adopted by 
the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (Venice 
Commission, 2006), it is advisable not to apply quorums. Most often 
two types of quorums are applied that have different negative effects 
on voting behaviour. First, in the case of a turnout quorum (threshold, 
minimum percentage of voters required for the validity of a 
referendum), its use is problematic because it assimilates voters who 
abstain to those who vote no, thus electorally benefiting the “no” side 
(Venice Commission, 2006). This approach is considered not healthy 
for a democracy, because it discourages civic participation and allows 
the minority viewpoint to prevail in a popular vote by just boycotting 
the vote, without running a substantive campaign or winning 
legitimate public support for its positions.  
The legal requirement for the second type of quorum – an 
approval quorum (approval by a minimum percentage of registered 
voters)– is also viewed as problematic as far as its use may lead to a 
difficult political situation in cases when the referendum proposal is 
adopted by a majority of voters lower than the necessary approval 
threshold. This may often lead to a situation in which the result might 
be viewed as legitimate and decisive by the majority of participating 
voters, while it would not be implemented due to procedural reasons. 
Yet another weak side of applying the approval quorum is that in 
some instances (if it is defined as too high a percentage of voters) it 
may hinder necessary changes in certain policies or legislation.   
For both types of quorums there is a risk of manipulating the 
turnout rate and thus negatively affecting the final result of the 
popular vote (its validity and the binding effect). For example, in 
countries that practice centralised ex officio registration of eligible 
voters (Bulgaria), regardless of whether they have suitable access to 
the polling stations or not, the number of votes cast inside/outside 
the country differs significantly. In the Bulgarian system, a specific 
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turnout quorum applies,5 while the total number of registered eligible 
voters includes both citizens situated in the country as well as those 
situated abroad (Slavov, 2010). Though all are allowed to vote, only 
those in the country have a proper and easy access to the polling 
stations. Without a system of electronic online voting or early postal 
voting, this has led to invalid results in the three national 
referendums undertaken over the last six years. The last two national 
referendums (on e-voting; compulsory voting, introduction of a 
majoritarian electoral system and reduction of budget subsidies for 
political parties) would have been valid and binding if there had been 
no specific turnout quorum required by the law.     
 
 Recommendation: Not to apply validity 
quorums/turnout quorums or maintain existing 
quorums at the legal minimum in order not to 
hinder democratic decision-making.  
Collecting signatures for popular initiatives 
Specific challenges to the organisation of referendums triggered by 
popular initiatives arise from the procedures used for collection of 
signatures, as well as from the number of signatures required. 
First, most of national systems allowing for popular initiatives 
do not facilitate the process by providing an opportunity for online 
signature collection systems (as is the case with the European 
Citizens’ Initiative) (Longo, 2019). Traditional paper-based collection 
systems, requiring extensive personal data entry (names, full address, 
date of birth or ID/personal identification number, signature), often 
collected in open public spaces (on the street, large shopping malls), 
offer no protection against manipulation of personal data, or 
incorrect entries that may affect the validity of the initiative. For 
example, in the case of popular initiatives for national referendums 
                                                        
5 The Bulgarian law on referenda and citizens’ initiatives, Art. 23. (1) stipulates: 
“The proposal, subject to the referendum thereof, shall be considered accepted if 
the number of voters, who have participated in the balloting, is not less than the 
voters who participated in the last National Assembly elections and if more than 
half of the voters in the referendum have cast a ‘Yes’ vote.” 
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in Bulgaria, the amount of invalid entries exceeded 20% of the total 
collected signatures in all three cases. 
Second, the process of collecting signatures on paper is difficult 
and costly, which hampers genuine but not well organised civic 
engagement, while in fact empowering strong party machines or 
organised interest groups (including big corporate actors) to use the 
popular initiative to achieve narrowly defined and situational gains. 
For instance, the popular initiative model in Croatia requires at least 
10% of the total electorate to support the initiative in order for a 
national referendum to be held, while, at the same time, only allows 
15 days to collect signatures (Podolnjak, 2015). The Bulgarian model 
also only allows collection on paper, while requiring at least 400,000 
signatures to be collected in 3 months to trigger a national 
referendum (albeit not constitutional). In comparison, the popular 
referendum provided for by the Italian Constitution (Art. 138) may 
be triggered by a popular initiative collecting at least 500,000 
signatures on paper within 3 months. 
It should be noted, that short periods for collecting signatures 
along with the higher number of required entries, though being 
publicly justified as necessary for ensuring validity and legitimacy of 
the process, in fact often create incentives to abuse the very same 
initiative process. Negative practices, such as buying voters to 
support certain initiatives, or misusing personal data from public 
registries proliferate in some countries (Bulgaria).  
 
 Recommendation: Introduce e-tools for collecting 
signatures; lower the number of required 
signatures; require less personal data; provide 
longer periods for collection. 
 
15.4 Conformity with the rule of law and halting the 
growth of populism 
One of the major requirements of referendum initiatives is 
substantive conformity with the rule of law. First, this means 
conformity with the hierarchy of legal norms in force in a given country 
(in a descending order starting with the constitution, the EU and 
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international law at the apex of the national legal system). The 
principle of the rule of law requires that questions or legislative 
proposals to be voted on in a referendum should not violate the 
established rules and norms of a higher order. In this respect, the rule 
of law should be safeguarded by the country’s highest court dealing 
with constitutional issues (Venice Commission, 2006). 
Second, the protection and preservation of the rule of law 
requires that no referendum proposal violates or erodes substantive 
constitutional values (human dignity, fundamental human rights and 
freedoms, rights of minorities, the principle of equality before the 
law). It is important to note that for the proper functioning of direct 
democracy, the system of 
constitutional democracy should be 
well established and protected. The 
contemporary understanding of 
constitutional democracy adds the 
dimension of civic engagement and 
participation in the decision-making 
(Murphy, 2007) to the classical liberal 
notion of limited government 
(Friedrich, 1974).  
Some referendums organised in several EU countries in recent 
years were often presented as advancing a specific populist agenda 
undermining the rule of law and the principles of constitutional 
democracy. For instance, the popular initiative for the 2016 national 
referendum in Bulgaria was organised by the team of a popular TV 
show, employing very strong populist and anti-elitist rhetoric. Three 
of the initially proposed questions were annulled by the 
Constitutional Court as they affected the constitutional framework 
(the Bulgarian model does not provide for a constitutional 
referendum). As scholars assessing the Bulgarian practice observe, 
the increased public demand for referendums “is accompanied by 
significant levels of distrust in politicians, political parties and the 
parliament – the key institutions of representative democracy” 
(Smilov, Primatarova, 2018). The populist trend in using initiatives 
and referendums to counter-balance or even bypass the institutions 
of representative democracy could be empirically tested. A great 
number of popular initiatives in Bulgaria (most of them never 
completed) focused on questions that were high on the agenda of 
The protection and preservation 
of the rule of law requires that 
no referendum proposal 
violates or erodes substantive 
constitutional values (human 
dignity, fundamental human 
rights and freedoms, rights of 
minorities, the principle of 
equality before the law). 
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national-populist movements (to name just a few: against the 
membership of Turkey in the EU; adoption of a new constitution; 
nationalisation of ownership of energy companies; to stop ratification 
of the CoE Istanbul Convention).6   
Likewise, the growing populism in central and eastern Europe 
and the use of referendums to achieve specific political goals often 
challenges the rule of law and democratic constitutional values. For 
example, the 2018 Romanian citizens-initiated referendum on 
changing the constitution to expressly 
ban same-sex marriage, thereby 
exploiting populist rhetoric against 
LGBT people, was supported by a 
rather odd coalition of socialists, 
national-populist and right-wing 
parties, conservative NGOs, as well as 
by major religious groups. The 
initiative failed due to insufficient participation in the popular vote –
21%, while the required turnout was 30% of eligible voters (Sebe, Vaș, 
2018).  
A similar issue arose in a 2013 citizen-initiated referendum in 
Croatia. The proposed constitutional amendment defined marriage 
as being a union between a man and a woman, thus establishing a 
constitutional prohibition against same-sex marriage. There was a 
clear preference to the ‘yes’ answer (65.87%), but only 37.9% of 
eligible voters participated, rendering the vote invalid due to the lack 
of a turnout quorum. The referendum was called after a conservative 
organisation gathered more than 700,000 signatures in May 2013 and 
was supported by conservative populist and right-wing political 
parties, the Catholic Church as well as by several other religious 
groups. The ruling left-wing coalition opposed the amendment along 
with numerous human rights organisations and the majority of the 
Croatian media.7 
                                                        
6 Register of National Assembly on national referendum initiatives: 
http://parliament.bg/referendum/?page=reg&lng=. 
7 The 2013 same-sex marriage referendum in Croatia: https://www.direct-
democracy-navigator.org/legal_designs/croatia-national-to-call-a-
referendum/cases/same-sex-marriage-referendum. 
The growing populism in 
central and eastern Europe 
and the use of referendums to 
achieve specific political 
goals often challenges the rule 
of law and democratic 
constitutional values. 
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The 2016 referendum in Hungary on the EU migrant relocation 
quota plans, proposed by the national-populist Orbán government, 
also exploited populist sentiments while undermining the 
application of EU law by attacking the value of European solidarity 
and the duty of sincere cooperation (Art. 4 (3) TEU). Without 
achieving the required turnout quorum of 50 % the referendum 
failed. The proposal, however, was criticised by the European 
Commission and the broader human rights NGO community as 
violating both constitutional standards and the principle of primacy 
of the EU law.8  
 Recommendation: Ensure preliminary and ex post 
constitutional review of referendum proposals and 
decisions, depending on their legal form 
(questions or legislative amendments) and legal 
effect (binding or consultative) in order to uphold 
the rule of law and fundamental constitutional 
/EU values.   
15.5 Conclusion and recommendations     
Intensified use of national referendums on constitutional and policy 
issues appears to be a long-term trend. The fact that some of the 
popular votes dealing with very contested social and political themes 
were easily harnessed by populists should not be used as an 
argument against this form of direct democracy. It remains up to the 
national constitutional systems to create safeguards (including 
constitutional/judicial review) and to design a sufficiently inclusive 
and deliberative referendum process (open and free access to public 
media) to allow citizens to engage and participate actively and to 
debate freely, while remaining true to fundamental constitutional 
and European values. Moreover, referendums should be one of many 
direct and participatory instruments – public consultations, agenda 
initiatives, citizens’ assemblies, to name just a few – enabling citizens 
to take part in public deliberation and political decision-making. 
Excluding citizens from direct participation, on the grounds of 
                                                        
8 EU Commission questions legality of Hungary's migrant referendum, Euronews 
(25.02.2016): https://www.euronews.com/2016/02/25/eu-commission-
questions-legality-of-hungary-s-migrant-referendum.  
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incompetence, populism or radicalism, runs contrary to the values 
enshrined in both national constitutions and the founding EU 
Treaties. The question, therefore, is not if, but how to practice 
referendums in a way to strengthen, not weaken our constitutional 
democracies, and our Union. Moreover, the question is surely how to 
deepen and expand democratic practices both nationally and EU-
wide (including in a foreseeable future, a common EU-wide 
referendum).9   
Elaborating common European standards and rules may be a 
necessary step to strengthening civic engagement and participation 
in decision-making. 
Cooperation among different 
stakeholders (national 
parliaments, EU institutions, 
Council of Europe bodies and 
civil society) will be needed to 
develop and strengthen direct 
democracy and referendum 
standards. Alongside the 
existing standards, some new 
dimensions could be 
introduced:    
 Enhancing procedures for citizen-initiated referendums (lower 
the specific number or percentage of signatures required; 
require less personal data; provide longer periods for 
collection); 
 Introducing e-tools for collecting signatures; 
 Ensuring public space and time for deliberation before and 
during official information campaigns (equal access to media 
of both sides); 
 Making objective and politically neutral expert statements on 
referendum issues accessible to a wider public; 
                                                        
9 The latter has strong support from active civil society groups, such as 
Democracy International: https://www.democracy-international.org/eu-
convention. 
Excluding citizens from direct 
participation, on the grounds of 
incompetence, populism or radicalism, 
runs contrary to the values enshrined 
in both national constitutions and the 
founding EU treaties. The question, 
therefore, is not if, but how to practice 
referendums in a way to strengthen, 
not weaken our constitutional 
democracies, and our Union. 
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 Abolishing validity/turnout quorums or maintaining existing 
quorums at the legal minimum; 
 Ensuring judicial/constitutional review of referendum 
initiatives and decisions. 
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 AN EU-WIDE REFERENDUM: 
POTENTIAL THREAT OR TOOL OF 
EMPOWERMENT? 
ELEONORA POLI 
In recent years, the permissive consensus, which once allowed the EU to pursue 
its integration process without directly consulting its citizens, has eroded in 
parallel with rising criticism of its democratic deficit. The introduction of the 
European Citizens’ Initiative as a tool of transnational direct democracy has 
done little to alter the EU’s technocratic reputation. This chapter explores 
whether the institutionalisation of an EU-wide referendum could be of use in 
reinvigorating integration and conferring democratic legitimacy on the Union. 
16.1 Introduction: An effective antidote to 
scepticism? 
Once regarded as an inspiring example of joint political endeavour, 
the EU has been losing its appeal in recent decades. Beyond the 
multiple economic, social and security reasons for this loss of 
attractiveness, there is also increasing scepticism about the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy. Although 44% of Europeans tend to trust the 
EU and its institutions (European Commission, 2019), increasing 
allegations that European institutions consider EU citizens as a 
passive public, and promote specific policies through ‘obfuscation’ 
rather than via direct engagement, have been undermining the 
Union’s legitimacy (Mac Amhlaigh, Cormac, 2009: 552).  
The introduction of EU-wide referendums on burning issues 
and key political decisions on the future of the EU could possibly 
challenge this negative perspective. Public plebiscites of all European 
citizens living in EU member states and enjoying the right to vote in 
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their own country could be a way to enhance democratic legitimacy 
and secure popular political backing. 
Despite widespread doubts about the capacity of ordinary 
citizens to make long-term decisions for the common good, the idea 
that policies can be more democratically legitimate if supported by a 
popular vote is even shared by detractors of direct democracy 
(Cheneval, Francis, and Mónica Ferrín, 2018: 1178-1194). Yet, a 
popular referendum across the EU is seen as a double-edged sword: 
it could be manipulated by anti-European political parties or used by 
citizens to manifest a general discontent regardless of the specific 
content of the plebiscite – extremely risky and potentially life 
threatening for the European integration process.  
However, when it comes to boosting the legitimacy of the 
Union, at a time when it needs a stronger mandate to face 
unprecedented internal and external challenges, putting citizens on 
an equal footing across all member states could be crucial. To date, 
although 56% of Europeans on average believe their voice already 
counts in the EU, citizens’ perceptions of their capacity to influence 
the European decision-making process vary considerably. According 
to Eurobarometer data, while the highest scores were observed in 
Sweden (86%), Denmark (81%) and Netherlands (76%), there are 
countries like Spain, Greece, Italy, the Czech Republic and Cyprus 
where only a small percentage of citizens believe they have a say on 
EU matters (European Commission, 2019b).  
Also, the EU should be able to perform better than member 
states when it comes to respecting the outcome of referendums 
(Hollander, 2019: 27-56), though the use of referendums would need 
to be limited and targeted at soliciting citizens’ opinions on 
fundamental issues that directly affect their lives.  
16.2 EU-wide referendum: the status quo 
Since its creation, the EU has never directly consulted its more than 
500 million citizens on concrete policy issues. To date, European 
decisions are made accountable via 
the elections of members of the 
European Parliament every five years 
and national governments, which 
participate at the European Council 
Since its creation, the EU has 
never directly consulted its 
more than 500 million citizens 
on concrete policy issues. 
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and Council of the European Union. Citizens have very limited direct 
democracy tools to express their ideas when it comes to the numerous 
policies and decisions made by the EU in between elections, and there 
are no procedures for holding a referendum at the EU level 
(European Parliament, 2017, 13). The European Citizens’ Initiative 
may have generated a burst of bottom-up activities, but it is non-
binding (Blockmans and Russack, 2018: 4). 
The first intimation of a binding EU-wide referendum emerged 
during the drafting of the European Constitution, presented in July 
2003 by the Convention on the Future of Europe.1 At the time, 97 
members of the Convention together with Liberal and Green 
members of the European Parliament called for a binding EU-wide 
referendum on the Constitutional Treaty to be launched on the same 
day across all member states. However, the body that led the work at 
the Convention, the Praesidium, considered this option too federal 
and left the decision to the discretion of member states (Mendez at 
al., 2014: 195). The latter, in turn, acting as trustees “for the collective 
good of Europe” believed that a public plebiscite, organised at the EU 
level, would have provided legitimacy to EU institutions to act 
beyond national governments (Habermas, Jürgen, 2001: 5-26; Rose, 
Richard, 2013: 4; Schmitter, Philippe, 2000). Moreover, the 
requirements of the Irish Constitution made a national referendum 
on the European Constitution inevitable and other member countries 
planned to follow suit. The ratification process was derailed when the 
attempt to approve the Constitution via a popular vote failed in 
France and the Netherlands. This led to the impression that public 
consultations were a source of disruption to the integration process.  
                                                        
1 Established by the Laeken European Council of 14 and 15 December 2001 the 
European Convention was inspired by the in 1787 Philadelphia Convention, 
which resulted in the adoption of the United States Federal Constitution. The 
European Convention brought together 15 representatives of the member states’ 
heads of state or government, 30 members of the national parliaments (two per 
member state), 16 MEPs, two members of the Commission, a chair (Valéry 
Giscard D’Estaing) and two vice-chairs (Giuliano Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene) 
to produce a Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe to be then 
adopted and finalised by the Council. 
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To date, although a general crisis of contemporary 
representative democracy has contributed to a rising number of 
referendums, from 1982 to 2015 only 8% of Europeans have been 
given the right to call directly for a referendum on European issues 
(Hollander, 2019: 2; Cheneval and Ferrín, 2018: 1178-1194). National 
governments tend to decide whether 
to call a public consultation on 
European affairs and, with the 
exception of Ireland where plebiscites 
on Treaty revisions are mandatory, 
referendums on the European Union, being on membership, Treaty 
revision or other policy issues, as exemplified in the tables below, are 
far from being a systemic practice. Moreover, even when held, 
referendum results are not always taken properly into consideration 
by national governments. For instance, while French and the Dutch 
citizens rejected the Constitutional Treaty, the same articles were then 
embodied in the Lisbon Treaty, which was directly ratified by the two 
countries, thereby nullifying the result of their referendums. 
Similarly, despite 61% of Greeks voting against the bailout deal with 
the Eurogroup, in the referendum held in July 2015, the Greek 
government, under pressure from the Troika, accepted even harsher 
austerity conditions than the ones already rejected.  
From 1972 to 2016, 44 referendums on EU issues were held in 
an EU member state. Yet, not all EU countries have called a national 
referendum relating to the EU and not on the same issue. For 
instance, out of the 44 referendums, 18 were accession referendums, 
which were never called in any of the funding countries and 2 were 
membership referendums, both organised in the UK.  
 
  
From 1982 to 2015 only 8% of 
Europeans have been given the 
right to call directly for a 
referendum on European issues. 
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Membership referendums    
 Year Country Subject Required/Advisory % Yes Turnout Result 
1 1972 Denmark Accession Required 63.3 90.1% Yes 
2 1972 Ireland Accession Required 83.1 70.9% Yes 
3 1975 United Kingdom 
Accession 
Treaty 
(remain in) 
Advisory 67.2 64% Yes 
4 1994 Austria Accession Required 66.6 82% Yes 
5 1994 Sweden Accession Advisory 52.3 70% Yes 
6 1994 Finland Accession Advisory 56.9 83% Yes 
7 2003 Czech Republic Accession Required 77.3 55% Yes 
8 2003 Estonia Accession Required 66.8 64% Yes 
9 2003 Hungary Accession Required 83.7 46% Yes 
10 2003 Latvia Accession Required 67.0 73% Yes 
11 2003 Lithuania Accession Required 91.1 63% Yes 
12 2003 Malta Accession Advisory 53.6 91% Yes 
13 2003 Poland Accession Required 77.5 59% Yes 
14 2003 Romania 
Accession 
(change to 
constitution 
to join later) 
Required 89.7 56% Yes 
15 2003 Slovakia Accession Required 92 52% Yes 
16 2003 Slovenia Accession Required 89.6 60% Yes 
17 2012 Croatia Accession Required 66.7 43% Yes 
18 2016 United Kingdom 
EU 
membership Advisory 48.1 72.2% No 
Source: European Parliament. 
 
As far as Treaty revision is concerned, since 1972 there have 
been 16 referendums – mostly called in Ireland, where it is 
mandatory, and in Denmark. Seven out of these 16 plebiscites were 
advisory referendums, with no formal obligation by the governments 
to take the results into consideration. 
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Treaty revision referendums     
 Year Country Subject 
Required/
Advisory 
% 
Yes Turnout Result 
1 1986 Denmark 
Single 
European Act  Advisory 56.2 75.4% Yes 
2 1987 Ireland 
Single 
European Act  Required 69.9 44% Yes 
3 1992 Denmark 
Maastricht 
Treaty I Required 49.3 83.1% No 
4 1992 Ireland 
Maastricht 
Treaty Required 68.7 57% Yes 
5 1992 France 
Maastricht 
Treaty Advisory 51.1 70% Yes 
6 1993 Denmark 
Maastricht 
Treaty II Advisory 56.7 86.5% Yes 
7 1998 Ireland 
Amsterdam 
Treaty Required 61.7 56% Yes 
8 1998 Denmark 
Amsterdam 
Treaty Required 55.1 76.2% Yes 
9 2001 Ireland Treaty of Nice I Required 46.1 35% No 
10 2002 Ireland Treaty of Nice II Required 62.9 49% Yes 
11 2005 Spain 
Constitutional 
Treaty Advisory 76.7 42% Yes 
12 2005 Luxembourg 
Constitutional 
Treaty Advisory 56.5 89% Yes 
13 2005 France 
Constitutional 
Treaty Advisory 45.3 69% No 
14 2005 Netherlands 
Constitutional 
Treaty Advisory 38.2 63% No 
15 2008 Ireland 
Treaty of 
Lisbon I Required 46.6 53% No 
16 2009 Ireland 
Treaty of 
Lisbon II Required 67.1 59% Yes 
Source: European Parliament. 
 
Out of the above 44 referendums, 10 were mostly advisory and 
policy-oriented (European Parliament, 2017: 20-23).  
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Policy referendums     
 Year Country Subject 
Required/
Advisory 
% 
Yes Turnout Result 
1 
1972 France 
Enlargement 
of the 
European 
Community 
Advisory 68.3 60.3% Yes 
2 1989 Italy 
Mandate for 
MEPs Advisory 88.1 85% Yes 
3 2000 Denmark 
Euro 
membership Required 46.8 87.6% No 
4 2003 Sweden 
Euro 
membership Advisory 42 83% No 
5 
2012 Ireland 
Extra EU 
Treaty 
(Fiscal 
Compact) 
Required 60.3 50% Yes 
6 
2014 Denmark 
European 
Patent 
Court 
Required 62.5 55.9% Yes 
7 2015 Denmark JHA opt-out Required 46.9 72.0% No 
8 2015 Greece 
Bailout 
terms Advisory 38.7 59% No 
9 2016 Netherlands 
EU–Ukraine 
Association Advisory 38.2 32.3% No 
10 2016 Hungary 
EU refugee 
quotas Advisory 98 40.4% Rejected 
Source: European Parliament. 
 
Thus, despite the fact that some European citizens have been 
directly consulted on EU matters through national plebiscites, not all 
referendums were binding, not all countries held a vote on the same 
issue or at the same moment and not all citizens were consulted. In 
this respect, national referendums on 
the EU end up being discriminatory 
as they contributed to creating 
political inequalities between EU 
citizens, which delegitimised the 
European Union even more 
National referendums on the EU 
end up being discriminatory as 
they cannot substitute for an 
EU-wide plebiscite. 
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(Cheneval, 2007). When it comes to fostering citizens’ participation in 
the EU decision-making process, national referendums on EU issues 
cannot substitute for an EU-wide plebiscite. This reason lies behind 
much support for the introduction of an EU-wide referendum to 
bridge the gap between EU institutions and citizens and promote 
positive perceptions of the EU decision-making process. Yet, an EU-
wide referendum remains, in effect, off the table. 
16.3 Member state reluctance 
There are several reasons for reticence about holding an EU-wide 
referendum at both European and national levels. There is a general 
lack of political will, which to date remains the main obstacle. 
Member states are not willing to sacrifice national sovereignty by 
accepting an EU-wide referendum, 
which, to be effective and credible, 
should be binding as well as multi-
national (Leininger, 2015: 17-27; 
Altman, 2010; Hug, 2004: 321–356; 
LeDuc, 2003). An EU-wide referendum would empower EU 
institutions with a direct democracy tool to use ‘against’ 
governments.  
It would also have an institutional cost: to be meaningful, an 
EU-wide referendum would require member states to harmonise 
their national laws on direct democracy, whereas, to date, they have 
different regulations on plebiscites. In some countries, specific 
referendums are mandatory, while in others they are non-binding; 
referendums can be initiated by citizens, called by the parliament or 
the government or even triggered by a constitutional disposition. 
Hence, if all EU member states were to adopt the same laws when it 
comes to public consultations this could imply a wide set of reforms 
at national level – even possibly modifying their national 
constitution, which inevitably highlights another issue: the massive 
cost that the institutionalisation of a EU referendum as well as its 
organisation would entail.  
In the end, it does not matter if one consultation at European 
level would probably be less expensive than the aggregate cost of 
having single national referendums on EU issues, or whether the 
harmonisation costs would be compensated by a smoother 
Member states are not willing to 
sacrifice national sovereignty by 
accepting an EU-wide referendum. 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE EU  277 
 
integration process. Inevitably, the costs entailed by an EU-wide 
referendum would be a good argument in the hands of Eurosceptic 
forces in support of the idea that the EU is a costly bureaucratic 
apparatus stealing national sovereignty and independence from 
member states. It has to be noted that the majority of EU leaders and 
national governments opposing the development and 
institutionalisation of a European plebiscite also use the arguments 
of Euroscepticism. In their view, since large numbers of citizens are 
dissatisfied with the EU and do not trust EU institutions, calling a 
European popular consultation could block any further advances in 
the EU integration process. At the same time, only 47% of citizens 
believe that an EU-wide referendum could make European 
democracy any stronger (Mendez et al., 2014).  
Conclusion  
Part of rising Euroscepticism is related to a lack of effective 
engagement with citizens, which has widened the gap between the 
EU institutions or the so-called Brussels bubble and ordinary 
Europeans (Schuck, Andreas RT, and Claes H. De Vrees, 2015: 149-
158). If citizens’ distrust towards the EU can no longer be addressed 
through a top-down approach, the arguments against EU-wide 
referendums need to be counter-balanced by their potential beneficial 
effects in terms of democratic legitimacy: the development of tools to 
directly consult citizens could trigger their mobilisation, going 
beyond national boundaries and contributing to sparking a shared 
debate on the future of the EU (De Clerck-Sachsse, 2012: 299-311). 
According to Habermas (2001: 7), the development of a European 
public sphere could result in a better construction of EU democracy, 
advancing a sense of European political identity. 
As rightly noted by Cheneval and Ferrín (2018), it is not 
possible to test the potential benefit of EU referendums empirically, 
yet, with more than two-thirds of EU citizens currently believing their 
country benefits from the EU, the institutionalisation of public 
consultations at European level 
can be recommended as it would 
certainly foster a sense of 
belonging to a common project. 
This does not mean that direct 
democracy should become a 
With more than two-thirds of EU 
citizens currently believing their 
country benefits from the EU, 
public consultations at European 
level can be recommended. 
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substitute for representative democracy. It means that citizens should 
be informed and then consulted through binding European 
plebiscites organised by EU institutions and not by single member 
states. Referendums should be held in all countries at the same time 
to avoid the chain effect that characterised the referendum on the 
Constitution and allow all European citizens to vote, even in 
countries where they are not resident.  
Moreover, an EU-wide referendum is only desirable if 
European institutions set their standards higher than national 
governments when it comes to respecting citizens’ decisions 
(Hollander, 2019: 27-56). For that it is necessary for the EU and its 
member countries to harmonise national legislation on public 
plebiscites, and make such consultations binding. Moreover, they 
should only be called for relevant Treaty changes or policy issues 
affecting citizens’ lives.  
In a time of global uncertainty, a multipolar world and shifting 
power, a stronger EU needs to provide for its citizens better. But to 
do that, it has to be able to understand what is best for them. If EU-
wide referendums were to be developed according to the above 
principles, they would at least confer new legitimacy on the European 
Union.  
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 THE EUROPEAN CITIZENS’ 
INITIATIVE AND ITS REFORM  
TRULY UNIQUE OR THE SAME OLD STORY?  
MINNA ÅLANDER AND NICOLAI VON ONDARZA 
The perceived crisis of representative democracy has prompted several EU 
member states to introduce elements of direct democracy in order to increase 
citizens’ participation. The European Union followed suit with the European 
Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) in 2012. However, the expectation that the new tool 
would significantly alleviate the EU’s democratic deficit has been disappointed 
by the low legislative impact of the initiatives. The instrument has therefore 
undergone a reform process and a new regulation came into effect in January 
2020. While improvement in the practicability of the ECI is to be expected, the 
reform has been mostly technical in nature and leaves questions about the 
fundamental political value of the tool unanswered. 
17.1 Introduction: The aims and design of the ECI  
The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) was introduced in the Treaty 
of Lisbon and entered into force in April 2012. The tool was intended 
to bridge the perceived distance between the EU institutions and 
citizens, and to reduce the infamous democratic deficit of the 
European Union (EU) by allowing citizens to submit legislative 
initiatives to the European Commission.  
Eight years after its launch, however, several shortcomings in 
the ECI procedure and the instrument’s assumed functions have 
become evident. The ECI’s impact has remained lower than expected: 
only five of the 70 registered initiatives have succeeded in collecting 
the required one million signatures of support and 23 were rejected 
by the Commission at registration, amounting to 25% of all initiatives. 
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Four of the five successful initiatives have undergone the follow-up 
process and in two cases the Commission decided to make some 
changes in the legislation concerned. However, in neither case were 
all the requests of the initiatives fulfilled, while in the other two cases 
the Commission found the existing legislation adequate and stated 
that no action was needed. The disappointment caused by the 
Commission’s reluctance to act, combined with the numerous 
practical obstacles encountered by the initiators, led to a revision 
process and a new regulation which became effective in January 2020. 
Article 11 paragraph 4 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
provides that at least one million citizens who are nationals of “a 
significant number of member states” can invite the European 
Commission “within the framework of its powers, to submit any 
appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal 
act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the 
Treaties” (European Union, 2008). The idea of introducing direct 
democracy into EU primary law was first raised in the Convention on 
the Future of Europe, which proposed it as part of the Draft 
Constitutional Treaty (Dehousse, 2013: 5). After the Constitutional 
Treaty was rejected by national referendums in two member states, 
the instrument was nevertheless included in the Treaty of Lisbon and 
implemented as Regulation 211/2011. 
The ECI is indeed unique, being the first instrument in EU law 
to enable citizens to proactively contribute to the Union’s 
policymaking process. The ECI differs from other participatory 
elements on the EU level, such as parliamentary petitions or the 
Commission’s consultation 
procedures, as citizens can address 
their own initiatives directly to the 
Commission, which holds the 
monopoly of initiative. In contrast, 
petitions to the European Parliament 
only allow citizens to express their preferences (in the form of a 
request or complaint) to the Committee of Petitions, which then 
proceeds as it sees fit. The ECI also goes beyond the public 
consultations on the Commission’s proposals, as the topic of an ECI 
is chosen by the citizens themselves. Furthermore, the ECI’s 
transnational reach differentiates it from the national referendums 
that have been held both on accession and EU treaty reform in 
The ECI is indeed unique, being 
the first instrument in EU law to 
enable citizens to proactively 
contribute to the Union’s 
policymaking process. 
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individual member states. The ECI is thus also the first instrument of 
transnational direct democracy (e.g. Conrad, 2013; Organ, 2014). 
Nevertheless, it suffers from many restrictions similar to those for 
national participatory tools, in addition to the obvious, specific 
challenges that stem from the ECI’s transnational character.  
The practical issues are, however, more a consequence of a 
general lack of agreement on the ECI’s purpose than the actual reason 
for its meagre success. Notably, while Article 11(4) TEU on the right 
of a citizens’ initiative is broadly formulated and allows for the 
suggestion of “any appropriate proposal”, regulation 211/2011 is 
much more restrictive.1 Each initiative is assessed by the Commission 
and must pass a four-part admissibility test, including: 
1. that the initiative committee is established appropriately 
2. that the proposed initiative is not “manifestly abusive, 
frivolous or vexatious”,  
3. is “not manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set out 
in Article 2 TEU”,  
4. and does not “manifestly fall outside the framework of the 
Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the 
Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties” (Organ, 
2014: 427).  
These restrictions laid upon the ECI by regulation 211/2011 – 
and, on top of that, the Commission’s narrow interpretation – have 
allowed the Commission to refuse the registration of a considerable 
number of initiatives and to remain 
largely inactive even in the case of 
successful ECIs. Especially the fourth 
criterion is so broadly formulated that 
it has given the Commission an easy 
way out of dealing with several ECIs. 
In fact, so far the Commission has justified all rejections with the 
fourth criterion. This has led to significant frustration among 
initiators and raised doubts about the sincerity of the Commission’s 
will to take ECIs seriously. As has been noted by Organ (2014: 245), 
                                                        
1 For a detailed account on the Commission’s reasons for its restrictive approach, 
see Russack 2018: 16-18. 
This has led to significant 
frustration among initiators 
and raised doubts about the 
sincerity of the Commission’s 
will to take ECIs seriously. 
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“the extent to which the European Citizens’ Initiative increases the 
direct influence of citizens over the EU’s policy and legislative agenda 
is therefore a key measure of its democratic impact”, and in the case 
of the ECI the impact has so far remained close to zero.  
17.2 The ECI in practice 
Since April 2012, 93 citizens’ initiatives have been submitted to the 
Commission.2 After the initial enthusiasm, resulting in 23 initiatives 
in the first year, the number of initiatives reached its lowest point in 
2016, when only three new initiatives were started. Since then, the 
number has risen again to 19 initiatives in 2019. Of the total number 
of initiatives, 21 are currently ongoing, 5 have been successful in 
collecting the required one million signatures of support, 30 failed to 
reach the threshold, 15 were withdrawn, and 23 were rejected by the 
Commission due to alleged failure in the legal admissibility test.  
Thematically, the most popular topics have been social issues, 
employment and education (22 initiatives), while climate and 
environment have also mobilised an increasing number of initiatives 
(14). Notably, the Brexit vote in 2016 inspired several EU citizenship-
related initiatives. The successful ECIs were “Water and sanitation 
are a human right! Water is a public good, not a commodity!” (2012, 
in short Right2Water), “One of us” (2012), “Stop vivisection” (2012), 
“Ban glyphosate and protect people and the environment from toxic 
pesticides” (2017, in short Ban Glyphosate), and “Minority SafePack 
– one million signatures for diversity in Europe” (2017, in short 
Minority SafePack). Furthermore, the “Stop TTIP” initiative would 
have been a successful ECI, had its registration not been refused by 
the Commission on the grounds that stopping a trade agreement 
allegedly fell outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to 
submit a proposal for a legal act (criterion four of the admissibility 
test). The rejection of “Stop TTIP” caused a political controversy, as 
the organisers claimed that the Commission’s decision was politically 
motivated (Weisskircher, 2017). This view was confirmed by the 
General Court of the EU, rejecting the Commission’s refusal to 
register the ECI (General Court of the EU 2017). Instead of re-
                                                        
2 As of December 2019. Four initiatives were initially withdrawn and 
subsequently resubmitted. 
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registration, the initiative was resumed as an unofficial citizens’ 
initiative against the free trade agreements TTIP and CETA and 
collected more than three million signatures (Barbière, 2017). 
Figure 17.1 Number of ECIs since April 2012 
  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on data from the official ECI website. 
 
Of the successful initiatives, the demands of “One of us”, 
namely to “ban and end the financing of activities which presuppose 
the destruction of human embryos” (European Commission, 2012), 
were rejected by the Commission without further follow-up. It 
argued that the issues raised by the initiative – human dignity, the 
right to life, and the right to the integrity of the person – are already 
satisfactorily enshrined in and protected by the current legal 
framework of the EU (ibid., 2014a). The initiators challenged the 
Commission’s decision in the General Court of the EU but lost the 
case (European Parliament, 2017).  
In the case of “Stop Vivisection”, the Commission’s response 
was similar: while sharing the initiators’ concern to strive for the 
phasing out of animal testing, the Commission nevertheless stated 
that it is still needed in the transition period and thus the directive 
currently in place will not be repealed, as demanded by the ECI 
(European Commission 2015). The Commission did, however, 
commit itself to accelerating the process of phasing out animal testing 
(albeit in rather vague terms). Although the “Stop Vivisection” 
initiators challenged the Commission’s response, the European 
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Ombudsman found no maladministration on the Commission’s part 
(European Ombudsman, 2017).  
The “Ban Glyphosate” initiative was somewhat more 
successful, and the Commission adopted a legislative proposal 
regarding the ECI’s second aim – ensuring that “the scientific 
evaluation of pesticides for EU regulatory approval is based only on 
published studies, which are commissioned by competent public 
authorities instead of the pesticide industry” (European Commission, 
2017a). However, with regard to the first aim of the ECI, namely to 
ban glyphosate-based herbicides, the Commission stated that “there 
are neither scientific nor legal grounds to justify a ban of glyphosate” 
(ibid., 2017b). Additionally, for its third aim, to “set EU-wide 
mandatory reduction targets for pesticide use, with a view to 
achieving a pesticide-free future” (ibid., 2017a), the Commission 
merely stated that it will focus on the existing Sustainable Use 
Directive and review the situation over the course of 2019. 
The very first ECI that managed to collect the required one 
million signatures, “Right2Water”, can also be considered as the most 
successful one. It resulted in a proposal for an amendment to the 
Drinking Water Directive, several public consultations, and seven 
further general points regarding, among others, water quality and 
transparency in water management that the Commission intends to 
pursue (ibid., 2014b). However, the pace of the directive’s review and 
amendment process has been slow, even compared to other EU 
legislation processes. The Commission finally adopted its proposal 
for the revision of the Drinking Water Directive on 1 February 2018, 
five years after the ECI’s submission, and the inter-institutional 
proceedings are still ongoing at the time of writing.  
Minority SafePack is the latest ECI that reached the threshold, 
after having been initially rejected by the Commission and 
subsequently re-registered following a decision by the General Court 
against the Commission’s refusal.3 The ECI demands the 
Commission “to adopt a set of legal acts to improve the protection of 
persons belonging to national and linguistic minorities and 
strengthen cultural and linguistic diversity in the Union” (European 
Commission, 2017c). Judging by the experience of the “Right2Water” 
                                                        
3 http://www.minority-safepack.eu/ 
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initiative, it is no surprise that there has been no progress so far, 
although the signatures were already submitted for validation in 
April 2018.  
17.3 Criticism and reform 
The remarkably small share of successful initiatives indicates that the 
ECI procedure has stayed far below the initial expectations and 
confirms that “collecting one million signatures in 27 Member States, 
23 languages, and twelve months cannot, by definition, be so simple” 
(Dehousse, 2013: 8). Democracy International criticised a “[l]ack of 
clarity in the initiative registration stage, complexity in collecting 
transnational signatures, and lack of 
public knowledge of the ECI itself [that] 
holds it back from realising its true 
potential” and further stressed an even 
greater source of frustration, namely 
that “there is no guarantee that a successful ECI will have an impact 
on EU policy”.4 
The weaknesses of the current regulation can be divided into 
two categories: firstly, practical problems related to the registration 
and conduct of an ECI, and secondly, more fundamental questions 
about the purpose of the ECI instrument. The first category is related 
to the five consecutive steps of launching an ECI: 
Table 17.1 Practical problems related to the ECI procedure 
Five consecutive 
steps: 
Related problems: 
1. Establishment 
of a citizens' 
committee 
No legal status for the ECI citizens' committee 
and high barrier of transnational, cross-
language organisation for individuals without 
connections to civil society organisations 
2. Registration of 
an ECI 
A rigid and non-transparent admissibility check 
leading to a high number of rejections 
3. Collection of Difficult conditions for the collection of 
                                                        
4 https://www.democracy-international.org/european-citizens-initiative-
reform emphases added (accessed on 25.7.2019). 
There is no guarantee that a 
successful ECI will have an 
impact on EU policy. 
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statements of 
support 
signatures, including technical problems with 
the collection software and the unavoidable 
costs of running transnational, multilingual 
campaign5 
4. Verification of 
the statements 
of support 
A high number of invalid signatures due to 
inconsistent personal data requirements for 
validating signatures with national authorities 
5. Submission 
and follow-up 
procedure 
The European Commission’s weak follow-up 
provisions for successful ECIs, lack of structure 
and purpose of the EP hearing 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Salm, 2018: 4 and Moraru, 2016:149-156. 
 
Some of these technical hurdles have been removed in the latest 
reform of the ECI. According to an official factsheet about the changes 
in the procedure (European Commission, 2019), the need for 
assistance and information in the registration phase has been taken 
into consideration and the ECI’s organisers will have the option to set 
up a legal entity. The possibility of partial registration and revision of 
the proposal are also enshrined in the new regulation, for the case 
when an initiative does not initially pass the legal admissibility test. 
Furthermore, the start date of signature collection can be set flexibly 
by the organisers within a time frame of six months following 
registration. The Commission now provides a central online 
collection system, while leaving the option open for the organisers to 
use their own software. Two major points of confusion regarding 
personal data and residence have also been addressed: the data 
requirements will be simplified and all EU citizens regardless of place 
of residence can sign an ECI.6 For the verification process, the 
Commission promises enhanced IT support. Last but not least, after 
a three-month examination period granted to the Commission, six 
months are foreseen for a more inclusive public hearing in the 
                                                        
5 Moraru (2016: 152) further points out that “[t]he minimum amount of money 
required for a successful initiative was 23.000 EUR while the maximum was 
160.000 EUR. However, an initiative which spent the equivalent of 75.000 EUR 
did not manage to gather the necessary signatures. Furthermore, the initiative 
which spent 23.000 EUR had extraordinary support from a well-known 
politician, who financed an independent awareness campaign.”  
6 EU citizens residing in a different member state than their nationality were 
excluded by some national regulations from signing an ECI. 
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European Parliament and more time for the Commission to prepare 
its response, if needed.  
Nevertheless, the conclusion for the second category of 
challenges – the fundamental political limitations – is that the reforms 
still do not “clarify the function and direction the ECI shall ultimately 
take” (Salm, 2018: 101). Indeed, as Moraru (2016: 156) points out, 
“[s]uccessfully collecting signatures is not the same thing as a 
successful ECI”. There is a discrepancy between what organisers and 
the Commission expect and how they perceive the tool’s purpose. 
Most organisers expect to generate political change, while the 
Commission sees the ECI as an agenda-setting tool that is meant to 
draw attention to certain issues (Russack, 2018: 21). The main 
problem is therefore the ‘expectations-delivery gap’, as the ECI “is 
designed as a direct democratic tool but has the effect of an agenda-
setting tool” (ibid.: 21-22). Furthermore, the assumption that the ECI 
would increase the EU’s democratic legitimacy by encouraging 
citizen participation and generating transnational debate reveals a 
superficial interpretation, as input and throughput legitimacy would 
require some sort of output. Hence, as long as there is no proper 
follow-up by the Commission and the other EU institutions, it is of 
little use to theorise about a potential legitimating function of the ECI. 
Moraru’s crushing conclusion is thus that the ECI “represents the 
diluted version of an overall weak instrument” (ibid.: 160).  
It is safe to say that expectations of the ECI’s contribution to 
mitigate the legitimacy crisis and democratic deficit have been 
exaggerated. Generally, direct democratic instruments often fail to 
attract the attention of large segments of the population with diverse 
views and political positions, and in the 
ECI’s case, the citizens who already 
perceive the EU as a legitimate political 
system are the most likely to participate 
(Kandyla and Gherghina, 2018: 1224, 
1227). Thus the expectation that the ECI 
would encourage ‘ordinary’ citizens to participate in the EU’s 
political processes has not materialised. Also the lack of public 
knowledge of the ECI proves that it has failed to achieve the aim of 
broadening civic engagement with EU affairs. It is doubtful that the 
current reform can effectively alleviate this major shortcoming, which 
fundamentally challenges the purpose of the tool. 
The expectation that the ECI 
would encourage ‘ordinary’ 
citizens to participate in the 
EU’s political processes has 
not materialised. 
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17.4 Citizens’ initiatives in the member states  
The trend to introduce direct democratic tools as an antidote to the 
perceived crisis of representative democracy is a common 
phenomenon in EU member states. The examination of participatory 
instruments in 14 EU member states7 conducted in the previous EPIN 
volume reveals that experiences on the national level have hardly 
been any better than with the ECI. All but two of the 14 member states 
have introduced some form of citizens’ initiative tools, albeit with 
technical differences.  
In comparison to the ECI, four aspects are noteworthy. First, as 
with the ECI, most national citizens’ initiatives are non-binding and 
the follow-up depends on the political decisions of the relevant 
national institutions. The most common requirement to follow up a 
successful initiative is at least a debate in parliament, but not 
necessarily a full-fledged initiative or the necessity for a vote in 
parliament. These national examples are therefore in line with the 
ECI, which is equally non-binding and only requires a statement from 
the Commission. In practice, though, the European Parliament has at 
least conducted hearings of successful ECIs. 
Exceptions to this general principle of non-binding initiatives 
can be found in Slovakia or Germany on a regional level, where 
successful initiatives can lead to referendums (Bilčík, 2018; Brandes 
et al., 2018). These referendums are then also legally non-binding, but 
may have a stronger political impact. This two-stage approach of 
citizens’ initiatives leading to a referendum is, however, not 
applicable to the EU as long as there is no possibility for EU-wide 
referendums. Overall, none of the national examples have a stronger 
impact on political institutions than the ECI and remain essentially 
non-binding in nature. 
The second notable aspect concerns the thresholds for a 
successful initiative. At first sight, the ECI’s threshold of one million 
signatures from at least a quarter of the member states is a higher 
threshold than in any of the national citizens’ initiatives. In 
comparison to the overall population of the EU and the individual 
member states, however, the threshold for the ECI is smaller. For a 
                                                        
7 These are Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and the UK.  
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member state to count towards the ‘quarter of the member states’ 
threshold, the ECI regulation has assigned a threshold for each 
member state in relation to its number of MEPs. Here the contrast is 
particularly strong. For instance, for Austria to count in an ECI, 
organisers need to collect 13,500 Austrian signatures while a 
successful national citizen initiative requires 100,000 signatures 
(Schaller et al., 2018). The comparative ratio is 9,750 to 50,000 in 
Denmark, 6,000 to 10,000 in Latvia and stretches as far as 9,750 to 
350,000 in Slovakia (Sørensen, 2018; Bukovskis and Vizgunova, 2018; 
Bilčík, 2018). The only country with a higher threshold for the ECI 
than for national citizens’ initiatives is Italy, though only by a small 
margin: 54,750 to 50,000 (Poli, 2018). It can thus be concluded that the 
threshold itself for the ECI in comparison to the overall population is 
actually smaller than for most national citizens’ initiatives. This does 
not alleviate, however, the natural organisational threshold of 
coordinating a bottom-up initiative across several European 
countries and in many languages.  
The third aspect is the additional limits placed upon citizen 
initiatives. Some national examples are limited to very specific cases 
(for instance constitutional amendments in Romania, though with a 
very high threshold of 500,000) or exclude certain areas such as 
taxation or international agreements (Sebe and Vaș, 2018; Jokela and 
Iso-Markku, 2018; Lorente, 2018). In comparison, although there are 
good arguments why the ECI should be limited to the competences 
of the EU, the very strict registration practice of the Commission for 
excluding ECIs, even those with regard to clear EU competences such 
as TTIP, have hampered its legitimacy. 
The strongest commonality of all 
national citizen initiatives and the ECI is, 
however, a sober assessment of the 
practice. High expectations for citizens’ 
increased participation most often clash 
with the reality of the non-binding nature 
of the instrument and weak follow-up. In 
addition, in some countries, low thresholds have prompted political 
interest groups to use citizens’ initiatives more than average citizens, 
contributing to an increase in social and political polarisation rather 
than resolving controversial socio-political issues.  
The strongest commonality 
of all national citizen 
initiatives and the ECI is 
 a sober assessment of the 
practice. High expectations 
most often clash with weak 
follow-up. 
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Only the Finnish experience with the citizens’ initiative, 
introduced in 2012, seems to present a positive example. Although 
non-binding, the initiatives have had a constructive impact, 
activating and politicising citizens and even contributing to the 
solution of a political blockade (Jokela and Iso-Markku, 2018: 231-4). 
Italy is an interesting case in point, too, as Italians are among the most 
active ECI participants, with a significantly higher participation rate 
in ECIs than in national initiatives (Poli, 2018: 285). The evidence from 
the national level thus suggests two conclusions: firstly, that the ECI’s 
weaknesses are common to all instruments of the type; and secondly, 
that expectations of what such tools can contribute should be 
adjusted to the reality on all political levels. 
17.5 Recommendations 
Several improvements to the user-friendliness of the ECI have been 
introduced with the reform that came into force in January 2020. 
However, the most crucial question will be the new Commission’s 
take on the ECI. Since the instrument has proved to be a “toothless 
tiger” (Russack, 2018: 17), it is up to the von der Leyen Commission 
to show it is taking the instrument more seriously. Interest in the tool 
has been on the rise again (19 new initiatives in 2019, compared to 9 
in the previous year), which suggests that European citizens have not 
entirely given up on the instrument. In this spirit, Ursula von der 
Leyen has mandated a specific Commissioner, Věra Jourová (Vice-
President for Values and Transparency), with further improving the 
ECI. Every new ECI is to be discussed in the Commission College 
when registered – not only when successful – and the reasoning of 
the Commission to be explained better.  
Beyond the declaratory approach, the new Commission would 
be well advised to show more commitment in its responses to 
successful initiatives. If it continues with the reluctant approach of 
the previous Commissions, all the well-meant practical reforms will 
be of no use. The ECI topics paint a clear picture of issues that concern 
European citizens, giving the EU an opportunity to show that the 
Union is also its citizens’ project and not only a technocratic one. 
While it is a valid argument that average citizens are hardly the best 
judges of extremely complex EU matters, their expressed concerns 
should nevertheless be taken more seriously, if the EU does not want 
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the negative experiences with the ECI to backfire and decrease 
citizens’ trust in the EU.  
Secondly, the comparison with citizens’ initiatives at the 
member state level reveals that the most important challenge for the 
ECI is not in the technicalities of registration. On the contrary, apart 
from the natural obstacles in transnational politics (language barrier, 
higher organisational requirements, and geographical distance) the 
ECI has neither a comparably higher threshold nor much stronger 
restrictions than its national counterparts. Experience points to the 
necessity of balancing expectations with the potential political impact 
of citizens’ initiatives and the need for the addressed institutions to 
engage in public discussions on the merits of the proposals rather 
than burying them in a technical follow-up process.  
Finally, the von der Leyen Commission has announced the 
establishment of a “Conference on the Future of Europe”, to be set up 
in early 2020. The first task of this new conference is to discuss how 
to improve the democratic functioning of the EU, with particular 
focus on the election of the EU’s leadership and transnational lists 
after the difficult process that followed the 2019 European elections 
(see relevant articles in this volume). This discussion should be 
extended to the whole spectrum of democratic legitimacy, including 
an honest assessment of the use of direct democracy on the European 
level. The experience with the ECI and the comparison with the 
national level suggest that such tools can only ever be 
complementary. But if established, they should be taken seriously 
and properly integrated into the policymaking process instead of 
remaining a mere gesture. 
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 MODERN PETITIONS  
FOR MODERN EUROPEAN 
DEMOCRACIES 
ELIZABETE VIZGUNOVA 
Petitions are instruments that strengthen democracy, narrowing the distance 
between the popular and the political. Whereas petitions historically have not 
been the most effective tool to push for policy change, they promote transparency, 
ensure greater information flows and can impact the agenda of legislators, 
executives or other addressees. In addition, petitions improve the system of 
governmental checks and balances. In EU member states nowadays, a 
particularly important role is played by official e-petitions, that have the 
potential of further narrowing the democratic deficit, especially among 
marginalised groups with limited access to political power. This chapter reviews 
two examples of petition systems – one in Scotland, and the other in Latvia – 
and points to differences between a state-owned model and a model run by a non-
governmental organisation, as well as suggesting the possible impact of petition 
systems on policymaking.1 
18.1 Introduction 
Petitions are agenda-setting tools and hence a form of participatory 
democratic process, which enables the organisation of the public in 
an action with potential political consequences. At the very least, the 
objective of petition systems is to achieve a reaction from the 
institution addressed; even if a negative one. This means, unlike 
referendums in many countries, petitions are a non-binding form of 
                                                        
1 The author would like to thank Dr. Karlis Bukovskis for his assistance in the 
preparation of this chapter. 
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participatory democracy. Petitions do not guarantee that 
governments will be held accountable for popular dissatisfaction; 
instead, the purpose of petitions is often to generate discussion in the 
broader society and attract the attention of politicians to a certain 
problem. Böhle and Riehm (2013) even compare their effectiveness to 
public opinion polling and public hearings, in that they are also an 
attempt to offer people a chance to make their voices heard. 
Petitions share similar characteristics: they are bottom-up; they 
do not need to meet various thresholds and criteria and they are free 
of cost; they often address ‘intermediary’ institutions that stand 
between the person submitting the petition and the body addressed 
in the petition. Importantly, bodies such as the parliamentary petition 
committee often lack the actual power of sanctioning, repealing or 
imposition, and therefore rely only on convincing arguments and 
reputation in their work (Linder and Riehm, 2011: 3). 
Petitions strengthen democracy, narrowing the distance 
between the popular and the political in EU member states. Petitions 
are not always considered to be the shortest 
path to decision-making and policy change, 
but they are often more transparent and 
more broadly engaging than other 
democratic processes. The emergence and 
use of modern information technologies is 
serving as one of the most important 
instruments towards the transformation of petition systems. Various 
online forums discuss the petitions, provide information to the public 
and have the potential to reduce the democratic deficit and integrate 
marginalised or passive societal groups in the policymaking process. 
In times of growing complexity of policymaking, petitions are 
a necessary and useful instrument for greater participation of 
citizens. Whereas petitions are most often non-binding policy 
instruments, their most valuable contribution is providing a channel 
of upwards communication, which 
significantly increases the ability of the 
public to address specific concerns relating 
to any public institution, without 
intermediaries in the form of political 
parties and politicians. Properly set-up 
petition systems are a cornerstone of the 
Petitions strengthen 
democracy, narrowing 
the distance between the 
popular and the political 
in EU member states. 
Properly set-up petition 
systems are a cornerstone 
of the democratic process 
and especially of direct 
democratic participation 
in the future. 
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democratic process and especially of direct democratic participation 
in the future. Should European democracies seek to be modern they 
need to embrace new technological solutions for direct democracy.  
Continuing the previous research in the series (Russack, 2018), 
this chapter addresses modern petitions in the context of digital 
technologies and as part of the parliamentary systems. It then looks 
at two distinct examples of government-owned and non-
governmental petitioning systems in Scotland and Latvia 
respectively in view of the future of direct democracy. The Scottish 
government-owned system, dating back to 1999, is selected as a 
contrast to the Latvian version, which was launched and developed 
by a non-governmental organisation and is also becoming part of 
Latvia’s public diplomacy abroad (Melkis, 2020). The chapter closes 
with conceptual recommendations regarding the future of petition 
systems in modern European democracies.  
18.2 The age of digitalisation and petitions 
As a result of the development of internet and communications 
technologies, the introduction of e-petitions has radically changed the 
dynamics of petitions. In broad terms, according to Linder and Riehm 
(2011: 3-4) e-petitions can be classified as follows: petitions submitted 
via e-mail or web interface; public e-petitions where the text of the 
petition is published online; and public e-petitions, with additional 
elements (e.g. submitting a signature). Nowadays, online petitioning 
tools are considered not only pioneering new ways of petitioning, but 
also as enabling petitioners to freely access all levels of government 
(and even businesses and corporations). As a result, new, loosely 
affiliated groups with traits of collective identity are rallying around 
certain online petitions, creating a dynamic which has sometimes 
been termed “Protest 2.0” (Dumas and LaManna, 2015: 2-3). 
Various web-based solutions have created a new toolkit 
attracting more attention to the petition and making parliaments 
switch to more transparent practices (Linder and Riehm, 2011: 3). The 
best-known examples of this are 
avaaz.org (55 million users 
worldwide) or change.org (337 million 
users worldwide and growing). Such 
transnational advocacy groups are 
Transnational advocacy 
groups are now at the 
forefront of contesting global 
political choices and 
suggesting alternative routes. 
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now at the forefront of contesting global political choices and 
suggesting alternative routes, for instance appeals to US and EU 
member state governments for suspension of arms exports to Turkey 
due to latter’s invasion of Syrian territory (Avaaz.com, 2019). Often, 
these loosely linked networks are referred to as a “world society”, 
developing global social norms (Strange, 2011: 1236).  
The groups behind global petitions are often characterised by a 
set narrative shared among the supporters of the petition; by 
consisting of small, numerous and interlinked groups across borders; 
and the fact that their survival is only ensured by the online 
environment (Strange, 2011: 1236). Yet, a distinction must be made: 
global petition platforms are not bound by national law as opposed 
to nationally-based platforms run by either parliaments or 
governments, or alternatively the non-governmental sector. The e-
petitioning systems tied to established governments serve an entirely 
different purpose: they are created to enhance communication 
between the public and the state, without interference from ‘third’ 
forces (mass media, political parties or corporations) (Dumas and 
LaManna, 2015: 3). 
Petitions are a tool to address the ‘democratic deficit’ that exists 
between the people and the government (e.g. as in Scotland, 
replacing the ‘Westminster model’ and introducing a new model of 
downward accountability in 1999) (Cavanagh, 2000: 67). The Scottish 
e-petition system was the first one to be introduced in Europe; 
following its example, the Deutscher 
Bundestag put in place their e-petitioning 
system (Linder and Riehm, 2011: 2). The 
rationale behind the modernisation of 
participation tools is the inherent 
unfairness of representative democracy: 
studies often argue that democratic participation is dependent on 
factors such as education, socio-economic status, and even physical 
distance from the political centres of the country (Lee, Chen, Huang, 
2014: 34). 
Thus, solutions like e-petitioning are seen as reducing the costs 
of participation and engaging passive parts of societies. Some authors 
even argue that “Fully fledged systems of e-democracy have the 
potential to reduce the problem of unequal political influence, 
thereby reducing the problem of unequal participation and making 
The rationale behind  
the modernisation of 
participation tools is the 
inherent unfairness of 
representative democracy. 
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democratic politics more representative and equitable” (Lee, Chen, 
Huang, 2014: 34). On the other hand, scholars are not united in this 
optimistic view of internet and communications technologies: e.g. a 
survey in Germany of 2007 showed that those most keen on 
participating in e-democracy were already highly active and had a 
long-standing presence online.  
Users of e-petition systems are younger, mostly male and with 
higher education than ‘traditional’ petitioners. Thus, there is some 
indication that e-petitions do not serve as a democratisation tool, but 
rather as another way of exacerbating already-existing differences in 
societies. Thus, e-petitions seem to amplify existing inequalities in 
participation patterns (Linder and Riehm, 2011: 2). Petitions are 
considered to have a significant agenda-setting influence on 
policymakers, especially on moving away from traditional forms of 
political participation such as demonstrations, boycotting and 
replacing them with online solutions (Durso and Jenkins, 2018: 207). 
18.3 Parliamentary petitioning in EU countries  
The right to petition in the EU is usually ensured by constitutions, in 
addition to specific laws that regulate the right to petition. The other 
important characteristic is that the petitioner has official legal 
protection from prosecution as a result of petitioning. Overall, the 
political systems of the EU member states allow direct access to all 
levels of state administration, including heads of state, ministries and 
parliaments. However, there are often special ‘intermediary’ 
institutions (such as parliamentary petition committees) put in place 
in order to manage the flow of petitions and ensure their efficiency. 
It is interesting to note that it is also is a commonality across EU 
member states that the right to petition parliament is foreseen 
(Dumas and LaManna, 2015: 4). 
All petitioning systems also share a certain number of steps 
that need to be completed for the petition to proceed through the 
process. Whereas the characteristics of each stage vary from country 
to country, they entail: firstly, the preparatory phase, when all 
activities, related to the submission of the petition are carried out; and 
the submission phase, when, according to the means (on paper or 
online) of handing the petition in are chosen and its requirements are 
filled out (e.g. personal information submitted). These two phases are 
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up to the petitioner. The following phases are, on the other hand, 
dependent on the receiving end: the consideration of the petition by 
checking the content and the requested annexed information; the 
termination phase, when the responsible body formulates a decision 
that is communicated to the petitioner and the broader public; the 
implementation phase and, finally, the follow-up phase where some 
control is given back to the petitioner (Böhle and Riehm, 2013). Böhle 
and Riehm (2013) also set out the qualifying factors for 
responsiveness that need to be ensured: a website of the 
parliamentary petitions system; submission of petitions via e-mail or 
an online submission form; publication of the petition on the web, 
plus consistent communication on the decision on the petition and 
other information; interaction between the petitioner and the petition 
body, in particular, implying the ability to acquire information on the 
status of the petition’s review or add information throughout the 
reviewing process; eventually, the involvement of the public, related 
to signing the petition and discussion of the petition in various, often 
state-mediated forums.  
18.4 The ascent of e-petitioning? 
Petition systems differ across EU member states. National 
governments have pursued different routes towards enabling e-
petitions. For instance, the Netherlands, Estonia, Finland have 
separate online portals that enable citizens to hand in petitions and 
are run by the national governments or outsourced to the non-
governmental sector. Latvia’s case on the other hand is different and 
provides a unique example where an online tool “manabalss.lv” is 
developed, run and fully ‘owned’ by a non-governmental institution. 
Both these governmental and non-governmental approaches provide 
a basis for conceiving the future of e-petitioning systems. 
In spite of Scotland not being part of the European Union after 
Brexit, its more than two decades of experience with managing and 
aggregating online petitions is an important source of information. 
The Scottish government-owned model can be easily contrasted with 
the Latvian approach. In the first case the use of emerging online 
technologies became a twofold attempt to both engage wider 
audiences in democratic process and gather additional ideas and 
articulations of interest from within the society. Hence, this system 
became the flagship for government-owned online petitions. The 
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Latvian case differs as it was the national parliament that embraced a 
system originally developed by non-governmental actors. 
Amendments to the Constitution (Satversme) facilitated the 
opportunity for an alternative and the alternative came from a private 
initiative. 
Therefore, Scotland is known as a pioneer of government-
owned e-petition systems where a particularly interesting trait – the 
gathering of oral evidence – is introduced to the system, offering an 
additional route for the petitioners to become involved. In Latvia, on 
the other hand, a non-governmental initiative, manabalss.lv, filled in 
the vacuum as a petitioning system did not exist before and has 
become a major (if not the main) tool of upwards political 
communication and public participation in political processes and 
decision-shaping. Both cases make it possible to draw broader 
conclusions on the potential impact of e-petitions and make 
recommendations for the future. The two different approaches each 
offer possibilities. 
The Petition System in Scotland 
The Scottish system is government-owned and curiously, is primarily 
concerned with issues like agriculture, forestry and fishing; education 
and training; environment; Gaelic; health; housing; law and home 
affairs; local government; natural and built heritage; planning; police 
and fire services; social work; sport and the arts; statistics and public 
records; tourism and economic development; transport (Scottish 
Parliament, 2020). For reserved matters, the petitions can turn to the 
UK Government’s petition system (e.g. foreign policy, defence and 
national security, employment legislation and social security).  
The Scottish Parliament has a Public Petitions Commission 
dealing with the admissibility of petitions. The tasks of the 
Commission include discussion on new petitions and decisions on 
the desirable direction each petition should take. Importantly, the 
Commission also has workers devoted to helping and guiding 
petitioners in the process of drafting and submitting a petition 
(Cotton, 2011: 34). The Scottish Public Petitions Committee may also 
call the submitter of the initiative to provide oral evidence (Linder 
and Riehm, 2011: 4).  
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Petitions can be submitted through the online “e-petitioner” 
system or a template. Importantly, Scotland has presented a blueprint 
for the rest of the world as it was the first country in the world to 
launch its “e-petitioner” in 1999. The platform enables petitioners to 
add a petition personally or support one as a signatory; to discuss 
petitions in a specially designated forum and add background 
information to petitions (Cotton, 2011: 34). The “e-petitioner” is now 
used to collect signatures for petitions in almost 100% of petition 
cases; and some 90% of the petitions are submitted to the Scottish 
Parliament via e-mail (Cotton, [2011], 21). Petitions can also be posted 
to the parliament free of charge by handing them in at the post-office. 
However, electronic submissions are encouraged. 
The petitioning process in Scotland is characterised by 
“intensive efforts to involve petitioners in the petition process and the 
make all of its stages transparent” (Cotton, 2011: 20). For instance, the 
“e-petitioner” accepts petitions in any language, including Braille. 
Furthermore, no limitations – neither a quorum, nor a “member of 
parliament filter” – are applied. The petition system is transparent 
and public, as the citizens can follow the Committee meetings online. 
Furthermore, all background information – including 
documentation, minutes of the Committee meetings, details of the 
petitioner etc. – can be accessed online (Scottish Parliament, 2020). 
This has, clearly, played out in the parliament’s favour, as a 
large percentage of petitioners (90%) “seem to believe that their 
petitions will be handled fairly” (Carman, 2007). Surveys also show 
that the public sees the Scottish petition system as easy to understand 
(58.82%) and that the petition system is doing a good job overall of 
keeping the public informed on the 
process (64%) (Carman, 2007). This is also 
why the public largely believes that the 
petition system is a useful tool to develop 
a closer link between the public and the 
parliament and are satisfied with the 
outcome of the petitioning system (55% in 
both cases) (Cotton, 2011: 34). A closer analysis of the Scottish e-
petition system also seems to support this perception, as 84.9% of all 
petitions submitted “were reviewed by government committees, 
bodies, or outside organisations, and entered the political 
discussions.” (Cotton, 2011: 38). Additionally, data indicates that 
The public largely believes 
that the petition system is 
a useful tool to develop a 
closer link between the 
public and the parliament. 
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55.3% of the e-petitions submitted through the “e-petitioner”, are 
submitted by individuals, indicating that the tool is easy to use for 
people non-affiliated to interest groups. The efficiency of this system 
in engaging the public is evident, while the actual outcomes of the 
petitions vary and should be investigated separately.  
The petition system in Latvia 
The Latvian Parliament amended its Rules of Procedure on 19 
January 2012 to make the provision that a collective submission can 
be submitted by no less than 10,000 people that have reached the age 
of 16 on the day of the submission. The collection of signatures can be 
done both online and on paper, taking into consideration that the 
protection of personal data must be ensured. If the collective 
signature has been submitted electronically, it is necessary to submit 
technical information (that testifies the number of signatures to the 
collective submission and allows for verification of each name, last 
name and personal code) (Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2019). 
After receiving a collective submission (complete list is 
available on manabalss.lv), the Saeima Praesidium evaluates, in no 
longer than 10 days, the compliance of the submission with the Rules 
of Procedure and decides if it can be submitted to the Mandate, Ethics 
and Submissions’ Commission. This Commission evaluates the 
submission for a period no longer than one month. The Commission 
is also entitled to invite the person responsible for the representation 
of the petition, as well as deputies from other parliamentary 
commissions and representatives of the institutions concerned by the 
submission. The person responsible for the collective submission is 
entitled to supply evidence for the legitimacy of the collective 
submission and participate in the discussions (Deputati uz Delnas, 
2012). 
Finally, the Commission prepares a report detailing the 
number of signatories, the ‘essence’ of the submission and the 
desirable direction the submission should take (e.g. the creation of a 
special parliamentary committee in order to prepare a draft law, to 
pass the submission to a different institution, to close it, etc.) (Latvijas 
Republikas Saeima, 2019). Importantly, the Saeima provides 
information on the process of the submission via phone or e-mail, as 
well as personally at its information centre (the Mandate, Ethics and 
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Submissions committee’s homepage also provides an overview of the 
process and direction of each petition; the portal manabalss.lv also 
tries to provide information on its homepage under each submitted 
petition). 
Paper-based petition submissions are now rare and considered 
as ‘dying out’. On the contrary, the online petition system in Latvia is 
popular as a means of public participation: it has 227,427 verified 
users (Melkis, 2020). Manabalss.lv (“My vote/voice”), run by a non-
governmental organisation (which is exceptional in the EU), claims 
that their success (which is not a widespread phenomenon in the 
success of online petitioning tools) is accounted for by the following 
factors: an early recognition by the President of Latvia of the 
usefulness of a collective initiative tool as a fundamental right of 
citizens; and the contextual conditions – the global financial crisis and 
mass emigration from Latvia created a situation where there were 
record-low levels of trust in the government and parliament.  
Furthermore, consistent and targeted lobbying activities were 
carried out at the Saeima in order to introduce the collective 
submission as a means of democratic participation. Manabalss.lv also 
consistently tries to support the petitioners, providing information 
and consultations on the process, wording and potential of 
petitioning. Largely, manabalss.lv filled in a vacuum where the 
government had not stepped in and the New York Times even argued 
that this could be an example for the rest of Europe (McGrane, 2013). 
According to its estimates, at least 67% of the initiatives submitted 
through the portal have had an effect on the law-making process in 
the Saeima with significant elements of original proposals being 
implemented in national legislation (Melkis, 2020). 
18.5 What impact can petitions have? 
The first observation to be made is that petition systems are, overall, 
not the best tools to achieve real changes in policymaking. Assessing 
the success of petitions is difficult, because most petitions finish up 
not making it through the high benchmark of quality-control 
established by the petitioning systems (e.g. manabalss.lv argues that 
only roughly 40% of all petitions submitted have the opportunity to 
be published online, in order to enter the public narrative space at all) 
or are closed for various reasons. However, the ‘success’ of petitions 
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can be seen in not only raising an issue in the public space, but also 
putting it on the agenda of the addressee. 
In fact, evidence suggests that the ‘chicken 
and egg’ problem is commonplace 
(Carman, 2007). According to Melkis 
(2020), some political parties picked up 
issues addressed in collective submissions 
even if they had not gathered the 
necessary threshold of 10,000 signatures. This means that measuring 
how many petitions have been ‘successful’ is overall a bad measure to 
assess the usefulness of a system. The downside is that, apart from 
the progressively developing systems of e-petitioning that allow 
access to information and discussion on the status of the files, 
decision-making is likely to take place without the participation of 
the petitioner.  
Regardless of these limitations, petitions can be influential. 
Particularly large signature campaigns can effectively mobilise 
supporters and many NGOs and interest groups strategically initiate 
large signature drives as a part of their issue-based campaigns in 
order to drum up supporters and capture media attention. However, 
it is undeniable that petitions can serve as a link between the public 
and their representatives. On another level, petitions certainly have a 
positive effect on societal organisation and mobilisation. Petition 
platforms are a space for participation where a group of supporters 
of a certain cause can develop similar narratives, form ideas and even 
‘language’ that helps to signal important directions of societal 
change. This also means that individuals/groups can become more 
integrated in the political system, providing an instrument that 
creates pathways for constructive input into policymaking. 
Recommendations 
The key practical characteristics of a responsive, modern petition 
system should be the following (Riehm, Böhle and Linder, 2014, 195):  
 petitions can be submitted through written and electronic 
channels;  
 petitioners get paid or free legal support as well as expert 
backing when formulating the petition;  
The ‘success’ of petitions 
can be seen in not only 
raising an issue in the 
public space, but also 
putting it on the agenda. 
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 petitioners can in real time obtain information about the state 
of processing of the petition during the procedure;  
 there are opportunities for petitioners to become actively 
involved in the consideration of their petitions;  
 the petition body actively informs petitions about the petition 
system;  
 the parliament’s petition system has its own website offering 
various features.  
These are requirements that are clearly more efficiently met by 
providing and encouraging electronic forms of petitioning.  
Promote an inclusive petitioning system. The ‘new’ tools of 
participation are largely accessible to the younger generations that 
are information and technology savvy, leaving the older generations 
in an information vacuum. For example, statistical reviews of the 
Scottish petitioning system indicate that “petitioners seem to come 
disproportionately from the middle class” and that “petitioners also 
seem to be, on the average, better educated than the average member 
of society”, as well as that “petitioners are clearly much more 
participatory and engaged than are general members of the public” 
(Carman). Similar issues concern other marginalised groups that find 
it difficult to participate in petitions (e.g. people with limited 
eyesight). A potential solution in this case is the introduction of the 
system of ‘contact points’, where those with limited online 
skills/access can exercise their right to petition. The Scottish “e-
petitioner” system is also available in Braille.  
Ensure support from visible figures and conventional/social media 
presence. The Manabalss.lv experience show that success stems from 
endorsement by various stakeholders, including politicians, officials, 
the media, the non-governmental sector, the academic sector, and 
representatives of culture and sports. As petitions are a political 
process with political goals, politicisation is unavoidable. A ‘natural 
selection’ would take place with petitions appealing to broader and 
more diverse audiences gaining the most support. By showcasing 
successful petitions, better results can be reached. Statistics are an 
important part in this process, as they make it possible to compare 
how some initiatives have been more successful than others, helping 
the design of strategies to achieve better results. Again, all of these 
are achievable if the system is electronic and hence automated and 
instantly accessible.  
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The host or administrator of the petition system (governmental or 
non-governmental) should provide full information on each petition 
not only to the petitioners themselves, but also the general public and 
the decision-makers (parliaments, governments, Ombudsman, etc.). 
This is crucial as it instils an understanding of the importance of 
petition systems in order to correct both input and output problems 
that impact people’s quality of life. The process should be transparent 
and indiscriminately accessible to all people residing in the country 
even if special assistance should be provided to parts of the 
population. Electronic access via mobile applications and internet 
sites should be broadly provided. 
The non-governmental sector can provide an effective gateway to 
increase the effectiveness of the petition system. Manabalss.lv is an 
example of a non-profit organisation that survives solely on 
donations. Therefore, as opposed to, for instance, state-owned 
organisations with a stable budget, the drive for this sort of 
organisation to effectively engage in policymaking process as a 
‘policy entrepreneur’ is much higher. Public and decision-maker trust 
in the host/provider/administrator of the system is paramount. 
Reputation is mainly the responsibility of the e-petition provider, but 
it should also be widely respected as part of modern democratic 
decision-making process.  
Finally, installing systems that are based on modern smart phones is 
essential. Fingerprint and face recognition technology, and internet 
banking tools are already popular ways of authorising online 
transactions and other activities. With this technology becoming the 
norm in every individual’s life, a well built and administered system 
would allow immediate direct democratic participation on an 
increasing number of issues. Not only would voting for political 
parties become usual, but decision-making in the form of submitting 
and expressing support for petitions could become a reality. Modern 
democracies require modern solutions and a comprehensively built 
e-petitioning system with the ability to cast votes could lead to online-
based referendums, the most extreme form of direct democracy. 
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 EUROPE’S DELIBERATIVE 
INSTRUMENTS: 
HAS THE EU DELIVERED? 
WOJCIECH BIAŁOŻYT AND  
ROMAIN LE QUINIOU 
The European Union has implemented three instruments to enhance the 
participatory character of its actions by engaging European citizens in the 
process of elaboration of EU policies. This chapter’s first section reviews these 
tools: on one side is the implementation of Citizens’ Dialogues as well as public 
consultations on specific legal and policy developments by the European 
Commission, and on the other are the European Citizens’ Consultations 
implemented by EU member states. Even if different in terms of processing and 
formats, these two tools share common objectives such as reenergising the link 
between citizens and politicians and developing mutual understanding. The 
following section provides an assessment of these instruments made by 
policymakers, researchers and European citizens, reviewing their ability to 
facilitate the empowerment of citizens’ voices in EU policymaking. Finally, a 
series of recommendations, at both strategic and operational levels, suggest ways 
of rising to the major challenge of designing a feasible EU participatory model.  
19.1 Introduction: A crisis of representativeness 
Most European Union member states have witnessed a considerable 
rise in populist and illiberal political movements over the last decade. 
In a few countries, they have gained power by attacking basic 
principles of liberal democracy such as an independent judiciary and 
media. However, the crisis of democratic legitimacy also affects the 
EU itself, reaching a particular peak as a result of economic and 
financial downturns. Whether at the national or EU level, this 
democratic crisis seems to be first and foremost a crisis of 
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representativeness (Tormey, 2015: 15). In addition to a broken link 
with their representatives, many citizens have lost confidence in 
politicians’ ability to manage current challenges, a prominent 
example being the refugee crisis. 
Democratic governments are then 
challenged by citizens’ opposition 
manifested through passive (abstention) 
or active (alternative voting/protests) 
means. Solutions are needed to reinvigorate democracy across 
Europe in order to rebuild societal consent around it.  
The European Union has taken into account the current 
democratic challenge by proposing a new participatory approach, 
included in the White paper on the future of Europe (European 
Commission, 2017) and later defended by President Juncker in his 
address on the State of the Union (Juncker, 2017). In another instance, 
President Macron has called for “a more democratic daily functioning 
of tomorrow’s Europe” (Macron, 2017a). However, as this declaration 
was made in the context of the upcoming European elections, one 
may wonder if it is a long-term perspective or solely a campaign 
position. Ursula von der Leyen, the newly appointed President of the 
European Commission, appears to be aligned with her predecessor 
(Butcher and Stratulat, 2019), proclaiming a “new push for European 
democracy” and the creation of a two-year Conference on the Future 
of Europe (von der Leyen, 2019). 
19.2 New tools for a democratic renewal 
Democratic renewal implicitly requires new methods to re-engage 
citizens in political debates and thereby the creation of policy 
instruments. In this regard, new democratic instruments involving 
citizens have been implemented in recent years across the EU. They 
are as follows: 
 Citizens’ Dialogues; 
 Public Consultations on specific legal and policy 
developments; 
 European Citizens’ Consultations. 
The Citizens’ Dialogues were first implemented by the European 
Commission in 2012. They became a priority under Juncker’s 
Solutions are needed to 
reinvigorate democracy across 
Europe in order to rebuild 
societal consent around it. 
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Commission, starting with an event in Riga (8 January 2015) where 
First Vice-President Timmermans, Vice-President Dombrovskis and 
Commissioner Creţu met 500 European citizens to debate several 
topics related to EU policymaking, including the stability of the 
Eurozone, energy independence and security issues. This tool is 
based on a general format which includes a dialogue between high-
ranking Commission officials – including even Commissioners – and 
ordinary citizens. Since the event in Riga, more than 1,600 events have 
been organised all around Europe, involving more than 200,000 
citizens (European Commission, 2019: 5). The European Commission 
labels these events as “public debates on EU policies” that offer the 
opportunity for European citizens to ask EU policymakers questions, 
make comments on EU policymaking that affects them or share ideas 
on the future of Europe. However, the format of these Dialogues has 
been put into question as it resembles more a ‘Question & Answer’ 
session than an authentic dialogue (Russack, 2018: 20).  
In recent years, the European Commission implemented public 
consultations on specific legal and policy developments within the 
EU. This tool offers the opportunity for citizens to provide online 
feedback on EU policymaking which directly impacts their daily 
lives. The citizens can express their views directly to the European 
Commission regarding the scope, priorities and added value of EU 
policies. Each public consultation on specific legal and policy 
development is open for several weeks (around three months) and 
covers specific areas of EU policymaking (e.g. industry, environment, 
social affairs). This tool is particularly interesting for stakeholders as 
they can offer precise feedback on the real impact of EU policymaking 
on their activity and thus provide some useful and technical 
recommendations to the EU.   
Following Emmanuel Macron’s speech at La Sorbonne, 
member states implemented European Citizens’ Consultations in order 
to “identify priorities, concerns and ideas for the future of Europe” 
(Macron, 2017b). This initiative then became a “pan-European 
process of citizens’ consultations” (Council of the EU, 2018a: 1) 
following the signing of the Joint Framework on citizens’ 
consultations by all EU member states in March 2018. Around 1,700 
European Citizens’ Consultations took place across Europe, 
generating in-depth discussions on a diverse range of EU-related 
issues (from general to specific ones). Contrary to Citizens’ 
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Dialogues, these consultations were organised by member states 
(national governments sometimes in partnership with local actors 
and civil society organisations) and not by the European Commission 
(Butcher and Pronckutė, 2019: 81). As a consequence, if member states 
agreed on limited “common principles” – including inclusiveness, 
political pluralism, openness or transparency – (Council of the EU, 
2018: 1), the format and content of these events would generally be 
very similar from one state to another (Butcher and Stratulat, 2018: 
40). To complement these member state activities, the European 
Commission simultaneously launched Online Citizens’ 
Consultations through a questionnaire (available in all EU languages) 
based on twelve questions designed by a Citizens’ panel 
(Zacharzewski, 2019: 19-22). As such, any follow-up actions taking 
into account citizen’s perceptions and recommendations will depend 
on political will in member states.  
While the Citizens’ Dialogues and the Citizens’ Consultations 
have been based on different methodologies and ways of functioning, 
they have been centred around common objectives. First, both 
instruments aim to reinvigorate the relation between citizens and 
politicians, both at the EU and national levels (Butcher and Stratulat, 
2019b: 4). There is undeniably a necessity to re-engage dialogue 
between those two sides in order to (re)-establish a climate of trust 
and confidence. This leads us to the 
second main objective of these 
instruments: the development of mutual 
understanding between citizens and 
decision-makers. For citizens, there is the 
necessity to increase their understanding 
of the functioning of the EU and its 
institutions (Macron, 2017a). For EU 
officials and politicians, there is the idea of developing an innovative 
approach to EU policymaking to better acknowledge citizens’ 
opinions and ideas about EU developments and the future of Europe. 
As such, an improved approach to Citizens’ Dialogues and 
Consultations to EU institutions and EU member states is needed in 
order to take citizens’ views into account and transform them into EU 
policymaking. European citizens would in this case feel that their 
voice is being heard (Lambertz and Jahier, 2018: 2).  
An improved approach to 
Citizens’ Dialogues and 
Consultations is needed in 
order to take citizens’ views 
into account and transform 
them into EU policymaking. 
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19.3 Assessment of the implementation: mixed 
reactions and identification of major issues 
Branded as central elements of democratic renewal by many 
European politicians, these new tools have received considerable 
support through extensive communication efforts by the 
Commission and member states. Since late 2018, several reports (both 
official and non-official) have drawn preliminary conclusions 
outlining the outcomes of these instruments. This has enabled an 
analysis of perceptions of them among politicians, citizens and 
researchers with reactions ranging from the enthusiastic to the 
cautious. More generally, a vast majority of people have recognised 
the necessity of implementing such tools while also emphasising their 
desired improvements. Assessment of the implementation of these 
tools is distinguished in this section as follows:  
 Official reports (from EU institutions and officials and member 
states); 
 Citizens’ evaluation based on Bertelsmann Stiftung’s report; 
 Civil society experts’ perspectives; 
 Our assessment of geographical diversity and inclusiveness 
based on official reports. 
In December 2018, the European Commission published a 
report on Citizens’ Dialogues and Online Citizens’ Consultations 
(European Commission, 2018). It includes statistical data 
demonstrating the smooth running of these initiatives in terms of 
high involvement of citizens (direct and 
indirect) and extended geographical 
coverage. As an official document, the 
tone used in this report remains neutral. 
On the contrary, some member states 
(Cyprus, Luxemburg and the 
Netherlands) were more enthusiastic 
when assessing their contributions to the European Citizens’ 
Consultations.  
  
Neither the Citizens’ 
Dialogues nor the European 
Citizens’ Consultations 
include a standardised 
feedback system. 
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Regarding citizens, the analysis of their views concerning these 
tools is much more complicated. Neither the Citizens’ Dialogues nor 
the European Citizens’ Consultations include a standardised 
feedback system. Such a mechanism would be useful to evaluate 
these instruments more accurately in order to identify possible 
improvements for future sessions. Apart from the European 
Commission report on Citizens’ Dialogues (European Commission, 
2018), which lists citizens’ main priorities (“A dynamic economy”, “A 
Europe that protects”, “Addressing migration”, “Fighting climate 
change, protecting the environment”, “A stronger Europe in the 
world”, “A Europe of values” and “A perspective for the younger 
generation”) no detailed official data on citizens’ experience with 
these instruments are available.  
 
Figure 19.1 How do you rate this Citizens’ Dialogue? 
 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (2019). 
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However, some civil society organisations touched upon the 
issue of citizens’ feedback. One initiative to mention was led by 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, which evaluated the EU Citizens’ Dialogue 
event in The Hague (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019) obtaining its 
assessment from 117 citizens. The majority of the participants were 
very satisfied (63%) or satisfied (35%) with the event (none of the 
participants considered the event as poor or bad), while their initial 
expectations were totally (76%) or partly (20%) fulfilled. The citizens’ 
key expectations were a debate with other citizens and dialogue with 
EU politicians about EU issues with a clear desire for their opinions to 
be taken into consideration (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019).  
 
Figure 19.2 Did this Citizens’ Dialogue fulfil your expectations? 
 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (2019). 
 
However, views were more balanced when it came to the 
evaluation of politicians’ participation in the debates, which was 
found poor or bad by 15% of participants (with 39% very satisfied) 
and on their willingness to listen to citizens’ opinions (12% of them 
considered it as poor and bad while only 41% were very satisfied) 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018: 14).  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
All expectations were 
fulfilled
Some expectations were 
fulfilled
Expectations were not 
fulfilled
320  EUROPE’S DELIBERATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
 
Figure 19.3 How do you rate the participation of the politicians in the 
discussions rounds during this Citizens’ Dialogue? 
 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (2019). 
 
Figure 19.4 How do you rate the politicians' willingness to listen to the 
citizens during this Citizens’ Dialogue? 
 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung (2019). 
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With regards to independent experts, their evaluation of new 
democratic initiatives seems more cautious. Above all, they share 
considerable scepticism towards the capacity of these instruments to 
increase citizens’ influence on EU policymaking (Russack, 2018: 20; 
Butcher and Stratulat, 2018: 42) and advise an “ambitious follow-up 
strategy” from politicians (European Movement International, 2019). 
Another concern raised by experts is about the inclusiveness of such 
events, with fears that “few ordinary citizens” attend these events 
(Russack, 2018: 20). Consequently, some experts have wondered if a 
deliberate selection of participants would not be more effective 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019: 16). In the specific case of the European 
Citizens’ Consultations, the lack of coherence due to the diversity of 
format and content between member states has been identified and 
the necessity for the initiative to have a common identity to achieve 
better results has been flagged (Butcher and Stratulat, 2018: 40).  
Figure 19.5 European Citizens’ Consultations per member state  
 
Source: Butcher and Stratulat (2018). 
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states. Available data is much more extensive concerning Citizens’ 
Dialogues rather than European Citizens’ Consultations. Regarding 
European Citizens’ Consultations, only a few of the countries that 
participated were heavily involved in this initiative. It is no surprise 
the most active country was France – the country which initiated the 
Consultations –organising more than 1,000 events. Countries such as 
Denmark (125 events), Finland (100 events), Germany (114 events) or 
Spain (100 events) followed. On the contrary, some other countries 
such as Croatia (1 event) and the Netherlands (5 events) appeared 
reluctant. Italy emerged as the only country not to participate at all in 
the Consultations due to internal political reasons. This inconsistency 
in involvement from the member states can be explained by the non-
obligatory and the customisable nature of the initiative. 
Figure 19.6 Citizens’ Dialogues per member state 
 
Source: European Commission (2018). 
 
In the case of Citizens’ Dialogues, the distribution of events 
among member states has been far more balanced. Most of the 
countries hosted around 50 events (up to December 2018). 
Accordingly, some of them appear as overrepresented (e.g. Poland, 
France), others underrepresented (e.g. Czech Republic, the 
Netherlands). This difference can be explained by the fact that 
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Citizen’s Dialogue is a top-down instrument for which the European 
Commission is in charge of geographical balance. 
Interesting results can be obtained by comparing Citizens’ 
Dialogues activities in each of the member states while using a 
weighting coefficient (in this case population). This is to the 
advantage of small member states such as Cyprus, Estonia and Malta 
with 1 event for around 30,000 inhabitants, while larger countries 
such as Italy (1 event for 1,300,000 inhabitants) or Germany (1 event 
for 900,000) lagged behind. But this logic is sometimes challenged in 
view of the high turn-outs noted in Poland or, on the contrary, weak 
participation in the Netherlands. No information is available on how 
the European Commission might address this imbalance. 
Figure 19.7 Citizens' Dialogues per inhabitant in each member state 
 
Source: European Commission (2018). 
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which represent 73% of the events and suburban/rural ones (with 
only 27%). This imbalance is also confirmed by the distribution 
between capital and non-capital cities as more than a third of events 
take place in the former. 
Figure 19.8 Distribution of 150 Citizens’ Dialogues per type of city 
 
Source: European Commission (2018). 
Figure 19.9 Distribution of 150 Citizens’ Dialogues per type of city 
 
Source: European Commission (2018). 
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This trend runs contrary to the desired level of inclusiveness. 
By favouring urbanised over suburbanised or rural places, the 
objective of attracting all European citizens, including those who are 
not particularly aware of EU policymaking or how it operates has not 
been achieved. A prejudicial flaw in an era of Brexit or Gilets Jaunes, 
which – inter alia – have demonstrated the increasing rejection of 
mainstream politics (including enthusiasm for the EU) from the 
perspective of levels of urbanisation.   
19.4 Conclusion 
Two flagship European Union citizen-oriented initiatives: the 
Citizens’ Dialogues and the European Citizens’ Consultations mark 
an increasing trend that aims at increasing citizens involvement in 
European affairs. This coincides with the rise of participatory 
initiatives well beyond Europe that aim to respond to the crisis of 
democratic legitimacy and the new expectations of citizens that are 
often linked to the absorption of digital technologies into human life.  
These two initiatives have been triggered as a result of the 
rapidly weakening credibility and legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of 
its citizens that peaked around the multiple crises affecting the EU 
and the member states in recent years, notably those of the euro zone 
and migration. Accordingly, the spread of digitalisation requires new 
management models within which the expertise will be shared, 
instead of being restricted. It is estimated that the best response to the 
populist challenge across the EU would be offering citizens a freshly 
created space to develop different types of reactions to turn it into 
democratic transformation (Fieschi and Grabbe, 2019). 
At the EU level, these dynamics have been fuelled in particular 
by the major electoral success of Emmanuel Macron, whose pro-
European agenda brought hope for the renewal of the European 
project and for challenging populist parties and movements across 
the EU. When newly elected, the French president managed to bring 
other EU members on board with his initiative for European Citizens’ 
Consultations, but at the cost of their ultimate coherence, which was 
linked to the principle of flexibility in their implementation 
demanded by member states (Butcher and Stratulat, 2018). 
This resulted in a traditional, rigid format being used in most 
countries – a panel discussion of policymakers and experts followed 
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by a Q&A session – overlooking the possibility of using techniques to 
generate a more participative spirit. In addition, several countries 
such as Germany, Lithuania and Ireland rebranded Citizens’ 
Dialogues as European Citizens’ Consultations leading to confusion 
about the identity of both initiatives. Also, most member states 
regrettably did not engage civic society in the process (Butcher and 
Stratulat, 2019). 
The overall expert assessment of the Consultations varies 
considerably, ranging from a decisive but small step towards the 
democratisation of the EU (Butcher and Stratulat, 2019) to the failure 
of the initiative (Alemanno, 2019). 
On the other hand, the limited 
budget and short timeframe for 
preparation and implementation of 
European Citizens’ Consultations 
need to be taken into consideration 
when assessing their overall 
outcomes.  
The Consultations conducted by most member states in the 
top-down scheme brought attention to recently emerging and often 
successful participatory initiatives such as citizens’ juries and 
citizens’ assemblies being set up across the EU member states and 
beyond. These initiatives have been improving in recent years in 
particular with regards to their methodological approach (Youngs, 
2019), which has included such features as: 
● Selecting participants by random lot;  
● Bringing experts into the process; 
● Getting public authorities to commit to the deliberations’ 
results.  
With the success of deliberative initiatives such as the citizens 
assembly in Ireland that concluded with a nationwide referendum on 
abortion, the establishment of a permanent citizens’ assembly in 
Madrid and the introduction of the participatory system in the 
German-speaking community in Belgium (Youngs, 2019; 
Zacharzewski, 2019), the question has arisen as to whether the scaling 
up of these projects delivered with a bottom-up approach might be a 
better solution than the traditional forms of consultations between 
citizens and decision-makers and the European Citizens’ 
The limited budget and short 
timeframe for preparation and 
implementation of European 
Citizens’ Consultations need to 
be taken into consideration when 
assessing their overall outcomes. 
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Consultations in particular. On the other hand, while they develop 
quickly these local or national level bottom-up participatory 
initiatives are still in the relatively early stages of development, focus 
(with a few notable exceptions) on policy issues of local interest and 
impact and are often organised in a one-off mode (Youngs, 2019). 
Transposing these local participatory schemes to the national and EU 
levels in all member states would require a major coordination effort 
by the European institutions.  
The positive feature of the Consultations process was citizens 
demanding to be better informed about EU actions (although many 
of them were not aware of policy progress already achieved) and to 
have a greater voice in the functioning 
of the Union (Butcher and Stratulat, 
2019). Some countries – such as 
Germany and Luxembourg – have 
already drawn lessons from the 
Consultations. The latter is about to 
introduce a new EU-centred school 
curriculum in response to low levels 
of knowledge about the EU project, in particular among young 
people. The former considered that the consultation’s conclusions 
constituted a mandate for the German federal government to 
implement policy actions outlined by the citizens (Butcher and 
Stratulat, 2019). Others such as Finland, Lithuania, Slovenia and 
again Luxembourg called for the Consultations to become 
permanent. This plethora of feedback, conclusions and lessons 
learned by member states that were particularly engaged in the 
Consultations process is in contrast to the unreceptive and rigid 
positions of other countries (often those affected by illiberal policies). 
This resulted in several major deficits identified after the whole 
process was concluded: 
● Lack of common identity; 
● No coherent message; 
● Ambition deficit among member states. 
In sum, the European Citizens’ Consultations were found to 
lack credibility, meaning and durability as assessed in the major 
evaluation report drafted by the European Policy Centre and 
Democratic Society (Butcher and Stratulat, 2019).  
The positive feature of the 
Consultations process was 
citizens demanding to be better 
informed about EU actions 
and to have a greater voice in 
the functioning of the Union. 
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19.5 Recommendations and suggestions 
To make the most of the results of the European Dialogues and the 
European Citizens’ Consultations while taking into account the best 
practices of local participatory undertakings, the effort for putting 
citizens at the forefront of EU integration (Alemanno, 2019) needs to 
focus on improving both itsstrategic design and its operational 
elements. Major strategic recommendations to be implemented 
(Alemanno, 2019; Youngs, 2019; Zacharzewski, 2019; Butcher and 
Stratulat, 2019) ahead of future rounds of Consultations include: 
● Centralising all participatory channels that will involve all EU 
institutions to tackle the current lack of synchronisation. This 
could lead to the establishment of the mechanism for inter-
institutional cooperation already proposed by the European 
Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social 
Committee, two entities with a significant record in 
cooperating with the civil society.  
● Securing appropriate funding at the EU level by including the 
Consultations initiative in the Multiannual Financial 
Framework and, on the national level, by a dedicated budget 
within each member state institution leading the process in 
their respective countries. 
● Establishing a Task Force consisting of experts, academics, 
civil society and EU and member state representatives that 
would be able to improve the process and propose a 
participatory design that would best fit into the EU decision-
making process. 
Several operational improvements, focused on bringing a 
unified identity and clear messaging to citizens, can also be identified 
(Butcher and Stratulat, 2018; Zacharzewski, 2019): 
● The purpose of consulting citizens and the connection with 
the European level should be made clear while the citizens 
should be informed from the start about what the 
implementation process will look like and how the outcomes 
of the consultations will be used. 
● Engagement is needed with networks of democratic 
innovations at the local level, making use of existing models 
of citizen participation. 
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● Experts to safeguard the quality of standards and processes 
(methodology) need to be involved. 
● The transnational dimension of the consultations should be 
enhanced to secure a good balance between a common format 
and diverse national practices. 
● National discussions should include issues that currently 
feature on the EU policy agenda. 
● A public synthesis of results, which should include 
independent voices, is needed. 
● Another Citizens’ Panel should be held. 
As Youngs (2019) points out, the major challenge will be to 
design an EU participatory model by improving other forms of 
democratic accountability rather than by undermining or 
overshadowing them. At the same 
time, a direct implementation of 
citizens’ input into policies will 
undoubtedly be confronted by the 
complex and multi-layered EU 
decision-making process. The way 
these two different policy realities will 
be resolved will define the eventual success of the process of 
regaining legitimacy and enhancing the democratisation of the 
European Union. 
  
A direct implementation of 
citizens’ input into policies will 
undoubtedly be confronted by 
the complex and multi-layered 
EU decision-making process. 
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 HOW CAN TECHNOLOGY 
FACILITATE CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN THE EU? 
MIHAI SEBE, BOGDAN MUREȘAN  
AND ELIZA VAȘ 
How can new technologies facilitate citizen participation in the European Union 
and what are the main trends in this field? This chapter defines concepts such 
as digital and e-democracy and looks at some of the opportunities, but also the 
challenges associated with the use of technology for increasing civic participation 
in the EU. It finds that technology can both facilitate and hinder civic 
engagement and there is no one-size-fits-all recipe for the best use of available 
tools and instruments. The chapter concludes with a series of concrete 
recommendations for European and national authorities in order to take 
advantage of current circumstances. 
20.1 Introduction: Fashionable or facilitating? 
We are living in an age where every political or civic activity, either 
it be old or new, is undergoing some sort of rebranding through the 
use of fashionable prefixes such as ‘digital-’, ‘cyber-’ or plain ‘e-’. This 
makes it difficult to discern what is new, what has remained the same 
or even if we are dealing with a substantive change at all. What kind 
of added value do new technologies bring to the democratic toolbox?  
There has been a change in nature of the relationship between 
those that choose, voters, and those being chosen, elected politicians. 
If this relationship was generally intermediated by formal processes 
(electing representatives every four/five years, etc.) before the 
internet and digital tools became widespread, it is now also being 
intermediated by tools and can occur at any time, without prior 
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official notice. These new tools, described in the following sub-
sections, do not infringe upon the electoral nature of our 
representative democracies, but have the potential to facilitate the 
participation of citizens in European democracies. 
The impact of new technologies on citizen participation is a 
matter for debate as we look deeper into the so-called ‘fourth 
industrial revolution’. In order to see how and if new technologies 
can facilitate citizen participation in the EU, we assess the key 
elements of digital democracy and analyse the opportunities and 
challenges arising from the use of new technologies (with a focus on 
AI and blockchain). Finally, we identify possible measures to 
improve citizen participation in the EU. 
20.2 Opportunities for the use of new technologies in 
democracy 
The common understanding for e-democracy and digital 
democracy 
The dedicated literature provides a wide range of definitions for 
some key concepts of interest, but also points to some general 
common ground among scholars and international institutions. 
For instance, there is an overlap between the concept of digital 
democracy and that of e-democracy, the latter being defined as “the 
practice of democracy with the support of digital media in political 
communication and participation” (Rose et al., 2018). Also, digital 
democracy is understood “as the pursuit and the practice of 
democracy in whatever view using digital media in online and offline 
political communication” (van Dijk, 2012: 51; Rose et al., 2018). 
The ‘e-democracy’ concept refers to “the use of information and 
communication technology (ICT) in political debates and decision-
making processes, complementing or 
contrasting traditional means of 
communications, such as face-to-face 
interaction or one-way mass media” 
(Päivärinta and Øystein, 2006: 818; Rose 
et al., 2018). 
In our opinion, an important conceptual framework is 
provided by the Council of Europe’s Recommendation on electronic 
The ‘e-democracy’ concept 
refers to the use of ICT in 
political debates and 
decision-making. 
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democracy, which encourages member states to: “consider and 
implement e-democracy as the support and enhancement of 
democracy, democratic institutions and democratic processes by 
means of ICT, and linked to the engagement and re-engagement of 
citizens in democracy” (Council of Europe, 2009). 
In the EU context, another important landmark was the 
eGovernment Action Plan 2016-2020: accelerating the digital 
transformation of government (Council 
of the European Union, 2016), which 
stressed the need for the digital 
transformation of governments as a 
means to empower citizens. This was 
later supplemented by the Tallinn 
Declaration of 2017, which marked a 
renewed commitment by 32 EU and 
EFTA countries to modernise their 
public administration and deliver cross-border eServices, 
eProcurement and electronic identification (eID). One of its core user-
centricity principles is the support of citizen engagement in public life 
(European Commission, 2017). 
Further, the 2018 report commissioned by the European 
Parliament on the prospects of e-democracy in Europe (European 
Parliament, 2018) analyses various types of e-participation such as e-
deliberative designs, e-consultations, e-initiatives or e-petitions. By 
referring to both national and European examples, the report 
highlights the fact that the supranational structure of the EU entails 
particular challenges when using e-democracy tools: large scale, 
language diversity, and transnationality. One example in this case is 
that of the European Citizens’ Initiative, the first transnational 
instrument of participatory democracy, which often proved to be a 
tool mostly for civil society organisations and less for individual 
citizen engagement, as it requires considerable organisation to 
actually set up an initiative and gather the necessary support. 
Therefore, while e-democracy aims to spread awareness about 
democratic institutions and processes and to generate civic 
participation, there are various opportunities that derive from this 
objective, as well as challenges that need to be taken into account by 
decision-makers. 
The Tallinn Declaration marked 
a renewed commitment by  
32 EU and EFTA countries to 
modernise their public 
administration and deliver 
cross-border eServices, 
eProcurement and electronic 
identification. 
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Voting and the influence of media and digital technologies 
Turnout for the European elections in 2019 exceeded most 
expectations, with more than 1 in 2 citizens going to express their 
vote. This was the highest turnout in the last 20 years and, even more 
noteworthy, the rise was due to the increase in participation among 
young voters (European Parliament, 2019). 
The European Parliament, alongside other institutions, 
launched initiatives using digital instruments to engage and attract 
more people in the discussions revolving around the elections. One 
clear example was the “This time I’m voting” digital campaign 
platform, which had a strong online outreach, but also included 
multiple offline events. In the post-electoral Eurobarometer, it was 
mentioned that almost half of the Europeans surveyed recall 
seeing/hearing messages in their home country to encourage them to 
vote. To the specific question on the European Parliament and its 
efforts to encourage people to vote, including messages on TV, on the 
internet, on posters, in newspapers or on the radio, 44% of 
respondents said they do remember seeing this type of message in 
the media or from other sources. 
Moreover, in the European elections campaign report 
(European Parliament, 2019), the impact of social networks on the 
electoral campaign was observed. The researchers collected more 
than 11,000 electoral materials produced by approximately 300 
political parties across the EU and concluded that there was a shift in 
the instruments used by political actors, with social networks 
representing the major source of news in the campaign. 
While it cannot be determined if and to what extent the digital 
outreach substantially influenced the voting behaviour of European 
citizens, it seems clear that a stronger presence of the European 
institutions in online and offline campaigns together with national 
political candidates has raised awareness of the importance of taking 
part in the democratic process of voting, with a direct impact on the 
future of the EU. 
Artificial intelligence and blockchain as political tools 
One of the most talked about new technologies these days is artificial 
intelligence (AI) which still lacks a consensual definition, but can be 
conceived as being basically about systems that, based on available 
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data, decide the best course(s) of action to achieve a given goal (AI 
HLEG, 2019). Any artificial intelligence system must have three key 
qualities: intentionality, intelligence, and adaptability (West, 2018). 
As a political tool, AI can be used for crowdsourcing in order 
to improve the representativeness of the public decision-making 
process. Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary laboratory founded at the 
Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy (University of 
Toronto, US), has developed its own NLP (Natural Language 
Processing) techniques, with the 
capacity to automatically classify 
and analyse thousands of 
contributions collected on citizen 
participation platforms. The 
algorithms identify the main topics 
and group similar ideas together 
into clusters, which it is then 
possible to break down by 
demographic trait or geographic location. The artificial intelligence is 
able to process ideas regardless of the language and works for 
multilingual platforms (Citizen Lab, 2018). 
Furthermore, AI has the potential to address and solve real life 
challenges and problems (e.g. health), and, since 2017, AI research has 
benefitted from increased political support, as a European Parliament 
report suggests. The adoption of various European strategies and 
regulations has laid a constructive path for development of AI 
technologies in the EU. However, this forward-looking political 
support has to be matched with positive results deriving from the 
implementation of AI technologies in the member states.  
At the moment, the EU is striving to become a leading actor in 
the field of AI by regulating the sector and assuring a level playing 
field for stakeholders. Compared to the US or China, the EU is the 
most advanced global player in applying ethical principles to the 
development of AI technologies to ensure that citizens’ data are not 
misused.  
Another technological development gaining traction is the 
application of blockchain technologies to voting. The reason for its 
success can be the attributed to blockchain’s security features that 
could greatly impact the way elections take place. The use of 
AI can be used for 
crowdsourcing in order to 
improve the representativeness 
of public decision-making with 
the capacity to automatically 
classify and analyse thousands 
of contributions collected on 
citizen participation platforms. 
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blockchain technologies can bring voters benefits such as: the ability 
to vote from anywhere without having to wait at a particular location 
to cast a ballot; ensuring that their vote has been effectively 
registered; the impossibility of their vote being altered and rendering 
the voting process secure (Vaghela, 2018).  
There are a series of risks that have been identified in analysis 
of whether blockchain technology could revolutionise voting, such as 
the need to comply with various European laws, including the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and accessibility for all 
potential voters (Boucher, 2016). If properly used, though, it could 
also benefit the political process as such and not just the electoral 
process as it can be incorporated in other public functions to provide 
a direct and secure interaction between the government and the 
public. Blockchain has attracted the attention of various groups, and 
coalitions have been set up in some member states to bring together 
representatives of the government, industries and the knowledge 
sector, as in the case of the Dutch Blockchain Coalition.  
Yet, these are just two of the upcoming technologies that could 
affect citizen participation, often in ways difficult to imagine at the 
present time. They will likely not act alone but most likely we shall 
witness a ‘cocktail’ of them, each reinforcing the other. 
20.3 The challenges of new technologies for 
democracy 
Be it on a national, European or international level, new media and 
social networks have become fertile environments for political 
communication, knowledge production and in some cases for civic 
participation. Consequently, disinformation has permeated these 
channels and challenged the common understanding of facts and 
truth. 
As defined by the European Commission, disinformation is a 
“verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented 
and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the 
public, and may cause public harm” (European Commission, 2018). 
Other popular terms for disinformation are ‘information 
manipulation’ or the incomplete, or even misleading term ‘fake 
news’, both usually associated with the ‘post-truth’ era or the 
trending (and vaguer) ‘hybrid war’ framework (Bârgăoanu and 
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Radu, 2018). A March 2018 Eurobarometer on fake news showed that 
85% of respondents perceive fake news as a problem in their 
respective country and 83% perceive it as a problem for democracy 
in general (Eurobarometer, 2018). 
Although not a new phenomenon per se, disinformation has 
mostly ‘benefitted’ from the sustained advances in digital technology 
and AI development. Recent years have shown that, as we become 
more interconnected in the 
borderless (and generally 
unregulated) digital realm, creating 
and propagating disinformation 
becomes cheaper and more effective 
for malign actors, and harder to spot 
and counter for targeted states and 
societies.  
This old threat in new clothes 
is usually most visible during electoral periods, with direct effects on 
our public debates, our civic participatory and deliberative processes, 
based on values, norms and rules. It tends to exploit existing societal 
vulnerabilities by creating confusion with the aim of eroding citizens’ 
trust in national authorities and, as a consequence, the overall 
resilience of states. 
2016 was marked by the fateful Brexit referendum and the 
unexpected win of the Republican Donald Trump in the US 
presidential elections. Both events have proven to be highly 
consequential for world affairs and both have been associated with 
malign online disinformation campaigns having one common 
(external) denominator – Russia.  
Nevertheless, disinformation has strong domestic roots as well, 
being resorted to without too much consideration by populist and 
nationalist politicians with a pronounced anti-European and anti-
establishment discourse (e.g., Marine Le Pen in France or Viktor 
Orbán in Hungary). By sowing distrust of the EU and painting simple 
black or white dichotomies, they demote pluralism, fuel toxic 
polarisation and extremism in their own countries and, at the same 
time, do the work of those who seek the decline of the EU’s global 
influence and promote European disintegration. In light of Russian 
interference in US and European elections, the EU has taken the lead 
As we become more 
interconnected in the borderless 
(and generally unregulated) 
digital realm, creating and 
propagating disinformation 
becomes cheaper and more 
effective for malign actors, and 
harder to spot and counter. 
340 HOW CAN TECHNOLOGY FACILITATE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE EU? 
 
in drafting and coordinating policy to counter disinformation, just as 
it did with its ambitious GDPR. 
Starting from 2015, the EU has been actively implementing 
concrete measures in order to address various disinformation 
campaigns, often deployed online and with political objectives. 
According to EUvsDisinfo, a project developed within the EEAS and 
dedicated to monitoring and covering pro-Kremlin disinformation 
targeting more than 20 countries, over 
6,500 disinformation cases have been 
debunked since 2015 (EuvsDisinfo, 2019). 
By promoting the principle of coordinated 
and concerted actions, EU institutions and 
member states have stepped up their 
efforts in countering disinformation, on 
the one side, and enhancing strategic communication, on the other 
side (EEAS, 2019). The most important document to date in this field 
is the Action Plan against Disinformation, launched in December 
2018, which provides the four pillars of a coordinated European 
response to disinformation. 
Among others, the Action Plan includes a Rapid Alert System 
and the close monitoring of the Code of Practice signed by the major 
online platforms. The Rapid Alert System was launched in March 
2019 and is set up among the EU institutions and member states to 
facilitate the sharing of insights related to disinformation campaigns 
and coordinate responses. The Code of Practice was signed by the 
online platforms Facebook, Google, Twitter, Mozilla and Microsoft, 
marking the first time worldwide that industry agrees, on a voluntary 
basis, to self-regulatory standards to fight disinformation and 
attesting the normative power of the EU in this emerging field 
(European Commission, 2018). 
Attempts to regulate the spread of online disinformation are 
still in their infancy in Europe (Germany, France, Italy) and the 
spectre of ‘deep fakes’ – highly realistic and difficult-to-detect digital 
manipulations of audio or video – is becoming more and more 
menacing (Chesney and Citron, 2019). 
Shortly after the European elections in May 2019, the 
Commission and the High Representative released a report meant to 
highlight the importance of the fight against disinformation and some 
EU institutions and 
member states have 
stepped up their efforts in 
countering disinformation 
and enhancing strategic 
communication. 
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of its concrete achievements in protecting European democracy 
(European Commission, 2019). It praised the progress already made, 
but warned that disinformation is a rapidly evolving threat and its 
tactics develop as quickly as the countermeasures adopted by states 
and online platforms, again highlighting the importance of the digital 
sphere as both a blessing and a curse for the European citizen. 
20.4 Measures to increase citizen participation in the 
EU through new technologies 
As we have seen, technology can both facilitate and hinder civic 
engagement and there is no one-size-fits-all recipe for the best use of 
available tools and instruments. There follow several measures that 
could be internalised by both European institutions and national 
authorities or private entities able to develop programmes in the field 
of citizen participation/civic engagement with the help of new 
technologies. 
Using digital tools to spread awareness about EU 
legislation and its impact on citizens 
The national/regional parliaments’ websites could feature a 
dedicated user-friendly section, where citizens could follow the 
transposing of EU legislation into national laws.  
For instance, following the adoption of each law that derives 
from European legislation, a simple infographic on the subject that 
was debated in the national/regional parliament could be uploaded, 
coupled with a brief explanation on how the outcome will improve 
the life of citizens. At the moment of writing, almost every parliament 
has a special section where the process of adopting legislation can be 
followed, but in most situations the language is very technical and 
not easily understood by citizens. 
A possible structure for the infographic, starting from the 
example of banning plastic bags could be the following: 1) What has 
been adopted at EU level (title of legislation); 2) How it was 
transposed into national legislation (e.g. law on banning certain 
plastic bags…); 3) What kind of impact is it expected to have for 
citizens. The graphic should not exceed more than an A4 page and 
should be easily downloadable and sharable. 
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Supporting citizen participation in the EU with the help of 
artificial intelligence  
An online platform on this subject (that could be named ‘European 
Civic Space’) could be a joint project developed by the Council of 
Europe and the European Commission.1  
It could start from the data on democratic citizenship already 
available to the Council of Europe and by using EU funds. The 
purpose of the platform would be to share in real time information 
related to European democracy between citizens and other entities 
(including civil society organisations) from various parts of the EU. 
In this way, civil society organisations could be connected and 
have the possibility to share information on drafts of legislation, for 
instance, that can produce a negative impact on their work. This 
could also lead to joint efforts to send feedback to the European 
institutions for improving the proposal concerned. 
As for regular citizens, it would be useful to have such a 
platform with integrated AI systems, especially for sharing 
information in their own language that could be automatically 
translated by the platform to other languages and be organised in 
different categories. 
Reducing disinformation in the EU by fostering critical 
thinking via media literacy 
The full implementation of the Action Plan against disinformation 
and the gradual development of a European fact-checking culture.  
The next Multiannual Financial Framework should include 
specific funds to counter disinformation and, in the case of 
Erasmus+/other related funds, civil society organisations should be 
encouraged to apply for funding that addresses disinformation and 
fosters media literacy. Also, positive and substantive civic 
engagement via digital media and social networks should go hand in 
hand with quality journalism and media literacy, meant to foster the 
critical thinking and emotional intelligence of the audience and 
general public. In this case, a complementary idea would be that of 
                                                        
1 It could be based on the 2007 Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Council of Europe and the European Union. https://rm.coe.int/16804e437b 
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European funding attributed to journalistic projects and reports in 
order to assure a higher degree of independence in the news sector. 
Although highly desirable, coordinating efforts between EU 
institutions, member states, journalists, researchers and civil society 
in order to increase public awareness will likely remain a challenge 
for the foreseeable future. 
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 PATTERNS AND PARTICULARITIES 
IN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY 
RICHARD YOUNGS 
The large amount of empirical research carried out under the 2CU project reveals 
much variation in democratic trends across EU member states. In some states 
democracy is facing an acute crisis, while in some places more positive reforms 
have taken shape. Notwithstanding the variation, there is something of a 
common trend towards more citizen- and community-oriented forms of 
accountability. Governments have sought both to encourage and limit such 
forms of democratic innovation. The EU level still needs to play a meaningful 
role in harnessing the myriad forms of democratic experimentation currently 
expanding across Europe. 
21.1 Introduction: Why the EU needs a one-stop shop 
for democracy 
For the last two years, the 2CU project has assessed democratic trends 
across the European Union. As this project concludes, a number of 
important issues emerge from its rich programme of on-the-ground 
research.  
The project has benefitted from the work of partner institutes 
in the majority of EU member states with strong local knowledge and 
able to undertake detailed empirical research within their own 
countries. This has helped build a picture of European democracy 
from the bottom-up and with a huge amount of extremely granular 
material.  
A striking feature of this mass of information is the sheer 
variation in political trends across Europe. Today much analysis of 
EU politics is framed in terms of a single and dramatic narrative of 
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pan-European democratic crisis. In contrast, our project suggests that 
a much messier set of developments defines changes to European 
democracy. The project’s detailed study of the many different 
dimensions of democratic change cautions against parsimony. While 
there are clearly shared challenges across member states, country 
contrasts are probably more striking than any all-encompassing 
thread of democratic evolution. 
In some states, democracy has indeed been in the thralls of 
existential crisis, and yet in others its current condition is un-dramatic 
and even modestly improved in some areas. Some EU governments 
have opened up to new forms of participation, but others have been 
reluctant to do so. In some there is stifling state control, while in 
others ungovernable pluralism seems to be the greater peril. In some, 
party systems have begun to realign, while in others mainstream 
coalitions have hunkered down in even more self-protective fashion. 
In some, parliaments have lost power and prestige, while in others 
they have taken on new functions and begun to reassert themselves 
over the executive.  
Some citizens seem to be searching for a different type of 
democracy, away from traditional representative channels; in other 
countries, dissatisfaction is with specific parties and leaders more 
than with the system as such. In some countries, the underlying 
driver of so much concern is popular antipathy towards core liberal 
values; in other states, this trend is much less palpable and the 
nativist-populist prism is of less relevance. And meanwhile at the EU 
level, while some democracy problems have deepened, promising 
new reform initiatives have also taken shape. 
A question arises from these particularities: is European 
democracy subject to what is simply a morass of contingent changes, 
some positive for democracy and others with more negative 
implications, all emerging from nationally specific circumstances and 
without much of an overall direction to them? Or are there patterns 
among the diversity of political developments – more directional 
changes that tell us something about the longer-term shape of 
European democracy? 
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21.2 Underlying patterns 
The disparity of current trends may make it impossible to trace any 
kind of grand theory of European democracy and it is certainly 
difficult to discern any obvious or single 
teleological endpoint to which democratic 
systems may be headed – either positive or 
negative. The prominent narratives of crisis 
and disruption appear too alarmist to fit 
some national contexts. A business-as-usual 
lens is too sanguine to fit others. The 
ubiquitously posited populist surge is a spectre more pressing in 
some contexts than in others. 
Yet at least some fairly general patterns are visible. Three 
common, broad concerns emerge from our project. These may 
express themselves in different forms or spur different kinds of claim 
from citizens in each national context, but they are shared concerns 
that seem to be propelling identifiable directions of change across 
Europe. 
First, an incipient downward shift in forms of accountability is 
evident. Behind the many reform initiatives that our project has 
unpacked is an apparent interest in citizens gaining more direct hold 
of public decisions. This sentiment has prompted different kinds of 
democratic innovation – whether online petitions, participative 
assemblies, consultations or local referendums. The common thread 
linking these is an ethos of bringing democratic control and 
monitoring down to a more local level and ‘closer’ to the apocryphal 
ordinary citizen. 
A second trend is a move from passive to active democratic 
engagement. This is a common spine of recent EU political 
developments. It is most clearly evident in the spiralling number of 
pro-democracy protests, citizen assemblies and civil society 
initiatives. Yet it is equally evident in moves to build an ethos of 
active citizenship into more traditional democratic channels like 
political parties and parliaments. It also infuses the spirit of 
developments in recent years at the EU level.  
Curiously, many European governments have become 
uneasily schizophrenic about these trends towards more locally 
appropriated, active democratic forms. Their actions have both 
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prompted but also resisted this direction of travel. Many 
governments and local authorities have encouraged such 
developments as a possible way of quelling public frustration with 
elites and existing institutional structures. But at the same time they 
have commonly sought to limit or control them, nervous about what 
more searching and combustible forms of active democratic 
engagement might produce in an apparent age of populist 
illiberalism and radical questioning of the status quo. This is the still 
largely unmapped frontier of current tensions and debates at which 
the future of European democracy is being fought out: the 
simultaneous push for more open-ended forms of democratic 
engagement, on the one hand, and for more controlled forms of 
democracy, on the other hand. 
A third pattern to emerge from the 2CU project relates to the 
EU level. There appears to be a growing expectation at many 
different levels of political engagement – from individual citizens 
through to political parties, parliaments, governments and 
supranational bodies – that the EU needs to prove itself relevant to 
democratic regeneration. Our case studies reveal how the EU level is 
still a problem that in multiple ways compounds Europe’s 
democratic shortfalls. Yet, the very depth of this concern has begun 
to galvanise wider recognition that democratic decay cannot be 
tackled without far-reaching change at the EU level. 
Much of the project’s work speaks to the increasingly evident 
inter-relationships between the national and EU levels. National 
democracy cannot be protected or enhanced 
without reform at the EU level; and 
democratic reform at the EU level will not 
suffice without reform at the national and 
sub-national levels. An interesting 
complexity is that while much focus in 
democratic innovation has been at a very 
local level, so too has it intensified at the EU level.  
This duality might be seen as paradoxical and challenging to 
the future evolution of European democracy. In a world of sharper 
geopolitical and geo-economic rivalry, a lot of the current EU debate 
is about size: many want to see the EU act as a large power to match 
other large powers and blocs. Yet it is equally clear that many citizens 
want power brought downwards and that their concerns are with 
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proximity and access to decision-making, more than with the EU 
being a singular, power-oriented behemoth. Quite how these twin 
concerns are to be reconciled remains unclear: how can the new 
nominally ‘geopolitical’ Commission also be the Commission that 
gives ‘a new push for democracy’ when these might ask for opposite 
kinds of changes? The pattern behind current political developments 
might be described as a quest for localised Europeanism. Whether and 
how this is achievable will be a defining issue for the EU’s future.  
21.3 A single European democracy policy? 
In sum, some patterns are visible – at least in relatively faint contours 
– among the particularities of national politics. Yet, what our project 
also shows is that there is no comprehensive ‘democracy policy 
agenda’ across Europe but rather a highly 
fragmented collection of individual policy 
responses, civil society initiatives, citizen 
uprisings, political-party adjustments, 
parliamentary efforts and digital strategies.  
This is true at the national level, within 
each member state. But it is even more striking at the EU level. At the 
EU level, the partial and splintered nature of democracy innovations 
is even more marked – and even more debilitating in terms of the 
impact that the wide array of reform efforts has so far had. This lack 
of integrative thinking and action on democracy is evident both 
across different areas of democratic reform – citizens, civil society, 
parties, parliaments, local authorities, EU bodies – and between 
different national-level initiatives.  
Of course, all areas of EU policy suffer from problems of 
coherence and strive with different degrees of success to bring their 
diverse component parts together in a meaningful whole. But in 
many areas – like climate change, competitiveness, technology or 
external relations – the EU has at least made some headway in 
crafting over-arching strategies and joining together the various 
relevant elements of a given policy domain.  
This is not the case in the area of democracy. Over time, the EU 
has developed a single European market and a single European 
currency. It endeavours constantly to find its way towards a single 
European energy policy. Many diplomats strive for elements of a 
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single European foreign policy. Yet, the notion of a single European 
democracy policy has never been raised. It is not even part of the EU 
lexicon.  
EU policies have not really got to grips with the underlying 
changes driving changes to democracy – whether in positive or 
negative directions. Rather, policies embody a scattergun of partial 
initiatives. In respect of European democracy, most actors agree on 
and even stress the need for reform and concerted effort to push back 
against strands of democratic erosion. In practice, however, each sees 
democratic improvement through its own particular prism. Political 
parties work for changes to political parties. Parliaments see the 
solution lying in parliamentary changes. Civic organisations advance 
ideas for getting civic groups more involved. Organisation involved 
in citizen assemblies champion this fast spreading form of 
participation. Tech experts work separately in the realms of digital 
democracy initiatives.  
The EU could benefit from a single ‘hub’ or ‘one-stop shop’ to 
serve as a focal point covering all these different areas and dealing 
with democratic reform in an all-inclusive sense – a unit and/or a 
single person charged with bringing all the different arena of 
democratic change together in a single policy framework. 
This is not in any way to advocate moves towards a single 
political system that seeks to replicate national-level democratic 
structures at the EU level. This is probably neither feasible nor 
desirable. Arguably, a strength of many of the initiatives explored in 
the 2CU project lies in their local roots and the way reform efforts are 
tailored to the specificities of different national and sub-national 
contexts. Replenishing the legitimacy of European democracy will 
rightly and necessarily entail reforms at multiple different levels of 
reform. The appropriate balance between different types of 
democracy will vary across these different contexts. 
However, precisely because of 
this need to rebuild democratic 
citizenship through a complex 
combination of representative, 
participative, deliberative and digital 
democracy, the EU as a whole needs 
some kind of hub to consider the state 
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of European democracy in its most comprehensive and integral sense. 
This one-stop shop would coalesce all the different areas of 
democratic change across Europe and build a picture of how they 
relate to each other. It would build linkages between those working 
on reforms across the different arenas of democratic accountability. It 
would assess how different forms of democratic regression might 
require different forms of response. It would work to reduce the risk 
of different areas of reform undercutting each other. 
A promising development is that one Commissioner, 
Dubravka Šuica, now has overall responsibility for democracy. But 
elements of fragmentation still exist. The proposed new action plan 
for democracy appears to break the issue of online threats to 
elections away from other areas of reform. The debates about a new 
Spitzenkandidaten system and enhanced powers for the European 
Parliament are narrowly about negotiations with that institution. 
There is no EU-level mechanism to feed in best-practice learning 
from the myriad national and sub-national experiments with e-
petitions and legislative crowdsourcing. 
The policy challenge in this sense lies in the EU juggling both 
the patterns and particularities in European democracy. It needs to 
take heed of widening particularities but also draw out emergent 
common patterns that require common kinds of innovation. Our 
project concludes just as the Conference on the Future of Europe kicks 
off, with one of its stated aims to improve democratic processes. The 
Conference presents an opportunity for the EU to consider some kind 
of cohering democracy hub. This would help take forward more 
proactive EU strategy for developing new kinds of democratic 
accountability and representation, and for encouraging democracy in 
its most promising long-term directions. 
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 PARTICIPATORY FUSION: 
HOW TO GALVANISE REPRESENTATIVE 
DEMOCRACY WITH DELIBERATIVE TOOLS  
STEVEN BLOCKMANS 
22.1 Introduction: Gauging the mood 
In an attempt to gauge the mood of European voters ten years on 
from the polycrisis, and just as Brexit comes to pass, our research 
picks up on the highest levels of voter turnout for European elections 
since 1994, and historically high levels of support on key indicators 
of EU attitudes (Chapter 4). If we can deduce from these findings that 
there is a positive momentum in EU public opinion, the optimism is 
a welcome boost because other surveys into the state of public 
opinion are sounding alarm bells (Chapter 3). Most European citizens 
today doubt that their children have better prospects than did their 
parents. And old certainties about the inevitability of democratic 
progress and the global future of democracy are under threat from 
the authoritarian, but undeniably efficient, regimes in China and 
Russia and from the rise of ‘illiberal’ populist parties in established 
democracies. 
While representative democracy remains the best possible form 
of government around, and the one preferred by most Europeans – 
especially in high-income countries, satisfaction with how it is 
practised varies greatly across Europe’s regions, east and west, north 
and south. Likewise, several aspects of democratic governance are 
viewed differently by European publics. The fight against corruption 
and low resilience to disinformation are perceived as key weaknesses 
in democratic governance (Chapter 3).  
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The examined data also indicate that commitment to 
democracy varies across Europe; in some countries significant 
majorities even find non-democratic models to be desirable 
alternatives to democracy. Younger cohorts, especially, are less 
committed to representative democracy. Public opinion remains 
rather critical and distrustful of political elites; for this reason, many 
Europeans support direct democracy mechanisms as a means of 
holding their elites to account. Yet the common assumption that 
populist voters are rejecting European integration appears 
empirically weak. In fact, the evidence suggests that when citizens 
vote for nativist parties, it is more likely to be in spite of (or in 
indifference to) their Eurosceptic stance rather than because of it. This 
finding points to a disconnect between national and European 
politics in the eyes of many citizens, which is important to address 
now if we are to maximise the relevance of the next European 
elections in 2024 (Chapter 4). 
Building on the empirical findings presented in two previous 
volumes (Blockmans and Russack, 2018 and 2019) the question that 
animated the research for this book was ‘How to tailor the use of 
direct participatory instruments to strengthen representative 
democracy in Europe?’ In no less than 17 contributions to this 
volume, 2CU partners have formulated their detailed policy 
prescriptions.  
This chapter draws together the Towards a Citizens’ Union 
proposals into a coherent framework following the four cumulative 
criteria used by modern political theorists to assess the health of a 
democracy: inclusion, choice, deliberation and impact (Fishkin, 2018: 12-
13).  
Inclusion means that all adult citizens have an equal 
opportunity to participate. Choice means that the alternatives for 
public decision need to be significantly different and realistically 
available. Deliberation requires that people are encouraged and 
empowered to think critically about competing alternatives. Finally, 
impact means that people’s deliberative choices direct or constrain 
official decisions or policies. As such, the impact criterion is also the 
missing link back into inclusion, which encompasses the notion of 
political corruption, i.e. practices that disadvantage the many to 
favour the few. Mechanisms to hold politicians and policymakers to 
account if they tinker with the basics that guarantee the proper 
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functioning of a democratic ecosystem, i.e. the rule of law, will also 
be discussed under this heading. 
Arguably, the boundaries between these four criteria are 
blurred. Political communication and the right to a free press feature 
under each of the headings, for instance. Rather than design a strict 
typology of determining factors of a vibrant democracy, we use the 
above-mentioned criteria as a loose framework to present the policy 
recommendations gleaned from the contributions to this volume. In 
doing so, we focus less on output legitimacy (‘choice’), since this is 
traditionally the realm where the EU has performed well – if the 
conclusions from subsidiarity and proportionality exercises at both 
the level of individual member states (e.g. the UK’s 2012-14 Balance 
of Competences Review) and that of the EU (e.g. Commissioner 
Timmermans’ ‘better regulation’ drive of 2014-15) are anything to go 
by. 
22.2 Inclusion 
From a neo-functionalist perspective, the Danish rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was the beginning of the end for what 
scholars have called the ‘permissive consensus’, which allowed elites 
to pursue the integration process without directly consulting 
European citizens (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Moreover, the failure 
of the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe marked the 
advent of a new period where the longstanding notion of the Union’s 
‘democratic deficit’ morphed with much stronger perceptions of 
unaccountability among political and bureaucratic elites. 
Notwithstanding top-down attempts to improve representativeness 
through an increase in qualified majority voting in the Council and 
more co-decision with the European Parliament, these innovations 
have largely failed to nurture 
a European public space due 
to a lack of complementary 
action from the grassroots up 
(Chapter 5).  
Yet, every EU-level 
decision that has been taken in 
the last 60-odd years has 
somehow, in however limited 
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a fashion, contributed to the Europeanisation of national politics. An 
inverse trend has also been observed: the nationalisation of European 
policies. However slow, these mutually reinforcing trends are leading 
irremediably to the emergence of a European political space (Lehne, 
2019). Growing talk of a political union bears witness to this 
phenomenon (Morillas, 2019). Therefore, not only politicians and 
institutions have contributed to it; so have citizens. Top-down and 
bottom-up solutions, innovations and developments are leading to 
an incipient European demos (Chapter 5). 
Yet, since its creation, the EU has never directly consulted its 
more than 500 million citizens on concrete policy issues. To date, the 
European executive is held to account via the elections of members of 
the European Parliament every five 
years and national governments 
represented in the (European) Council. 
Citizens have very limited direct 
democracy tools to express their views 
when it comes to the numerous 
policies and decisions made by the EU between elections. The 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) may have generated a burst of 
bottom-up activities, but it is non-binding and has done little to alter 
the EU’s technocratic reputation (see further, below). 
Transnational lists have been a longstanding federalist dream, 
as they would bridge the gap between voters and representatives. 
Such a list would feature candidates, in particular those chosen by 
their European party families, to lead the campaign and run for the 
position of president of the European Commission, to be elected in a 
single constituency from throughout the EU. This would facilitate 
voting for candidates across member states and effectively give 
citizens two votes: one for their national constituency and the other 
for the EU as a whole. First brought before the EP plenary in 2011, 
this proposal has repeatedly failed to gain majority support. The 
latest rejection was in 2018, which meant that there was no 
transnational list for the 2019 EP elections. However, with the 
reallocation of the 25 seats that became vacant after the UK’s 
departure from the EU, the idea will probably be put back on the table 
of the Conference on the Future of Europe, i.e. well before the EP 
elections in 2024. It remains to be seen, however, if the first use of the 
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transnational list will be preceded by a revision of the failed 
Spitzenkandidaten procedure (Chapter 8).  
In the same vein, the idea of a European electoral code 
common to all member states, is an idea whose time has not yet come. 
For years, member states have resisted the European Parliament and 
Commission in implementing proposals to change and harmonise 
national electoral procedural laws (Chapter 5).1 
Initially, it was the role of European party federations (aka 
Europarties) to coordinate EP election campaigns and adopt common 
manifestos for these elections. But their limited visibility at the 
national political level and the related low awareness of them among 
publics mean that Europarties can hardly play their role in 
transmitting national political preferences to the EU level. Unless 
national parties begin to mention their Europarty links and unless 
Europarties themselves run their websites in multiple languages, 
little can be expected to change. To attract more individual members 
in the light of declining party membership across Europe, Europarties 
would need to give them more participatory rights in terms of policy-
making and decision-making powers. Allowing them a say in 
drawing up European manifestos would also force national actors to 
download the main common positions to the domestic level. That, in 
turn, leads to the idea of giving Europarties the right to participate in 
EU-related national referendums and run campaigns for them 
(Chapter 7). 
The supranationalisation of the electoral model, the variants of 
which have been mentioned above, is a prerequisite not only to 
enhancing the role of Europarties but also to adhering to the principle 
of an equal vote. Allowing citizens to vote for transnational lists, next 
                                                        
1 Even in the UK, where the makeup of the House of Commons does not reflect 
the current demographic of the British public, and where the outcome of the 2016 
EU referendum and the December 2019 general elections have revealed serious 
flaws in representative democracy, there has been no serious discussion about 
replacing the first-past-the-post system with a proportional one. It simply doesn’t 
serve the interests of the party that wins a governing majority to table such 
proposal. As a result, smaller parties with similar political alchemy cannot 
translate their combined vote in a coalition (government) to beat the biggest 
party, even if the latter only received a majority with a plurality of the vote. 
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to their national ballot for EP elections, and for Europarties and 
common EU-wide candidates, would likely Europeanise EP elections 
through the centralised campaign strategy, the conduct of campaigns, 
candidate selection and manifestos, and would give national media 
incentives to cover Europarties more intensively (Chapter 7). If 
information is power, the question arises whether European citizens 
have sufficient access to information to control EU action. 
The EP has tried to increase its own representativeness. An 
improvement frequently cited by citizens is the use of new 
technologies (see section 4) to keep better track of voting patterns and 
parliamentary activity (cf. VoteWatch). With respect to transparency, 
the European Parliament has often been a pioneer, with higher 
standards than many of the national parliaments. But there continue 
to be different views on transparency among other EU institutions 
and member states, which has led to varying degrees of openness 
across the EU. Several trends challenge the EU’s already limited 
transparency regime: the increased role of the EU’s persistently 
secluded intergovernmental bodies, the emergence of new actors and 
agencies and the prevalent use of closed trilogues in legislative 
decision-making (Chapter 6). In terms of specific measures to meet 
the present challenges, the recommendations of the European 
Ombudsman following her strategic inquiries into trilogues 
(European Ombudsman, 2015) and Council decision-making 
(European Ombudsman, 2017), as well as the ruling of the General 
Court on the transparency of trilogues from 2018, go a long way.2 The 
                                                        
2 For trilogues, these measures include making publicly available: a calendar 
identifying forthcoming meetings; summary agendas of those meetings; the 
positions on legislative proposals; documents tabled during negotiations; 
minutes or videos of public meetings where trilogues were discussed. For the 
improvement of Council decision-making, recommendations include: to 
systematically record the identities of member states expressing positions in 
preparatory bodies; to develop clear and publicly available criteria for the 
application of the ‘LIMITE’ status, in line with EU law; systematically review the 
‘LIMITE’ status of documents at an early stage before the final adoption of a 
legislative act, including before informal negotiations in trilogues; improve the 
user-friendliness of the Council’s public register and its search function, and list 
all types of documents, irrespective of format and whether they are fully 
accessible, partially accessible or not accessible at all; develop a dedicated and 
up-to-date webpage for each legislative proposal, following the example of the 
EP’s legislative observatory.  
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implementation of these proposals would be an important first step 
to increasing the openness of the EU’s legislative process. The 
extension of such reforms to EU agencies and ‘de novo’ bodies would 
be a logical next step. 
Secrecy breeds (the perception of) corruption. Political 
corruption violates the assumption of political equality by excluding 
large masses of people, while allowing privileged access to a small 
group of people to the decision-making process. In a democratic 
society, trust is key to a government’s legitimacy. In Europe, four 
areas of social and political life are vulnerable to political corruption: 
the financing of political parties, lobbying, public procurement, and 
EU funds. At a time when perceptions of corruption by politicians is 
high and trust is low, the EU transparency register should be 
improved and expanded to include the Council. Apart from ensuring 
that data on EU-funded projects (structural, agricultural, social, 
cohesion funds) are published in a readable format to allow for public 
scrutiny, the European anti-fraud office (OLAF) and the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office should be provided with ample human 
and financial resources to investigate and prosecute abusive practices 
(Chapter 13). For their part, member states should enforce timely 
reporting of political campaign financing in readable formats to allow 
for external, independent scrutiny. They should also strengthen the 
protection of media reporting about political corruption and continue 
to depoliticise police and judicial (appointment) processes. 
Improving representativeness is a challenge that should also be 
led by civil society and individuals. The European Citizens’ 
Initiative was the first instrument in EU law to enable citizens to 
directly and proactively contribute to the Union’s policymaking 
process. Unfortunately, the original ECI suffered from too many 
restrictions, beyond those also bearing down on national 
participatory tools, for it to have any legislative value added and 
secure continued citizen engagement. The instrument was therefore 
revised and a new regulation came into effect in January 2020. While 
improvement in the practicability of the ECI is to be expected, the 
reform has been mostly technical in nature and leaves questions 
about the fundamental political value of the tool unanswered 
(Chapter 17). 
Petitions share similar characteristics: they are agenda-setting 
tools and hence a form of participatory democratic process that 
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enables the organisation of the public in an action with potential 
political consequences. At the very least, the objective of petition 
systems is to elicit a reaction from the institution addressed; even if a 
negative one. However, unlike the ECI, they do not need to meet 
thresholds and criteria, are free of cost and often address 
‘intermediary’ institutions that stand between the person submitting 
the petition and the body addressed by the petition. Petitions do not 
guarantee that governments will be held accountable for popular 
dissatisfaction; rather, the purpose of petitions is often to generate 
discussion in the broader society and attract the attention of 
politicians to a certain problem. As such, they promote transparency, 
ensure greater information flows and can impact the agenda of 
legislators, executives or other addressees. Large signature 
campaigns have the potential to further narrow the democratic 
deficit, especially among marginalised groups with limited access to 
political power. Online petition platforms are a space for 
participation where a group of supporters of a certain cause can 
develop similar narratives, form ideas and even a ‘language’ that 
helps to signal important directions of societal change. This also 
means that individuals/groups can become more integrated into the 
political system and as such this instrument creates pathways for 
constructive input into policymaking (Chapter 18). 
While there is much room for improvement, e-petitions surpass 
the level of inclusiveness of the citizens dialogues, which leave much 
to be desired. Our research reveals a huge disparity between urban 
areas (73% of the events, with more than one-third taking place in the 
capital) and suburban/rural ones (with only 27%). As the Brexit and 
gilets jaunes phenomena show, this is a ‘fault in the weave’ that needs 
to be corrected if the increasing rejection of mainstream politics in 
non-urbanised areas is to be countered (Chapter 19). 
In the last decade, national referendums were often used by 
populist forces to advance their political agenda and erode the 
institutions of constitutional democracy. Across the EU, there are 
important distinctions between facultative and mandatory 
referendums, popular votes on specific issues and legislative 
referendums, top-down governmentally controlled plebiscites and 
bottom-up popular initiatives. As well as highlighting common 
European standards and good practices identified by the Venice 
Commission, existing shortcomings could be addressed in the way 
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referendums are organised, for instance by allowing for citizen-
initiated referendums (e.g. abolishing validity or turnout quorums); 
lowering the number of required signatures; introducing e-tools for 
signature collection; requiring less personal data; providing longer 
periods for collection; and ensuring sufficient public space and time 
for the preliminary deliberation and ex post constitutional review of 
referendum proposals and decisions (Chapter 15). 
Referendums on EU issues present a mixed picture across the 
continent. And EU-related referendum results are not always taken 
properly into consideration by national governments (e.g. Greece 
2015). In other cases, votes expressed by less than a third of eligible 
voters in consultative referendums have been considered as 
politically binding on the government, irrespective of their 
potentially disastrous consequences for both the EU and the country 
in question (e.g. the Netherlands 2016, the UK 2016). National 
referendums have in fact contributed to political inequalities between 
European citizens and the delegitimisation of the EU (Cheneval, 
2007). When it comes to fostering citizens’ participation in the 
Union’s decision-making processes, national referendums on EU 
issues cannot be a substitute for a Europe-wide plebiscite. Indeed, a 
referendum among all those European citizens who enjoy the right to 
vote in their own member state might enhance the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy and secure popular political backing for key issues on the 
future of Europe that require a substantial change to the treaties or 
policies affecting citizens’ lives. Whether an EU-wide referendum 
would be able to bypass problems of polarised opinion among 
citizens is less certain, though. Notwithstanding, member state 
governments are not willing to sacrifice national sovereignty by 
accepting the introduction of an EU-wide referendum which, to be 
credible and effective, would have to be binding as well as multi-
national (Chapter 16). The latter would require a harmonisation of 
national legislation on public plebiscites which, as we have discussed 
above, is still a no-go area for member state governments. 
22.3 Choice 
Today, the eurozone and ‘migration’ crises appear to have entered a 
period of dormancy and external challenges have shown the value of 
the Union in an uncertain world. The internal convulsions of the UK’s 
political system have also transformed Brexit from a potentially lethal 
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cry of dissatisfaction with the EU into proof of its importance. While 
deep divisions and incompatible preferences for problem-solving 
strategies among member states remain, polls indicate that citizens 
expect the European Union to play a role in addressing the big-ticket 
policy challenges: migration, climate protection, protecting social 
rights in an economic union, cyber security and foreign policy 
(Blockmans, 2019). Increasing citizens’ commitment to democracy in 
Europe demands that the EU develop and implement policies that 
address these genuine concerns.  
On the back of a raft of conclusions of the EU27, proposals by 
smaller groupings of member states, Commission white papers, 
Parliament reports and debates on the future of Europe, the 
‘geopolitical’ Commission of President von der Leyen has set out a 
strategic agenda centred on a ‘green deal’ and on surfing the wave of 
digitalisation. An ambitious and detailed workplan informs the 
legislative process to implement change. Returning to ‘business as 
usual’ would be a mistake, however. It would signal to citizens that 
the EU has not learned the lessons from the huge populist disaster 
that is Brexit. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU should serve as a 
warning to all as to what happens when ordinary people see the EU 
as distant, unaccountable and out of touch. The same social and 
political forces that deepened the political divides in the UK are still 
a menace across much of Europe. The real test for the EU will come 
with the next crisis, and national governments again use the Union as 
a scapegoat for many of their own failings. A greater sense of multi-
stakeholder buy-in must be generated to provide the EU with more 
legitimacy. In this respect, the idea of organising a two-year 
Conference on the Future of Europe has promise. 
22.4 Deliberation  
The Conference on the Future of Europe is expected to organise its 
work along two strands. The first should focus on policy priorities 
and what the Union should seek to achieve in terms of output 
legitimacy. The second strand should focus on institutional matters 
and democratic processes, thus generating input and throughput 
legitimacy. Ahead of the kick-off on 9 May 2020, the three main 
political institutions are involved and will manifest their intentions 
with a Joint Declaration defining the concept, structure, scope and 
timing of the Conference. For reasons mentioned in the previous 
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section, the Conference should not be reduced to a tokenistic exercise 
for and by the EU bubble. The voices of national politicians and civil 
society need to be heard, loud and clear, or they may start calling for 
their national governments to ‘take back control’. 
The EU is made or undone in national debates. Just as it is up 
to heads of state or government representatives to own up to the 
decisions they take collectively (or, as the case may be, fail to take) 
around the negotiating table in Brussels, so too must national parties 
and parliaments intensify efforts to bridge the divide in many voters’ 
minds between national and European politics. More focus on the 
European dimension in day-to-day discussions of national policies is 
recommended. It is by constructively engaging with the EU 
dimension of national policies which concern citizens that elected 
officials would have a chance to rekindle interest and belief in 
democracy among the youth as well as channel their energies 
towards democratic forms of participation.  
In a multi-layered EU, representative democracy should 
reform itself, and facilitate and respond meaningfully to such 
deliberative processes. In the same way that there is a virtuous circle 
and a better perception of representativeness when citizens are 
involved in holding those in power to account (Habermas, 2013), 
institutional reforms such as the harmonisation of electoral systems 
and the creation of transnational lists can create an upward spiral that 
positively impacts representativeness in Europe. 
When analysing Europarties’ deficits, Kovář, Sychra and 
Kratochvíl in Chapter 7 point to the need to work towards a genuine 
and functional transnationalisation of party cooperation, instead of 
the de facto association of national political parties or the mere 
umbrella organisation that exists today. Such a shift would 
correspond to the Europeanisation of what used to be purely national 
policy themes (socio-economic protection, migration, internal 
security, foreign policy). The transnationalisation of European party 
discussion and programmes should not be an artificial attempt at 
social engineering but a reflection of the cross-border preferences of 
European publics. This change would have to be predicated on 
parties’ presence in the public discourse, the contestation of their 
ideas, thus offering a deliberative choice to citizens. This, in turn, 
requires reliable and verifiable information. 
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In the recent crisis years in Europe, examples of innovative 
forms of deliberative democracy have emerged, where soundbites 
and headlines are replaced by informed consideration of issues on 
citizens’ platforms set up for that 
purpose. The challenge is to weave 
facts and values into concrete yet 
flexible strategies for democratic 
deliberation that lead to legislative 
and social change.  
The plethora of news and the development of sophisticated 
technologies makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between 
actual news and fake news. Social media not only complement classic 
sources of information, they might completely replace them, thus 
adding to ‘bubble’ mentalities and the polarisation of views (Chapter 
12). In addition, targeted online disinformation weakens the 
democratic system and influences democratic elections. 
Eurobarometer data show a correlation between the level of 
trustworthiness of information provided by national media and 
public satisfaction with national democracy. Low political pressure 
on public service media correlates with a higher level of press 
freedom in a country (European Broadcasting Union, 2019). To help 
a European public space emerge, public service media should pool 
forces and work on the establishment of transnational media 
platforms (traditional and millennial) offering content that appeals to 
a broader European audience. Reinforcing the network of agencies 
known as Europe Direct, TV channels such as Euronews, Eurosport 
and Arte, specialised magazines and online newspapers deserve the 
support of EU institutions (Hillje, 2019). 
Positive and substantive civic engagement via digital media 
and social networks should go hand in hand with quality journalism 
and media literacy to foster the critical thinking and emotional 
intelligence of the audience and general public. European funding 
should be attributed to quality journalism and investigative projects 
and reports in order to assure a higher degree of independence in the 
news sector. The European Commission’s financial and technical 
support of fact-checking networks is already an important element 
in helping factuality regain ground, especially in the era of new 
media. Nevertheless, these efforts should be intensified: increased 
investment is needed as well as better promotion of fact-checkers’ 
The challenge is to weave facts 
and values into concrete yet 
flexible strategies for democratic 
deliberation that lead to 
legislative and social change. 
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activities and findings that rarely reach a broad public. The funding 
for the East StratCom Task Force aimed at detecting and exposing 
cases of disinformation should be stepped up. In October 2018 the 
Commission established a code of practice that was signed by 
Facebook, Google, Twitter and software companies and bodies 
representing the advertising industry (Microsoft joined in May 2019), 
who “voluntarily committed to improve the transparency, 
accountability and trustworthiness of their services”. The next step 
would be for the Commission to oblige social media platforms to 
tighten their transparency regulations and redouble their efforts to 
counter fake news content and – if these prove insufficient – to 
propose regulatory measures at the EU level. More transparent 
political advertising on all relevant online and social media platforms 
would be welcome. Access to data, especially on sponsored content, 
should be facilitated for the public, journalists and the scientific 
community to allow in-depth analysis, comparison and long-term 
research (Chapter 12). 
Armed with facts, citizens can be expected to inject positive 
energy into the moribund institutions of democracy, improve their 
representativeness, insist on constructive deliberation, and thus 
enhance their legitimacy. Research has revealed that citizens tend to 
agree when identifying the best ways to improve representativeness 
at the continental level (Notre Europe and CIDOB, 2014). They want 
policymakers, and in particular their MEPs, to be more informed 
about their needs and be more accessible. In fact, the possibility to see 
in person the politicians and the professionals that work in the EU 
gathers most support in the polls. That desire extends to civil 
servants, Commissioners and middle administrators. Such an 
initiative is not entirely new in Europe. It has been tested at the 
national level, in particular in the UK, where MPs hold ‘political 
surgeries’ with their local constituents. These one-to-one 
conversations create a strong sense of accountability as MPs are 
compelled to follow up on many of the issues brought to them (House 
of Commons, 2019). The generalisation of political surgeries, the 
consolidation of tools to consult with citizens on a regular basis, and 
the use of new technologies to follow parliamentary activity are some 
of the ideas explored in this book (Chapter 5). 
Initiated by the European Commission in 2012, citizens’ 
dialogues have since been quasi institutionalised. They are thought 
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to be the most efficient way of creating links between Commissioners 
and national audiences.3 In spite of criticism that they constituted just 
another type of academic conference to explain technical policies to a 
passive audience rather than a venue for authentic dialogue (Russack, 
2018: 20), public interest was nevertheless sparked by simply making 
‘Eurocrats’ visible (Gutiérrez-Peris  et al., 2018). At the time of writing, 
more than 1,600 events have been organised all around Europe, 
gathering more than 200,000 citizens (European Commission, 2019: 
5). The Commission labels these events as “public debates on EU 
policies” which offer the opportunity for European citizens to ask 
questions to EU policymakers, make comments on EU policymaking 
that affect them or share ideas on the future of Europe.  
In another effort to whip up participative spirit, several 
countries such as Germany, Lithuania and Ireland have started 
organising ‘European citizens’ consultations’, thereby confusing the 
nature of the initiative with the Commission’s citizens’ dialogues. 
Inspired by Emmanuel Macron’s 
speech at La Sorbonne in which he 
stressed the need to “identify 
priorities, concerns and ideas for 
the future of Europe” (Macron, 
2017), the initiative was upscaled to 
become a “pan-European process 
of citizens’ consultations” (Council 
of the EU, 2018: 1). Following the 
signature by all member states in 
March 2018 of a joint framework premised on a set of “common 
principles” – including inclusiveness, political pluralism and 
transparency, around 1,700 European Citizens’ Consultations took 
place across the continent, generating in-depth discussions on a 
diverse range of EU-related issues (Chapter 19). Unlike citizens’ 
dialogues, these consultations were organised by national 
governments, sometimes in partnership with local actors and civil 
                                                        
3 Citizens’ dialogues became a priority under the Juncker Commission after an 
event in Riga in January 2015 where First Vice-President Timmermans, Vice-
President Dombrovskis and Commissioner Creţu met 500 European citizens to 
debate several topics related to EU policymaking, including the stability of the 
eurozone, energy independence and security issues. 
Following the signature by all 
member states of a joint framework 
premised on a set of “common 
principles”, around 1,700 European 
Citizens’ Consultations took place 
across the continent, generating  
in-depth discussions on a diverse 
range of EU-related issues. 
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society organisations (Butcher and Pronckutė, 2019: 81). The 
unevenness in terms of organisation, ambition, identity and political 
messaging has so far prevented the European citizens’ consultations 
from producing meaningful change at the EU level (Stratulat and 
Butcher, 2019). 
In an effort to complement member states’ activities on the 
European citizens’ consultations, the European Commission 
simultaneously launched ‘online citizens’ consultations’ via a 
questionnaire (available in all EU-languages) based on 12 questions 
devised by a citizens’ panel (Zacharzewski, 2019: 19-22). At the time 
of writing, it is too early to draw any conclusions from this exercise. 
The results of these online citizens’ consultations were expected to be 
submitted to the European Council. Any follow-up action on citizens’ 
perceptions and recommendations will therefore depend on the 
political will of the member states (Chapter 19). 
The European Commission has a long tradition of public 
consultations on EU policies and specific legal files. This tool offers 
the opportunity for citizens to provide online feedback on issues that 
directly impact their lives (e.g. industry, environment, social affairs). 
However, this tool is particularly useful for businesses and lobbyists 
to share technical recommendations that are in line with their 
corporate interests. The real challenge is how to use new technologies 
to facilitate a wider citizen participation in the EU. The idea of 
creating an online ‘European civic space’, akin to the project 
developed jointly by the Council of Europe and the European 
Commission, could connect civil society organisations and allow 
them to share information and opinions on draft legislation in real 
time. Integrating artificial intelligence (AI) systems that would 
automatically translate information shared in all official languages of 
the EU and logically place it in the online debating forum would 
enhance both the participation and deliberation of regular citizens 
(Chapter 20). It would also enhance the mutual understanding of EU-
related matters between citizens and policy- and decision-makers. 
The participatory instruments mentioned above mostly follow 
a top-down approach. Other successful participatory initiatives such 
as citizens’ assemblies and citizens’ juries take a different 
methodological approach that has included selecting participants by 
random lot, involving experts in the process, and getting public 
authorities to commit to the result of the deliberations. With the 
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successes of the citizens’ assembly in Ireland (which culminated in a 
nationwide referendum on abortion), the establishment of a 
permanent citizens’ assembly in Madrid, and the introduction of the 
participatory system based on randomly drawn lots in the German-
speaking part of Belgium, the question has arisen whether these 
bottom-up approaches might be scaled up to secure enhanced 
citizens’ deliberation at the national and even the transnational level. 
Obviously, this would raise major practical and financial problems 
and require an enormous coordination effort (Chapter 19). In this 
respect, policy recommendations (Alemanno, 2018; Butcher and 
Stratulat, 2018; Youngs, 2019) strategically focus on future rounds of 
European citizens consultations and include: 
 Centralising all participatory channels that involve EU 
institutions to tackle the current lack of synchronisation. This 
could lead to the establishment of a mechanism for 
interinstitutional cooperation of the kind already proposed by 
the European Committee of the Regions and the European 
Economic and Social Committee,4 two advisory bodies in the 
EU decision-making process with a significant record of 
cooperating with civil society.  
 Securing appropriate funding by including European citizens’ 
consultations in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
of the EU and by dedicating a budget within each member state 
institution leading the process domestically. 
 Establishing a task force of experts, academics, civil society and 
representatives from the EU and member states to propose the 
participatory design that would best fit into EU decision-
making processes. 
 Clarifying the purpose of consulting citizens and its connection 
to the EU level. 
 Engaging local democracy networks and experts to ensure the 
methodology and quality of the consultations; i.e. so that 
people are encouraged and empowered to think critically about 
competing alternatives. 
                                                        
4 See, e.g., COR, “Working together to bring the EU closer to its citizens: EU cities 
and regions' key proposals to renew the EU (2019-2024)”, CdR No. 3975, June 
2019. 
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 Securing unity in the diversity of national practices and debates 
to enhance the transnational character and value added of the 
consultations. 
 Including independent voices to synthesise the results. 
 
The overarching challenge of these endeavours would be to 
design a deliberative model for Europe that reinforces other forms of 
democratic accountability rather than undermining or 
overshadowing them (Youngs, 2019). 
This remark applies especially to European Affairs 
Committees (EAC) of national parliaments, which have traditionally 
been seen as the aggregators of citizens’ preferences on European 
affairs, the conveyer belts to and from EU institutions, and EU-level 
actors in their own right (cf. COSAC, below). In reality, however, it is 
more important for national parliaments to scrutinise their own 
governments. Many parliaments do not even demand that their 
governments report back from Council and European Council 
meetings. Even the question of granting a greater role to parliaments 
in monitoring the implementation of EU law is controversial, 
including among parliaments themselves (Chapter 9). The general 
tendency seems to be in favour of mainstreaming EU expertise across 
national parliaments, not of keeping it within the bounds of the 
EACs. While such mainstreaming is to be welcomed, MPs in sectoral 
committees would need more EU expertise and assistance to better 
scrutinise government and engage more directly in EU decision-
making. 
Our research has shown that national parliaments view 
subsidiarity as a broad political principle rather than as a narrow 
legal or technical principle to hold the executive to account. The 
extension of the early warning system (EWS) to ‘blue’ and ‘green’ 
card procedures would allow for multilevel parliamentary scrutiny 
in a more flexible and proactive way, while at the same time making 
this control mechanism legally binding for the Commission, the 
Council and the EP throughout the entire legislative cycle (Chapter 
10). In such a new framework, the existing yellow and orange cards 
would morph into a ‘blue card’ procedure, no longer leaving the 
discretionary power to the Commission to decide whether to 
maintain, amend or withdraw a proposal. National parliaments 
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would work in tandem with the EP, providing mixed parliamentary 
scrutiny of legislative proposals and binding the Commission and the 
Council. In a similar vein, the green card procedure would be 
amended to allow for a ‘positive voting’ procedure on proposals 
issued jointly by national parliaments and the EP (Borońska-
Hryniewiecka, 2015). Of course, such a challenge to executive 
authority would not go unnoticed in the Commission, the Council 
and national capitals. In the absence of a gentlemen’s agreement, it 
would be difficult to introduce such improvements to the way 
multilevel democracy works in the EU. For that reason, preliminary 
work should be carried out to equip national parliaments and their 
EACs with specific institutional competences. 
In spite of the differences between national parliaments’ EACs 
(their constitutional position and political weight, their ex ante and ex 
post powers to control government on EU matters, their direct 
communication with EU institutions, and ways to involve the 
broader public on European affairs), there are nevertheless a few 
approaches and practices that could help committees increase their 
representative role (Chapter 9): 
 Make it obligatory for the government to report back to 
parliament after each (European) Council meeting, and to 
report all information relating to changes in (position vis-à-vis) 
Commission proposals. 
 Invite Commissioners and top EU officials for debates on 
strategic and contentious issues, and to respond to green and 
white papers at an early stage of the legislative process. The 
appointment of shadow rapporteur MPs may be useful in this 
regard. The early warning system and political dialogue may 
also be used, but one should not overestimate the importance 
of these communication channels because subsidiarity checks 
usually happen quite late in the legislative process. 
 Involve experts and civil society organisations in EAC and 
sectoral committee debates to provide guidance on EU affairs 
and national interests. 
 Devote EAC-specific sections on national parliaments’ 
websites, where at least the agenda and reports on discussions 
on EU policies and legislation during EAC and plenary 
meetings could be easily found. 
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 Produce own-initiative assessments of legislation in force 
across the EU or, at least, provide feedback to the government 
when it states its position on the European Commission’s 
evaluation reports of existing EU law. 
 Produce regular self-assessments of the effectiveness of 
parliament and, in particular, the EAC to engage on EU 
matters. 
 Find ways to communicate regularly with the country’s MEPs; 
meeting with EP rapporteurs on dossiers of interest; and 
participating in small-scale events organised by the European 
Parliament on topics of interest to citizens. 
 Reinforce and use the federal or regional parliaments’ liaison 
offices in Brussels as permanent interlocutors regarding 
legislative developments pertinent to the public at home. 
 Take part in networking events at EU level, especially 
COSACs. 
 
While, in theory, the Conference of Parliamentary Committees 
for Union Affairs of the Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) 
is a useful tool for MPs and MEPs to coordinate priorities and 
cooperate in improving the legitimacy of EU affairs, limited powers 
to scrutinise (ex ante and ex post) and influence EU policymakers have 
meant that the benefits of interparliamentary cooperation in Europe 
remain largely untapped. Aligning the work and timing of COSAC 
meetings to (European) Council agendas would improve their 
impact. Splitting COSAC meetings into smaller groups of 
parliamentarians to facilitate closer and more informal discussions on 
specific topics would also reinforce political dialogue, as would 
increasing the frequency of the appearance of representatives of EU 
institutions. The use of new technologies might also help to arrange 
ad hoc working groups without increasing the budget. Finally, taking 
the development of sectorally-oriented joint parliamentary sessions 
(as exists already for CSFP/CSDP and economic stability, 
coordination and governance) and joint parliamentary scrutiny 
groups (as for Europol) further, would help to improve their impact 
on the decision-making process as they would be able to adopt 
deeper analyses of different policy questions, especially when 
accompanied by joint secretarial support (Chapter 11). 
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Apart from introducing new 
elements of direct democracy, 
representative democratic processes 
themselves need to innovate. Indeed, 
some of the most obvious ways to 
narrow democratic deficits in Europe 
and boost EU legitimacy can be found in improving national 
parliamentary debates and oversight on EU-related matters. 
22.5 Impact 
As noted in passing, the recurrence – if not permanence – of sound 
deliberative modes of citizens’ participation is a determining factor 
in representativeness. The most efficient and durable way to gain and 
retain credibility as a public representative is to create channels of 
communication and accountability that extend beyond election day.  
In terms of political communication, democratically elected 
leaders should adopt language that counteracts, not imitates, 
populists’ divisive narratives. Referring, for instance, to the rule of 
law may not be engaging enough and too ‘cold’ to elicit positive 
responses from the public (Chapter 3). Instead, politicians, experts 
and opinion-makers should start speaking about democracy by 
referring to people’s interests and benefits that can be directly 
derived from the separation of powers, free press and the rule of law. 
The aim would be to forge stronger emotional bonds between citizens 
and the system of democratic and legal 
standards that protects them and 
promotes their individual and 
collective interests. Crucially, they 
should engage citizens in this 
conversation. Fact-based deliberation 
in representative bodies, direct 
channels to give voice to citizens’ 
concerns and choices, and shoring up 
mechanisms to hold government to 
account – these factors can save democracy in Europe from the 
onslaught of proto-fascist populism. 
In terms of accountability, a representative democracy should 
guarantee that the people’s deliberative choices direct or constrain 
Apart from introducing new 
elements of direct democracy, 
representative democratic 
processes themselves need to 
innovate. 
Fact-based deliberation in 
representative bodies, direct 
channels to give voice to 
citizens’ concerns and choices, 
and shoring up mechanisms to 
hold government to account 
can save democracy in Europe 
from the onslaught of proto-
fascist populism. 
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official decisions and policies. In cases where member states’ 
governments have hollowed out those defences, the EU – through all 
of its institutions – should step in. Democratic backsliding in one or 
more member states challenges the mutual trust-based operation of 
the single market and the entire European Union. Enforcing 
democratic standards in member states where the rule of law is in 
crisis should take priority over concerns about a possible Eurosceptic 
backlash in those countries. The publics in Poland and Hungary, for 
instance, have remained strongly pro-EU despite the steps taken 
against their governments’ policies and the rejections of ‘Brussels 
interventions’. Populist governments’ claims that targeted EU action 
is unfair because problems also exist in other member states should 
be dismissed altogether. This does not, after all, absolve them of their 
assault on the fundamental values on which the EU is built (cf. Article 
2 TEU). An erosion of the rule of law requires urgent and determined 
countervailing action to spread the risk of contagion. Increasing 
citizens’ commitment to democracy in Europe requires that all EU 
institutions do more to consistently ensure that democratic standards 
and the rule of law are observed in all member states. 
The new EU institutional cycle is an opportunity to intensify 
collaboration between the Commission, the European Parliament and 
the Council of the EU to restore the rule of law and narrow the 
divisions between member states that have opened up as a result of 
violations. Among the steps to be taken (Chapter 14), are: 
 For the Commission to carry out an objective annual review of 
the state of democracy in all member states, relying not just on 
data provided by governments but by making better use of the 
Fundamental Rights Agency, bodies of the Council of Europe 
(e.g. Venice Commission) and civil society organisations in 
collecting information. 
 If certain governments’ explanations are unsatisfactory and the 
prospects for addressing the rule of law problems identified in 
the report not promising, then the Commission should not 
hesitate to start an infraction procedure before the Court of 
Justice and ask for interim measures to suspend controversial 
government action until it renders its final judgment. 
 Political ‘families’ in the European Parliament have a 
responsibility to assist in upholding the rule of law throughout 
the EU. The indecisiveness of the European People’s Party in 
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dealing with Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz is the most prominent but 
certainly not the only failure of a European party family to 
address the persistent violation of EU founding values in a 
member state. It is a stain on the house of European democracy 
that national parties that undermine the rule of law at home 
receive protection from their European party federations. 
 In the negotiations on the MFF, member states should accept 
the European Parliament’s proposal to increase EU funding for 
rule of law promotion and agree to establish a stronger link 
between respect for fundamental values and sound EU 
finances. Framing rule of law conditionality for EU funding as 
an objective, legally grounded instrument and not an attempt 
to bypass the cumbersome Article 7 procedure would help to 
see off accusations that the EU is prepared to bend its own laws 
to punish defiant member states (Chapter 14). The MFF should 
also include specific funds to counter disinformation and, in 
the case of Erasmus+ and related instruments, civil society 
organisations should be encouraged to apply for funding that 
addresses disinformation and fosters media literacy. 
22.6 A more democratic future of Europe? 
By way of conclusion, the 2CU project has shown that there is a 
plethora of concrete ideas for how to strengthen representative 
democracy at both the 
national and EU level, with 
interlinking mechanisms and 
instruments to facilitate 
citizens’ direct and 
constructive involvement in 
EU affairs. However, the 
problem of implementing 
policy recommendations in this field is twofold. Firstly, there is no 
European democracy policy agenda, one that promotes integrative 
thinking and reform action in a comprehensive, coherent and 
consistent way (Chapter 21). Secondly, democracy reform is mostly 
resisted by the main stakeholders: politicians. In every politician 
lurks a monopolist that is unwilling to share power with others, let 
alone ‘the’ people. Then again, this lack of integrative thinking and 
action on democracy is evident among other constituencies too – 
The 2CU project has shown that there is  
a plethora of concrete ideas for how to 
strengthen representative democracy at 
both the national and EU level, with 
interlinking mechanisms and instruments 
to facilitate citizens’ direct and 
constructive involvement in EU affairs. 
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citizens, civil society, parties, parliaments, local authorities, EU 
institutions. Each sees democratic improvement through its own 
particular prism: political parties work for changes to political 
parties; parliaments see the solution in parliamentary changes; civic 
organisations advance ideas to get civil society more involved; etc. It 
is for this reason that Richard Youngs argues that the EU would 
benefit from a ‘one-stop shop’ to cover 
all aspects of democracy reform in 
Europe and deal with them in an 
inclusive sense, not to replicate 
national-level democratic structures at 
EU level but to find a better balance 
between different types of democracy across these different contexts: 
“Replenishing the legitimacy of European democracy will rightly and 
necessarily entail reforms at multiple different levels of reform” 
(Chapter 21). The policy challenge lies in the EU juggling both the 
patterns and particularities of European democracy. 
Our project concludes just as the Conference on the Future of 
Europe kicks off, with one of its stated aims to improve democratic 
processes. While the focus along the institutional strand of its work is 
expected to rest on the election of the EU’s leadership and 
transnational lists (after the difficult process that followed the 2019 
EP elections), the discussion should be extended to the whole 
spectrum of democratic legitimacy (Chapter 17). Indeed, the 
Conference presents an opportunity for the EU, and in particular the 
new Commissioner responsible for democracy and demography, to 
consider a more proactive strategy to develop new kinds of 
democratic representation, deliberation and accountability, and to 
encourage a more far-sighted vision of democracy. 
  
The EU would benefit from a 
‘one-stop shop’ to cover all 
aspects of democracy reform 
in Europe and deal with 
them in an inclusive sense. 
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